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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the integration of' colonial Ghana into the world 
trading network between 1886 and 1939. It attempts to explain the underde-
velopment of Ghana's economy as a result of her subjection to a system of 
economic and political imperialism. Ghana's contact with Britain resulted in a 
situation in which, although her trade economy "developed, 11 her economic 
potential, as well as the potential :for development of her trading and 
entrepreneurial classes, was thwarted. While three groups, namely the expatri-
ate businessmen, the expatriate Government, and the African elite, interacted 
in the setting of economic policies, genera.J.ly speaking the policies were set 
by Government for the benefit of the expatriate oligopolists. In response to 
what they perceived as exploitation~ Ghanaians organized protests and boy~otts 
both against the Government and against the European firms with whom they dealt 
as producers end consumers. 
The thesis, then, is organized around various aspects of Ghana's e·::!onom-
ic situation between 1886 and 1939 which help to explain her underdevelop~ent 
within the world economy. Chapter I summarizes her role in the world economic 
system prior to 1886. Chapter III elaborates on the development of Ghana's 
role as a producer of prima:ry products and a consumer of manufactured goods; in 
short, her 11peripheralization. 11 Chapter IV deals with the progressive oligopo-
lization of the Ghanaian economy; the takeover of trade, shipping and ban~ing 
by European firms, the various agreements in restraint of trade which were in 
force in the colony, and their effects on indigenous businessmen. Chapters 'l 
and VI deal with th<::: co-operation betv.·een the British economic and political 
elites in Ghana and the effects which this co-operation had on economic policy; 
specifically on transport policy, the intro(:uction of modern currency, inYest-
ment policies, a..>1d Govemment 1 s feeble attercpts at crop diversification a..1d 
., 
..i. 
2 
quality control. Chapters II and VII discuss two movements of African resist-
ance to foreign economic control which roU&~ly coincide with the beginning and 
the end of the period, and Which indicate the extent of African opposition: 
Chapter II is concerned with the attempted institution of a Crown Lands Bill 
which would have removed ownership of land from African hands, and Chapter VII 
is concerned with the two large boycotts of European cocoa-buying firms which 
took place in 1930-31 and 1937-38. The con~luding chapter considers the under-
development of Ghana and the thwarting of her possibilities for indigenous 
capitalist growth in the light of the research presented in the preceding 
chapters. 
The purpose of the thesis is to describe the underdevelopment of coloni-
al Ghana in such a way as to have meaning fJr scholars unfamiliar with Ghana, 
or indeed, Africa, and to situate Ghana wit::1in the "world systems" school of 
analysis of underdevelopment. 
ABREGE 
Le sujet de cette these est 1 1entree du Ghana colonial dans le reseau 
mondial d'echanges commerciaux entre 1886 et 1939. Le sous-developpement de 
l'economie ghaneenne y est interprete comme etant le resultat de son 
assujettition a un systeme politiquement et economiquement imperialiste. Le 
contact entre le Ghana et la Grande-Bretagne, bien qu'ayant permis le 
"developpement" des ressources d1 echanges commerciau:x du Ghana, ettouffa le 
potentiel economique aussi bien que le potentiel de developpement des classes 
marchandes du pays. Alors que trois groupes principaux se partageaient 
l'organisation de la politique economique, a savoir les hommes d'affaires 
expatries, le gouvernement expatrie, et 1 1elite africaine, le gouvernement 
etablissait generalement sa politique en fonction des interets d 1 oligopoles 
expatries. En reponse a ce qu'ils consideraient leur exploitation, les 
Ghaneens organiserent protestations et boycottages contre le gouvernement et 
les firmes europeennes avec lesquelles ceux-ci entretenaient des relations de 
producteurs/consommateurs. 
Cette these est done organisee autour des differents aspects de la 
situation economique ghaneenne, entre 1886 et 1939, qui expliquent son sous-
developpement a l'interieur de l'economie mondiale. Le chapitre premier resume 
son ~le dans le syst~me economique mondial avant 1886. Le chapitre III etudie 
les details du developpement du Ghana en tant que producteur de matieres 
premi~res et de consommateur de produits manufactures; en bref sa 
"peripheralise.tion. "* Le chapi tre IV examine la transformation progressive de 
l'economie ghaneenne en economie oligopole, la monopolisation du commerce, des 
expeditions et des banques par des firmes europeennes, les differents accords 
*Terme de l'auteur. N. du T. 
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imposes aux colonies et restraignant les echanges commerciaux, et leurs effets 
sur les hommes d'affaires indig~nes. Les chapitres V et VI traitent des effets 
de la cooperation entre les elites britanniques economiques et politiques du 
Ghana et l'influence de cette cooperation sur la politique economique; 
principalement sur les transports, l'introduction d'une monnaie moderne, la 
politique d'investissements, et les faibles efforts du gouvernement vers la 
diversification et le contr$le de qualite des recoltes. 
Les chapitres II et VII examinent deux mouvements de resistance 
africaine au controle economique etranger qui coincident presque avec le debut 
et la fin de la periode, et qui donnent une indication de la mesure de 
l'opposition africaine. Le chapitre II examine la tentative d'imposer la 
"Crown Lands Bill"* par laquelle la terre aurait ete enlevee aux africains, et 
le chapitre VII s'interesse aux deux grands boycottages des firmes europeennes 
acheteuses de cacao, qui se deroul~rent en 1930-31 et 1937-38. Le chapitre de 
conclusion decrit le sous-developpement du Ghana et l'entravement de ses 
possibilites de croissance capitaliste a la lumiere de la recherche presentee 
dans les chapitres precedents. 
Le but de cette these est de decrire le sous-developpement du Ghana 
sous une forme comprehensible aux erudits peu familiarises avec l'histoire 
ghaneenne, et m@me africaine, et de situer le Ghana dans l'ecole d'analyse du 
sous-developpement des "systemes mondiaux." 
• 
*Projet de loi sur les Terres de la Couronne. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is a discussion of the integration of the economy of Ghana 
into the world trading network during the period of colonial rule, from about 
188.6 to 1939. The dates chosen are meant to coincide with both the institution 
of formal politica.l control in Ghana, and the use of that control to promote 
Ghana.' s economic development as a peripheral nation in the world economic sys-
tem; that is as a supplier of primary agricultural and mineral products and a 
buyer of manufactured consumer goods. The assumption of formal political 
control in Ghana was a process extending from 1874 to 1901; however, by 1886 
the colonial Government had been relatively firmly established in the Gold 
Coast Colony area of Ghana and part of its function was to help to promote the 
import-export trade. During the 1880s the beginnings of the processes whereby 
Europeans took over a monopoly of trade became evident, 1939 is taken as the 
cut-off date for the thesis as the economic system changed during World War II, 
especially with the institution of the Government-run Cocoa Marketing Board, 
and it continued to change in the decolonization period up to 1957. 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to present evidence for the 
point of view that the present underdevelop~ent of the Ghanaian economy is in 
part a result of the economic imperialism which it underwent during the colo-
nial period. Ghana's contact with the developed capitalist West, especially 
her contact ~ith Britain, resulted in a situation in which she was not able to 
realize her own economic potential. The formation of economic policy in Ghana 
during the colonial period was a result of conflict and accommodation among 
three groups; the external economic elite ~hich controlled the import-export 
trade, the Government which usually sided with this elite but sometimes tried 
to modify its policies or to protect African traders and peasant producers, and 
the African eli.te which was i tseli' interested in participating in trade and 
X 
c 
c 
obtaining some of' the profits '\ihich seemed to be monopolized by its European 
competitors. 
xi 
The view taken here is that the primary cause of' Ghana 1 s underdevelop-
ment was her interaction with a foreign, capitalist nation. Ghana herself', it 
is argued, did not become capitalist, as the possibilities f'or development of' 
a bourgeois class were constantly thwarted by economic and political means. 
The underdevelopment of the Ghanaian trading class (the class which might have 
had the possibility to evolve into an actual bourgeois class) is considered in 
tandem with the underdevelopment of' the economy as a whole. The theoretical 
question of' 11 entrepreneurship" is, however, not considered; it seems clear f'rom 
the evidence presented in this thesis that Ghanaians were possessed of entre-
preneurial skills but that they were denied outlets for these skills by the 
international trading system in which they were obliged to operate. Moreover, 
the ability of' Ghanaians to organize protest movements and boycotts deliber-
ately aimed at European businesses can be taken as evidence of their 
organizational skills and their determination to take every possible means to 
try to break into the world market as independent businessmen. 
Because the purpose of' this thesis is primarily to consider the economic 
roots of' Ghana's underdevelopment, the body of the work concentrates for the 
most part on her external economic ties, not the internal Ghanaian economy. 
Developments in social differentiation among Ghanaian peasants are considered, 
as also are the Government's policies towards the idea of diversifying the 
economy and possibly even introducing some industrial production. But the 
economy of Ghana was oriented towards export growth; railways and roads flowed 
south to the harbours, cash-crop production was geared towards the European 
market. The internal economy did not develop apace with the import-export 
trade; indeed, its lack of' development was precisely a function of' the 
c 
c 
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overdevelopment of the latter sector. 
Similarly, this thesis is biased in consideration towards the two areas 
of Ghana most closely connected with the world economic system, the Gold Coast 
Colony and Ashanti. Togoland did not become part of Ghana until 1918 after the 
League of Nations Mandate was created over the former German territories of 
Africa; the Northern Territories, while part of the colonial administration 
after 1901, remained peripheral to the export-import sector. 
Thus the thesis is organized around various aspects of Ghana's economic 
situation between the years 1886 and 1939 which can help explain her basic 
underdevelopment within the world economy. It is not strictly chronological. 
Chapter I is a summary of Ghana's role in the world economic system prior to 
the period under discussion in this work. Chapter III elaborates on Ghana's 
peripheralization during the colonial period, and on the development of her 
role as a producer of primary products and a consumer of manufactured goods. 
Chapter IV deals with the progressive oligopolization of the Ghanaian eccnomy 
throughout the period; the takeover of trading, shipping, and banking by 
British-dominated oligopolies, the various agreements in restraint of trade 
which operated in Ghana, and their effects on indigenous businessmen. Chapters 
V and VI deal with the co-operation between the British economic and political 
elites in Ghana and the effects which this co-operation had on economic policy; 
specifically with the issues of transport policy, the introduction of modern 
currency, investment policies, and Government's feeble attempts at crop di-
versification and quality control. Chapters II and VII deal with two movements 
of African resistance to foreign economic control which roughly coincide with 
the beginning and the end of this period, and which indicate the extent of 
African opposition; Chapter II is concerned with the attempted institution of 
a Crown Lands Bill which would have removed ownership of land from African 
c 
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hands, and Chapter VII is concerned with the tvo large boycotts of European 
cocoa-buying firms which took place in 1930-31 and 1937-38. Chapter VIII, the 
conclusion, considers the underdevelopment of Ghana and the thwarting of her 
possibilities for indigenous capitalist growth in the light of the research 
presented in the preceding chapters. 
The thesis is a contribution to original knowledge insofar as it is an 
original approach to analysis of colonial Ghana, adopting as it does the theo-
retical stance that Ghana's underdevelopment can be explained in terms of her 
relationship to the world economic system and, within that system, to the ex-
patriate businessmen who dominated her economy. While the history of Ghana has 
been well documented, very little research has been done within this frame-
work.l The thesis is an attempt to situate Ghana within the "world system" 
school of analysis of underdevelopment which is currently gaining strength 
among many social scientists concerned with the "Third World," and to describe 
the underdevelopment of colonial Ghana in such a way as to have meaning for 
scholars unfamiliar with Ghana or, indeed, with Africa. Insofar as the thesis 
research is based on primary Government and commercial archives, it is also 
original; some of these documents had not previously been available to schol-
ars. No part of the thesis has been published, although the author has 
presented two conference papers based on materials from Chapters IV, V, and VII. 2 
10ne thesis adopting a somewhat similar framework has been written. See 
Roger Southall, "Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1907-38: The Dilemma of a. Mcdel 
Firm in a Colonial Economy." (University of Birmingham: unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1975.) 
2Rhoda Howard, "Development and Underdevelopment in the Gold Coast: 
Foreign Business and the African Response, 1886-1939" (presented to the 
Canadian Association of African Studies, Toronto, February 1975), and Rhoda 
Howard, "Differential Class Participation in an African Protest Movement: The 
Ghana Cocoa Boycott of 1937-38." (Presented to the Canadian Association of 
African Studies, Victoria, February 1976.) 
c 
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The reader will note that throughout this thesis the term Ghana is used 
interchangeably with the term Gold Coast, d~spite the fact that the colonial 
name for the country was uGold Coast" and that the name "Ghana" was instituted 
only with independence in 1957. In adopting this practice the author is fol-
lowing Kwabina Dickson in his Histonaat Geography of Ghana. 3 The reasons for 
this practice are threefold. First, the terms are used interchangeably for 
stylistic reasons, especially to avoid the use of the term "Gold Coasters" 
when referring to the colony's inhabitants. Second, the intent is to emphasize 
the continuity between colonial and postcolonial economies even at the risk of 
using anachronistic terms. Finally, neither Ghana nor Gold Coast is the cor-
rect name for the colony during the period under discussion; Gold Coast 
referred only to the Gold Coast Colony, which was administered separatelJ· from 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories until 1936. Given that neither ten1 is 
precisely accurate, it seems that there would be no serious objection to using 
both. 
3Kwamina B. Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana (Cambridge: at the 
University Press, 1971). 
CHAPTF..R I 
GHANA IN THE WORLD ECONO~IT: 1450-1885 
From the time of her earliest contacts with European explorers, Ghana 
entered the emerging world economy of which Europe, and especially Britain, 
was the core. Her contact with Europe resulted in her becoming a trade econ-
omy in which imports and exports soon came to dominate indigenous economic and 
political structures. The basic economic framework of the Ghana which this 
work studies, and the basic relationships between Europeans and Africans which 
persisted into the twentieth century, were established in this period of early 
capitalist expansion from Europe to Africa. 
1. The Early Gold and Slave Trades in Ghana 
The first Europeans to arrive on the West African coast were the 
Portuguese. 1 They first set foot on what soon became known as the Gold Coast 
in 1471, and established the fort of Elmina there in 1482. 2 The Portuguese 
were searching for African sources of gold, which was especially needed in the 
fifteenth century to pay for the goods which Europe imported from East Asia 
and the Levant. It was also needed as currency within the rising state syst~~ 
of Western Europe. "Larger and larger supplies of this precious metal were 
required by the European states in the sixteenth century for currency and for 
1There had however been some contact between Europe and the West 
African coast in pre-Christian times. The records of Herodotu3 suggest that 
the ancient Phoenicians rounded West Africa and reached the Gold Coast around 
the sixth century B.C. W. Walton Claridge, A History of the GoZd Coast and 
Ashanti (London: Frank Cass~ 1964), p. 14. 
2After having been granted permission to build a fort by the African 
king at Elmina, the Portuguese immediately committed the error of attempting 
to obtain their building materials from some sacred rocks. The enraged 
Africans at once attacked the European wor~~en and the Portuguese were com-
pelled to give compensatory gifts to the king before the work could be resumed. 
Basil Davidson, The African Past (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966}, pp. 187-88. 
1 
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financing courts and governments, and above all to pay for increasingly costly 
wars."3 West Africa had long been one of the major sources of Europe's gold, 
but the European states had hitherto been dependent for their supply on Arab 
traders who obtained their gold through overland savannah routes. The Spanish 
and Portuguese had tried to conquer the Maghreb area, partly to obtain control 
of this gold trade, but without success. Hence it was a major breakthrough 
for the Europeans when the Portuguese reached the Gold Coast by sea. 
The gold which the Europeans received was obtained primarily as dust 
from alluvial washings and small pits. According to J. D. Fage, by 1500 
£100,000 worth of gold was travelling every year to Portugal from Ghana; this 
constituted about one-tenth of the world's supply. 4 Sylvia Harrop gives the 
figure as £350,000 per annum.5 
There was little European demand for slaves in the fifteenth century. 
By the sixteenth century, however, the Portuguese had begun to trade in slaves 
to work in their Brazilian colony. With the discovery of huge deposits of 
precious metals in America, the demand for African gold had declined while the 
demand for African slaves to work the American mines had grown. This need for 
slaves multiplied rapidly after the establishment of plantation agriculture, 
producing coffee, cotton, sugar, and tobacco, in the West Indies and North 
America. From the mid-seventeenth century, 11 . [t]he demand for slaves 
tended always to exceed the supply .•• ,"6 
3sylvia Harrop, 11The Economy of the West African Coast in the Sixteenth 
Century," The Economio Bulletin of rJhana, nos. 3 and 4, Vol. 8 (1964). No. 4, 
p. 23. 
4J. D. Fage, A History of West Africa (Callibridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), p. 59. 
5Harrop, op. oit., no. 4, p. 23. 
6Fage, op. cit., p. 68. 
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The slave trade emerged as a very important aspect of the commercial 
integration of the Gold Coast into the world economy from the early seventeenth 
to the early nineteenth century, both in terms of volume and in terms of the 
effect which it had on indigenous African society. Nevertheless the gold trade 
also continued. 
That the m1n1ng of gold continued to be the major concern on the Gold 
· Coast well into the era when Europeans elsewhere in West Africa were 
dealing with scarcely anything but slaves attests to the fact that gold 
was considered more valuable within the capitalist economy especially 
since the attachment to gold was increased by influential bullionist 
theories. Conversely, the shift away from gold on the Gold Coast meant 
that within the overall process of capitalist accumulation, slaves had 
become Africa's most valuable contribution to Europe and the Americas. 7 
Unfortunately for the European traders, it was difficult for Africans to pro-
vide both gold and slaves simultaneously. European traders frequently 
bemoaned the fact that while wars between the African states stimulated the 
supply of slaves, they cut off the supply of gold, while times of peace had 
the opposite effect. 
The Gold Coast, in times of war between the inland nations, and those 
nearest the sea, will furnish great numbers of slaves of all sexes and 
ages •..• At other times slaves are so scarce there, that in 1682 I 
could get but eight from one end of the coast to the other, not only 
because we were a great number of trading ships on the coast at the same 
time, but by reason the natives were everywhere at peace. 8 
Walter Rodney provides a succinct analysis of the contradictions involved in 
trying to produce both gold and slaves. The slave trade meant war, kidnap-
pings, and violation of peaceful trade in a situation in which one's very home, 
not simply the public footpaths and transportation routes, was unsafe from 
attack. One Dutch record reported: " ..• [A]s one fortunate marauding makes 
7Walter Rodney, "Gold and Slaves on the Gold Coast," Transactions of the 
HistoricaZ Society of Ghana, vol. 10 (1969), pp. 18-19. 
8John Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North «ad South Guinea, p. 
420, quoted in Davidson, op. cit., pp. 213-14. 
c 
4 
a native rich in a day, they therefore exert themselves rather in war, robbery 
and plunder than in the old business of digging and collecting gold." 9 The 
loss of able-bodied workers on the Gold Coast had tremendous repercussions. 
There were fewer people to engage in the very labour intensive process of 
digging and sifting for gold. There were also fewer people to act as porters 
to transport the goods with which Europeans paid for gold, inland from the 
coast. And finally, there were fewer people to engage in indigenous domestic 
agriculture and production. 
With the introduction of the slave trade came the beginnings of British 
preponderance in Ghana. It must be noted, however, that it was not a foregone 
conclusion that the British would become the predominant European power on the 
Gold Coast. Indeed, until the point arrived in the seventeenth century when 
England's naval power enabled her to outstrip her rivals, this was far from 
clear. On the entire West African coast, the Gold Coast was the area most 
densely settled with European forts and factories. At one period or another 
there were forts from Portugal, Britain, the United Provinces, France, Sweden, 
and Denmark, indeed even from Brandenburg and Prussia.10 The development of 
power relationships in the Gold Coast closely paralleled developments in 
Western Europe. Portugal was the dominant nation until the early seventeenth 
century. After this point, however, it began to be pushed out by the British 
and especially by the United Provinces, who captured Elmina in 1637. 
While attempts at accommodation among the different trading nations were 
often made, in fact there were constant battles to get control of the forts. 
9Quoted in R~dney, op. cit., p. 19. 
10Sir Matthew Nathan, "The Gold Coast at the End of the Seventeenth Cen-
tury under the Danes and Dutch," J aurnaZ of the African Society, no. 13, vol. 
4 (1904-05). Many of the "forts," of course, were actually simply tiny 
trading stations with perhaps two or three men. 
-'-' 
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The forts of Cape Coast and Accra were the only two which the British held 
consistently for any length of time. While by the mid-eighteenth century 
Britain had gained the upper hand on the Gold Coast, in fact neither Denmark 
nor Holland ceded all of its possessions there until well into the nineteenth 
century. The Danish forts were purchased for £10,000 in 1850 and the Dutch 
possessions were ceded for £3,790 compensation {for stores) in 1872. 11 
The first documented English slave trading venture was that of Sir John 
Hawkins in 1562, under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. 12 However, although 
profitable, this slaving venture was unusual, inasmuch as Britain was not at 
this point encouraging the slave traffic and very few of her were going 
to West Africa. Rather, the English were concentrating on their explorations 
to India. But by 1618 the first English West Africa Company, "The Company of 
Adventurers of London Trading to Gynney and Bynney11 was incorporated. This 
company however traded in produce, not slaves. It was not until the period of 
the Restoration that the slave trade was seriously organized in Britain, as a 
response to the development of sugar plantations in the Caribbean. In 1660, 
the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa was established. Lasting 
only a short time, it was superseded in 1672 by the Royal African Company, 
which technically was given a thousand-year monopoly, to be renewed, however, 
at twenty-year intervals. 13 
The Royal African Company was a potent force only until the Revolution 
11Sir Matthew Nathan, "Historical Chart of the Gold Coast and Ashanti," 
Joumal of the African Society, no. 13, vol. 4 (1904-05), pp. 40, 42. 
12Alice M. Kleist, "The English African Trade under the Tudors," Trans-
actions of the Historical Society of Ghana, vol. 3, part 2 (1957), p. 143. 
13K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: Longmans, Green and 
Company, 1957), pp. 39ff. 
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of 1688, after which it steadily declined. The reasons for the decline were 
twofold. First, as Davies points out, the Royal African Company was largely a 
creation of the monarchy; in fact, its greatest investor was James II. Royal 
Prerogative had been responsible for the creation of the Company, but after 
1688 the Royal Prerogative was no longer an accepted form of regulation of 
trade in the British Isles. 11 . [I]n no instance was the identification 
between the royal family and a trading monopoly so close as in the African 
companies."l 4 Secondly, the Royal African Company was a monopoly of certain 
traders in London, who controlled both the export to the Gold Coast of goods 
produced in England and the export of slaves from the Gold Coast to the West 
Indies. There was considerable opposition to the London monopoly from three 
sources. 
One such source was the planters in the West Indies. The slave popula-
tion in the West Indies h~d to be constantly replenished. "Since the life of 
the average negro on a plantation was but seven years and negro slaves, for 
whatever reason, did not multiply, incessant reinforcements were necessary."l 5 
The monopoly of the Royal African Company meant both that the number of slaves 
being landed in the West Indies was too low, and that their prices were too 
high. At all times during the legal and government-backed monopoly of the 
Royal African Company there were also English privateers engaged in the slave 
trade, and the West Indian planters found the privateers to be the better 
suppliers. They could afford to sell slaves at lower prices since they did 
not have to pay for the upkeep of the forts and factories on the West African 
coast; they were in fact benefitting from external economies supplied by the 
Royal African Company. 
I4n · 't 3 a~es, op. o~ ., p. 10 • 
15Walter L. Dorn, Competition foP EmpiPe~ J740-1?65 (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1963), p. 261. 
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The privateers, or "separate traders" constituted the second party of 
opposition to the Royal African Company. These separate traders tended to 
represent the less privileged regions within England, first Bristol and later 
Liverpool, as opposed to London. They argued that the Royal African Company 
impeded their trade and that as the Spanish and Portuguese managed to make 
profits without the use of forts, the English should do likewise. Until 1688, 
the Royal African Company was supported by the navy and was permitted to con-
fiscate ships and cargoes of private traders. After 1688, however, many of 
the separate traders sued for compensation for the seizure of their ships and 
were awarded it.16 
A third opposition party consisted of the manufacturers of England, es-
pecially the Lancashire cloth manufacturers who argued that monopoly was 
limiting the amount of exports to West Africa. The Charter of the Royal 
African Company did in fact include a commitment to "export yearly woollen and 
other English manufactures to Ithe] value of £70,000," 17 a commitment which it 
found increasingly difficult to keep. The manufacturers felt that private 
traders could increase exports and they had a powerful argument inasmuch as 
under mercantilism "the level of exports was still regarded as the most con-
venient and revealing indicator of the health of the national economy."l8 
The actual monopoly, then, of the Royal African Company, existed only 
from about 1672 to 1688. After that time, Parliament became increasingly re-
luctant to support the Company's monopoly privileges, and began to grant the 
1 6navies, op. ait., pp. 104ff. 
17Nathan, "Historical Chart , 11 op. ai t . , p • 36 • 
18navies, op. ait., p. 127. 
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legal right to trade to separate traders. By 1712, Parliament had decided to 
throw the trade open to all, so that the Company's monopoly became a myth, al-
though it still held it in name until 1750. In fact, the Company was in a 
vulnerable position inasmuch as it was still responsible for the upkeep of 
forts and factories on the Gold Coast and other parts of West Africa from its 
own funds. Separate traders were supposed to, but often did not, pay a ten 
per cent duty on articles which they exported out of England in order to help 
with this upkeep.l9 
Not until 1750 did the trade become once again regulated with the forma-
tion of the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa. This company levied duties 
on all those trading in order to provide for the upkeep of forts and factories. 
It was in this company that the Liverpool merchants, who were feeling the bite 
of the London and Bristol control of the trade, became powerful slavers and 
indeed came to dominate the trade until its termination in 1807. 
The merchants of Liverpool owned and outfitted ships that carried 
manufactures to Africa and. slaves to the West Indies .... The London 
Commission agent ... operated in the esoteric world of high finance. 
He handled the sugar and the nicely engraved pieces of paper that were 
remitted in payment of slaves. His function was undoubtedly as important 
as that of his confederate at Liverpoo1.20 
London remained the centre of finance of the slave trade, but Liverpool, aided 
by its proximity to the industrial heartland of England, the northwest, w~s 
responsible by the early nineteenth century for some seventy-five per cent of 
all the imports of African slaves into the West Indies; in 1802, for example, 
it imported 31,371 of the 41,086 slaves who landed.21 
1 9 Ibid. ' p • 46. 
20R. B. Sheridan, 11 The Commercial and Financial Organization of the 
British Slave Trade, 1750-1807, 11 Economic History Review, 2nd. Series, no. 2, 
vol. 11 (December 1958), p. 263. 
21Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade 3 
Liverpool 1750-1807 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 273. 
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Eric Williams' book, Capitalism and Slavery, 22 provides an excellent 
introductory exposition of the role which the slave trade played in the world 
economy. The slave trade in West Africa vTas part of the Triangular Trade be-
tween England, West Africa, and the West Indies and Americas. The heart of the 
Triangular Trade was the West Indies; it was the function of West Africa to 
act as a labour reserve for this productive core of the trade. The sugar, cot-
ton, coffee, tobacco and other goods produced in the West Indies were 
transported to Britain to be processed and manufactured • 
. • • [T]he 'triangular trade' ••. depended first mainly upon sugar 
and tobacco and later on cotton. The processing of these materials turned 
England into a manufacturing country, and the focussing of the attention 
of technicians upon methods of manufacture brought an astonishing series 
of inventions in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Negroes 
were purchased with British manufactures and transported to the planta-
tions. There they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, tobacco, and other 
products. The processing of these created new industries in England; 
while the needs of the Negroes and their owners provided a wider market 
for British industry, New England agriculture, and Newfoundland fisheries. 
By 1750 there was hardly a manufacturing town in England which was not 
connected with the colonial trade. The profits provided one of the main 
streams of that capital which financed the Industrial Revolution.23 
The Europeans used West Africa as an area of free plunder; they ransacked it 
for gold and slaves and were not concerned with the effects of their plunder on 
the people or the economy of the area itself. 24 West Africa, in other words, 
was a secondary adjunct to the West Indian and American trades during the slave-
trading era. 
22Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1966). 
23w. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1965), p. 58. 
24For a description 
The Modern World-System: 
European World-Economy in 
1974), pp. 335-36. 
of the concept of "plunder, 11 see Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 
10 
However, by the eighteenth century West Africa had also become a market 
for the textiles and light. consumer goods produced in the British Isles. The 
supply of slaves had always been dependent on the ability of the Europeans to 
supply African traders with consumer goods. Formerly, however, these goods 
had not been produced in Europe. 
It is particularly striking that in the early centuries of trade, 
Europeans relied heavily on Indian cloths for resale in Africa, and 
they also purchased cloths on several parts of the West African coast 
for resale everywhere. Morocco, Mauritania, Senegambia, Ivory Coast, 
Benin, Yorubaland, and Loango were all exporters to other parts of 
Africa--through European middlemen.25 
But by the late eighteenth century 
The 'African Trade' had come to form an essential part of the economy 
of the maritime states of Europe, and it was expanding fast--British 
exports to Africa, valued at £130,000 in 1720, had risen to £866,000 in 
1775. The ramifications of the trade were very great; not only slave 
dealers in Liverpool . • . or planters in Jamaica or Virginia had a 
stake in it, but also merchants in London .•. industrialists in 
Manchester .•.. 26 
As Britain changed from a mercantile to an industrial capitalist nation, so 
also West Africa changed from being simply a supplier of goods for the merchant 
traders to being a market for the industrialists. 
The slave trade was officially abolished by the British in 1807, and 
abolition by other European nations quickly followed. Popular mythology has 
often had it that the British abolished the slave trade from merely humani-
tarian motives, and that it was humanitarian idealism which obliged them to 
assume more control in West Africa in order to stamp out the infamous commerce. 
Humanitarian aims, diplomatic rivalry, commercial interests--all three 
contributed to the partition of West Africa by Britain, France, and 
25Wa1ter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: 
Tanzania-Pub1ishing House, 1972}, p. 113. 
26Robin Ha1lett, "The European Approach to the Interior of Africa in the 
Eighteenth Century," Journal of African History, no. 2, vol. 4 (1963), p. 196. 
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Germany. But as far as Britain was concerned, it was the anti-slavery 
movement, the humanitarian factor, which led to the involvement from 
which all else followed.27 
11 
There were of course many sincere Christian missionaries and abolition-
ists who believed that the introduction of "Christianity, commerce, and 
civilization" into the West African coast would eliminate the slave trade. 
Humanitarianism, however, was often a cover for baser motives. Eric Williams 
carefully documents the fact that many of the most powerful abolitionists were 
those whose primary concern was to abolish slavery in the West Indies to safe-
guard their own investments in the East Indies, where slavery did not exist 
and where in consequence labour costs were higher, so that East Indian sugar 
could not compete with the West Indian variety. 2 8 
'2, The Effects of the Early European Intrusion 
in West Africa and Ghana 
In analyzing the effects of the European intrusion on West Africa in 
general, and on Ghana in particular, during the mercantilist era, an important 
question to be considered is, what was the effect of the slave trade on the 
indigenous African society? The effects seem to have included depopulation, 
the diversion of traditional trading routes to the new slave trade, and dis-
ruptions of local African polities occasioned by slaVe-raiding wars. 
On the whole~ the African population declined, or at least stayed stag-
nant, as a result of the slave trade. Rene Dumont argues that". the 
African continent, which in the eighteenth century had about the same popula-
tion as Europe, or a fifth of the world population, today only has about a 
twelfth." 29 The trade deprived Africa of its most vigourous citizens; it was 
27Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1959), p. 10. 
28Williams, op. ait., eh. 11. 
2 ~Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (London: P~dre Deutsch, 1966), 
p. 36. 
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the healthy young men and women who were taken, not the old and the sick. 
Hence, simply, the strongest, the most efficient, and the most fertile, were 
taken from the West African coast. 
It should be noted that the intrusion of the Europeans into the Gold 
Coast was not a matter which met with no resistance on the part of the 
Africans. The early records of the slave traders recount incident after inci-
dent of rebellions by Africans around forts, of kidnappings, and of murders of 
individual European Governors or factors. This occurred especially when the 
Europeans had committed a "diplomatic error" such as kidnapping royal person-
ages as slaves. A random selection of such accounts in Ghana includes the 
destruction of the Portuguese fort at Accra by Africans in 1578, the takeover 
of the Danish f0rt at Accra in 1693, a Fanti attack on the English fort at 
Anomabu in 1701, and the murder of the Dutch Governor at Elmina in 1808.30 
Nevertheless what the Africans were resisting was not the slave trade per se, 
but rather the acts of individual Europeans. 
At any time the native population by sheer weight of numbers could 
have taken all but the strongest of the forts. That they seldom did 
so is an indication less of white strength, more of negro disunion, and 
more still of the advantages which the Africans themselves (or some of 
them) thought they derived from the presence of European traders. 3l 
Slavery not only depopulated West Africa but it also diverted the old 
established trade routes, which had gone north through the savannah to the 
Mediterranean, south to the Guinea coast. However it is not certain whether 
this diversion of trade was, in the long run, detrimental or beneficial to 
West Africa. It may simply have meant more trade, going now through the coast 
instead of across the savannah. According to Fernand Braudel, the Africans 
30Nathan, "Historical Chart ••• ," op. ait., pp. 34-40. 
31Davies 
' 
'+ 6 op. a-z.,,. , p. . 
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had long been used to receiving European goods via the North African routes, 
but the prices of these goods were very high.32 The arrival of the Europeans 
on the southern coast might have been welcomed as an alternate source of 
supply for European goods, even though the articles offered for sale were in-
ferior to those which the Arabs had imported. 
Fage argues that the articles received in return for slaves made up for 
the losses of the savannah trade. He estimates that the contemporary value of 
goods received by West Africa in the eighteenth century in return for slaves 
exported to America was about sixty-six million pounds sterling. "There can be 
no doubt that in the eighteenth century West Africa's involvement in the slave 
trade was big business, contributing substantially to the growth of her 
trade." 33 Rodney argues, however, that Fage 1s view on the question is overly 
optimistic, for it was not only the trade routes, but the economy as a whole, 
which was disrupted by the coming of the Europeans. Not only were the young 
men and women removed from the continent, but "The most dynamic groups over a 
great area of Africa became associated with Foreign trade • . • 11 34 to the 
detriment of indigenous production. Cheaply-made English manufactures swamped 
the African markets from the seventeenth century onwards, pushing out of pro-
duction the cloth and iron goods which had been made within the continent by 
less advanced production techniques. When the Africans tried to compensate for 
their technological backwardness, the Europeans refused them aid. The 
Asantehene Opoku Ware (1720-1750), for instance, asked the Europeans to set up 
factories and distilleries in Ashanti but was refused. The Europeans were 
32Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen a l 'Epoque 
de Phi Uppe IT (Paris : Armand Colin, 1966) , p. 426. 
33Fage, op. cit., p. 91. 
34Rodney, How Europe • , op. ci t . , p • 115 • 
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willing to provide only poor quality consumption goods which could not be used 
for development. Furthermore, not only did the European conquerors disrupt 
the tendency of African states to consolidate into larger units, but they also 
tried to take over and control existing trade among different African communi-
ties, especially along the coast. In sum, the coming of the Europeans meant 
the disruption of any tendencies to growth and development of African polities 
and the maintenance of these polities in a state of technological regression.35 
Diverted from their natural trading routes and from the development of 
indigenous production, African states turned to the traffic in human beings as 
a way to enrich themselves. 
Les forces productives n'evoluaient pas et la marche historique 
des peuples africains s 1 est vue meme retrograder par les guerres tribales 
que la traite d 1 esclaves et les intrigues des puissances europeennes 
interessees dans ce commerce etendaient sur le continent.36 
For example, Ashanti diverted much effort into the slave trade. By obtaining 
arms from the Europeans, especially from the ports which Ashanti controlled 
(i.e., for the use of which Europeans paid tribute to Ashanti) as of the early 
eighteenth century, it was able to overcome the resistance of many small 
political groupings and sell its captives to the Europeans.37 
The question of Ashanti suggests that the embr-oilment of Europeans in 
the political affairs of local African states had an effect on African develop-
ment. As already mentioned, the European presence hindered the evolution of 
large and integrated African states, In fact, as one Governor of the Gold 
35The argument in this paragraph is taken from ibid., pp. 112-23. 
36Joao Mendes, La RevoZution en Afrique (Paris: Centre d'Etudes et de 
Recherches Marxiste3, 1970}, pp. 47-48. 
37J. C. Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," p. 107 in J. C. Anene and 
Godfrey N. Brown ( eds. ) , Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1966). 
Coast, Sir Hugh Clifford, argued: 
There can be no doubt that, if the British had not interfered, the 
Ashanti would have extended their empire over all the nations of the 
Gold Coast; but our disapproval of their invasions was due, in the 
beginning, not so much to any feeling of pity for their victims, as to 
resentment at the disturbance to trade which they occasioned.3 8 
European involvement in African political and military affairs stemmed from 
two causes. First, the Europeans often incited the Africans to act on their 
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behalf against other European states, who of course also had African allies, as 
for instance when the English promoted a Komenda rebellion against the Dutch 
in 1694 by giving a "loan" of £240 to the Komenda.3 9 Secondly, they inter-
fered in African affairs to avoid the stopping of trade routes. While wars 
per se were useful to the Europeans inasmuch as they supplied slaves, wars for 
the control of trade routes (especially, after about 1750, between the inland 
Ashanti and the coastal Fanti) might stop supplies altogether. The Europeans 
were also preoccupied with undermining the independence of the coastal states, 
especially insofar as these states had a firm grip on the middleman trade with 
the inland states or still controlled coastal trade. 
The diversion of African states' resources to the slave trade was ex-
acerbated by the corruption of chiefs which followed upon it; they falsely 
convicted their subjects of crimes in order to be able to sell them as slaves, 
or found fault with their domestic slaves in order to be able to turn them 
over to the Europeans. "Principal men of enterprise at all levels of society 
became increasingly aware of the economic value of their servants, pawns, 
serfs and subjects, and became increasingly keen to add to their numbers 
38Sir Hugh Clifford, introduction to Claridge, op. cit., p. x. 
39K. Y. Daaku, "The European Traders and the Coastal States, 1630-1720," 
Transactions of the Historical Society of mzana, vol. 8 (1965), p. 19. 
16 
to the greatest possible extent. n40 
This corruption of chiefs who had formerly acted to protect their citi-
zens was symptomatic of the changes taking place in Ghana throughout the 
period of the slave trade; from a territory which had previously had little or 
no connection with the emerging capitalist system of the West, it was changing 
into a territory in which large numbers of people were being affected by the 
gold and slave trades, and in which increasing numbers of people were attempt-
ing to enter trade with Europeans in order to make profits. At the same time, 
Europeans were making demands on Ghana which resulted in internal wars and 
disorganization. As the slave trade declined after abolition, disorganization 
became a serious hindrance to the development of new types of exports to re-
place the lost commerce in human beings. Eventually, the need for organized 
commerce was to facilitate the outright takeover of Ghana by the British, but 
this process of takeover was to last almost a hundred years. 
3. The Period of Informal Empire 
The period from 1807 to the 1880s can be described as one of 11 informal 
empire11 in Ghana, to use a term coined by Gallagher and Robinson. 41 That is 
to say, that the control of Britain, which by this time was the dominant power 
on the Coast (although it did not gain complete formal control until 1872 when 
the Dutch ceded the port of Elmina) was tightening, but it was still based on 
informal, not formal, means. British administrators were sent out to the Gold 
Coast forts but the territory itself did not yet have formal status as a 
colony. The British Government wavered throughout this period in the degree 
of control which it wished to maintain. In 1821 the Colonial Office took over 
40Fage, op. oit., p. 94. 
41John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 11The Imperialism of Free Trade," 
Eoonomio History Review, 2nd. Series, no. 1, vol. 6 (December 1953), p. 1. 
17 
the Gold Coast forts, but by 1828 it had put the forts under the control of a 
Committee of Merchants. In 1843 the Goverr~ent again took over responsibility, 
and the Gold Coast forts were ruled jointly with the colony of Sierre Leone 
from 1844 to 1850. The period from 1850 to 1865 was the only period during 
which the Gold Coast had its own separate, resident governor until the assump-
tion of formal control of the Colony in 1874. In 1865 a Parliamentary 
Committee of Investigation recommended complete withdrawal from Ghana; rather 
than implementing this, however, the area was simply put under the jurisdiction 
of the Sierra Leone Governor once again. 
The decision to assume tighter control of the Gold Coast was not made 
on purely political grounds; it was a result of structural economic factors. 
Most weighty of these factors was the decision, in 1807, to abolish the slave 
trade. As a result of this abolition, the economy of the Gold Coast declined. 
One little-mentioned aspect of this decline was the abolition in 1833 of 
domestic slavery in the regions controlled by the British; that is, in the 
areas around the British forts. This change vas a part of the general aboli-
tion of the institution of slavery, as opposed to the ~ade in slavery, in all 
parts of the British Empire; after 1874 the abolition of domestic slavery was 
extended to the entire Gold Coast Colony, and after 1900 to Ashanti and the 
Northern Territories. There were many complaints from the African slave-
owners to the British when domestic slavery was abolished. In a "Petition of 
the Principal Mulatto Females of the Gold Coast to the Right Honourable I.ord 
John Russell" in 1841 several prominent ladies complained that they had not 
been paid compensation for the loss of their slaves as West Indian slave-
holders had been. 42 The implication was that agricultural production was 
42Petition dated Cape Coast Castle, 29 March, 1843; in G. E. Metcalfe, 
Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History 1807-1957 (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964), p. 161. 
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falling without the labour of domestic slaven. Several chiefs also presented 
a statement to the British: 
First that they are as it were deprived of the power of holding 
domestic slavery, which has greatly reduced their power and dignity 
as kings and chiefs .... They agree to follow agricultural pursuits 
if they will be permitted to hold domestic slavery for reasons 
assigned by them. . . . They observed also that the country in sixty 
or seventy years past was in a thriving condition when domestic slavery 
was prevalent, but now since the great alteration that has taken place 
with reference to the slave holding, the country is totally deprived 
of its wealth.43 
Formerly, according to Edward Reynolds, the Fanti had used slaves to produce 
foodstuffs which were then sold to passing European ships. The abolition of 
domestic slavery had the effect of cutting back on this particular type of 
enterprise. 44 Reports from various British settlements shortly after the 
abolition of the trade indicated economic decline. One observer, stationed at 
Komenda, reported that: "The progress of agriculture has decreased since the 
aboliton of the slave trade, there not being that vent for their commodities 
which there was when shipping had frequent recourse here." 45 
Nevertheless if the economy of the settlements around the British forts 
was declining, the economy of the Africans in the hinterland area of the Gold 
Coast continued strong. The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of the 
Ashanti kingdom as the only block to the incursion of the British into the 
hinterland. " ... Ashanti in this period can best be regarded as a separate 
economy, having important relations not only with the Gold Coast but also with 
other parts [of Africa], such as the territories to the north and the Ivory 
43"Grievances of the Gold Coast Chiefs," 9 August 1864, in ibid., pp. 
300-01. 
44Edward Reynolds, "Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coast, 1807-
1874" (University of London: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1971), p. 125. 
45"0bservations on the State of 'l'rade at the Several British Forts on the 
Gold Coast, 1814-1815," quoted in Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 30. 
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Coast."46 The Ashanti were still very much involved in the now technically 
"illegitimate" slave trade. Ashanti ilas, moreover, a thriving commercial 
centre. In the early half of the century, the savannah trade was still flour-
ishing, and Ashanti was an important focus of trade. In 1812 Kumasi, its 
capital, was " ••• not only the meeting point for the routes from Timbuktu 
and Hausaland, but was also the nerve centre for four important routes to the 
coast. "4 7 It was not until the middle of the century, when steam transport up 
the rivers from the coast became cheaper than the camel trade, that the 
Europeans put a complete stop to this 2,000-year-old commerce. 48 
Several Ashanti-Fanti wars took place during the nineteenth century. 
The principal reason for the Ashanti expansionary movement to the south was to 
eliminate the Fanti middlemen from the coastal trade; the Ashanti wanted direct 
access to the coast. The British, wavering between involvement and noninvolve-
ment in these "internal" matters, finally decided to take the Fanti side. The 
slave trade could not be completely eliminated until the powerful and well-
organized Ashanti were prevented from trading with other European nations, and 
it was difficult to establish trade routes when such a large proportion of the 
territory through which such routes went was controlled by Ashanti. "European 
merchants were naturally reluctant to venture their capital, and Africans were 
discouraged from developing new lines of trade to replace the traffic in 
slaves, in a country in which there were no settled relations between the 
coast and the hinterland." 49 The final subjugation of the Ashanti did not 
46H. J. Bevin, 11The Gold Coast Economy about 1880," Transaations of the 
GoZd Coast and TogoZand HistoriaaZ Soaiety, vol. 2, pt. 2 (1956), p. 73. 
47J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen, The RevoZutionary Years: West Afriaa 
Sinae 1800 (London: Longmans, 1967), p. 61. 
48Ib'd 71 t. • ' P· ' 
49J. D. Fage, Ghana~ A HistoriaaZ Interpretation (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1961), p. 61. 
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occur until 1896, when the British entered Kumasi. The last breath of the 
Ashanti nation was spent on a 1900 uprising in futile protest against a demand 
by the British Governor that the Golden Stool, the religious symbol of Ashanti 
nationhood, be turned over to him. 
Several adverse economic conditions, then, arose in Ghana as the result 
of the abolition of the slave trade and the beginnings of the system of "infor-
mal" empire. But just as a need for slaves had arisen simultaneously with the 
decline in the European demand for gold from West Africa, so a demand for pri-
mary agricultural products superseded the demand for slaves. The European 
economy had changed from one of mercantile capitalism to one of industrial 
capitalism, and the Gold Coast was now a full-fledged peripheral area. No 
longer could the Europeans simply raid for slaves, disregarding the effect on 
the Gold Coast of such raids. 
Capitalism in the centre • . • took on its complete form; the function 
of mercantilism--the primitive accumulation of wealth--lost its 
importance. , •• The old periphery--America of the plantations--and 
its periphery--Africa of the slave trade--had to give way to a new 
periphery. The function of the new periphery was to provide produats 
••• raw materials and agricultural produce.so 
The function of Ghana at this time, then, was to act as a supplier of 
raw materials and agricultural produce. However, such production as existed 
was still of an extraative nature; organized production and cultivation f~r the 
capitali.st world market did not as yet exist, " • IoJne cannot call the 
primitive process of oil extraction from palm nuts, the extraction of kernels 
and washing and crushing of auriferous ores, technical transformations." 51 
50Samir .Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Histori-
cal Origin," JoUPnat of Peaae Researah, no. 2 (1972), p. 113, italics in 
original. 
51R. Szereszewski, Struaturat Changes in the Eaonomy of Ghana 1891-1911 
(London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1965}, p. 5. 
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Until the introduction of cocoa in the 1890s the level and character of the 
economy, according to Szereszewski, remained static for centuries. Products 
for export changed, but the mode of production did not. The raiding of human 
communities for slaves was replaced by the simple extraction of the natural 
resources of the Gold Coast. 
While gold remained an important product in the nineteenth century, the 
economy of Ghana during the period of informal empire was based upon the ex-
port of palm oil and palm kernels. In the period 1881-1885, for instance, 
seventy-three per cent of the total exports were palm products, oil accounting 
for forty-seven per cent and kernels for twenty-six per cent. 52 In the same 
years, gold accounted for ten per cent of exports.53 Apart from these two 
products, there was a brief boom in rubber in the latter part of the century. 
Gold, rubber, and palm products, however, were not enough to inject the Gold 
Coast into the modern world economy. It was fortunate indeed that, so soon 
after Britain assumed formal political control, cocoa, which was to find a 
large international market at high prices, became Ghana's economic mainstay. 
The massive new cocoa export economy, however, was to facilitate the introduc-
tion of new controls on trade which would help to push out the remainder of 
the old African trading class which, up to the period of the formal British 
takeover, had been competing on relatively equal terms with the European 
traders. 
4. Competition between African and European 
Merchants in the Nineteenth Century 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that competition between 
African and European merchants was conducted on a fairly balanced basis until 
52B · ev1n, op. cit., P• 73. 
53Jh 'd 
'- •' P• 74. 
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about the mid-nineteenth century. On an economic level, and moreover on a 
political and social level, Africans and Europeans were e~uals. The Europeans 
did not at first consider themselves as a superior race dealing with an in-
ferior race; in fact, as Margaret Priestley shows in her book, West Afrioan 
Trade and Coast Sooiety, 54 a number of intermarriages took place between the 
early European traders in Ghana and aristocratic African families. 11 fT ]here 
were few resident traders, lacking white female company, who did not enter into 
a more settled relationship with a local woman."5 5 
Well into the nineteenth century, until with better health facilities 
it was possible for more Europeans to live in Ghana, and especially for white 
women to accompany their husbands, European traders were only too willing to 
socialize with their African counterparts; the gulf was not between white and 
black but between educated and uneducated in the coastal towns. 56 Africans and 
Europeans belonged to the same trade organizations and the same Chambers of 
Commerce until the 1870s.57 Together, the two groups of educated traders ran 
the forts and administered justice in the areas under British control, It was 
not unusual for Africans to hold high administrative positions, although the 
highest ever held was by James Bannerman as Lieutenant-Governor in 1850.58 
In its egalitarian quality, the system of trade reflected the social and 
political systems of Ghana in the early nineteenth century. Trade was still 
54Margaret Priestley, West Afrioan Trade and Coast Sooiety (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969). 
55Ibid., p. 106. 
56susan Beth Kaplow, "African Merchants of the Nineteenth Century Gold 
Coast" (Columbia University: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1971), p. 170. 
57Ibid., p. 184. 
58David Kimble, A PoZitioaZ History of Ghana 1850-1928 (Oxford: at the 
Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 65. 
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small-scale and high risk. "Trust," the willingness to trust one's trading 
partners, was one of its most important aspects, and as Edward Reynolds points 
out, the willingness of Africans to trust Europeans was as important as the 
Europeans' willingness to trust Africans. 
The granting of credit had been a feature of Gold Coast trade from 
at least the seventeenth century with both Africans and Europeans offering 
credit terms. Africans frequently offered the European trader staple 
exports on credit when the goods he wanted were not immediately on hand. 
The European trader likewise offered the African trader goods on credit 
to be paid for with the produce of the country when it was available. 59 
Many Africans traded independently, many others worked as commission agents 
for European houses. Although, Reynolds argues, there was not enough room in 
the trade to accommodate all the Africans who wished to enter it, on the other 
hand it was possible for some Ghanaian traders to import as much as £20,000 to 
£30,000 worth of goods each year on credit. 60 Especially after 1853, when 
steamship lines were introduced in the West African trade and regular crossing 
enabled small independent entrepreneurs to ship small consignments with a 
security of arrival dates which had been mL~own to them before, many oppor-
tunities arose for African competition with the large European firms, such as 
Forster and Smith and F. and A. Swanzy, who had hitherto dominated the trade. 
"Forster and Smith as well as F. and A. Swanzy became alarmed at the increased 
direct trade with indigenous merchants and tried to interfere with the opera-
tions of the steamships which hit at the trade that had once been their 
monopoly."61 
59Edward Reynolds, "The Rise and Fall of an African Merchant Class on 
the Gold Coast, 1830-1874," paper submitted to the International Congress of 
Africanists, 3rd Session (Addis Ababa, December 9-19, 1973), pp. 8-9. 
60Reynolds, "Trade . . . , " op. ait. , pp. 226 and 257. 
61Reynolds, "The Rise ••• ," op. ait., p. 7· 
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But by the end of the nineteenth century the tenuous system of equal 
trading relations had collapsed. No longer was it true that "The run of 
Europeans who came out to the Gold Coast were quite a superior class of men, 
[who] ••• mixed freely with the intelligent sons of the soil, and helped to 
lay the foundations of a new civilization."62 Rather, the European firms were 
reorganizing in such a way as to minimize the need to use African traders. 
Direct shipments to European employees on the coast were being substituted for 
shipments consigned on credit to African trading partners.63 The change to 
direct shipping was in part a deliberate attempt to remove African competition; 
Andrew Swanzy, a partner in F. and A. Swanzy, argued that indigenous merchants 
"drove the European merchants from the trade by ruinous competition."6 4 But by 
this time the European merchants were also arguing that too much credit was 
being extended to Africans, and that in the absence, especially, of adequate 
bankruptcy laws, it was unsafe to entrust them with imports.65 
At least part of the reason, however, for the inability of African 
merchants to repay their debts was the fact that Africans were consistently 
charged more than Europeans for the same trade goods. Reynolds points out that 
"As early as 1826 it had been reported that trade goods were sold to Europeans 
on the coast at cost price, to mulattoes at a higher price and to blacks at a 
still higher price." 66 In 1856 an African trader by the name of Joseph Smith, 
62J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London: Frank 
Cass, 1970), p. 95. 
63c. W. Newbury, "Credit in Nineteenth Century West African Trade," 
Journal of African History, no. 1, vol. 13 {1972), p. 91. 
64"Select Committee of the House of Commons to Consider the State of the 
British Settlements on the Western Coast of Africa," 1865 (412) V, l. Minutes 
of Evidence, testimony of A. Swanzy, Q. 4673. 
'6 5Reynolds , "Trade • , " op. ait., pp. 380ff. 
66Ib'd 
-z. • ' P· 
c 
25 
in debt to the firm of Forster and Smith for £18,000, discovered that Forster 
and Smith had consistently, over a period of fifteen years, been charging him 
between twenty and fifty per cent more than it charged white traders for the 
same goods. He therefore claimed that Forster and Smith had made £27,000 
extra profits in its dealings with him, and far from his owing them £18,000 
they owed him £9,000. Smith's claim was not acknowledged, however, and he 
died a bankrupt.67 
Indeed, of the fifteen large Ghanaian businessmen of the nineteenth 
century whom Kaplow investigated in detail, only five escaped bankruptcy or 
serious financial difficulty.68 Africans could simply no longer compete with 
Europeans who held numerous advantages along with increasingly monopolistic 
contro1. 69 Whereas Africans had to transport their goods down the inland 
waterways to the coast by canoe, Europeans possessed steam launches.70 
Africans found it difficult to obtain enough British specie to pay customs 
dues, whereas British traders had enough not only to pay dues but also 
to pay cash for agricultural produce; thus pushing African traders, who were 
obliged to pay barter for such products, out of the market. 71 Europeans 
consistently engaged in practices of undercutting Africans in sales, and over-
pricing them in purchases. 72 One African trader complained in 1889: 
67Kaplow, op. cit., pp. 69-71. The incident is also recounted in 
Reynolds, "Trade • • • 11 op. cit., pp. 387-88. 
68Kaplow, op. ait., p. 62. 
69Qn monopoly control, see below, Ch~IV. 
7
°Kaplow, op. ait., p. 114. 
71Jbid., p. 120. For a detailed discussion on the question of specie, 
see below, Ch.V. 
72Ib'd 121 -z, • ' p. . 
But now our African markets are failed and the only business we can 
transact is commission business, because lot of European firms has been 
established here who sell their goods invoicely and also give 10% 
commission to all buyers who buy from one pound upwards, so there is no 
profit at all in our works here when ive order [sic]. 7 3 
As a result of the unequal terms of competition and of technological 
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developments whose costs to Africans were prohibitive, many scions of indige-
nous trading families began, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, to move 
out of trade and into professional life. Many mulatto Africans, formerly able 
to compete successfully in trade because of the advantage of their partial 
European ancestry, began to move into professions such as trading agents, 
teaching, evangelism, and the ministry. 74 Law was also a favorite recourse 
for the son of a trader who had lost his fortune. Professional Africans, with 
degrees from British universities, began to replace traders in positions of 
power in the European administrative structure. After 1904, of all the 
Africans who sat as unofficial representatives on the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council, only one was a trader.75 Of the twenty-six men who were included in 
the biographical work, Gold Coast Men of Affairs,7 6 only one or two engaged in 
any sort of trade. 
The decline of African traders as a significant economic force was 
accompanied by their decline in other spheres as well. Not only did the Gold 
Coast Chambers of Commerce systematically exclude Africans by the turn of the 
73I. H. Caesar to Edward Challinor and Company, quoted in ibid., p. 117. 
74Reynolds, "The Rise ••• ," op. ait., pp. 14-15. 
75Kaplow, op. ait., p. 232. 
76M. J. Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs (London: Dawsons of Pall 
Mall, 1969) . 
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century, 77 but they were also excluded from government, as the administration 
initiated a policy of putting power into the hands of the "traditional" elites 
who seemed more likely to support British rule; and from social intercourse 
with the whites, who had now a large enough community of trade and government 
personnel, including wives, to enable them to be socially exclusive. The 
introduction of direct colonial rule, with its consequent steering of educated 
Africans into the professions and away from competitive trading, facilitated 
the eventually complete economic takeover of the import-export sector by 
foreign, predominantly ~ritish, firms. 
5. The Assumption of Formal Political 
Control in Ghana 
The period of informal empire in Ghana came to an end in 1874, when the 
territory along the coast on which British forts and trading factories were 
established became the Gold Coast Colony. Ashanti, however, remained indepen-
dent until a British expeditionary force of 1896 finally conquered it 
completely .. The Northern Territories were added as a protectorate in 1901. 
While the assumption of formal political control by Europeans in Africa 
is often attributed to the Berlin Conference and the "scramble for Africa" of 
1884, it is clear that the scramble cannot explain the takeover of the Gold 
Coast which occurred ten years prior to the Conference. Rather, it would seem 
that a confluence of forces resulted in an almost desultory takeover of the 
Colony. Not least of these was the debate, stretching back to a Select Com-
mittee Report in 1842, on what to do with the Gold Coast forts; whether to 
leave them under government-regulated merchant control or to take them under 
direct colonial contro1. 78 In 1865, the Select Committee on the Western Coast 
77Kaplow, op. ait., pp. 183ff. 
78"Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the West 
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of Africa recommended that, while it was not possible to withdraw from current 
settlements, a policy of extension of territory would be 11 inexpedient." 79 Yet 
in 1874 the Colony was taken over. 
While it seems as if the decision to take over the Colony in 1874 was 
almost incidental, based as it apparently was on administrative efficiencies, 
the Proclamation announcing the takeover clearly indicated that law and order 
and the protection of trade were important considerations. The Proclamation 
listed, among other purposes: 
••. the protection and encouragement of trade and traders, including 
the construction, maintenance and improvement of roads, paths, bridges, 
harbour works, water ways, telegraphs, and other public works which 
benefit trade and promote civilization .•• [and] the maintenance of an 
armed police force for the preservation of internal order and the 
prevention of foreign aggression.so 
The takeovers of Ashanti and the Northern Territories were more direct 
results of political and economic pressures. The scramble for Africa was 
inciting a fear in certain British circles that if she did not obtain tighter 
control on all her spheres of influence, she might lose them altogether to her 
French and German rivals. At the same time, because they needed better trans-
portation and better systems of protection for their trade inland from the 
Colony, British commercial houses were pressuring the Colonial Office for 
military takeovers of Ash anti and the Northern Territories. 
An important theoretical issue surrounding the question of the change 
in British policy to direct colonial rule in the late nineteenth century is 
the debate as to whether this transition constituted a qualitative change in 
African Settlements," 1842 (551) XI.l and XII.l. 
79ap 't ... 
• 01.- •' P· 111. 
80Quoted in Casely Hayford, op. ait., p. 366. 
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British policy. Gallagher and Robinson, in their article "The Imperialism of 
Free Trade,"8 1 criticize the notion that any such change in policy took place. 
They carefully document their case, proving that there was a consistent ex-
pansion by the British all over the world during the nineteenth century, and 
that direct political dependencies were established in parts of the world 
other than Africa during the mid-Victorian period. 
Those who accept the concept of 'economic imperialism' would have us 
believe that the annexations at the end of the century represented a 
sharp break in policy, due to the decline in free trade, the need to 
protect foreign investment, and the conversion of statesmen to the n.eed 
for unlimited land-grabbing ...• [But] the tariff policy of Great 
Britain did not change. • . . British foreign investment was no new 
thing and most of it was still flowing into regions outside the formal 
empire •..• [T]he statesmen's conversion to the policy of extended 
annexation was partial .•• ,82 
Gallagher and Robinson are indeed correct in stating that there was no autono-
mous change in political policy. But in denying the theoretical relevance of 
the concept of economic imperialism they miss their own point. There was 
indeed a certain continuity in British expansionism during the nineteenth 
century. But as they so rightly state: 
Whether imperialist phenomena [that is, political control] show 
themselves or not, is determined not only by the factors of economic 
expansion, but equally by the political and social organization of 
the regions brought into the orbit of the expansive society •.•. 83 
In Ghana, the situation was ripe for direct political takeover precisely 
because the social and political organizations of indigenous Ghanaian society 
were not conducive to the type of trade in which Europeans were beginning to 
engage. Intertribal wars had facilitated the export of slaves; they did not, 
however, facilitate the free export of palm oil, rubber, and later cocoa. Nor 
81ap. eit. 
82 Ibid., p. 12. 
83Ibid., p. 6. 
\ 
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did intertribal boundaries and tolls facilitate the free import of cheap 
European goods for the African consumer. The foremost need of the European 
traders in the colony was for fast, efficient, cheap, and orderly transport 
both of exports and imports. Hence, the first priority was railroads, and 
later motor roads. In order to be able to build these roads, the Europeans 
needed peace and good government. Later, they for the abolition of 
tolls into Ashanti and the North, so that their goods could have free access. 
Gallagher and Robinson argue that there was " ••• no strong political 
or commercial movement in Britain in favour of African acquisitions." 84 How-
ever, while such a statement may have been applicable for Africa as a whole, 
it does not seem to have been applicable for Ghana. Rather, from the 1870s on, 
the powerful Chambers of Commerce of London, Liverpool, and Manchester were 
actively pressing the Colonial Office for additional takeovers. A letter, for 
example, from the predominantly European Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce to the 
Manchester Chamber, urging immediate occupation of Ashanti, received the sup-
port of both the Manchester and London Chambers in 1894. 
Istagnation of the Gold Coast trade was a result of] • • • constant 
interruptions of the roads and trade routes, and {of] ••• the fact that 
traders from the surrounding districts were restricted in their peaceful 
operations by a general lack of security •••• This insecurity was due 
to the unsettled state of the interior in consequence not only of inter-
tribal animosities, but also of interferences and aggressions between 
these tribes and their European neighbours. The petitioners prayed that 
the kingdom of Ashantee might be brought within the sphere of 
British influence, and that the Government should place its administration 
upon a footing which should embrace some form of permanent residence under 
an experienced officer of a diplomatic and military training. • • • That 
the British resident • should be charged with the duty of protecting 
all traders passing to and from the sea coast.85 
84Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London: 
Macmillan, 1961}, p. 462. 
85Letters from the Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce to the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, reported in ManCC, 6 February 1895. 
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The purpose of the above petition, then, was clearly to urge the takeover of 
Ashanti for the purpose of protection of trade. From 1894 until the final 
complete "pacification" (to use contemporary terminology) of Ashanti in 1900, 
petitions and letters from British Chrunbers of Commerce interested in Africa 
made a stready stream to the Colonial Office, all urging 
... that the British sphere behind the Gold Coast should be extended 
over the basins of the rivers which discharge themselves into the sea 
within the limits of the Colony, and that Ashanti and other countries 
adjacent to the Colony, which come under more active British influence 
than the distant parts of the interior, may be taken under British 
protection, and a Commissioner be appointed to reside at Coomassie. 86 
Nor was the pressure only to take over Ashanti. In 1894 the Manchester and 
Glasgow Chambers of Commerce urged the Government also to take over the North-
ern Territories. 
Read letter from Messrs. Alex. Miller Bro. and Co., Messrs. Taylor, 
Loughland and Co., and Messrs. W. B. Mciver and Co., all merchants of 
the city of Glasgow, on the subject of the disturbances on :-:c:rthern 
boundary of the Gold Coast Colony and their injurious eff'-~r:·c;s upon the 
Colony in recommending Her Majesty's Government to assume a Protectorate 
over the Frontier as well as the Ashanti tribes. 87 
Much of this pressure, aside from demanding simple law and order to 
facilitate trade inland, was also geared towards the takeover of the gold mines 
of Ashanti. Europeans were no longer content simply to buy gold from Africans 
as they had done in the past; they were now anxious to construct their own 
mines. As one contemporary commented about the 1896 campaign against Ashanti, 
One of the main motives for the expedition •.. not admitted till 
after its conclusion, was, of course, command of the mineral wealth in 
which the interior of the Gold Coast is supposed to abound. Before the 
troops had returned from Kumasi, in fact, several speculators had begun 
arrangements with local chiefs and others, with the object of obtaining 
valuable concessions [of land] at low prices.88 
86LivCC, 44th Annual Report, 1894, p. 68. 
87ManCC, 10 January 1894. 
88H. R. Fox Bourne, Blacks and Whites in West Africa (London: P. S. King 
and Son, 1901), p. 41. 
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As soon as Ashanti and the Northern Territories were taken over, the 
British commercial interests began to press for the abolition of all tolls on 
products entering the two areas, arguing that such tolls were a restraint on 
trade and that furthermore they constituted unfair competition, inasmuch as 
tolls were levied on goods entering by road but not by the new railroads, 89 
which only the wealthier (usually European) traders could afford to use. The 
system of tolls was a relic of the days when all trade into the independent 
Ashanti nation was regulated by the Ashanti government. Although the British 
fought Ashanti in order to make Ashanti trade as "free" as possible, the actual 
tolls into the area were not abolished until 1906. 90 Tolls on roads to the 
Northern Territories (which constituted the only source of revenue for the 
area) were abolished in 1907, because of fear of competition for routes with 
the surrounding French and German colonies. 91 The governor in 1908 stated 
that, since all tolls had by then been abolished, "There is every reason to 
anticipate that the removal of all transport restrictions will result in a 
marked increase of traffic in the interior."92 
Thus it can be seen that a primary aim of the British in taking over 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories was precisely to attain the economic 
objectives which Gallagher and Robinson deny were crucial to British policy in 
the late nineteenth century. How important the scramble for Africa was in 
comparison to these economic aims cannot be decided here, 93 but the economic 
89GCLegCo, answer to question posed by John Sarbah, 30 April 1906. 
90acLegCo, 30 September 1907. 
91 F. M. Bourret, Ghana, the Road to Independence, 1919-1957 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 84. 
92GCLegCo, statement by the Governor, 26 October 1908. 
93For a discussion of the scramble for Africa, the reader is referred to 
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motive has been established. Nevertheless, the motive was not specifically to 
protect foreign investment or to engage in land-grabbing. While trade with 
Ghana was extensive and profitable, and was expected to grow as Ghana became 
a major exporter of agricultural and arboricultural produce, actual foreign 
investment in the country was miniscule. 94 While there were many who would 
have liked to take over the land, to facilitate both the establishment of gold 
mines and the potential setting up of plantations, they failed to do so. 
Chapter II discusses the attempts by the British government to take over 
possession of the land of Ghana once the takeover of the Colony and the con-
quest of Ashanti had been completed, and the reasons why this attempted 
takeover failed. 
Raymond F. Betts (ed.), The 11ScPamble 11 for Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
D. C. Heath, 1966). 
94For a discussion of foreign investment in Ghana, see below, Ch.VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
AFRICAN RESISTANCE TO EXPATRIATE ENTREPRENEURS: 
THE LMID ISSUE 
To understand the position which the Gold Coast was to occupy after 
1885 in the world economic system, it is essential to keep in mind that the 
actual land of the colony never fell completely into the hands of the Colonial 
Government. Attempts were made during the 1890s to declare all "unoccupied11 
land in the colony Crown Land and to vest it in the Government, which would 
supervise the land's disposal and its revenues. For a variety of reasons, not 
least of which was organized resistance on the part of educated Africans and 
chiefs to the blatant takeover of their ancestral possessions, the move to vest 
the land in the Crown failed. Land did, however, become subject to regulation 
by the Crown, and could not be alienated to non-Africans except in accordance 
with a set of rules laid down by the Government as the Concessions Ordinance 
in 1900. In 1911, the Government tried again to take over control of lana, by 
fostering a new policy of setting up "forest reserves," ostensibly designed to 
safeguard African resources. As a result of local opposition) however, the 
Forest Bill had to be postponed until 1927, when it was finally enacted in a 
much watered-down version. 
It will be clear from the following that African opposition alone was 
not enough to prevent enactment of laws contrary to the interests of Ghanaian 
landowners. But organized African opposition, combined with appositional 
elements abroad, ensured that, unlike in most other colonies, the natural re-
sources of Ghana would stay under some measure o? Ghana:l.an control; further, 
that crops such as cocoa and palm oil would be produced by Ghanaian enterprise 
and initiative. Rather than being confined to reserves to live in 
34 
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anachronistic "communal" societies, Ghanaians became independent farmers, 
quickly dividing into rich and poor) landowner and landless, and forming the 
beginnings of classes in the countryside. 
1. The Crown Lands Bills: 1894 and 1897 
A simplistic model of land tenure in the Gold Coast would distinguish 
it from modern European land tenure systems by the fact that there was, 
throughout the colonial period, no private property in land, and that only 
usufruct was granted to the individual cultivator. Land in Ghana 
was owned by the tribe, as a communal entity, and was not alienable. It was 
divided, in general, into stool land (land for the chief's use, to be used by 
him for his own purposes but also to earn revenue to fulfil the ceremonial 
needs of the tribe) and tribal land, for the use of the whole tribe) portions 
of which were allotted to individual families and to which the families held 
rights (for use only) in perpetuity.l 
A system of shifting cultivation was the norm in the Gold Coast. This 
system, while seeming irrational to outsiders, was in fact a rational adapta-
tion to soil conditions and the level of technical development. The system 
seemed crazily patchwork to the Europeans who took over the colony, used as 
they were to clearly-defined, permanent fields. But, in fact, boundaries were 
relatively well-marked as far as the Africans were concerned, as indeed,were 
property rights. Strangers to particular tribes held certain obligations of 
payment to the chief which a member of the tribe did not hold; usually, in 
Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony, under what was known collectively as the 
"abusa" system, they were obliged to present one--third of their produce (or in 
1G. Benneh, "The Impact of Cocoa Cultivation on the Traditional Land 
Tenure System of the Akan of Ghana," Ghana Journal of Soaiology, no. 1, vol. 6 
{February, 1970), pp. 45-46. 
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the case of cash-crop production, of the revenue of their produce} to the 
chief. 
This brief sketch does little justice to the complexity of land tenure 
in the Gold Coast, a complexity which increased throughout the period as more 
and more Ghanaians were drawn into the system of cash-crop production. It is, 
in fact, more a description of what European administrators perceived to be the 
system of property than the actual system, which was not only more diverse but 
which also was undergoing some change, even before the twentieth century, in 
the direction of private ownership of land. For example, reports compiled by 
various District Commissioners in 1895 indicated a wide variety of property 
systems, especially near the coast where, because of contact with the Europeans 
and the consequent desire to earn money by cultivating permanent cash crops, 
private property in land was developing. From Pram Pram, east of Accra, the 
District Commissioner reported, no doubt rather simplistically, that 11Excepting 
leasehold properties, all lands sold either to strangers or natives become the 
absolute property of the purchasers.u 2 The District Commissioner for Cape 
Coast reported that" .•. land along the coast is conveyed in nearly all cases 
by deed. 11 3 In Accra, the Attorney-General reported that 
• it has become a common custom to transfer land absolutely for 
a consideration by conveyance forms. These conveyances are made at 
least as frequently to natives as to Europeans ..•• They are generally 
held by the Courts to be valid instruments of title between natives, 
even if imperfect according to English law·. 4 
The report above quoted was specifically commissioned in order to ascer-
tain African customs as to land rights at a time when the Colonial Government 
2
"Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure of Land on the Gold 
Coast" (London: 1895), p. 5. 
3 Ibid. ' P· 10. 
4 Ibid. ' P• 16. 
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was considering taking over all 11unoccupied" or "waste" land as Crown Land. 
vlliat the report indicated was that the ownership and tenure of land was well-
organized, that in fact such waste land as the Crown wished to take over hardly 
existed, and that moreover, without any prompting from Government, Africans 
were evolving forms of ownership consistent with their new role as producers 
for the world market. 
Given that such forms of ownership were being evolved, permitting 
Africans to participate more effectively in the world economic system, for what 
reason did the Government wish to try to take over the land in its own name? 
With hindsight, it is now a truism that Africans were capable of producing for 
the world market on their own initiative, without any stimuli (other than the 
cash paid for products purchased) from the Europeans. At the time, however, 
many Europeans doubted that enough could be produced without complete European 
takeover of the land. There was talk of establishing plantations using im-
parted Chinese labour to produce cocoa and palm products.s Moreover, the 
Europeans regarded Africans as unreliable and they hesitated to do business 
with a race which they considered inferior. Controlled production, as one 
contemporary Ghanaian observed, was more to their taste. 
Is it lthe land question] •.. that the land shall belong to the 
indigenes and not to foreign capitalists; or that, in the last analysis, 
neither the foreign capitalist nor the indigenes, but Government shall 
own it? To state the problem in another way, is it that the people 
shall be free to till the soil in their own right and sell produce thereof 
to the merchants abroad, the Supreme Court protecting the rights of 
contractor and contractee in common; or that Government shall step in 
and control private rights on the assumption that parties are incapable 
of managing their own business?6 
50lufemi Omosini, 11The Gold Coast Land Question 1894-1900: Some Issues 
Raised on West Africa 1 s Economic Development, 11 International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, vol. 5 (1972), p. 457. 
6J. E. Casely Hayford, The Trv~.th about the West African Land Question 
(London: Frank Cass, 1971), p. 2. 
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Gold Coast land, in any case, was valuable for more purposes than simply as a 
producer of cocoa and other agricultural and arboricultural products. The 
1890s was the period of the first Ghanaian "gold rush"; a period when hundreds 
of small speculators were trying to take out concessions to prospect land in 
the hopes that gold might be found. Before the Concessions Ordinance was 
passed in 1900, limiting the permissible size of concessions, huge claims on 
land were being granted to Europeans by African chiefs who often had no idea 
of the extent of the land that they were bargaining away. During this period 
Ashanti Goldfields, for example, obtained a concession of one hundred square 
miles, over which it obtained complete monopoly rights, in some of the best 
gold land of Ashanti.7 
In the face of such abuses of gold concessions, and in the light of a 
land tenure system which, although it was evolving capitalist forms, was as 
yet, from the European point of view, disorganized, it was easy for the Govern-
ment to argue that it ought to vest all waste lands in the Crown in order to 
protect the interests of the Africans against those of European entrepreneurs 
who were "flooding" the colony. 8 The first lands bill, the Crown Lands Bill, 
was introduced in 1894. It was publicized as a laudable project, meant to 
protect chiefs from being cheated by European concessionaires. This protection 
was to be effected by the vesting of all "waste lands, forest lands, and 
minerals" in the Crown. 9 But, in fact, it would seem that protection of the 
African was a minor consideration compared to the desire to protect the rights 
of both Government and business concerns. In the Gold Coast Legislative 
7For a discussion of this concession, see below, Ch. Ill. 
8In 1895, there were only eight gold mining companies with interests in 
Ghana listed in the Stock Exchange Yearbook. But by 1905, there were 153. 
Stock Exchange Yearbook (London), 1895 and 1905. 
9GCLegCo, 14 November 1894. 
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Council, the Governor stated freely that" .•. for the past three years his 
attention had been directed to the establishment of a means of acquiring the 
waste land in the Colony for the use of the Government."lO 
In the 1890s the Government was more concerned with the mineral than 
the agricultural wealth of the country; and it was recognized that whereas 
Africans could produce cocoa, they could not mine gold. For that, Europeans 
were needed. 
Governor Maxwell's Public Lands Bill ..• was framed less for 
' the purpose of protecting African cultivators from the squandering of 
chiefs, as he professed, than to prepare the way for allotment of valuable 
mineral and forest lands to selected European developers. Whether African 
cultivators concurred in the chiefs' conveyancing of stool land or 
received a fair share of the proceeds troubled some Gold Coast officials, 
but Maxwell was more concerned that ill-defined boundaries, overlapping 
titles and disputed claims would discourage responsible European entre-
preneurs from investing in the area. Far beyond clarifying and improving 
the land law, Maxwell desired to endmr the Colonial Governor with over-
riding power of intervention in all concessions agreements. 11 
In fact, the Governor's insistence on having powers to regulate concession 
agreements backfired; European merchants and miners feared too much control by 
officialdom and made representations to the Colonial Office to that effect. 
These fears, combined with protests registered by Africans who sent memorials 
to the Governor asking that the Bill be withdrawn, resulted in the substitution 
of a new Bill, called simply the Lands Bill, in 1897. The vesting of all lands 
in the Crown was dropped from the 1897 Bill, the aim being stated simply as a 
desire to regulate and control the use of land in the colony. However, under 
the new Bill the Government intended not only to regulate the land's occupation 
and use by expatriates, but also its occupation and use by Africans, thus 
10 Ibid. 
11R. E. Dumett, "British Official Attitudes l.n Relation to Economic 
Development in the Gold Coast, 1874-1905" (University of London: unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1966), p. 211. 
abrogating, as thoroughly as the earlier Bill would have done, the Africans' 
right to control of their own resources. 
African rights of ownership would no longer be automatically recog-
nized. Occupiers of land would not be disturbed; but they would be 
entitled only to a 'settler's right', a permanent heritable right of 
occupancy, which could be transformed into an absolute right, on appli-
cation to the Governor, by the gra~t of a land certificate. The 
Government could also declare that any piece of land had no owner, and 
then authorize its occupation.12 
40 
In the face of this promised onslaught upon their land rights, Ghanaians 
were quick to organize. Many petitions were laid on the table in the Legis-
lative Council against the Lands Bill, but with little effect. 13 The 
Aborigines Rights Protection Society, a society formed ostensibly to protect 
the rights of the chiefs and peoples of the Gold Coast but consisting primarily 
of educated Africans, went so far as to send a delegation to England to present 
a petition to the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. The petition argued 
that the British had no paramount title to land in the Gold Coast Colony, es-
pecially since the land had been obtained not by conquest but by cession;1 4 
that in any case lands needed for Government use could be obtained under the 
Public Lands Ordinance of 1876; that no compensation would be issued to persons 
whose land was granted to some other person by a Government Land Certificate; 
that the Bill removed all rights for Africans to buy, sell, or make profit from 
land and retained for their benefit only the minimal customary rights; and that 
if Africans tried to obtain a Government Certificate to their own land they 
would by doing so be putting themselves under English law, and removing 
12Kimble, op. oit., p. 340. For a detailed exposition of African oppo-
sition to the Lands Bill the reader is referred to Kimble's Ch. IX, "The 
A.R.P.S. and the Lands, 1889-1900." 
13GCLegCo, May-June 1897. 
14Kimble, op. oit., p. 338. 
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themselves from "native customary" law. 15 All of these were detrimental 
measures, which, the A.R.F.S. argued, would undermine traditional rule and 
custom, and prevent the natural evolution of proprietary relations. 
The petition to Joseph Chamberlain had its desired effect, and under 
his orders the Lands Bill was removed from the books, to be replaced three 
years later by a Concessions Ordinance which regulated the granting of African 
lands to Europeans, but left dealings in land among Africans in the hands of 
the traditional authorities. There is no doubt that had the A.R.F.S. not or-
ganized and presented its petition in such an articulate manner, the Bill 
might well have gone through. However, it would be facile to attribute the 
demise of the Bill solely to such African opposition; both prior to and after 
this Bill many issues arose in Ghana on which African opposition had no effect 
whatsoever. 16 David Kimble suggests that the A.R.P.S.' protests 
.•. were not the only objections that weighed with Chamberlain, who 
also had commercial interests very much in mind. Although no hint of 
weakening had been apparent in the Gold Coast, there had been heart 
searching in the Colonial Office for a long time over this Bill. . • • 
George Fadmore argues that Chamberlain acted as he did partly because he 
was already under attack for his alleged complicity in the Jameson Raid, 
and mainly be.cause he realized that West Africa was not suitable for 
permanent white settlement: 'The mosquitoes saved the West Africans, 
not the eloquence of the intellectuals.'l7 
It would indeed seem that a confluence of forces combined to suggest to 
Chamberlain that it would be wise to rescind the Bill. First, it was obvious 
to him that even with a system of peasant proprietorship, Ghana was producing 
15"Report of the Proceedings of the Deputation from the Kings and Chiefs 
of the Western Province of the Gold Coast" (London, 1898). 
16For instance, the issue of the Sedition and Water Works Ordinances of 
1934. See Francis Agbodeka, Ghana in the TWentieth Century (Accra: Ghana 
Universities Press, 1972), p. 115. 
17Kimble, op. cit., p. 354. The quotation is from George Padmore, The 
Gold Coast Revolution (London: Dennis Dobson, 1953), p. 38. 
the goods needed for the world market; it 'vas not necessary to establish plan-
tations and introduce forced labour in order for British merchants to obtain 
the goods they needed. Moreover, the political situation in Africa was un-
stable enough as it vTas; a war was brewing in South Africa and Sierra Leone had 
just had a hut tax rebellion; the Gold Coast petitioners hinted that a similar 
rebellion might take place there were their needs not met.l8 Moreover, Ashanti 
had just been conquered and was still in a state of unrest. A strong body of 
opinion within England, led by such personages as Mary Kingsley and E. D. 
Morel, was also of opinion that land should be left in African hands. 
Moreover, the Bill was opposed by certain commercial elements in the 
colony, since among its provisions was that of a five per cent royalty to be 
paid on the gross value of mineral products of the colony; a royalty to be paid 
not to the owners of the land but to the government.l9 "One of the express 
purposes of the Bill was to restrict the freedom of concess; 'Daires to drive a 
one-sided bargain; another was to enhance colonial revenues by exacting royal-
ties from concessions."20 Opposition from expatriate commercial concerns, 
literate and articulate Africans, and libera.l opinion within England, combined 
with the pressure of political events elsewhere in Africa, was sufficient for 
Chamberlain to decide to withdraw the Lands Bill.21 
What must be noted from this extremely cursory outline of the history of 
the Lands Bills in the 1890s, is first, that African opposition did, at least 
18Letter from lawyers of the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Under-Secretary of State, the Colonial Office, 18 August 1898. 
"Report of the . IA. R. P. S. J Delegation," op. cit. , p. 16. 
190mosini, op. cit., p. 462. 
20numett, op. cit., p. 213. 
Society to the 
Included in 
21For a discussion of Colonial Office relations w·ith British firms with 
interests in Ghana, see below, Ch. V. 
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in this one case, have some independent effect on the outcome of the policy, 
and second, that by asserting their opposition in terms of the defence of their 
traditional rights, those same Africans were bargaining away their right to 
change their forms of land tenure in the future. 22 The A.R.P.S. consistently 
argued that the traditional form of land holding was communal; that all land 
was held for common use by the tribe, and that it was inalienable. In its es-
sential forms this vras correct but, as described above, the system was already 
changing by the 1890s (if not, indeed, earlier) to accommodate itself more 
fully to the development of cash-crop agricultural production for the world 
market. But after the rescission of the Lands Bill, the Government adopted a 
policy of retaining traditional forms even >lhen the internal dynamic of the 
indigenous society demanded change; even when, for example, certain tribes were 
willing to sell land outright to members of certain other tribes, or when 
chiefs were willing to grant freehold to their subjects because it was recog-
nized that freehold and security of tenurewerenecessary for the cultivation of 
cash crops, a cultivation which would eventually benefit the whole society 
through the introduction of a greater amount of cash with which to buy new 
goods and education. Because the Africans' only method of defense had been to 
counterpoise the traditional against the new society, the actual development of 
Ghana was thwarted. 
Once a land policy had been established for the Gold Coast Colony, a 
similar policy was established for Ashanti. After the conquest of Ashanti in 
1900, many British firms argued that they should be allowed freehold rights to 
land in this new possession, since Ashanti could not plead, as could the Gold 
Coast Colony, that oy right of voluntary cession she was entitled to keep her 
22This point was suggested to the author by Dr. E. R. Brett in discus-
sion, London, November 1974. 
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traditional laws. The firms urged that land be granted to them freehold, or 
with a minimal rent, for a 999-year lease. On 9 December 1907 the Liverpool 
Africa Committee sent a letter to the Colonial Office urging that all possible 
speed was necessary in order to obtain grants of land from chiefs before the 
chiefs became aware of the land's value. "If these arrangements be completed 
before the land has acquired value, owing to the trade brought by the railway, 
the necessary dealings with the Chiefs should not be very difficult." 23 The 
Colonial Government, in this situation, emerged as the guardian of the African 
people against the absolute rapaciousness of its commercial compatriots, inas-
much as it refused to accede to these demands for freehold rights for trading 
firms. 
In the Northern Territories, however, the Government did eventually 
take over the land, although not until 1927. Under the Land and Native Rights 
Ordinance, all land in the Northern Territories (with some exceptions) was 
"placed under the control and made subject to the disposition of the Governor 
for the common use and benefit of the natives," and the Government was respon-
sible for the granting of rights of occupancy to both "Natives" and 
"Non-natives," 24 As Northern Territories affairs were not debated in the 
Legislative Council, 25 opposition to this usurpation of northern land rights 
was difficult to organize. In addition, African lawyers were not permitted to 
practice in the courts of the Northern Territories. Hence they could not 
organize opposition to this Bill. 
The last of the flames caused by direct attempts to take over control of 
23LivCC, 9 December 1907. 
24Gold Coast, Colonial Report, 1927-28, p. 44. 
25The powers of the Legislative Council are explained below, Ch. V. 
45 
land died, then, by 1897. After that time land was still a political issue, 
c but the basic policy of leaving control of land in African hands had been 
established; with the exception of the Northern Territories, it was universally 
implemented. Nevertheless, a second issue, that of Forest Reserves, arose in 
1911. The reaction of the African chiefs and educated men was similar to the 
reaction they had experienced fourteen years earlier, and as ir.i the earlier so 
in the later case the Bill was watered down and eventually reformed. 
2. The Forest Bill: 1911 
The Forest Bill, introduced into the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 
1911, was the only serious challenge presented by the British after the turn 
of the twentieth centurJ to the policy which had been laid down by Chamberlain, 
that land in Ghana was to remain in Ghanaian hands. Explicitly, its purpose 
was to protect forest lands in order to preserve the humidity necessary for 
cocoa production. Implicitly, however, it seemed--at least to the African 
opposition--that its purpose was to try, on-:::e more, to create new opportunities 
for European capitalists at the expense of Africans. 
In 1910 a Forestry Bill had been introduced into the Gold Coast Legis-
lative Council which" .•. enabled the Colonial Secretary of the Colony to 
grant concessions, leases or licenses on behalf of the owners of the land, and 
to regulate the gathering of forest produce in a forest reserve, and the sale, 
or export, of such produce." 26 The intent of this bill was to preserve forests 
and forest products, and also the humidity necessary for the cocoa industry, as 
well as both to safeguard chiefs against "dirty deals" with European conces-
sionaires and to safeguard the rights of the African people as a whole to use 
their forests. There was no argument as to the fact that forests were indeed 
c 2 6A. McPhee, 1ne Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London: 
Frank Cass, 1971), p. 148. 
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necessary for the ecologJ of the country, and that without their protective 
roots soil would erode and water would disappear. What was at issue was the 
means by which forests should be protected. 
The 1910 Bill imposed such stringent "protective" measures on forests 
that opposition was intense, and the Government was soon compelled to withdraw 
the Bill. One of its opponents, E. J. P. Brown, an African, accused the Gov-
ernment of drafting the bill in order to acquire the privileges of compulsory 
acquisition of land which had been denied it in 1897. 27 Certainly the Bill was 
drafted in such a way as to imply this, as it provided for measures to compel 
chiefs to alienate, against their will and absolutely, land deemed by the 
Government to be necessary for forest reserves. In the face of opposition, a 
milder Bill, the Forest Ordinance, which included provisions for chiefs and 
their people to protest takeovers of their land for reserves, was introduced 
and unanimously passed (with the consent not only of European unofficial mem-
bers but also of African unofficial members) 28 on November 9, 1911. This Bill 
provided that when it deemed it necessary, the Government could set up forest 
reserves, administering them as best it saw fit, and making a profit from the 
forests by leasing them, or allowing concessions on them, as long as the prin-
ciples of conservation were adhered to. Two-fifths of any profits the 
Government made was to go to the owners, the other three-fifths to be retained 
by the Government for administrative purposes. 29 
Although the Bill was passed unanimously, there was a great deal of 
2711 Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native Lands in 
the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, 1911 11 (hereafter referred to as the Belfield 
Report} {London: 1912), p. 99. 
28"Report of the West African Lands Committee11 (hereafter referred to as 
the Digby Report) (London: 1917}, p. 284. 
29GCLegCo, 9 November 1911. 
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opposition to it, even within the Legislative Council. It was generally felt 
that whatever the ostensible reasons for the Bill, the Government had an ul-
terior motive not beneficial to the African. 
It is quite evident that from the principles laid down by this Bill, 
it is wholly and purely a foreign element which is being imposed into 
Native Customary Laws and for its 'objects and reasons' it is stated 
that, it is to establish 'Forest Reserves' and to enable the Government 
to grant licenses and leases, ••• but for its 'objects and reasons' 
where does the Native come in?30 
One of the chief issues of debate between Africans and Europeans was 
whether deforestation, which in the cocoa areas would have the ultilll!3,te effect 
of decreasing humidity, was actually the responsibility of Africans. Africans 
argued that the European mines were as responsible for deforestation in the 
Colony as was the constantly criticized shifting cultivation which the Africans 
practised. Yet it seemed that the mines ,,;ere to get off scot-fr· 
tribes took all the financial burden of reforestation. The assumption behind 
the Forest Bill was that unless the Government declared certain land as pre-
served land, and planted trees on it, the forests would all disappear because 
of the devastations of the ignorant Africans. But it was also known that a 
great deal of deforestation occurred, not because of devastations caused by 
peasants, but rather because of the ravagings of the 'mines. 
There was much debate as to whether or not a mining concession brought 
with it the right to timber products of the land on which the mine was situa-
ted. In general, in fact, the rights of mines over the surface products of 
the land they mined were in dispute. The investigator of land policy in the 
Colony in 1911, Conway Belfield, noted that mining companies often planted 
cocoa and rubber trees in cleared areas, a right which their actual 
30Nene Mate Kale of Krobo, in GCLegCo, 13 September 1911. 
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concessions did not grant them. 31 By appropriating this right the companies 
denied access on mining land to Africans, either for shifting cultivation or 
for the more permanent and profitable cultivation of cash crops. 
In general, it was assumed that the mining companies' concessions 
granted, at the minimum, the right to use such lumber and timber as was neces-
sary for the mine. But this was often quite an extensive need. 
Each company leased from the native owners, at the very outset, 
certain blocks of forest for timber and fuel, in addition to the 
areas actually required for erection of plants, buildings, etc. 
These areas have been and are being added to by further leases, as it 
is most essential that the supply of timber and fuel should not be 
exhausted, and thus bring the mining industry to a standstill. 32 
In 1917 it was estimated that the mines consumed 1,070 acres of forest 
per year, and it was recommended that 134 square miles of land should be set 
aside to assure an adequate supply of timber in the future. 33 Nevertheless, 
the idea that the miners, not the Africans, should therefore be responsible for 
the cost of reforestation was never entertained . 
• • • [T]here is no obligation on the Mines authorities to replant. 
They have leased Forests for the specific purpose of using all the 
timber they can get out of them, without any proviso that they shall 
re-stock the denuded areas .... If the owners of forests are previously 
warned that they will be held responsible for re-afforesting, • . • and, 
this obligation is enforced by legislation, the future of the forests 
will be safeguarded. • • • [I] f these are unable to defray the expenses 
then re-afforestation should be done by Government, and the future crop 
regarded as Government property .•.. [W]ith reference to the Reserves 
aggregating 134 square miles which will be required for the future 
requirements of the Mines, it is hardly necessary to point out no 
cultivation of crops in these Reserves can be allowed.34 
31Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 35. 
32
"Papers Relating to Re-Afforestation of Areas which have been denuded 
of Forest by the Requirements of the 1'-ITNES and of the RAIL\.J'AY" (Gold Coast: 
Government Press, Accra, 1918). Report by N. c. McLeod, Conservator of Forests, 
25 March, 1917, p. 4. 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid.' p. 5. 
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In.other words, chiefs were to be responsible for the reforestation of areas 
which mines had denuded, even though the timber rights of those mines were none 
too clear in the first place. Further, the chiefs were to create reserves for 
the mines which were to be completely unproductive, in the economic sense, from 
the chiefs' point of view, for not only were no rents to be paid on the re-
served lands, but also no crops were to be grown on them. The cost of such 
reforestation to be paid by Africans was estimated in 1917 at about £6,400 per 
square mile. 35 
The question of whether mines or shifting cultivators were responsible 
for deforestation was one of the most severe issues surrounding the Forest 
Bill. Several other issues arose, at the core of all of them the fear that the 
Government was actually trying once again to give opportuni Ucs to Europeans at 
the expense of Africans. Because of the immense hostility to the Bill, a 
Committee was set up to investigate land tenure and the forest situation in the 
Gold Coast in 1912. The Committee was supposed to be an impartial body of 
investigators. 36 Neither the European business community nor the African 
community was given representation on it, despite many protests. The Joint 
West Africa Committee, representative of the Manches.ter, London, and Liverpool 
Chambers of Commerce, asked for representation but was told that 11 if they 
once included representatives of the various interests on the Committee it 
would require the addition, not only of educated, but Bush natives, as they 
were the people most concerned. 1137 Nevertheless, Conway Belfield, the leader 
of the investigatory committee, was unusual in West African history inasmuch as 
35Ib. :J 7 1-u.. ' p. • 
36Cited above as the Belfield Report, fn. 27. 
37JWAC, 17 July 1912. 
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he did make a serious effort to encourage testimony to the Committee not only 
from educated Africans, but also from chiefs. The picture they built up of the 
proposed administration of the forest reserve system was one of mistrust and 
abuse. 
The educated Africans criticized the Government, first of all, for try-
ing to set up reserves when an adequate system of forest protection was already 
extant in the Timber Protection Ordinance. 
There is a Timber Protection Ordinance in force in this Colony, but 
I do not think the mining companies take any notice of it nor do the 
Government see that it is enforced in the mining districts to guard 
against deforestation. The object of that Ordinance is to prevent the 
cutting of immature trees except trees of a certain girth and width. 38 
If the Government had to have timber protection, the Africans argued, the 
chiefs themselves could take care of the forests. Instead of enacting ordi-
nances, the Government could sponsor the education of young African men in 
forest conservation. Indeed, the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, on its 
own initiative, had already sponsored such young men in the cocoa industry, but 
their efforts had been thw·arted by the Government. 
The [Aborigines Rights Protection] Society formulated a scheme for 
training young men at the Botanical Gardens in the Colony in the proper 
cultivation of cocoa. These young men were to be distributed among the 
cocoa districts to diffuse among the cocoa planters a technical knowledge 
of the method of cultivating, pruning, and fermenting cocoa ••.• All 
the initial expenses such as clothing, board, and other incidental 
expenses, were borne by the Society, and it was f1rrther proposed that the 
Society should employ the young men for five years .•.• All that the 
Government had to do ••• was to give the young men free tuition and 
lodging at the Gardens •••• [But] the Government wrote back to the 
effect that inasmuch as the young men had not passed the Seventh Standard 
(although all had passed the Sixth Standard) they were not eligible within 
the existing regulations. The efforts of the Society were thus thwarted 
39 
. . . 
Speaking for his own class of educated, "modernized" Africans who used 
38Belfield Report, testimony of E. J. P. Brown, p. 111. 
39Ibid.' p. 109. 
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land not only for subsistence cultivation but also for cash-crop production, 
E. J. P. Brown further argued, as did many others, that if the Government took 
over forest land, paying only two-fifths of the profit to the original African 
owners, it would in effect be depriving those Africans of the right to make 
profits on their own. "I do not consider the reservation of my land and the 
p~ent to me of two-fifths of the profits arising therefrom a matter of public 
interest to which must be subordinated my private interest, right, and ardent 
desire to work and improve my own land myself. n40 Three-fifths of the profit 
would be going to a Government which was free, if it saw fit, to rent out the 
land, technically only "reserved" from the Africans, to European entrepreneurs. 
• • • [F]oreign speculators • • in the process of time will absorb 
our lands and thereby reduce us to a landless proletariat fit to work at 
a wage for the benefit of outsiders •••. [U]nder the Forest Ordinance 
we have neither voice nor choice in the matter--for by a stroke of the 
pen the Governor has the power to reserve and afterwards lease our lru1ds, 
and this, in effect, is compulsory acquisition of our lands for the 
benefit of outsiderso 41 
In essence, there was no difference between the 1911 Bill and the 1897 Bill. 
"[T]he Forest Bill of 1911 o •• introduces the same encroachments on the 
people's proprietary rights which were objected to in 1894 and again in 
1897." 42 
Beside the highly articulate and extremely angry protests of the edu-
cated elite of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, the arguments of the 
chiefs against the bill sounded weak. Nevertheless, chief after chief com-
plained to the Belfield Commission, always asking the same question, why they 
could not be allowed to take care of the forests themselves, with the help of 
their educated young men. The question was especially important to them 
4 0 Ibid. ' p 0 111. 
41Ibid.' p. 109. 
421bid., testimony of Jo E. Casely Hayford, p. 102. 
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because of the existence of sacred groves, which they feared would be expropri-
ated by the Europeans. It was even argued, if feebly, that the very existence 
of these groves constituted sufficient reserved forest space for the Governrr!ent 
to abrogate its programme. 
We should be glad if the Government '.YOuld send us instructors to teach 
us how to improve our forests, but we wish to manage them ourselves. I 
admit that we have never taken steps to improve our forests, in fact at 
present we do not understand the management of forest lands •••. [But] 
I should not be satisfied with any arrangements which do not give to the 
people the sole control of the forests. 43 
The masses of testimony presented against the 1911 Forest Bill convinced 
Conway Belfield that it must be revised. He did feel that the AL~, ,c, ... were 
ignoring the issue of forest conservation, and that they were not facing the 
very real need to protect the cocoa industry against disease and an overly dry 
climate. 44 In addition, he felt that if administration of forest l~~d were 
left solely in the hands of chiefs and elders, they would administer it for 
their own profits. 45 Nevertheless, he agreed that it was unfair for the Gov-
ernment to remedy the situation by simply taking over lands and running them 
for its own profit. Rather he recommended that the Government not b~' ~rmi tted 
to lease land, but only to employ the reserved land for its own u~e. Further, 
the Government should not be allowed to retain three-fifths of the prof'i ts, but 
only as much of the profit as was absolutely necessary to cover the costs of 
administration. Finally, he recommended that a maximum be set on the percent-
age of stool land which could be reserved so that no tribe would find itself 
without a sufficient supply of common land.46 
43Ibid., testimony of Amanhin Mensah of EliP..ina, p. 117. 
44Ibid., report by Belfield, p. 38. 
45Ibid.' p. 7. 
46Ibid., pp. 39-41. 
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Because of the many protests against the Forest Bill, which were backed 
up by Belfield's recow~endations, the Bill itself was never implemented despite 
the fact that it had been legally passed. The 1910s were taken up by pre-
occupation with the European war, and the issue of forest conservation was left 
in abeyance until Governor Guggisberg took over the Colony in 1919. Guggisberg 
was a strong believer in forest conservation and he decided to implement a 
system of reserves. His policy with regard to reserves was originally 11 • • • 
to trust the Chiefs entirely with the, formation and administration of those 
reserves which are considered necessary by the Forestry Officers and which are 
set aside after mutual agreement between them and the Chiefs. "4 7 The chiefs 
were to set aside reserves under the powers granted to them under the Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance. However, it soon became apparent that not enough re-
serves were being set up by the chiefs on their own initiative, and after a 
great many threats, Guggisberg had a Forestry Ordinance passed on 3 l-1arch, 
1927. It maintained the rights of O'lmers and did not override by-laws made 
under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance as long as such laws were satisfactor-
ily administered. Provision was made 11 • • • for buying out any rights (but not 
the land} if the exercise of established claims would make successful forest 
management impossible. " 48 The Government was to supervise and maintain re-
serves constituted either under the Forest Ordinance or under by-laws, and one-
third of the revenue was to be used for improvement. The owners could grant 
concessions to work minerals or timber in a reserve, but 
• • • in the event of such a concession being granted the taking of 
firewood for other than domestic purposes, or of trees for conversion 
into timber, will be carried out under the direction of the Forestry 
47GCLegCo, 6 March 1924. 
48GCLegCo, 3 March 1927. 
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Department, and the owner will get a fair price for his timber, which is 
not always the case at present. 4 9 
The Government also pledged to give an annual bounty of one pound per 
year per square mile to owners of land as acknowledgement that they had set 
aside land for the good of the country, but the bounty did not imply that the 
Government had taken over ownership. SO By 1932, however, payment of this 
paltry sum had been discontinued, apparently on the grounds that the African 
Provincial Councils were no longer paying bounties, and therefore the British 
had no need to pay bounties either.51 Chiefs were expected to contribute land 
and preserve forests entirely on their own financial responsibility. 
By 1938, 5,659 square miles of some 30,000 square miles of forest land 
in the Gold Coast had been constituted or approved as reserved land. 52 Some 
Africans, despite the fact that the land was clearly, in law, now guaranteed 
as the possession of the stools, feared this gradual expropriation, and their 
representatives often cautioned the government to "make haste slowly" in order 
not to upset the people. One chief, for example, recommended t .. d.C the Govern-
ment should state its purpose when it acquired land and refer the acquisition 
to the Legislative Council ". Iw]ith a view to allay the present ~~rest 
amongst the natives brought about by the wide areas of land acquired by the 
Government. I! 53 But the Government, far more concerned about cocoa dis-
ease and the need at all costs to protect the cocoa crop, referred land 
issues to the Concessions Ordinance, the vehicle enacted in 1900 after the 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 GCLegCo, 2 February 1932. 
52Bourret, op. eit., p. 126. 
53Nana M. A. Awah II of Adangme, in GCLegCo, 24 September 1931. 
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1897 Bill failed. This Ordinance, as will be shown below, regulated land 
dealings between Africans and Europeans to the satisfaction of the latter> but 
not of the former. 
3. The Regulation of Dealine;s in Land 
between Africans and Euro~ 
Once it was determined that Europeans would not be able to take over 
Gold Coast lands in their own name, and that property would remain in African 
hands, the question became: how much access to land would Europeans have, and 
how would their dealings with Africans be regulated? By 1900, after the polit-
ical ferment surrounding the 1897 Lands Bill, it was obvious to Europeans that 
Africans could produce enough of the export crops which traders desired, and 
that for a variety of reasons, not least of which was climate, plantations were 
not a desirable option for Europeans in any case. But Ghana was still a major 
source of gold, and the political power of the gold-mining investors at the 
Colonial Office in London was strong. Hence a way had to be found to guarantee 
rights to gold-mining companies in Ghana while simultaneously protecting 
African land rights. The solution to this dilemma was promulgated in the Con-
cessions Ordinance in 1900, 
During the latter half of the 1890s, a minor "gold rush" had taken place 
in Ghana, a rush which tapered off after the Boer War when investors turned 
their attention back to South African gold fields. Europeans entered the Gold 
Coast and began negotiations with Africans for mining rights. Because there 
was no legislation regarding such negotiations, enormous areas of land were 
negotiated away, often for paltry sums. In 1897, Ashanti Goldfields obtained 
concession rights to one hundred square miles of territory. 54 The success of 
54The Ashanti Goldfields concession will be described in detail J.n Ch. 
III. 
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Ashanti Goldfields in obtaining such monopolistic rights prompted others inter-
ested in mining to pressure the Colonial Office to institute regulations which 
would guarantee other prospectors and investors a reasonable chance to exploit 
Ghana 1 s resources in competition with Ashanti Goldfields. 
The upshot of this pressure was the Concessions Ordinance of 1900, an 
Ordinance which limited the size of concessions to five square miles for 
mineral lands, and twenty square miles for timber, rubber, or other products of 
the soil, with a maximum length in time of ninety-nine years. (Ashanti Gold-
fields, however, having already obtained its lease, was exempt from these 
provisions.)SS The 1900 law applied only to the Gold Coast Colony, but a 
similar law was enacted in Ashanti in 1903. Leases were to be negotiated be-
tween the European and the African chief responsible for the area concerned, 
but they were to be ratified in the Gold Coast courts in the Colony, or by the 
District Commissioner in Ashanti (where African lawyers were forbidden to prac-
tice in order to "protect" the chiefs from the "exorbitant" costs of lawyers 1 
fees). In the Northern Territories, no Concession Ordinance was enacted; the 
Government simply had the right to grant concessions as it saw fit; however, 
by 1910 the total area leased in the North was less than one acre. 56 
It was clearly stated in the Ordinance of 1900 that no concession should 
"derogate from the customary rights of natives"; 57 that is, that the rights of 
Africans to practice shifting cultivation, collect firewood, and snare and hunt 
game, should be guaranteed in all mining concessions, and that the surface 
rights to the land should remain in African hands even when mining was carried 
55Dumett 
' 
56McPhee 
' 
op. cit., p. 229. 
op. cit., p. 188. 
57Digby Report, op. cit., p. 123. 
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on. They were to retain the right to collect products of' the soil other than 
those specif'ically claimed by the lessee. Nevertheless such rights were on~y 
loosely guaranteed and guarded. For instB.nce, the text of' a lease to Messrs. 
Brunner, Mond and Company58 in 1913 gave the company complete liberty to sell, 
dispose of', or underlease its rights, provided only 
[t]hat the Lessors, their people and servants, shall at all times have 
liberty to hunt and snare game to gather f'ire-v10od snails and building 
materials f'or their dwelling houses and to till and cultivate their f'arms 
and plantations so far as the same can be done without causin~ interrup-
tion to any operation carried on under the pOl.Jers and prim: · · Y'eby 
granted • •.. 59 
Such a qualification in a lease could ef'fectively abrogate the rights of the 
original owners of' the land, since it would be unclear to them what their 
rights were in the first place. 
The limitation of lease rights to ninety-nine years was regarded by some 
Europeans as a drag upon their enterprise; they f'elt that they should be al·-
lowed to work their lands in perpetuity. 'l'o many Africans, however, ninety-
nine years was more time than they could fathom; in essence it meant that land 
was being signed away not only f'or the original owners' lifetimes, but also 
f'or the lifetimes of their children and grandchildren. The f'eeling among these 
Af'ricans was that usufruct should be returned to a man's family; that 
he should not be able to or required to sign away its rights as well as his 
own. In 1912 the Bel:field Commission, investigating the operations of the 
Concessions Ordinance as well as the problems connected with the Forest Bill, 
heard chief after chief complain that ninety-nine years was too long. F'or 
example, Kobina Foli, the Omanhene of' Adansi, stated: "I • consider the 
58Later a division of Imperial Chemical Industries. Stock Exchange 
Yearbook (1939). 
59"Correspondance relating to Oil-Palm Lands," Cd. 6673, 1913, p. 5, 
italics the author's. 
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term of ninety-nine years too long because the land will not come back to the 
people now living. If the rents were larger I should not mind .... "60 Bel-
field, however, rejected this argument by the chiefs. "I hold that the wish of 
the chiefs is mainly prompted by the desire to get back into their own hands 
properties which have been proved to be valuable in order that they or their 
successors may reap the advantage of disposing of them a second time." 61 
The limitations of land holdings to twenty square miles for agriculture 
and five square miles for mining were subject to considerable abuse. By law 
no one concessionaire, either an individual or a company, could hold more than 
two concessions, but the practice of setting up dummy corporations to acquire 
options on land to be held for future use soon became prevalent in Ghana. Even 
without the setting up of such dummy corporations, however, the chiefs soon 
began to feel that too much land was being alienated. Few had any accurate 
idea of what exactly a square mile was, and while European administrators were 
willing to explain, conceptually, what the term meant, they did not visit the 
Africans' lands to point out to them in detail just how much land they were 
alienating. In testimony to the Belfield Commission, many chiefs stated that 
had they known the extent of a square mile, they would never have alienated 
their land. Chief Esselkojo of Appinto, in the Tarkwa area, for instance, said 
"I do not know what a square mile is. Sometimes I have given more land than I 
intended, and if I had known the true extent I would have given less. It would 
be an advantage to have advice in the preliminary stages."62 Chief Kobina Foli 
of Adansi agreed. "Before signing the agreement I appear before the 
60Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 97. 
61Jb'd ~ . , p. 20. 
621bid., p. 76. 
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Commissioner to have the document explained to me. He describes the area in 
square miles, so we are not much wiser then. The Commissioner never visits the 
land. I should like a local officer to visit it and explain the boundaries to 
me." 63 Belfield was more sympathetic to the confusion which the chiefs expres-
sed over the concept of square miles than he was to their desire to have leases 
shortened, arguing that 
[t]he chiefs and their advisors ..• always imagine that what they 
are granting is a mere fraction of the area which they actually dispose 
of .••• I have been told by almost every chief who granted a conces-
sion, that if he had known the extent of the country which was being 
sought from him, he would have refused to concede all that was asked 
for. 64 
Nevertheless, as he recommended no changes in length of concessions, so Bel-
field recommended no changes in area of concessions, simply expressing the 
pious hope that Africans would be better informed than prior to his investiga-
tions of the magnitude of land which they were alienating. 
In 1911, land alienation appeared to be a very serious business indeed 
since in some parts of the Colony, there was more land under option (that is, 
to which a concessionaire had first rights if he so desired them) than there 
was actual land in existence. In toto, only about 880 square miles of land (or 
one in twenty-sevenl in the Gold Coast Colony had been alienated but another 
3,000 square miles were "under notice. " 65 ifuile some chiefs seemed deliberately 
to be granting options two or three times over on the same land, others simply 
had no idea of the extent of the land they w·ere alienating or indeed whether 
the land was theirs to alienate in the first place. Boundary disputes were 
arising with alarming frequency as neighbouring chiefs discovered that they 
6 3Ibid.' p. 97. 
64 Ibid. ' P· 9-
65Ibid. ' P• 11. 
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were alienating the same land, and each wanted to retain the land as his own so 
that he could have payment for it. Lawyers from the coast were making small 
fortunes arguing the claims of rival chiefs to the same plots of land. For-
tune hunters from Europe were, of course, the originators of this practice of 
overalienation, or double alienation of land. Ghana was known to have large 
deposits of gold, although at the time, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, such 
land was often unworkable because of the difficulties of transport and of ob-
taining labour. In order that potential gold land be not lost to them, 
therefore, Europeans would travel to the Gold Coast and arrange to have options 
for leasing land, thus tying it up at minimal option rents of perhaps five 
pounds or ten pounds a square mile, until they saw fit to actuall;;' lease and 
hopefully work it. There was no legal regulation as to how long an option 
could exist before it lapsed, nor was there any way a chief could compel a 
European either to take up the option or to forgo the land. 
Land so tied up was often used for speculative purposes in Europe; 
gullible Europeans bought options thinking that the options ensured them actual 
ownership of Gold Coast land, unaware that by law they could never do more than 
rent the land in question for ninety-nine years. In 1904 the Legislative 
Council passed some regulations to counteract this practice, since in that year 
alone there were some 3,000 "enquiries .. on the Court lists, that is, conces-
sions for which the claimants had merely filed claims and gone no further. The 
Government feared both a sudden rush for validation and, more important, fraud. 
All concessions are not bona fide. In some cases, it is believed that 
the land has no existence; in other cases, the same land has been leased 
again and again; in many cases, the moneys agreed upon have not been 
paid; in many cases the claimant knows that his concession cannot be 
supported, and, in the great majority of cases, the claimants have no 
intention of proceeding with their claims. It is this class of case 
which has led to fraud. A claimant could truthfully allege that his 
claim was pending in Court, and the pendency of a claim would be suffi-
cient to induce an unwary purchaser to pay for a valueless concession. 
In fact the filing of a claim gave it the imprimatur of the Court which 
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could be used for fraud.66 
Concessions granted by chiefs were definitely being used in Europe to induce 
investors to finance companies when there ivas no proof either that the Govern-
ment would validate the concession or that the land contained what it was 
purported to contain by way of exploitable resources. 
[D]uring the present year [1910], as in the so-called 'boom' of 
1901, many investors in the United Kingdom have been victimized by company 
promoters .... An instance has been brought to my notice where a syndi-
cate acquired a concession from a Native Chief for an area of land 
considerably in excess of that allowed by the Concessions Ordinance, and, 
on the strength of that 'concession' •.• floated a company on the un-
warranted supposition that the concession in question would be certified 
as valid in the Courts of the Colony. The public should be careful to 
ascertain before investing in any Gold Coast Company purporting to have 
rights in land, that the concessions granting such rights have received 
legal sanction, or ..• that a certificate of validity has been i8sued 
in respect of such concessions .•.• [I]n connection with the company 
referred to above which was floated primarily to exploit a trace of 
country purported to have some ten rubber vines or trees to the acre, 
• • . an official of the Agricultural Department reports that he passed 
along one of the boundaries of this concession but that he saw no 
Funtumia [rubber] trees and that the Chief and natives informed him that 
there were no such trees in the forest in question. 67 
Even on land where legitimate concessions had been granted, very little 
profit was made by the Africans after the concessions had been validated by the 
courts and after the boundaries had been clearly defined. Concessions rents 
were always very low, in order to encourage European·investment and specula-
tion. The few mines, such as Ashanti Goldfields, which made large profits did 
not therefore have to pay more in rent to the African owners of the land. They 
were simply obliged to pay five per cent of their profits in royalties to the 
British Government(and such royalties were not necessarily retained in the 
Colony for the Colony's use). "Considerations money" (that is, money paid in 
order to have the right to negotiate a concession) usually amounted to about 
66GCLegCo, speech by the Chief Justice, 25 July 1904. 
67GCLegCo, speech by the Governor, 28 October 1910. 
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fifty pol.Ulds for five square miles with a ten pol.mds per annum occupation fee 
until the concession was actually worked. 68 After the concession was worked, 
rents varied around one hundred to three hundred pounds per annum. 69 'l'he 
difficulty was, however, that there was no time limit on occupation before 
working the concession, and the concessions often lay dormant whil~' the European 
lessees decided whether or not to work them. In times of boom, especially 
during the "gold rushes" of the late 1890s and the 1930s (when the price of 
gold was allowed to float on the open market) the amount of cor : 0eration 
money was raised and chiefs often received bribes, occasionally as high as 
£5000. 70 
The problem with these concessions was that they were '"'1<>ntly worked 
without the consent of the Government, and without Government validation rents 
were lower than they otherwise would have been. 71 Africans, who either did not 
go to the courts for protection, or were unaware that by hiring one of the much 
abused "half-educated" lawyers from the coast they could prov;<:·G themselves, 
often had their rights to the land curtailed. A1 though African access to land 
granted for mineral concessions was supposed to have been guaranteed in the 
original 1900 Concessions Bill, in fact the Bill had to be amended in 1912 to 
include this provision. 11 [T]o prevent Concessions being certifled as 
valid if the conditions therein provided exclude natives from their rights of 
collecting natural produce, or give powers to the concessionaires to remove 
natives from their habitations within the area of the Concessions." 72 As well, 
68Belfield Report, op. oit., testimony of Francis T. Dove, p. 49. 
69Ibid., testimony of Giles Hunt, p. 65. 
70 Interview with a former British barrister, Accra, May 1974. 
71Digby Report, op. oit., p. 141. 
72GCLegCo, 24 August 1912. 
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the concessionaires frequently abused the provisions of the concessions by 
renting out parts of their concessions to other ~uropeans, for instance for 
trading posts. Such extra rents vrere su.pposed to be paid not to the Europeans, 
but to the original African owners. Chief Esselkojo of Appinto complained to 
the Belfield Commissions about this practice. 
I wish to complain that in the case of the Tarquah concessio"' the 
concessionaires have allowed white people to build houses and s:wps on 
land forming part of the concession, and, inasmuch as their surface 
rights are restricted to such as are appurtenant to mining, I think the 
rent should come to me instead of being appropriated by them ...• I 
do not know whether the Government made any arrangement with the mining 
company respecting the Government buildings erected on the concession 
land, but they did not do so with me. 73 
In general, concessions were viewed not as means for i\.[".<i.cans to make 
profits which could then be invested in money-making ventures or self-
improvement schemes of their own, but as a means to further the development of 
the Gold Coast through European investment. Even Conway Belfield, whose com-
mission of investigation into land law in the Gold Coast certainly took 
seriously Africans' complaints of abuse and who tried to remedy these abuses as 
best he could, saw the object of the Commission as primarily to "expedite the 
process of alienation and reduce the expense of acquisition. 1174 While it 
could be argued that the rents charged for concessions were too small, the 
European companies themselves seemed to feel that the expenses of obtaining 
concessions were too great. In the Minutes of the London Chamber of Commerce 
in March 1906, for example, "Mr. J. H. Cordner James referred to correspondence 
which had passed between his firm and the Colonial Office giving particulars of 
an instance where it had cost a Syndicate £6000 and taken ~~years to render 
valid a concession five miles square." 75 There were continual disputes between 
73Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 76. 
74Ibid., p. 25. 
75LonCC, 29 March 1906. 
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Government and prospecting firms as t.o who should be responsible for surveying 
concession land; the firms aretied that by putting the onus of such work on them 
the Government was getting a free survey of the land76 while the Govermnent 
argued that the opposite was true. The general belief of the firms was that no 
obstacle should be put in their way, since only through European investment 
would the Colony develop (even though by the mid-1910s it was obvious that the 
Colony was rapidly developing through African investment in cocoa, rubber, and 
palm oil production). The Government was concerned to protect its own inter-
ests, to make sure that royalties on minerals were paid and that it did not 
itself have to pay the costs of granting concessions. 
The business community was not willing to pay much for the concessions 
it held, either to the landowners themselves or to the Government. The five 
per cent royalty on profits of concessions which was fixed by the Government in 
1900 became law only after extreme protests in England from businessn><;;:·; -who 
felt that a one per cent royalty was ample. In 1897, for instance, the Liver-
pool Africa Committee sent a letter to Joseph Chamberlain· objecting strongly to 
the Government policy of charging five per cent on profits of mining, timber, 
rubber, and other concessions. The Committee preferred "Small rents, or 
a royalty not exceeding one per cent, on the gross value of produce." 77 
••• [I]n view (1) of the very large capital invested in the various 
undertakings, and of the fact that only one Company has been able to pay 
one small dividend upon its capital; and further, in view (2) of the 
large contributions of the Companies to the revenues of the Colony paid 
in duties on imports, including storage, the Committee think it un-
reasonable that either the Mining Companies, or other concessionaires, 
should be expected to pay a royalty of more than one per oent, until at 
least such time as the districts have been properly opened up by roads 
and railways. 7 8 
76 GCLegCo, speech by Mr. Osborne, a European unofficial member, 17 
December 1901. 
77LivCC, 48th Annual Report, 1898, p. 155. 
78Ibid., p. 167. 
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That the Government stood firm in its dispute with the European business 
community, and passed a law requiring a five per cent royalty despite their 
objections, is a sign not of its concerD with African rights so much as with 
its own revenues. In fact the Government did little to protect African land-
owners short of insisting that concessions be validated and that minimum rents 
be paid (to the Gove1~ment Treasurer, who then passed them on to the landowners 
concerned). The major purpose of the Concessions Ordinance and subsequent 
amendments to it was to render efficient the alienation of la-,~- +o organ-
ize means of regulating boundaries and ensuring security of tenure to 1ropeans 
so that they could carry out their commercial ventures in peace. 
In the firms' view, however, the Government seemed singularly uncon-
cerned with the real problems they faced in validating concessions and making 
sure that land was surveyed and boundaries defined. Even with the legislation 
which was extant, boundary disputes were common, even endemic, it seemed, to 
Gold Coast society. Until well into the 1920s African lawyers w~;;...e forbidden 
to practice in the courts of Ashanti and the Northern Territories, 79 ostensibly 
to protect the innocent "natives" of those areas from shyster advocates but no 
doubt also to protect Europeans from the legal costs which would be entailed 
were their claims to land to be challenged in the courts. The British firms 
were very much opposed to juridical control of concessions; they preferred to 
see them controlled by the executive, and they were against the African law-
yers' practicing in court and helping chiefs in their battles with 
concessionaires. In the Colony proper concessions went through the courts and 
the African lawyers were allowed to defend their clients. These "modernized" 
AfricaDs were much mocked for their supposed inconsistency in protecting their 
79McPhee, op. ait., p. 188. The act prohibiting lawyers from practicing 
in Ashanti and the northern Territories was in existence from 1906 to 1923. 
"traditional" rights to the ls..nd; and indeed, no doubt they were motivated by 
other than purely ideological concerns as they waged war in the courts over 
which chief was to be entitled to which land rents. Nevertheless, they were 
the only guardians of traditional land rights as they were the only Africans 
who could understand and inte1~ret British laws of property to their own ad-
vantage. 
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One reason why the Government was not overly concerned with the dangers 
of allowing African lawyers to challenge European claims to land was that it 
was itself entitled to take over land, as it saw fit, and without p~-ing rent, 
under the Public Lands Act of 1876. This Ordinance permitted the Government to 
take over land for public purposes, such as roads, railways, hospital or ad-
ministrative buildings, wi~hout compensation to the owners. In Kumasi, for 
example, the Government took over for its own use all land within one square 
mile of Kumasi fort. 80 In the Northern Territories, it was able .. 1.:a.ke over 
as much land as it wished, as, according to the Digby Report, the chiefs and 
peoples seemed to feel that all land belonged to the British by right of con-
quest. 11 There has been no difficulty in getting land without payment for the 
establishment of Government stations or for other public purposes [in the 
North). 1181 
While both Europeans and Africans agreed to the need to allow the Gov-
ernment the right to expropriate land for public purposes, there were 
complaints throughout the colonial period about abuses connected with this 
right. In 1897 the Government was obliged to pay compensation when i.t expro-
priated the land of an independent European mining company, the Ahanta Company, 
80Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 13. 
81Digby Report, op. ait., p. 169. 
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without going through even the formalities of the 1876 Act. Until the Company 
pressed its claims for compensation this practice had apparently bee::1 quite 
common~ as a confidential circular from the Acting Colonial Secretary indicated. 
Several recent instances [have] been brought to the Governor's notice 
of private land being occupied, and even built on, by some Government 
Department, without any proper steps being taken to acquire the land 
beforehand, either by arrangement with the owner or under the provisions 
of the 'Public Lands Ordinance, 1878' .. ,82 
Until 1919, when the practice was changed, the Government not only took over 
land for public use without compensation but also took the liberty of disposing 
of it, as it saw fit, for the use of other Europeans, often charging them rent 
for the use of these 11public 11 lands. In fact, most of the land on which the 
European firms erected their bungalows and trading houses was owned by the 
Government and they paid rents for it to the Government. The firms disliked 
this system and continually pressed for the right to hold freehold land for 
commercial buildings. The Joint West Africa Comnrlttee suggested in 1907, for 
example, that 
• • . merchants should be allowed to purchase land for their premises 
and to become absolute owners. The present system of leases for 
fourteen to twenty-one years was unsatisfactory: there was no security of 
tenure and no inducement to tenants to erect substru1tial buildings. 83 
Such privileges were never, of course, granted by the Government since they 
would infringe on the principle of African ownership of land. Only the Govern-
ment was allowed to take over ownership. 
But to Africans, Government use of land often meant abuse, especially 
when they could see that Europeans were profiting from their right to oc~upy 
expropriated land. Although as late as 1932 the Governor could argue that in 
toto, Government owned only fifty-two square miles of land in the Colony, 
82GNA, file Adm. 11/1461. Confidential Circular no. 52-1906/6327-00, 12 
December 1906. 
83J1ilAC, 27 November 1907. 
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including all the land needed for the railweys, 8'+ some of this fifty-two square 
miles was prime urban land. Had the Africa~s had the right to rent out that 
land to the Europeans themselves, instead of watching the Government expropri-
ate it for "public" purposes and then rent it out on its own terms to its 
European compatriots, considerable fortunes might have been made. 
An issue which especially aroused African public opinion as regards the 
Public Lands Ordinance was the government takeover of lands in Sekondi to fa-
cilitate the establishment of that town as a commercial and railway centre. 
This takeover was protested vigorously by the Aborigines Righ. ·· 'Protection 
Society. 
We have cause to be apprehensive of confiscatory tendencies in regard 
to land legislation in this country, when we come to think of the many 
uses to which the Pub1ic Lands Ordinance, 1876, has been put •..• 
When the railway was being constructed at Seccondee the Government • • • 
acquil·ed absolutely the site at Seccondee at an inadequate valuable 
consideration and asked the people to remove to Essikadu. • [T]he 
people moved to Essikadu, and the Government parcelled o· · c;y of 
lease, the site to tenants at substantial rents instead of it 
outright in the same way as they had acquired it. The people have now 
their homes at Essikadu. . . • Now the Government have applied the same 
Public Lands Ordinance to oust them from this place also at an inadequate 
consideration by an out-and-out sale. 85 
The opposition to the Government policy of taking land over and then renting it 
to commercial firms, as exemplified by the Sekondi case, was intense, as it 
directly affected the interests of the wealthy, educated community of coastal 
Africans. The policy was therefore eventually changed by Governor Guggisberg 
in 1919. 
We have done away once and for all with the old policy of the Government 
taking up land and sub-letting it afterwards and holding on to the rent 
themselves. The natives are going to have the benefit of the land rented 
to merchants, for that is a fair return to them for having given the land 
to Government for Government purposes.86 
84GCLegCo, 1 March 1932. 
85Belfield Report, op. ait., testimony of E. J. P. Brown, p. 113. 
86GCLegCo, 17 November 1919. 
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But although the decision to grant land rents to the original owners improved 
upon the situation, as late as 1927 Africans 'tvere still complaining that they 
had lost control over urban land, hence had lost control of the right to ex-
ploit it for profit as they saw fit. Kojo Thompson complained in the 
Legislative Council against the government policy of declaring "free zones," 
land set aside for possible Government use which had to be left unused by 
Africans in anticipation of future public needs • 
• • • [A]lthough this Government recognizes that the land belongs to 
the people of this country, yet Government does not allow the people to 
exercise their rights of ownership in particular cases .••• I refer 
. • • to some of the dispossessed people in Accra and to the land on 
Asylum Road--the land that is known by Government as 'free zone'. Some 
of these lands are the properties of private owners and whenever they 
have endeavoured to sell these lands intending purchasers are warned 
that they will not be allowed to build because Government has declared 
that portion 'free zone' .•. I say that whilst the Government fully 
recognizes that the land belongs to the people, they should be paid 
for their lands if Government wants them, whether they use them or not. 87 
In this particular case, the Government agreed to take action to remedy the 
situation of which Kojo Thompson complained. sa Nevertheless, the principle 
remained that the Government could, if it wished, expropriate land for its own 
use. While only fifty-two square miles had been appropriated by 1932, this -vras 
fifty-two square miles of prime land. Had Africans been able to bargain 
directly with the European entrepreneurs who used that land, instead of, after 
1919, indirectly through the Government, they might have been able to make tidy 
fortunes in urban real estate which could then have been invested in other 
enterprises. Similarly, had they been compensated for the use of land for 
roads and railways, small fortunes could have been made in the countryside, 
The development of an indigenous bourgeoisie was inhibited, in this inst~~ce, 
87GCLegCo, 3 March 1927. 
88Ibid. 
c 
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by Government restrictions on the operation of free market forces. 
And indeed, the whole situation with regard to land in Ghana was anoma-
lous. In order to prevent their complete expropriation, from 1897 on Africans 
were obliged to argue for the preservation of traditional rights in land. 
They successfully argued their case in both 1897 and 1911, and pressured the 
Government enough for it to institute a Concessions Ordinance which, while sub-
ject to considerable abuse, could at least be used by educated Africans to 
protect their rights. But in arguing for the preservation of their traditional 
rights against the encroachment of the Europeans, educated Africans used an 
argument which was already, to some extent, outmoded. The preservation of 
traditional property rights was at the expense of the possible development of 
new forms of ownership which would have been more conducive to individual 
private profit for Africans participating in the world economic system. The 
internal economic development of the country was therefore inhibited. A 
choice had to be made between allowing private property relations to develop 
freely, with the concomitant risk that the Europeans, with their greater re-
sources, would then take over all property, and protecting traditional property 
relations into which the Europeans could not intrude, at the expense of 
possible internal capitalist development. The African political community 
chose the latter option. 
0 CHAPTER III 
PERIPHERALIZATION OF GHANA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Despite the fact that land in Ghana was retained in Ghanaian hands and 
that therefore no plantation system arose, or indeed any massive proletarian-
ization of the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, Ghana very early began to 
exhibit the classic signs of a peripheral nation; peripheral, that is, to the 
world capitalist system as a whole. Ghana was economically and politically 
weak. Politically, she was under the direct control of the British imperial 
system. Economically, she was soon to come under the control of expatriate 
firms which were nearly always British in origin. 
Ghana's weak economic position was a result of her inability to control 
her own resources, and of the non-my role which those same resources played in 
the economic system of the world. Moreover, she rapidly became a prima~i!y 
monocultural country. With her heavy reli&tce on cocoa exports she was depend-
ent on economic swings of the world market in general and the cocoa market in 
particular. Even had political power been in African instead of European hands 
between 1886 and 1939, the room for improvenent of Ghana's economic position 
would have been limited by the nature of the crops which she produced and sold. 
This chapter will describe Ghana's economy, as it was in its basic 
features, between 1886 and 1939. There was no structural change to speak of in 
the Ghanaian economy during this time period; it started and ended the colonial 
era as a peripheral economy heavily ~eliant on imports and exports. Y~no­
culturalism became dominant by 1915 when farmers and traders began to neglect 
other products in favour of cocoa. While mi.neral exports provided some r•.;lief 
from complete financial reli~~ce on cocoa, they too were subject to world 
market fluctuations and in any case were entirely controlled by Europeans. 
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Much of' the economy was based on simple extraction, a carry-over of' the earlier 
plundering of' slaves and gold-reserves by the Europeans. A certain amount of 
actual cultivation for profit was evident even before 1900, and the twentieth 
century was a time of' institution of an organized cash-crop economy. But many 
people still engaged only in subsistence cultivation, and many more were able 
to retreat, at least partially, into subsistence cultivation when the market-
place could not supply them with sufficient remuneration f'or their products. 
On the whole, however, their ability to extricate themselves at will f'rom the 
world economy decreased over time. Although Ghana's importance to the world 
economic system was small, the world economic system's effects on her were very 
large. 
This chapter will describe the bases of' Ghana's econo:rcy, concentra.ting 
on her import-export trade. The concluding section of the chapter will analyze 
the regional differentiations within Ghana which resulted f'rom her external 
orientation, and demonstrate how her position in the world system resulted in 
her economic powerlessness. 
l. Ghana as a Producer of' Primary 
Products: Mining 
The colonial name f'or Ghana was the "Gold Coast," and the name reflects 
the economic history of' the area. The Portuguese first came to Ghana in search 
of' gold; gold remained an important export commodity throughout the period of 
the slave trade and when the British took over formal political control of' the 
Gold Coast Colony in 1874, and of Ashanti in 1896, gold was one of' their chief' 
reasons f'or doing so. Throughout the colonial period, gold was one of' Ghana's 
chief' exports. Table 1 indicates the importance of' gold as a percentage of 
Ghana's total exports by value f'rom 1886 to 1939. Its value fluctuated, but its 
importance was always obvious. For twenty-seven of the f'ifty-four years covered 
in this study, it constituted over twenty per cent, by value, of Ghana's 
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Table 1. Gold, Diamonds, and ~anganese as Percentages 
of Total Ghans Exports, 1886-19391 
Total Gold Diamonds Manganese Total Mineral 
Year Exports Value % Total Value % Total Value % Total Value % Total ( £000s) (£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports ( £000s) Exports ( £000s) Exports 
1886 407 75 18 75 18 
1887 372 81 22 81 22 
1888 382 87 23 87 23 
1889 416 103 25 103 25 
1890 601 92 15 92 15 
1891 684 88 13 88 13 
1892 665 99 15 99 15 
1893 722 79 11 79 11 
1894 850 77 9 77 9 
1895 878 91 10 91 10 
1896 792 86 11 86 11 
1897 858 85 10 85 10 
1898 993 64 6 64 6 
1899 1112 51 5 51 5 
1900 885 38 4 38 4 
1901 560 22 4 22 4 
1902 774 97 13 97 13 
1903 980 255 26 255 0?:, '--
1904 1340 346 26 346 26 
1905 1646 596 36 596 36 
1906 1996 822 41 822 41 
1907 2641 1131 43 1131 43 
1908 2525 1122 44 1122 44 
1909 2655 982 37 982 37 
1910 2697 790 29 790 29 
1911 3792 1058 28 1058 28 
1912 4307 1439 33 1439 33 
1913 5427 1626 30 1626 30 
1914 4942 1659 34 1659 34 
1915 5943 1755 30 1755 30 
1916 5816 1201 21 6 0 1207 21 
1917 6364 1718 27 50 1 1768 28 
1918 4472 1365 31 56 1 1421 32 
1919 10814 1404 13 72 , 1476 14 ..... 
1Sources: 1886-1899; Gold Coast, Blue Books. 1900-1939: Geoffrey Kay: 
The PolitiaaZ Eaonomy of Colonialism in Ghana (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), Table 18, p. 325, "Imports,exports, and the balance of visi"ole 
trade, 1900-1960," and Table 2la, pp. 334-335, "Value of major exports, 1900-
1960." N .B. -- = no exports, 0 = some exports but less than 0. 5 per cent. 
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c Table 1 (cont'd.) 
Total Gold Diamonds Manganese Total Mineral 
Year Exports Value % Total Value % Total Value % Total Value % Total ( £000s) (£000s) Exports {£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports 
1920 12352 889 7 68 1 957 8 
1921 6942 855 12 12 0 867 12 
1922 8335 889 11 106 1 995 12 
1923 8959 851 10 327 4 1178 14 
1924 9914 875 9 85 1 526 5 1486 15 
1925 10890 840 8 99 1 681 6 1620 15 
1926 12104 850 7 363 3 685 6 1898 16 
1927 14350 727 5 512 4 683 5 1922 14 
1928 13824 685 5 584 4 610 4 1879 13 
1929 12677 690 5 585 5 748 6 2023 16 
1930 11287 1056 9 659 6 823 7 2538 22 
1931 9300 1069 11 441 5 389 4 1899 20 
1932 8348 1692 20 537 6 124 1 2353 27 
1933 8048 1842 23 518 6 357 4 2717 33 
1934 8117 2421 30 757 9 481 6 3659 45 
1935 9971 2635 26 546 5 612 6 3793 37 
1936 12636 3047 24 585 5 613 5 4245 34 
1937 16218 3911 24 648 lt 1025 6 5584 34 
1938 15425 4842 31 548 4 908 6 6298 41 
1939 16235 6178 38 464 3 790 5 7432 46 
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exports. For the fifteen years between 1903 and 1918, it constituted about 
one-third, by value, of the country's exports, as it did again in the late 
1930s, the Depression era, when a rise in the price of gold was accompanied by 
a decline in demand for Ghana's nonruineral exports. 
Table 1 also indicates that gold was not the only mineral export of 
Ghana; in 1916 Ghana began to export manganese, and from 1924 diamonds were 
also exported. Both these minerals soon became significant, if not major, 
contributors to Ghana's foreign exchange earnings, although they, like gold, 
were controlled almost entirely by Europeans in both production and distribu-
tion so that little benefit accrued to Africans from their sale. 2 
The history of the gold mining industry of Ghana is partially the history 
of the takeover of an indigenous industry by a group of expatriates who, be-
cause they possessed superior technology, were easily able to displace the 
original producers. Gold was mined on an active basis in Gha.."'la. long before the 
first European explorers appeared and negotiated concessions for mines with 
chiefs in the early 1870s. In factt the result of such concession-granting in 
the late nineteenth century was the stoppage of indigenous mining enterprises. 
Sir Richard Burton's account of his voyages, To the Gold Coast fo~ Gotd, 3 shows 
that many prospecting licences granted to Europeans were simply licences to 
take over mining in areas in which it was already known that African mining 
activity existed. Even shaft mining was conducted by Africans, contrary to the 
generally held belief that their level of technical skill had not reached 
beyond the level of "women 1 s washings," or panning. Burton, for instance, saw 
2The exception is the diamond indust1y. In the early years of the in-
dustry, some diamonds were found and exported by African "diamond-winners." 
See below. 
3Richa.rd F. Burton and Verney Lovett. Cameron, To the GOZ.d Coast fo~ Gold 
(London: Cha.tto and Windus, 1883). 
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a "native" shaft in the centre of a concession at the Apatim valley. This con-
cession, known as the "Izrah" concession, was 2,000 by 1,000 yards square, and 
as many as 2, 000 Africans had been known to work there at one time, with 
shafts twelve feet square and fifty-five feet deep over an area of 150 by 120 
yards. 4 The generally held belief was that the Appolonia tribe worked these 
shafts, having learned the elements of shaft mining from the Portuguese centur-
ies before. 5 
In his article, "The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation," G. W. E. Turner 
quotes an oral account of African methods of gold mining, obtained, he states, 
from "a very old man. " 
••• before the White Man came to Obuasi the Appolonians used to sink 
pit until they found the hard rock, when they pile firewood in the pits 
and set fire to this. When the fire is wasted, then they carry water in 
big pots and pour down into the pits until the fire goes out. They wait 
for a day or two until the pit gets cool before they go down again and 
with hammer or something of the kind they break the walls, then having 
become quite loose and very easily broken up ~#ing to the fire they 
burned. Then they bring all the stone up and divide them into three 
parts, one of which is given to the Chief of that land. 6 
All over Ashanti, Africans mined gold either by the panning method, chiefly 
confined to women, or by shafts. Their methods, however, were hardly as so-
phisticated as the European, although they quickly picked up European 
techniques. Burton reported that as soon as Africans learned how to "bore and 
blast" from him, "thefts of powder, drills, and fuses became every day more 
common," 7 as his African employees stole off at night to use his techniques on 
their own shafts. 
4Ibid., p. 159. 
5G. W. Eaten Turner, "The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, n The Mining 
Magazine, no. 6, vol. 46 (June, 1932), p. 329. 
6Ibid., P• 329. 
7Burton, op. cit., p. 246. 
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The Europeans who first made concessions for gold mining did so in areas 
where mining already was taking place~ and they reached these areas not through 
their own intrepid exploring, but rather with the help of hired African guides~ 
The chiefs who negotiated concessions were accustomed to receiving tribute from 
the indigenous miners, but they realized that the rents which the Europeans 
were willing to pay were more than their indigenous miners, with their less 
sophisticated methods of mining, could pay. The chief of the Izrah concession 
preferred a fixed rental of £100 per month to the dues to which he was entitled 
from his own tribespeople. 9 The early gold concessions, ostensibly made for 
prospecting purposes, were simply means by which the chiefs exchanged insecure 
customary tribute for more secure concession rents. Referring ·to the Apatim 
concession, Burton wrote the following: 
Its lessor had forbidden his fraudulent people to prospect or to 
mine, because, as usual, they systematically robbed him of his royalty. 
This universal practice has made the kings and chiefs throughout the 
country ready and even anxious to sell mining lands for small sums which 
will be paid honestly and regularly.lO 
Although European mining methods in the early 1870s, when gold conces-
sions were first staked out, were still relatively primitive (especially since 
it was not yet possible to transport large pieces of machinery inland), African 
methods were even more so. Africans had not yet learned how to prop up large 
tunnels underground, nor had they learned how to pump out their pits. When, 
however, they saw the European inventions, they were eager to use them. The 
Frenchman Bonnat, renowned in all histories as the negotiator of the large 
8For instance, Mr. Sam of Cape Coast, mentioned in ibid., p. 113. 
9Ibid., p. 159. 
1 0 Ibid. ' p • 122 • 
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Tarkwa mining concession, 11 deliberately refused to make pumps available to 
Africans when they asked for them. Bonnat, referring to the Africans working 
the Tarkwa mines, wrote in his journal in 1879 
This has been a very profitable year for them; but their galleries 
· are getting very deep; and when the wet season sets in, not being able 
to drain them, they -vrill have to abandon them. This will be all the 
better for us; for a time will come when we shall reach those galleries 
from our tunnel and easily drain them; all will then be in our posses-
sion • • •12 
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Another European explorer wrote of the African miners "One man assured us that 
he estimated his daily out-run, with two others, at £40. He was most importun-
ate in begging us to sell him a pump at any price, as of late his operations 
had been entirely suspended by the entry of water into his shaft. "13 
Despite the handicaps they faced, several early ventures were made by 
educated Africans to become gold miners themselves, rather than allow the 
industry to :fall straight into the hands of the Europeans. The Tarkwa gold 
area, later to house several European :firms, was originally taken as a conces-
sion by Dr. J. Africa.nus Horton, an African physician in the employ of the West 
African Medical Service, in conjunction with one Mr. Fitzgerald, British pub-
lisher of the African. Times and an enthusiastic supporter of indigenous 
African enterprise. 1 ~ These two entrepreneurs formed the Gold Coast Mining 
Company in 1880, after Horton had already spent over two years going "rotmd the 
country inland from Axim persuading rulers to grant him mining concessions.nlS 
11For a biography of Bonnat, see H. Bevin "M. J. Bonnat; Trader and 
tl.ining Promoter," The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, no. 7, vol. 4 (1960). 
12Quoted in W. F. Holmes, "Notes on the Early History of Tarkwa as a Gold 
Mining District," Gold Coast Review, no. 1, vol. 2 (1926), p. 81 
13Ibid., p. 84. 
14The story of Horton' s gold mining venture is found in Christopher 
Fy:fe' s Africanua Horton: West African. Scientist and Patriot (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), pp. 129-132. 
I sib ·a 1.- ·, p. 131. 
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But the Company failed for want of technology. At a meeting of the Society of 
Arts in London in 1882, Horton pleaded for technical aid to save the African 
Gold Coast Company and the Effentua Company, both his own concerns. The first 
company, he said ". • • did its work well, but unfortunately they had not the 
machinery which would bring good dividends to the shareholders. "16 At Effentua 
"They had four different places, and shafts in another place, and it was only 
the want of proper machinery to raise the water from the valley up to where the 
stamping machinery was, which prevented their paying large dividends. • •• " 17 
Because of his inability to obtain machinery and financial backing, Horton, 
like other African entrepreneurs, was obliged to stand aside and watch as 
Europeans quickly made concessions over all the gold land of Ashanti and the 
Gold Coast. 
The European takeover of mining in the late nineteenth century was to 
have a serious effect not only on African entrepreneurs, but also on African 
goldsmiths. The function of gold, in European eyes, was to act as currency, 
not inside Ghana which could function well enough on silver and cowrie shells, 
but outside Ghana, in the world market where gold was the ultimate means of 
exchange. The African custom of using gold for ornament;:; and jewelry was 
downgraded and considered irrelevant by the Europeans. In 1908 a law was pas-
sed permitting the free dealing by Africans in gold won by "native methods"18; 
the Government, however, consistently refused to publicize this Bill or to ad-
viae Africans as to this right as it wished to buy as much gold as it could for 
itself. " • [T]he interests of the Colony would best be served by issuing 
16Reported in Joumat of the Society of Arts, vol. 30 (June 2, 1882), 
p. 782. 
17Ib*d ~ •t '1.- • , t-OO. 0'1.- • 
18GCLegCo., 4 August 1908. 
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no official notification to native landowners that they are allowed to offer 
for sale Gold Dust collected on their own lands." l9 The Government wished to 
ensure that as much gold as possible was exported. No gold produced in the 
mines could be sold in Ghana and anyone found with mined gold was presumed to 
have obtained it illegally. Goldsmith's shops were often searched for illegal-
1y obtained gold. 
African members of the Legislative Council often spoke up on the subject 
of the rights of goldsmiths, but they received little redress until 1926 when 
goldsmiths were at last given the right to bu;y a certain amount of gold from 
the banks so that they could continue their trade. 20 But in 1932, to curb the 
African indus~ry, Government passed a regulation that all goldsmiths must pay 
licence fees; 21 and in 1938 another bill was passed shifting the onus of 
proving that gold had been legally obtained onto the possessor. 22 All of these 
acts served to guarantee that the maximum amount of gold was available for 
Empire use and the minimum for traditional African uses. The craft of gold-
smithing declined as a result. 
The law of concession which eventually emerged out of the Government's 
attempts to regulate gold mining in Ghana stipulated that no concession could 
I 
exceed five square miles in area~ while no company could have more than twenty 
square miles in toto. The maximum period of validity was ninety-nine years, 
while the maximum period during which an option to acquire a concession could 
be held was three years. A five per cent duty was to be paid on all mining 
19Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Accra, to LivCC, 6 June 1906, re-
ported in LivCC, 2 July 1906. 
20GCLegCo., 23 February 1926. 
21GCLegCo., 2 March 1932. 
22GCLegCo., 17 March 1938. 
c 
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profits. 23 The law of concession, however, did not apply to concessions ob-
tained before 1895, hence Ashanti Goldfields, which was rapidly to become the 
largest, most successful gold mine in the colony, was permitted to retain the 
lOO-square-mile concession it had obtained in 1897, on the grounds that the 
original negotiations for its concession had begun in 1895. 
A two-tiered system of gold mining quickly grew up in Ghana and remained 
the pattern until the Second World War. A plethora of small companies emerged 
about the turn of the century when a false report on the gold-mining prospects 
of Ghana combined with the South African war to divert much mining capital to 
investment in the former colony. In the Annual Report of the Gold Coast for 
1898 the Government stated that there was enough gold in the Western Province 
for £40,000,000 of gold to be extracted in ten years, at an annual profit of 
These statements touched off a burst of speculation, 1-rhich became 
known as the 'Jungle Boom' and by the end of 1901 about 400 companies 
with a total nominal capital of nearly £40,000,000 had been formed to 
operate concessions in West Africa. The boom collapsed in the following 
year •••• [O]ut of those 400 companies not one ••. has survived in 
•t . . 1 f 24 1 s or1g1na orm. • • . 
Although the 400 companies registered in 1900 represented a high point 
in gold speculation in Ghana, they were typical of the many small firms which 
were to emerge and re-emerge throughout the colonial period, often dissolving 
themselves and then re-forming under slightly different names. Their subscribed 
capital rarely approximated their declared capital, and investors frequently 
lost their entire investment. An investigation of the Stock Exchange Yearbook 
at ten-year intervals reveals that while there were only eight public gold 
23N. R. Junner, 11 Gold in the Gold Coast" (Accra: Government Printer, 
1935), "Appendix," by?.. P. Wild, p. 72. 
24GCCMines, "Gold in the Gold Coastn (December 1950), p. 7. 
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mines listed for 1885 and only three for 1895, in 1905 there were 153, in 1915 
sixty-seven, in 1925 forty-three, and in 1939 forty-nine companies registered 
as having interests in mining gold in Ghana. Aside from these companies there 
were many others which were never listed as public concerns. 
Many of these mines failed because they were no more than prospecting 
ventures, which never actually struck gold. For example, the Gold Coast Selec-
tion Trust Limited spent a total of some £108,000 on prospeating its concession; 
but no gold was ever found. 25 Other mines failed because they simply did not 
have the capital necessary for their investments; operating often on shoestring 
budgets, one major loss could break them. The important Abontiakoon Mine, for 
example, was liquidated in 1927 after the mine flooded because the crank shaft 
on the main engine broke and there was no money for repairs. 26 Another fre-
quent complaint of the mines was that they could not find enough underground 
labourers to operate successfully; Africans could make more on cocoa farms than 
the mining venturers were willing to pay them. 
Only Ashanti Goldfields and the mines which had very large holdings in 
the Tarkwa area of Ghana were able to make any substantial profits in the in-
dustry. Over the nineteen-year period from 1912 to 1931,, only four mines 
produced over £3m. worth of gold. 
The first mining boom, around 1900, was followed by a second "boom," 
somewhat more subdued in style, in the 1930s when the fixed price of gold was 
removed and the price therefore rose dramatically. During the 1930s, with the 
251bid., pp. 12-13. 
26Interview with an English metallurgist involved in mining in Ghana 
from 1919 to 1968, Liverpool, November 1974. 
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Table 2. Output of Chief Producing Mines in Ghana 
for the Nineteen Years Ending March 193127 
Mine 
Gold Coast Colony 
Abontiakoon 
Tarkwa and Abosso 
Prestea 
Broomassie 
Akoko 
Bibiani 
Ankobra Dredging 
Cinnamon Bippo 
Koyiankor 
Akim and Atta 
Wassaw (G.C.) 
Ashanti 
Obuasi Mines 
Ashanti Goldfields 
Offin River Estates and Dredge 
Lyndhur st Deep 
Fine Ounces 
731,634 
1,16~( ,941 
985,809 
119,149 
30,952 
29,982 
10,588 
89,652 
3,662 
8,639 
8,347 
19,944 
1,929,042 
30,947 
4,521 
Value (£) 
3,107,942 
4,961,378 
4,188,030 
506,190 
122,994 
127,458 
45,128 
380,841 
15,556 
36,585 
35,457 
84,716 
8,194,959 
131,448 
19,207 
high price, many formerly unremunerative mines re-entered production. 28 Also 
during the 1930s the gold-mining industry as a whole became somewhat more or-
ganized. A group kno~~ as the Finsbury Pavement House Group bought up many of 
the Tarkwa mines, including Aristo, Prestea, Gold Coast Main Reef, Amalgamated 
Banket Areas (which itself owned several mines), Gold Coast Banket Areas, South 
Banket Areas, and the Brimang Gold Dredging Company. 29 At one point the 
Finsbury Pavement House Group owned some 400 companies. Its chairman, H. G. 
La.tilla, was also a director of mines in Nigeria, South Africa, and Rhodesia.30 
27GCCMines, Fourth Annual Report (1931), p. 13. 
28GCCMines, Seventh Annual Report (1934) speech by the President, p. 16. 
29Interview with a former Chairman, Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, Accra, 
May 1974. 
30Direatory of Direa·tors (1935). 
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More order was introduced into the mining industry with the formation of 
the "London Advisory Committee" in 1936, which, according to one former cl1air-
man of the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, was formed of all the chairmen of the 
major mining interests and made all of the important decisions for the indus-
try.31 Its first chairman was J. H. Batty, the chairman of Ashanti Goldfields 
as well as of several other mines, and former chairman of the African and 
Eastern Trade Corporation.32 
Ashanti Goldfields was the foremost goldfield of Ghana, the only mine 
with a consisten~ record of profits throughout the colonial period. Much of 
its success it owed to the fact that it was a far more productive mine ths.n 
others; whereas the Tarkwa group of mines was located in the low-producing 
banket areas, Ashanti was a high-producing quartz mine. In the nineteen-year 
period from 1912 to 1931 Ashanti produced some two million fine ounces of gold 
at a total value of eight million po~~ds sterling. Table 3 indicates the 
dividend rates paid by Ashanti Goldfields up to 1939. The consistently high 
dividends (which do not include bonuses such as the issue of two shares for 
one) indicate the high level of profitability as compared with the hundreds of 
other mines which either failed completely or eked out o~ly the smallest of 
production and profits. 
Some of Ashanti's success might, however, be attributed to its lOO-
square-mile concession over some of the richest gold land of Ashanti.33 
31 Interview. The author was unable to obtain access to any records of 
the London Advisory Committee, nor to locate any records of its assumed prede-
cessor, the West African Chamber of Mines, which is mentioned frequently in the 
Minutes of the British Chambers of Commerce. 
32Directory of Directors (1935 and 1925). 
33Stock Exchange Yearbook (1939} lists Ashanti as follows: "Registered 
25 May 1897. Owns (inter aUa) the lease (until 31 Dec. 1986, subject to a 
Government royalty of 5% on gold and other metals) of 100 square miles in the 
district of Bekwai and Adansi, Ashanti, West Africa." 
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Table 3. Ashanti Goldfields: Dividend Rates 
(Ordinary Shares) 1903-1939 3 ~ 
Year Dividend Year Dividend Year Dividend Year Dividend (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1903 75 1912 87-1/2 1921 25 1930-1 90 
1904 nil 1913 75 1922 nil 1931-2 75 
1905 nil 1914 68-3/4 1923-4 25 1932-3 70 
1906 nil 1915 68-3/4 1924-5 37-1/2 1933-4 75 
1907 20 1916 70 1925-6 45 1934-5 85 
1908 nil 1917 75 1926-7 50 1935-6 95 
1909 25 1918 70 1927-8 55 1936-7 95 
1910 75 1919 62-l/2 1928-9 65 1937~8 95 
1911 87-1/2 1920 45 1929-30 100 
Although Ashanti Goldfields did not use all of this land for gold mining, 
nevertheless its concession prevented competitors from moving in. Further, the 
concession gave the mine exclusive rights tQ the use of timber in the 100-
square-mile area, thus effecting considerable savings in the costs of fuel and 
construction. With such a large concession, it was able to exert a consider-
able amount of influence over the Colonial Government; specifically, to make a 
deal with the Government to extend the railw~ to its minehead at Obuasi in 
1903. 35 
A further privilege which accrued to Ashanti Goldfields under the terms 
of its lease was a complete monopoly of trading rights within the lOO-square-
mile area. The mine ran a company called the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company, 
in conjunction with the three companies of ~illers, Swanzy and the African 
Association (which were later to become the mainstays of the Afric~~ and Eastern 
Trading Corporation and then of the United Africa Company).36 This trading 
34stoak E~ahange Yearbook (1939, 1910). 
35For details of this deal, see Chapter V. 
36see Chapter IV for details of these companies. 
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company was on the whole very successful and "There were years when the divi-
dend on the paid up capital exceeded forty per cent." 37 Because the 
concession's trade monopoly had been granted by the Government, there were some 
constraints on the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company's activities. Specifically, 
the company could not charge Europeans more than ten per cent above cost on 
imported goods. However, no such constraint was placed upon dealings with 
Africans. A report by the Ashanti-Obua.si 'l'rading Company to its headquarters 
in London in 1928 shows how jealously its monopoly of trade was guarded. 
This business has the sole monopoly to trade on the lOO square miles 
of the Concession belonging to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. • • • 
The Trading Rights have been the subject of litigation •••• [I]n 1917 
we on the Gold Coast brought a Case in the Ashanti Courts for infringe-
ment of our rights against an African trader, and as a result this man 
was turned off our property. The question of these Rights turns up from 
time to time and the Government know they have to support us as if they 
did not they would probably have to compensate us to do away with the 
Rights. We undertake to supply Europeans working on the Mines at an 
agreed 10% upon cost, but we are free to do the African trade without any 
such arrangement. We purchase annually about 2,500 tons of Cocoa. Here 
again Africans have infringed our Rights by attempting to buy Cocoa en 
the Lands, and the Government usually remove them without action being 
taken . • • as we claim to have the Sole Right here also. • 38 
Those African traders who were permitted to trade on concession property had 
to pay ground rents to the company. Although the Government could have re-
moved the monopoly rights on the grounds that Ashanti Goldfields did not 
actually have th.e right to transfer the monopoly to the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading 
Company, a se·parate concern, it did not choose to do so. The injunction against 
and expulsion of the "native trader Nelson" in 1917 was one of several inci-
dents in which the company destroyed the businesses of Africans trading on 
' 
37J. J. Rankin, The History of the United Africa Company Limited to 1938 
(London: United Africa Company, 1938) p. 87. 
38UAC.Rankin file: Report 55. (Italics in original.) 
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its concession land; in general it only permitted Africans to trade if they 
originally bought their goods from Ashanti-Obuasi. 39 
Ashanti Goldfields ·was rivalled in its profit-making capacity by only 
two other Ghana mines, the African Manganese Company40 and Consolidated African 
Selection Trust. The former was the first to exploit the huge manganese de-
posits discovered by a Government geologist during the First Weld War,41 the 
latter was to become the owner of Ghana's diamonds. As shown in Table 1 above, 
the discoveries of manganese and diamonds helped to diversify Ghana's export 
economy. The reason for their discovery, however, was not the Government's 
concern with monocultural dependence, but rather its increased need for mineral 
supplies in wartime. Manganese, especially, was a strategic material and as 
soon as it was discovered in 1914 the Government made plans to exploit it. 42 
Bauxite was also discovered during World War I and was immediately pre-empted 
by the Government, over the protests of certain African members of the Legis-
lative Council, 43 for the use of the Empire. "It has been considered advisable 
to secure this mineral deposit for the Colony, and through the Colony for the 
exclusive use of the Empire, as aluminium is likely to be in great demand after 
the war. 
War II. 
n44 But the bauxite was not actually exploited until after World 
Government policy with regard to the new mineral resources, combined 
39UAC: document 393, Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Co. Ltd. 
40A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation. 
41Its discovery was announced in GCLegCo, 25 October 1917. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
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with the tec~~ological inability of Afric&lS to exploit these resources, 
quickly pushed both manganese and diamonds into British hands. As early as 
1860, Africanus Horton had speculated that there were diamonds in Keta, in the 
eastern province of the Colony. '+ 5 When the diamonds were eventually found by 
Europeans in Akim Abua.kwa, however, Africar~s could not exploit them on any 
large scale. Consolidated African Selection Trust, registered in 1924, quickly 
acquired "alluvial diamond mining concessions over about fifty-four square 
miles in the Akim district, "'+ 6 and immediately began to pay high dividends. 
Table 4. Consolidated African Selection Trust: Dividend Rates 
(Ordinary Shares) 1925-26 to 1938-3947 
Year Dividend Year Dividend Year Dividend Year Dividend (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1925-6 45 1929-30 60 1932-3 4o 1935-6 70 
1926-7 70 1930-1 35 1933-4 60 1936-7 90 
1927-8 70 1931-2 20 1934-5 65 1937-8 15 
1928-9 70 
Al~hough most of the diamonds exported from Ghana went to the Consoli-
dated African Selection Trust, some diamonds were found loose in the soil. 
Africans who wished to sell these diamonds were obliged, even if the diamonds 
were found on their own soil, to purchase licences to act as "diamond winners." 
Such licences were granted at the discretion of the District Commissioner who 
was, however, obliged after 1926 to grant the licence if he was satisfied that 
the landowner was the true owner of the diamond. '+8 The capacity of individual 
45Fyfe, op. ait., p. 128 
46stook Exohange Yearbook (1939). 
41Ibid. 
48This licence system was discussed in GCLegCo, 22 February 1926. 
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Africans to export found diamonds was seriously hampered, however, by the fact 
that they had to enter into a bond to ensure that they could p~ the export 
duty. Few Africans could afford to pay the fifteen per cent of the value of 
the diamond required as a bond, 49 hence they sold their found diamonds to 
Europeans inside the country. In areas covered by diamond concessions, 
African diamond winners were not permitted to operate and "the holder of the 
mining concession possesse[d] certain rights of search and power to prohibit 
unauthorized persons from entering therein. n50 
This brief exposition of the development of diamond, manganese, and 
gold industries in Ghana highlights the dependence of the Africans on European 
technology to exploit these resources, a dependence which resulted in the 
almost total takeover of the industry by Europeans. Fortunately for Ghana, 
however, it was only in mining that pPoduation, as well as distribution, was 
taken out of indigenous hands. Chapter IV will describe in detail how 
Africans were driven out of the commercial network while large British trading 
houses, banks, and shippers took over the international distribution of 
Ghanaian produce. But, partly because of African agitation to keep the land 
in their own hands, and partly because of other political factors, as well as 
because plantation agriculture did not suit the climate,and products of Ghana, 
export production remained in the control of African farmers. While the 
country became more and more monocultural as the initially diversified agri-
cultural exports gave way to cocoa, nevertheless the fact that cocoa 
production was so uniquely suited to peasant agriculture guaranteed a certain 
leeway to the Ghanaian producer. 
49GCLegCo, 16 August 1920. 
SOJ 't 7 unner, op. ~ ., p. 3. 
2. Ghana as a Producer of Primary 
Products: Agriculture 
Table 5 presents the percentage figures for the major agricultural ex-
ports of Ghana from 1886 to 1939. From this table it can be seen that the 
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major exports, aside from minerals, were cocoa, palm oil, palm kernels, rubber, 
and timber. Graph 1 presents visually the percentages of Ghana's total exports 
which all of these major crops constituted. It can clearly be seen that palm 
oil, rubber, palm kernels, and timber, while constituting significant percent-
ages of Ghana's exports in the early colonial period, dropped sharply after 
1905 and had virtually disappeared by 1915, leaving cocoa as the only agricul-
tural export of any significance whatever. 
The gradual elimination of all other export crops in favour of cocoa 
production reflected the external conditions which Ghanaian producers faced. 
They produced, and sold, the product for which they could receive the best 
price. Attempts,such as they were, by Government, business, or chiefs to 
diversify the economy, always fell back against the economic fact that cocoa 
was simply the most profitable product for the Ghanaian farmer. That cocoa was 
profitable, however, also reflected market realities. Poor quality rubber or 
palm oil from Ghana could not compete with good quality rubber and palm oil, or 
oil substitutes, from other countries; but poor quality cocoa could always find 
a market. 51 
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a concentration 
on palm oil, palm kernel, and rubber production to the detriment of all other 
Ghanaian exports. Certain products which had formerly been minor sources of 
revenue lost their importance; these included ivory, monkey skins, gum copal, 
and kola nuts. Animal exports such as ivory and monkey skins declined as the 
51The question of cocoa quality is discussed below, Chapter VI. 
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Table 5. Major Agricultural Products as Percentages of 
Total Ghana Exports, 1886-193952 
Total Palm Total Cocoa Palm Oil Rubber Timber Year Exports {%) (%) Kernels (%) .(%) Agricultural ( £000s) (%) Exports {%) 
1886 407 38 12 17 67 
1887 372 38 11 17 66 
1888 382 39 18 10 67 
1889 416 33 15 13 61 
1890 601 24 13 38 75 
1891 684 28 13 29 3 73 
1892 665 27 15 25 5 72 
1893 722 0 25 11 30 7 73 
1894 850 0 28 13 27 8 76 
1895 878 0 26 11 37 3 77 
1896 792 0 16 11 40 7 74 
1897 858 0 13 8 49 11 81 
1898 993 1 11 7 56 11 86 
1899 1112 1 16 10 50 8 85 
1900 885 3 27 11 37 8 86 
1901 560 8 32 16 19 10 85 
1902 774 12 30 17 12 3 74 
1903 980 9 15 ll 20 5 60 
1904 1340 15 10 6 27 4 62 
1905 1646 ll 5 5 20 5 46 
1906 1996 17 6 4 17 4 48 
1907 2641 20 5 4 13 6 48 
1908 2525 21 5 3 7 6 42 
1909 2655 28 5 4 10 3 50 
1910 2697 32 6 7 13 5 63 
1911 3792 43 3 5 6 4 61 
1912 4307 38 3 5 4 5 55 
1913 5427 46 l 3 2 7 59 
1914 4942 44 1 2 0 5 52 
1915 5943 62 0 1 0 2 65 
1916 5816 66 1 1 1 2 71 
1917 6364 49 0 1 2 1 53 
1918 4472 40 2 3 1 3 49 
1919 10814 77 0 2 0 1 80 
52sources: 1886-1899: Gold Coast, Blue Books. 1900-1939: Kay, op. 
cit., Table 19, "Imports, exports, and the balance of visible trade, 1900-
1960," pp. 325-326, and Table 2la, ''Value of major exports, 1900-1960," pp. 
334-335. N.B. -- =no exports, 0 = some exports but less than 0.5 per cent, 
n. d. = no data. 
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Table 5 (cont'd.) 
Total Cocoa Palm Oil Palm Rubber Timber Total Year Exports (%) (%) Kernels (%) (%) Agricultural ( £000s) (%) Exports (%) 
1920 12352 81 1 2 0 3 87 
1921 6942 69 0 0 0 3 72 
1922 8335 70 0 1 0 3 74 
1923 8959 73 0 1 0 2 76 
1924 9914 73 0 1 0 n.d. 74 
1925 10890 76 0 1 0 n.d. 77 
1926 12104 76 0 1 0 n.d. 77 
1927 14350 82 0 1 0 n. d. 83 
1928 13824 81 0 1 0 1 83 
1929 12677 77 0 1 0 1 79 
1930 11287 62 0 1 0 1 64 
1931 9300 59 0 0 0 1 60 
1932 8348 66 0 1 0 0 67 
1933 8048 62 0 0 0 0 62 
1934 8117 50 0 0 0 1 51 
1935 99'71 52 0 0 0 1 53 
1936 12636 61 0 1 0 1 63 
1937 16218 62 0 1 0 1 64 
1938 15425 29 0 0 0 0 29 
1939 16235 31 0 0 0 0 31 
0 
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supply was depleted, while other exports such as kola, which was used by 
Africans in other parts of West Africa, especially Nigeria, and cotton, from 
which cloth was made, suffered as the direction of trade reversed from the 
north to the south. 
Various British Government efforts were made to diversify and intensify 
Ghana's export capacity after the political takeover in 1874. Among crops 
which the British Government (and traders) tried to introduce were cotton, 
coffee, and tobacco. 5~ None of these crops could succeed, however, without the 
active cooperation of the Africans who were to cultivate them. And the African 
cultivators were aware that, while cotton, coffee, and tobacco were of specula-
tive value only, a ready market could be found for both palm products and 
rubber. 
Palm oil and kernels had been important Ghanaian crops since the aboli-
tion of the slave trade had compelled entrepreneurs to search for something new 
to sell. After 1850, a large market for palm products arose in Western ~~rope. 
The new machine-based factories in Europe used palm oil for lubrication; and 
the rising prosperity of the middle classes and skilled workers provided a 
market for palm-based soap and candles. 55 From the palm kernels, oil for 
margarine was extracted. Palm oil was an inportant product because it was also 
used locally; hence its production did not impose on traditional ways of life 
or cause major reallocations of farming priorities. Palm kernels, however, 
were produced primarily for export.56 
54
"Report of the Commission on Econcmic Agriculture in the Gold Coast 
1889" (manuscript) GNA Adm. 5/3/7, pp. 99-123. 
55John E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and. the Making of Nigeria (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 10. 
56Bevin, "The Gold Coast .• "op. ait., p. 73. 
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Until about 1902, the combined production of palm oil and palm kernels 
constituted about forty per cent of Ghana's exports. It is interesting to note 
that the production of palm products seemed to vary inversely with that of 
rubber, suggesting that these were probably alternative lines "between which 
traders could switch their interest according to where their best advantage lay 
for the time being. n57 The decline in palm oil exports after 1902 seems to 
have been caused by a combination of poor production conditions and falling 
prices on the world market. Transportation costs were high in Ghana, and palm 
oil and kernels were high-weight, low-priced goods which gave little return per 
mile compared to more expensive goods such as gold, or even rubber. 58 More 
important, however, the methods of purification of oil in Ghana were primitive, 
and the oil produced often could not compete with oil from other areas such as 
Lagos, let alone with substitutable products such as tallow, petroleum, or 
whale oils. The process of fermentation employed in Ghana produced low-quality 
"hard" oil, whereas "soft" oil connnanded a better price. 59 The problem was 
exacerbated, moreover, by persistent adulteration of the product; palm oil was 
mixed with adulterants as various as red e~·th, overripe plantain, and sour 
kenke.6° The idea of quality control for palm products was entertained by the 
Government as early as the 1890s, but no efforts at legislation to that effect 
were made until the 1930s. 
The combination of poor quality and lack of competitiveness with aubsti-
tutable products resulted in lower prices for palm products between 1885 and 
57H. J. Bevin, "Some Notes on Gold Coast Exports 1886-1913," The Economic 
Bulletin of Ghana, no. 1, vol. 4 (January 1960), p. 16. 
58 11Report ••• 1889,n op. oit., p. 57. 
59Ibid., PP• 46-56. 
6010id., p. 51. Kenke is a staple food of Ghana made from fermented corn 
(maize). 
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1905.61 Since, simultaneously, the price offered for cocoa rose, it was 
natural for farmers to switch their efforts from palm trees to cocoa trees, 
despite the fact that palm trees grew "naturally" whereas cocoa trees had to be 
planted and tended for a good five years before they could bear fruit. In 
later years, it became a constant concern of the Government that African 
farmers· refused to cultivate palm products because they were too concerned 
with cocoa, and it was often charged that fine supplies of palm trees were 
brutally cut down to make way for cocoa farms. 62 Such charges, it would seem, 
were exaggerated, especially as palm trees ·were used by farmers to provide the 
necessary shade for the growth of young cocoa plants. In any case, palm trees 
were also exploited locally for oil and palm wine. The Government's sporadic 
attempts through the 1910s and '20s to encourage Africans to cultivate and ex-
port more palm products failed to recognize the realities of the international 
market. 
The cultivation of rubber began for reasons similar to palm oil and 
failed for much the same reasons. Between 1890 and 1905 the Gold Coast was 
the largest rubber producer in the British Empire, and fourth of the world's 
five leading rubber producers.6 3 According toR. E. Dumett, the rise of rubber 
exports was due to African responsiveness to international market conditions, 
at a time when the Government was trying to encourage nonprofitable crops such 
as coffee and tobacco. He argues that rubb~r production in Ghana began in 1883 
61Bevin, "Some Notes •.•• -1913," op. cit., p. 15. 
62For example, a report by W. S. Tudhope, Director of Agriculture, 23 
September 1910. "The destruction of the oil palm trees in making clearings for 
cocoa and other agricultural crops is quite unnecessary and should be discon-
tinued. 11 In GNA S.N .A. Case no. 87/1911. 
63R. E. Dumett, "The Rubber Trade of the Gold Coast and Asante in the 
Nineteenth Century: African Innovation and Market Responsiveness," Journal of 
AfPican History, no. 1, vol. 12 (1971), p. 79. 
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as a response to an attempt by an international ring of speculators to corner 
all existing supplies of Para rubber, mainly from Brazil. Gold Coast Africans 
quickly joined the attempts to break this monopoly.6~ 
But, like palm oil, rubber also suffered from inferior methods of pro-
cessing and preparation, which resulted in a product which was wet, heavy, and 
difficult to transport. The rubber trees were also overexploited, as their 
trunks were often cut down in order to obtain rubber, rather than simply being 
tapped. 65 As soon as alternative sources of supply were found, Gold Coast 
rubber lost much of its market. Gold Coast rubber was wild, not cultivated; as 
such it could not compete with rubber from the organized plantations whicb 
arose early in the twentieth century in Southeast Asia, where the rubber was 
also of the Hevea variety, a variety which had a higher caoutchouc content and 
yielded more rubber because of the "wound response" flow which its trees 
evinced during the first five years of tapping.66 Given the competition from 
Asian rubber, and the obvious opportunities for investment in cocoa, the iemand 
for which rose rapidly in the 1900s and 1910s, it was rational for rubber pro-
ducers (and oil palm producers) to use the money they had earned to invest in 
new cocoa plantations.67 
Before going on to discuss the cocoa industry, a look should be taken at 
the timber trade in Ghana which, although it did not provide a very large per-
centage of Ghana's exports, nevertheless is unique in that production and much 
of distribution were in African hands. The timber industry was never as large, 
6~Ibid.' p. 81. 
6 5
"Report • 1889 , 11 op. ci t . , p • 90 • 
66Dumett, 11The Rubber • • • Responsiveness, 11 op. cit., p. lOO. 
67Ibid 
. . ' p. 95. 
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during the colonial period, as one might have supposed it could have been from 
the amount of timber, especially mahogany, available. In fact, during the 
1880s and 1890s Ghana was importing timber from the United States because of 
the difficulty of obtainin it in the colony.68 Transportation difficulties 
were the main reason for the slowness of the development of the industry. The 
heavy logs were cut as near to rivers as possible, and then floated down; hence 
the Ankobra river and the port of Axim were the centres of the earliest timber 
export trade. As logs near the rivers were depleted, it became necessary to 
move further inland; logs were cut near railway lines as these were built, and 
later near roads. After World War I, lorries were introduced to carry the 
logs. Until 1939, all logging was conducted by this method of manual extrac-
tion and dragging of logs to transport facilities, although a very few tractors 
were introduced to replace hauling gangs in the 1930s. 69 
The logs which were exported were usually owned by Africans. No 
Europeans, exeept for one American Company from Louisville, 7 0 had timber con-
cessions in Ghana prior to World War II. Many mines, of course, possessed 
timber rights on their concessions, but they did not avail themselves of these 
rights for exporting purposes although they complained bitterly about Africans 
who trespassed on their land to obtain logs. 7l African entrepreneurs could 
obtain "concessions" for logs from chiefs; to the chagrin of certain Europeans, 
these concessions were not subject to the 1900 Concessions Law as they were the 
68The Gold Coast Legislative Council decided in 1892 to spend £2,650 on 
timber from the U.S., GCLegCo, 24 June 1892. 
69Tbe above description is taken from "Gold Coast Timber Industry-Report 
of a Fact-finding Committee Appointed by the Minister of Commerce, Industry and 
Mines" (Accra, 1952.), p. 29. 
70 Interview with a former European Barrister, Accra, May 197 4. 
71See statement by Mr. Hunt, European Unofficial Member, in GCLegCo, 29 
April 1907. 
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object of dealings between "natives." "Pa" Grant, a legendary figure in 
Ghanaian history and probably the first African timber merchant to open up an 
office in Britain, obtained his logs from concessions, at one time having as 
much as 700 square miles of concession land. 72 other entrepreneurs obtained 
logs simply by buying them, one at a time, from the owners of the trees, and 
shipping them to the coast in whatever manner they could. 
For many years, even after logs had arrived at the coast for shipment, 
facilities at the surf ports were unable to handle them. 'l'he older ships, 
moreover, were not able to lift the logs and their hatches were unsuitable for 
their transport. 7 3 Many of the regular shipping lines refused to handle logs 
at all, although the German shipping line, Woermann, was willing to take logs. 
Prior to World War I much Ghanaian timber went to Germany while British brokers 
complained that it was unobtainable. 74 "Pa" Grant was often unable to obtain 
shippers for his logs. After World War I he bought and converted two German 
minesweepers for carriage of his exports, but in the face of this competition 
the large shipping companies agreed, at last, to ship his logs. 7 5 
The timber industry as a whole, however, never reached large propcrtions 
until after World War II. The transportation infrastructure had to be com-
pleted before it was worth the while of Europeans to invest in the trade. 
Africans, with the exception of such persons as Grant, generally did not have 
enough capital to exploit the industry; they certainly did not have the contacts 
72Interview with George Grant Jr., son of "Pa" Grant, Takoradi, July 
1974. 
73Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Cd.4668 (1909). Testimony of Sir 
Ralph Moor, Q.7055. 
74Charlotte Leubuscher, The West African Shipping Trade (Leyden: A. W. 
Sythoff, 1963), p. 22. 
75rnterview with George Grant Jr. 
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in Europe and America which would enable them to get credit for exporting. 
Moreover, there were difficulties in proving ownership of trees. 76 Neverthe-
less, it would seem that such problems would have been surmountable had there 
been a real desire to export Ghanaian timber in large quantities; as it was, 
timber exports, like palm kernels, palm oil, and rubber exports, declined to 
almost nothing after 1915. The cocoa market provided so many opportunities 
for European entrepreneurs that timber was not even considered as an opportun-
ity for investment. 
The export of cocoa from Ghana began in minute quantities in the 1890s, 
rising considerably after the turn of the twentieth century to become the fore-
most export of the colony, vastly overshadowing all others, by 1910. 77 The 
origin of the cocoa industry in Ghana was for many years a matter for debate, 
centring around the question of whether Africans or Europeans were responsible 
for its introduction. The Basel Mission experimented with cocoa in Ghana as 
early as 1858,78 but as there was no market for the product at that time its 
cultivation did not spread. In 1876, however, a Ghanaian by the name of Tetteh 
Quarshie, who had gone to Fernando Po to work on the Portuguese cocoa ple.nta-
tions, stole some pods and brought them home to his native Mampong, where he 
sold them to his fellow farmers. 79 It seemed that there was a market for the 
cocoa, especially after 1900 when the firm of Cadbury decided to buy its cocoa 
76
"Timber Supply, Consumption, and Marketing in Gold Coast," undated, 
report included in GNA, Cape Coast, Adm.23/l/801. 
77The rise, organization, and effects of the marketing of cocoa will be 
discussed only partially in this chapter. Chapters IV and VII deal with cocoa 
marketing inside Ghana and the international cocoa market. 
78"The Story of the Basel Trading Company Limited, 1859-1935," supplement 
to the West African Review (November 1935), p. 14. 
79The story of Tetteh Quarshie can be found in Sampson, op. cit. 
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from Ghana rather than from the slave plantations of Sao Thome and Fernando Po. 
The Government agriculture department, unaware of the market for cocoa, did not 
begin to promote its cultivation until well after the industry was established 
through the enterprise of the African farmers. Nor, indeed, did its transpor-
tation policy encourage the development of cocoa. Transportation in the 1890s 
and early 1900s was geared towards opening up gold-mining territory; cocoa 
farmers were compelled to build their own roads or carry their cocoa crops on 
their heads if they wished to sell them to the European buyers. "[I]improved 
internal transport facilities ••• followed, but did not precede the dev~lop-
ment of cocoa growing. n80 
The type of cocoa grown in Ghana was in high demand on the international 
market as a base for chocolate production. Cocoa production on a world scale 
was divided into "fine" cocoa, known as Trinitarios or Criollo and cultivated 
chiefly in the West Indies, certain Latin American countries, Ceylon, and Java, 
and "basic" cocoa, known as Forastero and grown chiefly in West Africa and 
Brazil. 81 The price offered for basic cocoa was, of course, never as high as 
that offered for fine, but on the other hand the demand for basic cocoa was far 
greater. The export of fine cocoa shrank from seventy-eight per cent of the 
world's total cocoa exports in 1895 to thirteen per cent in 1933.82 The two 
types were in fact not competitive, although higher quality Forastero than 
Ghana produced was often in demand {that is, Forastero free of defects and 
80Polly Hill, The Migrant Coaoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 170. 
Blunited Africa Company, "What Cocoa Means to the Economy of the Gold 
Coast," Statistiaa"l and Eaonomia Review, no. 2 (September 1948), p. 2. 
82c. Y. Shephard, "Report on the Economics of Peasant Agriculture in the 
Gold Coast" (Accra: Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 10. 
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properly cured),83 
The beginnings of cocoa cultivation in Ghana represented a dramatic 
change in the organization of trade inasmuch as, for the first time {except for 
some palm tree "plantations" in Krobo), exports were the result of organized, 
planned, cash-crop cultivation, not simply of the extraction of naturally 
growing produce from the land. Cocoa "plantations," or farms, were established 
over most of Ghana except the Northern Territories, starting first in the East-
ern Province of the Colony, spreading into Ashanti, and moving later into the 
Western and parts of the Central Provinces of the Colony. Most cocoa farms 
were very small; in 1938 the Nowell Commission on cocoa estimated the average 
Ashanti farm at two-and-a-half acres, although multiple farm ownership was 
common. 84 Often Ghanaians who had already saved capital through trade or pro-
fessional work bought cocoa farms; in such cases the size of their farms was 
considerably larger, in some cases reaching as high as twenty-eight or forty-
five acres. 8 5 Investments in cocoa involved a considerable amount of waiting 
time, as cocoa trees did not bear fruit until they were five years of age. An 
acre of cocoa land produced on average, in 1938, about nine "head-loads" (of 
sixty pounds each) of cocoa; it was estimated that in 1938 a million acres of 
land in Ghana were under cocoa, using approximately one-sixth of the total 
potential labour force of the country.86 
The cultivation of cocoa as the major export crop, while it interfered 
83For a discussion of cocoa quality, see Chapter VI. 
84"Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa" (here-
after referred to as the Nowell Commission) Cmd.5845 (1938), p. 17. 
8 ~. Hunter "Cost of Establishing Cacao by Ashanti Farmers," Gold Coast, 
Department of Agriculture YeaP Book (1930) included in Cad:289/24. 
86s. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1969), p. 323. 
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with ~ubsistence farming, nevertheless was of considerable advantage to Ghana 
as a whole because it did not preclude the growing of other crops on the same 
land. Cocoa trees needed shade, which palm trees could provide, and underneath 
the cocoa trees, during their first few years of existence, "nursing" plants 
such as yams and cassava could be cultivated, A traveller in Ghana in 1912 
described the typical cocoa farms as follows: 
• the bulk of cocoa appeared to be grown on small patches of 
forest land, sharing the intervening spaces with several other products 
--near at hand, a group of broad-leaved yams; then a square of cassava, 
between the plants of which were inserted young cocoa trees of a few 
months' growth taken from the nursery; then half an acre of full-grovm 
trees. Interspersed between all this luxuriant growth the tall oil 
palms reared themselves •.• ,87 
The other crops grown on cocoa farms could be eaten by the farmers and their 
families, or they could be sold to provide income while waiting for the cocoa 
trees to yield. 88 
The introduction of cocoa as the most import~~t cash crop of the economy 
led to significant changes in the system of land tenure in Ghana. As the or-
gani~ed production of agricultural goods specifically for the world market 
became a significant means of acquiring a higher income, the communal system of 
land ownership, or the system by which the chief was not permitted to sell or 
alienate land without the consent of his communal group, gave way to the be-
ginnings of a system of private ownership. In her book, The Migrant Cocoa-
Farmers of Southern Ghana, Polly Hill points out that the system of private 
ownership of land usufruct was not altogether unfamiliar to the migrant farmers, 
even before the introduction of cocoa. They had already been familiar with a 
87John H. Harris, Cocoa Production in West Africa: The Labour Problem 
(London: Denison House, 1911), p. 4. 
88Hunter, op. cit. The farmers studied in Hunter's article sold corn, 
coco-yams, yams, and plantain from their farms while waiting for their cocoa 
trees to yield. 
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cash economy through their participation in the palm trade, as well as in 
rubber or coffee production. 89 They were already used to buying and selling 
usufruct, especially for oil-palm plantations.90 Customary law in Ghana had 
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long recognised the outright sale of usufruct by chiefs, acting on behalf of 
the group,9l and the early cocoa farmers, who were migrants into the area of 
Akim, took advantage of this law. Later farmers, especially in Ashanti, grew 
cocoa on their own family land, and thus were not compelled to pay any rent, 
although they owed a customary tribute of one-third of their produce (later 
reduced to one-tenth by the Government) 92 to the chiefs. Outright private 
ownership, however, continued to be prohibited. 
Hill's description of the migration of cocoa farmers illustrates the 
changing relationships between land and its owners characteristic of Ghana at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Starting in 1882, producers migrated from 
Akim and Akwapim to southern Ashanti. They bought land in groups, either in 
"companies" of friends, or as groups of relatives. But there was strictly in-
dividual ownership within these groups; each individual received his own plot 
of land, which was usually very carefully measured out. He was not obliged to 
consult with other members of the group should he wish to sell his usufruct. 
It was common for a farmer to invest profits from one farm into buying usufruct 
for another farm, hence "large" landowners in the cocoa-producing areas were 
not rare. "The need to secure the future was involved in the idea, so reason-
able in Africa, that there is no resting place between stagnation and growth; 
890p. 't 15 16 a1.- •, PP• - • 
90Ib'd 
. 1, • ' 
911bid., p. 109. 
92Digby Report, op. ait., p. 299. The one-third rent was considered ex-
orbitant and was therefore reduced by the British in 1910. 
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a business cannot be healthy unless it is expanding."93 
Eventually the cocoa industry developed into a system in which there was 
much absentee ownership of usufruct. Wealthy cocoa farmers did not farm their 
own land, preferring to engage in other activities such as cocoa brokerage or 
money-lending. Much migrant labour, especially from the Northern Territories, 
was used on the cocoa farms, paid either by time rate, by salary, or by some 
system of share-cropping (generally one-third). Often the landowner had a 
11care-taker," sometimes a relative, on the land, to manage the overall super-
vision of the farm. Samir Amin refers to this type of development, which he 
considers typical of the "trade economies" which developed on the Gulf of 
Guinea, as "Kulakization." He describes it as " ••• the constitution of a 
class of indigenous planters of rural origin, the virtually exclusive appropri-
ation of the land by these planters, and the employment of paid labour •.•• '~ 
In other words, an incipient class system was forming. Three groups of 
producers emerged. These groups can be loosely identified as the "Kulaks" who 
employed labour on their farms, peasant farmers who used only their own and 
family labour on their farms, and migrant labourers. 
Some of the earliest individuals to avail themselves of the new oppor-
tunities for cash-crop farming (that is, f&rming specifically for the external 
market) were the chiefs. Already wealthier than the average tribal member 
because of their control of stool lands and their receipt of dues, fines, and 
tributes, some chiefs found it easy to become wealthier still through the sale 
of concessions to Europeans. Chiefs who negotiated concessions on behalf of 
their tribes were occasionally tempted to misappropriate the funds received, 
or to grant special rates to the Europeans in re~urn for secret bribes. The 
93Hill, op. cit., p. 179. 
94Amin, op. ait., p. 116. 
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Belfield Report of 1912 described some such practices. 
Their [the chiefs'] sense of obligation to the tribe in respect of 
their trusteeship was frequen~ly obscured by their greed for money, and 
some cases have certainly occurred where the proceeds of concessions 
granted have been misappropriated to their own personal use. Such 
fraudulent action has, however, been invariably resented by the tribe, 
and has resulted in the removal of the offender from the stool. 
As a general rule, therefore, and particularly in later years, the 
chiefs who have granted concessions have been careful to effect distri-
bution of the proceeds in a manner conformable to the rules of the 
tribe, but the fact nevertheless remains that in consequence of their 
own ignorance, and the reluctance of the tribe to press their elders 
unduly, concessions have been granted upon terms which are unfavourable 
to the people ••• ,95 
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It was common for Europeans to overcome chiefs' scruples as regards concessions 
by the distribution of what was charitably known as "consideration money." 
Consideration money was granted over and above the public "gifts" which a 
European might give to a chief and his elders. With such additions to the 
already considerable advantages they had over ordinary farmers in terms of 
wealth, chiefs could easily invest in cocoa farms. They were also pe1~itted, 
by customary law, to commandeer labour to work on their farms, although, as 
their subjects became more tied themselves to the external market, they became 
less and less willing to devote their labour to the chief's farm. 
It was not, however, necessary for an individual to be a chief or to 
have some initial advantage in order to rise to be a wealthy farmer. Each 
individual member of a tribe was entitled to a section of the tribal land to 
cultivate as he wished, and the products of this land, after payment of trib-
ute, were his own. Cocoa trees or palm trees grown on tribal land were the 
property not of the tribe but of the individual who cultivated the land. Those 
who wanted more land for cultivation could, upon application to the chief, be 
granted more. Land was a "free good," not an object of property, at least 
950p •t • en ... , p. 9. 
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within each tribe. Those Ghanaians who came originally from areas in which the 
land was not suitable for cash crops, especially cocoa, migrated to other areas 
where they could buy or rent usufruct of land from the indigenous tribe. Their 
payments to the chief were of course greater than the payments made by the 
indigenous people; but the principle of 11 instalment payment 11 was well recog-
nized and land could be paid off gradually from the profits from selling 
cocoa. 96 
Polly Hill lays great stress on the notion that African capitalist 
farmers were entrepreneurs; innovative and risk-taking and at the same time 
capable of rational investment and planning. She argues that cash-crop farmers 
were characterized not only by their willingness to invest but also·by their 
willingness to expand, to increase their areas of production and delegate 
responsibility to relatives or hired labourers. A farmer might barely oversee 
his land, leaving responsibility for day-to-day cultivation and decisions in 
the hands of his employees. As he accumulated wealth, he might try to expand 
into different activities; trade being often blocked beyond the middleman's 
role by the European distribution system, a favourite new role to adopt was 
that of a money-lender.97 
For while some farmers were able to become rich through cash-crop pro-
duction, others, perhaps through a lack of initial advantage, a lack of 
entrepreneurship, ·or simply bad luck, found themselves going under. If they 
had a bad crop or if the international price for cocoa was low, they might not 
recover their investment in their farms.· Noreover, they were often tied into 
96Polly Hill, "Some Characteristics of Indigenous West African Economic 
Enterprise, 11 Nigerian Institute of Soaial and Eaonomia Researah: Conferenae 
Proaeedings (1962), p. 116. 
97Ibid. 
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the consumer network sufficiently that they did not wish to, or were unable to, 
wait for the sale of their crop in February or March in order to buy the goods 
they needed; hence they took out loans on the security of their fUture crops 
in September. School fees, especially, were a heavy expense for farmers who 
wished to further the opportunities of their children, and as the school year 
started in September, at the beginning of the cocoa season, farmers were 
obliged to take out temporary loans to cover the fees. 
The need for loans to cover their costs was, according to one observer, 
the direct result of the introduction of cash-crop cocoa farming into Ghana. 
Prior to the arrival of cocoa, loans could not be made as farmers could not 
offer security; now the cocoa crop was taken as security. 98 The opportunity 
for farmers to borrow and to indebt themselves on a large scale was introduced 
with production for the external market. 
Three different types of people engaged in money-lending in the country-
side. Rich farmers practiced money-lending as a means of investment; de~ts 
were often paid off in cocoa crops or in usufruct of the debtor's land, en-
abling the rich farmer to increase his own salable product. The rich farmer 
was' often a farmer-cum-chief, or even a farmer-aum-chief-aum-broker. His 
object might be to control as much cocoa as possible in order to sell to the 
Europeans. Cocoa brokers pure and simple also engaged in money-lending; it was 
their objective to "corner" as much of the cocoa supply as possible at the be-
ginning of the season, at the lowest possible prices, hoping to reap substantial 
gains on the cocoa on its sale to European firms at the end of the season. 
There was much resentment among farmers at the high rates of interest 
which borrowers had to pay for loans. One Africun borrower complained in 1912 
98shephard, op. ait., p. 39. 
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that 
Ricbmen are very barbarous cruel and inhumanity [sia] in loan; 
charging unreasonable interest ten shillings (10/-) on a pound 
sterling (£1.0.0.) charge sheeps before loan. Sale of money for 
double interest weekly. Pledge of cacao farms for a period of five 
years in hands of debtors; who neither has nothing to do to pay the 
debt nor against his daily bread.99 
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By his last accusation, that the debtor had "nothing to do" the author of this 
sad letter was complaining against the prevalent practice of creditors' com-
pletely taking over farms. Aside from the other abuses of this system, the 
creditor was unlikely to invest in the farm or even to keep it in good order; 
his only interest was the crop. Conversely, when they were allowed to stay on 
their farms, peasants who had pledged the entire crop, regardless of its size, 
were unlikely to work to increase the crop; any increase would simply go to the 
creditor. Entire crops were often pledged simply as interest, not as principle, 
for a loan. In 1936, C. Y. Shephard wrote of this system, which was then at 
its most prevalent because of the world economic Depression, 
In most cases, the lender takes possession of the farm, and reaps the 
crops, until the debt is liquidated. The crop is usually regarded as 
interest. The crop of a low-yielding farm is sometimes regarded as a 
mere perquisite of the lender and the borrower is required to meet his 
obligations from other sources. The crop of a high-yielding farm may· be 
considered sufficient return to liquidate both the capital and interest 
in an agreed number of years. In other cases, the borrower remains in 
possession of ~he farm. He may give the lender two thirds of the crop 
--one third being for repayment of capital, and the other third being 
for interest--and retain the remaining one third as consideration for 
his labour. 100 
Interest rates generally varied anywhere between twenty-five and lOO per cent. 
Shephard sampled, in his investigations, ninety-three farmers who had borrowed, 
between them, £2,015; they had already paid a total of £456 in cash for these 
99Letter toR. Beaver, Commissioner, Eastern Province, from Theodore 
Asiedu, of Tinkong, dated 17 May 1912, in GNA Adm.ll/1/411. 
l 000p. ait., p. 41. 
110 
debts and supplied their creditors with 2,495 loads of cocoa, nevertheless they 
still owed some £2,379.1°1 In 1933-34 he estimated that some seventy-five per 
cent of all farmers in Ghana had pledged part of their crop to money-lenders; 
moreover thirty per cent of the farmers had pledged one or more farms and five 
per cent had pledged all their farms.102 
The cocoa broker with his advances, and the rich farmer with his loans, 
were figures of no little power in the rural Ghanaian community. By lending 
money to farmers in return for a pledge of their crops, they could keep the 
farmers in perpetual debt. Rural society began rapidly to differentiate be-
tween "Kulaks" and "peasants," both groups tied into the system of cash-crop 
production for the external market but the former successful both in production 
of its own crop and in the expropriation of the crop from others, while the 
latter succumbed to debt and poverty. 
The characteristics which distinguished the "Kulaks 11 from the peasants 
were not only their greater wealth and their ability to indulge in activities 
such as money-lending, but also the fact th~t the former employed labour while 
the latter did not;.peasant agriculture was confined to the use of family 
labour. Although he was a cash-crop farmer, in the sense that he, as well as 
his wealthier compatriots, produced for the external market, the peasant was 
using what were basically traditional modes of production. Nor were his in-
vestments in production as extensive as the Kulaks'. Nevertheless, the 
retention of tribal structures and especially of the custom of family obliga-
tions in the llider kinship network ensured some guarantees of support to the 
peasant; moreover, although he could lose the produce and even the usufruct of 
101Jbid., P• 127. 
102Ibid.' P· 41. 
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his land, he always retained ultimate possession of the farm since the system 
of private ownership of land had not developed to the stage at which it could 
be completely alienated to a creditor. 
Thus in Ghana it was never the case that a class of landless labourers 
emerged, a class which had been dispossessed of its own land and was therefore 
obliged to hire itself out as labour on the farms of the wealthy. A class of 
labourers in the cocoa areas existed, but these were migrant labourers from 
the Northern Territories and from the surrounding French colonies, who might 
have been landless in Ashanti or the Colony but who retained land in their 
homelands. These migrant labourers travelled to the Colony and Ashanti in 
order to work both on the cocoa farms and f,:>r the mines and on Government con-
struction projects. Their number increased steadily during the early twentieth 
century as the demand for their labour grew. 
Migrant labourers generally congregated by tribe, new labourers joining 
their countrymen. Each tribal group had its own headman, known as the "Zongo" 
headman. The headman acted as an agent for the labourers and also as their 
protection, providing them, for instance, with credit before they were paid. 
Normally, a labourer entered into a semipersonal relationship with his employer 
and worked for the same farmer year after year,l 0 3 It was estimated that some 
five per cent of the migrants sta.yed in the colony each year, instead of re-
turning home after the cocoa season was over. 1 04 Some migrants were given land 
of their own to work on and could thus establish residence in the new areas. 
103This information is taken from a report by M. Y. Hewson, Acting District 
Commissioner, Koforidua, dated 25 April 1938, entitled "Memorandum on Northern 
Territories and French Sudan Labour on the Cocoa Farms of the Eastern Province," 
in GNA, Adm.29/6/14. 
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"Annual Invasion of the Gold Coast -by French and Northern Territcries 
Subjects in Search of Labour," report filed as GNA Adm.ll/1076. 
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The labourers from the Zongos may be divided into two classes; those 
who reside there throughout the whole year and those who live there only 
during the cocoa season. The former came from the North probably many 
years ago and have established permanent dwellings with small food farms 
attached. Although many earn their living by petty trading and home 
crafts~ there is always a large floating population ready to work for 
wages. Such a labour surplus would not however be sufficient to meet 
with the heavy demand of the cocoa season, were it not supplemented 
yearly by fresh inundations from the North a great proportion of which 
came from French Territory.l05 
The terms of payment for migrant labourers varied, although in general, 
by the late 1930s, a labourer would receive about eight pounds a season. In 
different regions of the country methods of payment varied. 
With regard to the terms of the labour contracts entered into, systems 
differ in various native states. All that can be definitely said to be 
common to all, is their general vagueness since the reward to be paid is 
not fixed in advance but left subject to certain eventualities. In 
Krobo country it is customary for the farmer to supply the labourer with 
a certain amount of food during the season, and to give him a sum of money 
at the end. In Akim it is common to pay the labourer in cocoa leaving 
him to conduct his own sales .••. But the most general practice, and 
that which appears likely to become in time universal~ is to pay the 
labourer at the end of the season a percentage of the actual money re-
ceived from the sales; the sum varies from 1/6 to 2/- for every 10/-
obtained by the farmer for his cocoa.l06 
There were three basic methods of payment. One was to give the labourer a 
third of the crop at the end of the season; this was his sole reward for his 
season's work and it was up to him to market the cocoa as best he could. An-
other was to grant him a piece of land which he could farm as his own, so that 
he could sell the produce from that land, or live on it himself. Finally, he 
might be paid in cash at the end of the season. The labourer generally had to 
wait out the entire season before he was paid~ and his total payment depended, 
except in the few cases in which a lump sum was agreed upon beforehand, very 
much on the state of the cocoa crop and the amount which his employer could 
l0 5Hewson Report, op. ait., in GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
l06Jbjd. 
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obtain from the cocoa. 
Thus the introduction of cocoa into Ghana produced an almost completely 
monocultural agricultural export economy: which resulted in differentiation in 
the countryside among rich farmers or "Kulaks," poorer farmers , and hired 
labourers. It also resulted in a situation in which, because they were be-
coming increasingly occupied by one-crop agriculture, Ghanaians became ever 
more dependent on imported consumer goods to satisfy their daily needs. Depen-
dence on the world cocoa market was exacerbated by dependence on European-
produced and -controlled manufactures. 
3. Ghana as a Consumer of 
Manufactured Goods 
In return for the mineral and agricultural goods which they so willingly 
produced for the international, European-controlled world market, Ghanaia~s 
were sold a variety of manufactured goods which varied surprisingly little over 
the period 1886-1939. In effect, Ghanaians consumed mostly light manufactured 
goods which were for personal use; textiles, foodstuffs and provisions, orna-
ments, liquor and tobacco, and arms and ammunition. Very few of their imports 
were investment goods of any description. 
Table 6 presents figures for 1900 to 1939 of the majqr imports into 
Ghana, divided roughly into consumer and investment goods, It can be seen that 
until 1900 only about twenty per cent, or less, of Ghana's imports were for 
investment purposes. After 1905 the percentage varied, for the next thirty 
years, at about the thirty per cent mark, rising to about thirty-seven per cent 
in 1939. The investment-oriented goods consisted primarily of construction 
goods, fuel, machinery, and transport goods. Construction goods were used by 
both Europeans and Africans; by the former to build mines, Government buildings, 
storage sheds, and European residences; by the latter primarily for their own 
housing needs and secondarily for retail shops. Fuel, which varied around a 
Q 
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Table 6. Consumer and Investment Imported Goods: 
Per Cent of the Total by Value, 
1900-1939107 
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1900 37 21 22 80 6 2 5 5 18 
1901 34 23 15 72 8 9 3 4 24 
1902 44 14 17 75 7 5 3 4 19 
1903 35 17 20 72 8 6 4 4 22 
1904 39 17 19 75 7 5 4 4 20 
1905 35 16 16 67 13 4 8 4 29 
1906 33 16 17 66 13 3 8 4 28 
1907 24 14 16 58 12 12 " 12 42 0 
1908 31 16 16 63 12 2 6 12 32 
1909 2~( 16 17 60 13 3 7 14 37 
1910 29 15 20 64 11 3 6 12 32 
1911 32 14 20 66 10 3 6 11 30 
1912 33 14 20 6~( 10 2 6 11 29 
1913 35 13 19 67 10 2 6 11 29 
1914 41 13 18 72 9 3 5 9 26 
1915 38 12 17 67 11 3 6 10 30 
1916 30 13 18 61 13 3 7 12 35 
1917 27 15 17 59 13 4 7 12 36 
1918 28 16 15 59 12 4 7 12 35 
1919 29 19 15 63 11 5 6 10 32 
1920 29 21 15 65 11 6 5 9 31 
1921 26 25 13 61~ 10 8 5 10 33 
1922 28 24 15 67 9 8 4 7 28 
1923 29 26 12 67 9 7 4 7 27 
1924 26 29 13 68 9 6 4 7 26 
1925 27 28 12 67 8 6 5 7 26 
1926 25 28 13 66 9 6 5 7 27 
1927 23 39 11 73 7 5 4 6 22 
1928 26 29 13 68 8 5 5 7 25 
1929 26 29 13 68 8 6 5 8 27 
l07source: Raw figures in Kay, op. ait., Table 20a, "Value of imports by 
commodity group, 1900-1960, 11 pp. 327-328. The totals for these imports do not 
coincide with the figures given by Kay as total :imports in his Table 18, "Im-
ports, exports, and the balance of visible trade 1900-1960," pp. 325-326, 
presumably because only major import groups are considered in Table 20a. Since 
it is the relative percentages of imported consumer and investment goods which 
are of importance here, it is assumed that the discrepancy in totals can be 
overlooked, and the table is calculated on the basis of the totals given in 
Kay's Table 20a. 
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1930 27 28 13 68 9 5 5 8 27 
1931 29 21 14 64 9 6 6 10 31 
1932 30 19 15 64 9 6 6 10 31 
1933 36 4 18 58 11 7 1 12 31 
1934 29 23 14 66 9 4 6 11 28 
1935 30 20 15 65 9 4 6 11 28 
1936 29 20 15 64 9 4 6 11 28 
1937 24 23 12 59 10 4 8 16 31 
1938 24 21 13 58 11 3 8 17 39 
1939 24 20 13 57 9 3 9 18 39 
constant figure of about five per cent of ~ports, was used for rail and lorry 
transport. Machinery had several uses, one of the most important of which, 
however, was in the expatriate mining sector. Only transport goods could be 
considered major investments for Africans in the sense that they encouraged the 
development of an indigenous transport business alongside the larger European 
transport concerns.lOS Very few of the so-~alled "investment" goods imported 
into Ghana had any long-term uses, or could be used to further economic develop-
ment by providing basic infrastructure. Their purpose was to facilitate the 
export of minerals, cocoa, and other goods from the coast, by providing trans-
portation and storage facilities. African investment in transport was of some 
use in building up capital which could be used for other purposes, but African 
investment in houses, while fulfilling consumer needs and acting as much-needed 
collateral for credit from European banks, had little effect in terms of 
108The indigenous African transport business is discussed below, Chapter 
V. 
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promoting a more active or independent economy. 
Table 7 presents a detailed list of imports for the year 1886. iVhile 
the total importation of major consumer goods for that year was same £183,000, 
the importation of "investment" goods was little over £26,000, or barely four-
teen per cent of the total consumer goods, even when such expendable goods as 
bags, sack, cord and twine are included as investment goods. The largest 
single group of imports was for liquor, tobacco, and arms and ammunition; with 
rum alone accounting for £59,000 worth of imports. This group was followed by 
textiles and wearing apparel, which in turn was followed by provisions. 
With the exception of the category liquor, tobacco, and arms and ammuni-
tion, which declined drastically in importance after the turn of the twentieth 
century, the composition of imports in 1939 was very similar to 1886. In that 
year, the United Africa Company described the import trade into West Africa as 
follows: 
The articles imported into West Africa are of infinite variety. They 
can be divided perhaps into two parts:-
(1) Staple articles of trade for which a demand .•. always exists, they 
are--
( a) Cotton piecegoods of all kinds for use as clothing 
(b) Articles of food or its equivalent (because the African native 
does not produce all his own foods) such as--
Tobacco Flour 
Salt Certain canned meats and fish 
Rice Spirituous liquors 
Dried Fish 
(c) Yarns for local manufacture of cloth 
(d) Fishing twine 
(e) Kerosene and petrol 
(f) Building materials as--
Cement, Iron sheets, Sawn Tj~ber 
(g) Articles of hardware of everyday use which are better imported than 
made locally (e.g. iron pots) 
(2) Articles which are not strictly essential but which are nevertheless 
desired by the native peoples of West Africa in varying degrees according 
to their method and standard of living, e.g. 
(h) Clothing and Haberdashery of all kinds 
(i) European provisions 
(j) A wide range of miscellaneous hardware 
(k) Medicines 
(1) Motor vehicles and Bicycles 
0 
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Table 7. Major Imports into the Gold Coast Colony, 1886110 
Consumer Goods Value (£) 
Textiles: 
cotton goods 
haberdashery 
hats and caps 
leather goods 
silk goods 
umbrellas 
wearing apparel 
woolen goods 
Total 
12,782 
11,860 
1,117 
1,097 
5,432 
1,070 
2,272 
2,162 
37,792 
Liquor, 
ale 
gin 
rum 
arms and ammunition, tobacco: 
and porter 2,300 
and geneva 9,010 
wines 
gun powder 
guns 
tobacco 
Total 
Provisions: 
beef and pork 
bread and biscuits 
flour 
mineral waters 
provisions (general) 
rice 
sugar 
Total 
Other: 
brass and copperware 
drugs and medicine 
earthenware 
furniture 
kerosene oil 
lead bars 
lumber 
perfumery 
soap 
stationery 
Total 
Total Consumer Goods 
58,695 
2,814 
3,858 
4,788 
132992 
1,300 
2,886 
3,811 
1,104 
6,972 
3,204 
22912 
4,800 
1,961 
2,172 
2,177 
2,009 
1,711 
2,861 
4,944 
2,703 
1 2811 
95,457 
22,249 
212142 
182,647 
Investment Goods 
bags and sacks 
boats and canoes 
building materials 
cooper' s stores 
cordage and twine 
machinery 
Total Investment Goods 
Value (£} 
2,122 
2,100 
1,556 
13,434 
4,339 
2,541 
26,092 
llOsource: Gold Coast, Blue Book 
(1886}. All imports of over £1,000 
were included in this table. Total 
imports for 1886 were £376,530. 
0 
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0n) Clocks, watches, etc. 
The above is not, of course, an exhaustive list, but only an indication of 
the range of goods taken by the Company into West Africa; naturally the 
margin of profit on the second class of articles is larger than on staple 
goods, because the demand for a particular article is less constant, and 
the quantities sold are smaller, so that the expense of handling and the 
risk of goods being left unsold.is greater.lll 
The decline in importance of arms and ammunition as articles of import 
followed quickly upon the final subjugation of Ashanti in 1900. The Colonial 
Government passed a law forbidding the indiscriminate importing of arms and 
ammunition and their sale to whichever Africans, friend or enemy, wished to buy 
them. It would seem reasonable that it wished to deny arms to Ashanti, a 
nation which had just been conquered, but by 1902 the business community in the 
Gold Coast was complaining of the loss of revenue occasioned by the prohibi-
tion. In 1905, therefore, the government removed some restrictions and drew up 
a list of selected Africans who were to be allowed to buy arms. 112 After that 
time, as one merchant reported, "We sold Long Dane muzzle loading guns, these 
could only be purchased with a government permit, permits were also necessary 
for buying lead bars and gunpowder. nl13 
The decline in importance of arms imports after 1900 was paralleled by 
a decline in the importance of liquor imports. Although in 1875 the value of 
liquor imports was £58,705, in 1895 £120,641 and in 1910 £176,359, nevertheless 
its importance as a percentage of total imports declined drastically from nine-
teen per cent in 1879 to fifteen per cent in 1894 to seven per cent in 1910.114 
ll1From "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited," report 5, UAC Rankin 
file. 
ll 2LivCC, 30 October 1902, 5 August 1906. 
ll 3Harry Martin, "Reminescences as a member of the trading firm of Swanzy 
in the Gold Coast from 1902" (Typewritten Ms: Rhodes House, Oxford, 1965). 
114Raymond E. Dumett, "The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade on 
the Akan of Ghana (Gold Coast and Asante) 1875-1910," Jour>naZ of Interdisci-
plinary Histo~, no. 1, vol. 5 (Summer, 1974), p. 77. 
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Europeans were inclined to attribute to Africans an incapacity to "hold their 
liquor" and to assume that the "demon rum" was destroying the fabric of African 
society; hence at a later date the GoverP~ent began to impose stringent con-
trols on liquor imports. Between 1913 and 1923 the import duty on liquor was 
raised over 400 per cent,llS ostensibly to discourage drinking but also, one 
suspects, for revenue purposes. In 1919 a prohibition was placed on the impor-
tation of low-quality "trade spirits" (a prohibition which incidentally 
seriously affected the American trade in rum which had formerly been one of the 
staples of the trade of the Swanzy company) but by this time some Africans were 
earning enough money to be able to afford beer and better quality liquor. The 
decline in consumption prior to 1913 indicates that as their incomes rose, 
Ghanaians spent less on liquor and preferred to buy other goods, such as 
c1oth. 11 6 
Indeed, as is well known, textiles were one of the mainstays of the vlest 
African trade, enabling many a Manchester merchant to make his fortune. Gener-
ally speaking the import of clothing, textiles, and leather was responsible for 
about twenty per cent of Ghana's total import bill, although it is worth noting 
that during the prosperous 1920s the figure was closer to the thirty per cent 
mark. Much of the clothing which was imported was in fact second-hand European 
clothing, a fact disguised by the statistics which listed clothing according to 
type, as dress, shirt, and so on. Second-h~d clothing from America, where the 
southern climate more closely approximated that of Africa, was a booming busi-
ness in which most of the British expatriate firms engaged with some 
11 5"Report of the Royal Commission on Trade and Taxation," Cmd.l600 (1921) 
Q.2254-57. 
116This point is made by Dumett, "The Social ••• -1910," op. ait., p. 94. 
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considerable success.ll7 But although the trade in second-hand clothes was 
large, the bulk of the textile trade was in lengths of printed cotton which 
Africans could use to make up clothing of their own. The large firms such as 
the predecessors of the United Africa Company had their own cotton mills in 
Manchester where cottons were printed to order. Any cloth pattern which became 
popular was jealously guarded by the firm which owned its patent. At the end 
of the nineteenth century a great deal of controversy occurred within the West 
African business community over extending the Merchandise Marks Act to the 
African coast, in order to protect these patterns. The Colonial Office was 
finally induced to protect patterns in the colonies, thus granting competitive 
advantages to the expatriate firms who had already cornered large sections of 
the textiles market ,118 
While the firms were concerned to protect their own privileges, however, 
they were less concerned to protect the African consumer. Occasionally both 
the Colonial Office and the Government in Accra attempted to institute measures 
of quality control over imports. During the 1890s the Government attempted to, 
and eventually did, enforce a law known as the "Folded Woven Goods Ordinance." 
Africans were accustomed to buy European cloth by counting the number of folds, 
to determine the length of the piece. The Europeans, however, had adopted the 
custom of folding the last piece short, so that it was not as long as it seemed. 
The British business community, while it acknowledged that "falsely folded 
goods" were prevalent, complained bitterly against the passage of controls 
which would leave them with short pieces of cloth which they could not sell.ll9 
117Interview with several former European traders of G. B. Ollivant, 
Manchester, November 1974. The centres of the second-hand clothes trade were 
London, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles and San 
Francisco. 
118Interview with an executive of Tootal Corp., Manchester, October 1974. 
119ManCC, 10 April 1894. 
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Lest it be thought that business morals improved after trade became more reg-
ularized, it should be noted that the same sorts of arguments, that they would 
not be able to sell their produce, were made in 1931 when the Chief Commission-
er of Ashanti tried to introduce regulations over a broad range of imported 
goods, included short-weighted bags of rice and corrugated iron sheeting so 
thin that it was ruinous for Africans to invest in it for their houses. The 
London Chamber of Commerce argued against this idea on the gro~~ds that 
11 Ithe] nativeisJ should not be barred from obtaining cheap goods if they 
were unable t<:> afford the better quality. 11120 
The large amount of money spent on European-manufactured consumer im-
ports in Ghanal 21 indicates the increasing wealth of the Ghanaian community 
which followed upon its rapid and ever-closer integration into the world 
economic system. It also indicated, however, an increasing dependence on 
foreign goods to the detriment of local industry and production. The point 
must not be oYerstated; in some cases foreign goods were provided vrhich Africans 
could not have provided for themselves, in other cases, new wants created new 
indigenous industries. As Hopkins states, "The composition of the manufacturing 
sector in Wes·~ Africa, as in pre-industrial Europe, reflected the embryonic 
nature of the market, and was based on clothing, metal working, ceramics, con-
struction, and f'ood processing."122 But as soon as the European presence in 
West Africa became strongly felt, and Africans began to produce for the market, 
African needs moved out of the "embryonic" stage. 
120Meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce with Mr. H. S. Newlands, 
Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, LonCC, 22 June 1931. 
121For figures on total imports into Ghana, see Table 8 below. 
122A. G. Hopkins, An Eaonomia Histo:cy of West Afriaa (London: Longman, 
1973), P• 48. 
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Everything which was imported into Ghana was used; singlets were made 
out of flour sacks, wooden cases were used for construction, iron hoops holding 
together packing cases could be converted into knives.l23 New opportunities 
for consumption and a higher standard of living resulted from the income from 
cocoa farming. But at the same time European manufactured enamelware and 
brassware partially replaced the indigenous pottery industry. Moreover, while 
it cannot be argued that the large amount of textile imports replaced an 
indigenous cloth industry, inasmuch as the cheap, mass-produced textiles 
catered to an enlarged market which the indigenous, narrow-weave Kente cloth 
industry would not have been able to supply, nevertheless it would seem that 
there was same decline in African-made textiles as a result of the influx of 
imports. In 1923 a witness to the Trade and Taxation Cammi ttee argued "I 
should think you would find native-made clothing amongst the very poor and the 
very rich,"1 24 presumably because the poor would wear whatever they could get 
hold of, while the rich could afford the elaborately patterned, hand-woven 
Kente. But on the whole, the market for African cloth declined, and "tradi-
tional11 centres of African weaving lost their role in the Ghana economy. In 
1939, an anonymous witness wrote of the decline of the Keta cloth industry as 
follows: 
Notes on Changes in West Africa. 
Keta Native Cloth Industry 
The cloth is made from yarn generally imported from Manchester. Up 
to the war lWWIJ there was an enormous trade in this cloth. Practically 
every family along the lagoon had primitive native made looms. The main 
income then was derived from cloth making. This industry has practically 
disappeared. European imported prints and garments are replacing the 
locally made article.l25 
123rnterview, G. B. Ollivant, Manchester, November 1974. 
124"Committee on Trade and Taxation," op. cit., Q.2144. 
125Anonymous report found in UAC Rankin File. The Keta cloth industry i's 
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A more serious criticism of the pattern of imports which established 
itself in Ghana is that many foodstuffs and provisions began to be imported 
which, presumably, Ghanaians could have produced for themselves. Cash-crop 
farmers, of course, often preferred to buy imported foods rather than devote 
time to subsistence farming. While many farmers did produce foods both for 
subsistence and for the local markets, patterns of transportation, especially 
prior to World War I, were such as to facilitate the movement of imports on 
railways rather than the movement of indigenous foods by road. " •.• ft]here 
would be no need for large imports of foodstuffs if non-cocoa farmers had been 
able to increase production to meet the ever~growing demand. Unfortunately 
this was made difficult by the lack of feeder roads and marketing facili-
ties, "1 2 6 But transportation patterns alone do not suffice to explain wr.y, for 
example, Ghana imported rice, which could have been grown in the Northern 
Territories, or salt, which had been produced for centuries in the salt flats 
at Ada. Government policy was directed to encouraging both cash crop produc-
tion for export, and African dependence on European imported goods. Prior to 
World War I, Africans who sold goods direct to Europeans were often paid in 
chits redeemable only at European stores. Patterns of European-oriented con-
sumption were established and reliance on internal production of food was 
actively discouraged by both expatriate firms and the colonial regime. As 
early as 1889, the "Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the 
Gold Coast," pointed out the irrationalities of Ghana's food dependence, 
also mentioned in W. M. Macmillan, "African Development," in C. K. Meek (ed.), 
Europe and West Afriaa (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 80. 
126J. C. de Graft-Johnson, Afriaan Experiment: Co-operative AgriCJUlture 
and Banking in British West Afriaa (London: Watts and Company, 1958), p. 117. 
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stressing among other arguments that the rice grown in Ghana was more nutri-
tious than the excessively cleaned rice brought in from Europe. 127 This report, 
however, was never acted upon by the Government, concerned as it was with 
promoting palm oil and cocoa production.l 28 
The composition of Ghana's imports, then, like the composition of her 
exports, encouraged reliance on the external capitalist market while discour-
aging self-reliance or indeed any trend towards development of those 
agricultural or industrial resources which characterized her colonizer. The 
peripheral status which she held in the world economic system was reinforced by 
the regionalism which developed very quickly within the country. 
4. Regionalism and Peripheralization 
The development of Ghana as a supplier of minerals and agricultural 
goods for the world market resulted in the division of the colony into areas 
with different economic functions and different opportQnities for growth and 
development. 
The Gold Coast Colony itself, the area taken over politically by the 
British in 1874, was the centre of African contact with Europeans • After cen-
turies of commercial relationships, a trading class had emerged which acted as 
an intermediary between producers, sometimes from the Colony hinterland and 
sometimes from Ashanti, and European buyers. This class spread out all along 
the coast of the Colony but it was centred primarily in Cape Coast, Sekofidi, 
and Accra. After the institution of colonial rule, however, the capital of the 
Colony was moved to Accra for the sole reason that Accra's climate was more 
congenial to Europeans than any other spot along the coast. Cape Coast 
127ap 't 36 
.01.-.,p •• 
128For details on Government policy as to agricultural diversification, 
see Chapter VI. 
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consequently entered a decline as a centre of trade, a decline which was given 
the final fillip when the Central Province Railway was built in the 1920s and 
by-passed the formerly active surf ports of Cape Coast, Winneba, and Saltpond. 
Sekondi similarly declined in importance when its twin town, Takoradi, became 
the location for a large port in 1928. 
The trading class was joined by a large, educated group of Gh~~aians 
which quickly took over a great deal of the political power in the Colony. 
Ever since the first African university graduate returned to Ghana in the 
1760s, 129 it had been commonplace for wealthy Ghanaians to send ~heir sons 
abroad for university training, especially in the fields of teaching, preach-
ing, and the law. In this behaviour the coastal Africans were emulating the 
standards of their European contacts; they were also assuring incomes to their 
sons as the fortunes made by Africans in the import-export trade were as 
easily lost as won, and in any case indigenous inheritance and family systems 
militated against the handing over of large sums from father to son. The edu-
cated southerners fulfilled the role of intermediaries between Europeans and 
Africans; playing, in such crucial issues as the 1897 Lands Bill, an active 
role. 
In comparison to the Colony, Ashanti, while perhaps more important as a 
producer, had a lesser political role and was often dependent on its tradi-
tional enemies, the Fantis from the south, for spokesmen in the Legislative 
Council. Most of the gold exported from Ghana came from Ashanti. Moreover, 
Ashanti shared with the Eastern Province of the Colony the honour of being the 
major producer of cocoa. As soon as Ashanti TN"as taken over by the Europeans, 
railroads and roads were built to facilitate export of its valuable products. 
129F. L. Bartels, "Philip Quaque, 1741-1816," Tr>a:nsaations of the GoZd 
Coast and TogoZand HistoriaaZ Soaiety, vol. 1, part 5 (1955). 
c 
127 
At the same time, Europeans quickly moved in to Kumasi to take advantage of the 
market for imported goods which the cocoa farmers, ever wealthier, provided. 
Politically, however, Ashanti was effectively quashed for many years by the 
exile of its traditional leader, the Asantehene, in 1900, and the breakup of 
its empire into independent 11tribal 11 units. Ashanti also, partly because of 
its persistent policy of isolation from Europeans prior to its conquest, did 
not have an educated class which could deal with the Europeans as could the 
coastal Fanti. 
But it was the Northern Territories which profited least from colonial 
rule, in the sense at least of prospering economically from integration into 
the world market. Prior to the European takeover of the North, caravan tolls 
had provided most of the revenue of that area. These tolls were abolished by 
the British in 1907, as they were considered to be hindrances to the free 
movement of impo1~ed goods.l30 Thereafter, the Northern Territories' revenue 
declined, as also did their traditional trade to the Sahara routes. Kola, once 
one of the biggest items of trade in the north,. declined into insignificance)31 
Indigenous trade gave way to European tradE as European traders began to bring 
imported goods into the newly-opened territories. 
The function of the Northern Territories, in the eyes of the administra-
tion, was to act primarily as a labour res~rve for the mines, Government 
projects, and cocoa farms to the south!, and only secondarily as a producer of 
130Bourret, op. cit., p. 85. 
l31During the early 1920s the kola trade was much debated and various 
measures were attempted to encourage it, without success as kola exports were 
taxed too heavily to make their carriage from Ghana to the market in Northern 
Nigeria profitable. See for example the statement by one European unofficial 
member, Mr. Rosenthal, in GCLegCo, 27 February 1922, 11We do not do one tenth of 
the trade through the North which was done in pre-war days. 11 
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agricultural products. The North also provided cattle for Ashanti and the 
Colony, but it did not provide goods for the external market. Some attemyts 
were made to promote agricultural production, especially shea-nuts. As early 
as 1907 inquiries were being made in Tamale, the newly-designated capital of 
the Northern Territories (a designation which had serious adverse effects upon 
traditional centres of trade such as Atebubu and Salaga) as to the extent of 
cultivation of shea-butter for export. 132 There was some pressure put upon the 
Government by the British Chambers of Commerce, anxious to exploit any source 
of production, to build a Kumasi-Tamale railroad. 133 The indigenous inhabi-
tants of the area, also fully aware of the benefits of transportation 
facilities, were eager to participate in railroad construction. 
Chiefs and people of the Northern Territories, impressed during the 
visits which they have paid to the south by the prosperity which 
railways and roads have brought to the Colony and Ashanti, have already 
volunteered to turn out in thousands for the oonstruotion of earthworks 
if only they oan have a railway.l34 
The Northern Territories Railway, however, was never built. It was decided 
that the shea-nut export industry was not profitable enough for it to pay, 135 
and, moreover, the labourers from the area did not need railways in order to 
move to the south for seasonal work in mines and on farms. 
The position of the Northern Territories in its relationship with. 
Ashanti and the Colony paralleled the position of the whole of Ghana in its 
relationship with the external world on which it was so dependent both economi-
cally and politically. The very concentration on Ghana's import-export trade 
132Circular from Tamale, no.T.2/1907, 30 December 1907, in GNA Adm.56/l/57. 
133LonCC, 2 June 1930. 
134Speech by the Governor to GCLegCo, 3 March 1927. (Italics in original.) 
135Speech by the Governor to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. 
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which characterizes all analyses of her economy re~lects this dependence. In-
ternal economic growth was a ~unction of Ghana's position in the world 
capitalist market as a primary producer. As more was sold to this market, so 
more could be bought. Table 8 below indicates the growth of both imports and 
exports in Ghana between 1886 and 1939. Although the long-range trend was for 
a steady growth in the import-export trade, the Ghanaian economy reflected 
world economic trends and slumped considerably during the Depression of the 
1930s. During the war years of 1917 and 1918, as also in 1921 when the world 
market ~or cocoa slumped, imports and exports declined considerably. 
Ghana's increasing monocultural dependence has already been discussed in 
Section 2 above. The varied composition of her exports ~rom 1886 to 1910 gave 
way to an almost completely monocultural situation a~ter 1915. The only major 
export fiom Ghana which could in any way compete in value with cocoa was gold. 
But the price o~ gold was subject to controls on the world market, and it was 
only in the 1930s, when gold was allowed to float after Britain went of~ the 
gold standard, that its price rose suf~iciently to make any serious inroad on 
Ghana's export composition. In any case, although gold was important to Ghana's 
economy, its importance on the world market was very small, as it contributed, 
between 1891 and 1931, only .04 per cent to 1.88 per cent o~ the total world 
supply.l36 With such a miniscule percentage of the world gold market dependent 
on it, Ghana had no room to manoeuvre, especially as expatriate mines controlled 
gold production. 
Other mineral exports, while they had some importance to the Ghanaian 
economy, did not become items o~ trade until the post-World War I era. Mangan-
ese rose to constitute at its highest point some eight per cent o~ Ghana's 
exports, while diamonds rose to six per cent. Neither could make any 
136GCCMines, Fifth Annual Report (1932}, p. 23. 
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Table 8. Ghana.: Total Imports and Exports 
by Value: 1886-19391 37 
Balance Balance 
Imports Exports of Visible Year Imports Exports of Visible Year ( £000s} (£000s) Trade ( £000s) (£000s) Trade 
( £000s) ( £000s) 
1886 377 407 + 30 1913 4,952 5,427 + 475 
1887 364 372 + 8 1914 4,456 4,942 + 486 
1888 432 382 50 1915 4,509 5,943 +1,434 
1889 441 416 25 1916 5,999 5,816 - 183 
1917 3,386 6,364 +2,978 
1890 562 601 + 39 1918 3,256 4,472 +1,216 
1891 666 684 + 18 1919 7,946 10,814 +2,868 
1892 597 665 + 68 
1893 718 722 + 4 1920 15,152 12,352 -2,800 
1894 813 850 + 37 1921 7,661 6,942 
-
719 
1895 932 878 54 1922 7,900 8,335 + 435 
1896 910 792 - 118 1923 8,448 8,959 + 511 
1897 911 858 53 1924 8,315 9,914 +1,599 
1898 1,102 993 - 109 1925 9, 782 10,890 +1,108 
1899 1,323 1,112 - 211 1926 10,285 12,104 +1,819 
1927 13,770 14,350 + 580 
1900 1,283 885 
- 398 1928 12,200 13,824 +1,624 
1901 1,795 560 -1,235 1929 10,082 12,677 +2,595 
1902 2,120 774 -1,346 
1903 2,082 980 -1,102 1930 8,953 11,287 +2 ,334 
1904 2,001 1,340 
-
661 1931 4,803 9,300 +4,497 
1905 r,486 1,646 + 160 1932 5,605 8,348 +2,743 
1906 2,058 1,996 62 1933 5,543 8,048 +2,505 
1907 2,366 2,641 + 275 1934 4,848 8,117 +3,269 
1908 2,029 2,525 + 496 1935 '"(,956 9,971 +2,015 
1909 2,394 2,655 + 261 1936 11,656 12,636 + 980 
1937 19,228 16,218 -3,010 
1910 3,439 2,697 
-
742 1938 10,380 15,425 +5,045 
1911 3,874 3,792 82 1939 10,626 16,235 +5,609 
1912 4,023 4,307 + 284 
137source: 1886-1899: Gold Coast, BZue Books 
1900-1939: Ka.y, op. ait., Table 18, "Imports, exports, and 
the balance of visible trade, 1900-1960," pp. 325-326. 
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Graph 3. Ghana: Imports and Exports by Value at Five-year Intervalsl38 
138Based on Table 8. 
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significant change in the basically monocultural pattern which arose after 
1915. Rubber, timber, palm oil, and palm kernels, once important exports, de-
clined to miniscule amounts. Ghana was left almost completely dependent on 
cocoa as an export crop. While in percentage-value terms its importance varied 
as the price of gold rose or fell, it was the only major employer of labour, 
land, and capital in African hands. The internal development of Ghana depended 
almost totally on the cocoa export trade. But as an agricultural export indus-
try, cocoa cultivation had no linkage effects. Tools were simple, labour 
unsophisticated. Investment in farms consisted almost completely of extension 
to new areas of cultivation. Because Ghana produced salable cocoa at all 
times, even though it was not always of the best quality, Government saw little 
need to invest in its production.l39 
The reliance of Ghana on cocoa, moreover, left her dependent for most of 
her trade on the countries of Western Europe and the United States. From 1900 
to 1939, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United 
States imported over eighty per cent of the total world supply of cocoa. 
Ghana's share of this total world supply rose steadily until the mid-1930s when 
competition from Nigeria began to assume some importance, but at its peak it 
was never more than forty-five per cent. A higher percentage of Ghana's cocoa 
than the world average went, of course, to the United Kingdom, because of colo-
nial political and economic ties. 
At its peak, Ghana produced a significant percentage of the world's 
cocoa. But because the marketing of cocoa was controlled by Europeans, it ben-
efitted the expatriate commercial class more than it benefitted the African 
farmers. Even the European commercial class, however, was limited in its powers 
139For a discussion of cocoa quality, see Chapter VI. 
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0 Table 9. World Net Imports of Raw Cocoa as Percentages of the Totall40 
Year France Germany Netherlands Switzerland United United Total % of Kingdom States World Supply 
1900 18 20 6 4 20 18 86 
1901 17 17 9 4 17 18 82 
1902 16 17 7 5 17 20 82 
1903 16 17 9 5 14 22 83 
1904 15 19 8 5 16 22 85 
1905 15 21 8 4 14 23 85 
1906 15 23 7 4 12 23 84 
1907 14 21 8 4 13 25 85 
1908 13 21 10 4 15 22 85 
1909 11 20 9 3 14 28 85 
1910 12 22 9 5 13 24 85 
1911 12 22 10 4 11 26 85 
1912 11 22 10 4 11 26 84 
1913 ll 21 12 4 12 24 84 
1914 10 20 12 4 11 29 e6 
1915 11 14 13 6 18 24 86 
1916 13 4 7 5 23 34 86 
1917 14 3 4 18 50 89 
1918 13 1 6 15 53 88 
1919 13 2 9 4 20 38 86 
1920 12 12 7 3 16 38 88 
1921 9 26 7 2 8 32 84 
1922 9 20 9 1 11 36 86 
1923 9 11 9 1 13 41 84 
1924 9 19 9 2 9 36 84 
1925 9 17 9 1 12 35 83 
1926 9 13 9 1 11 39 82 
1927 6 15 8 2 13 40 84 
1928 7 16 10 2 12 34 81 
1929 6 14 9 1 12 40 82 
1930 8 16 11 1 11 34 81 
1931 8 16 11 2 12 34 e3 
1932 8 14 7 1 13 39 82 
1933 8 14 8 1 13 38 82 
1934 7 18 9 1 12 34 81 
1935 6 11 9 1 14 40 81 
1936 7 10 10 1 16 39 83 
1937 7 11 8 1 14 42 83 
1938 6 12 11 1 20 30 80 
1939 7 11 10 2 16 39 85 
140source: Gill and Duffus Limited, Cocoa Statistics (London: February 
1970), Table 7 "World Net Imports of Raw Cocoa," pp. 21-23. 
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by the fact that cocoa was not a necessary good. The demand for cocoa was more 
or less inelastic in an upward direction; it was an everyday luxury and con-
sumers did not buy more of it when their income was raised. On the other hand, 
the demand was elastic in a downward direction, since in times of economic re-
cession or depression it could be easily eliminated from the consumer's 
diet. 141 
Ghana was dependent to a very high degree on Britain for her trade. 
From 1900 to 1939, rarely was less than fifty per cent of her trade conducted 
with the "mother country"; usually sixty or seventy per cent of her total im-
ports and exports originated in or were destined for Britain. As shown in 
Table 10 and Graph 4, another twenty per cent, approximately, of her trade was 
with Western Europe, while about ten to twenty per cent was with the United 
States and Canada. This pattern owed itself, not to imperial preference, but 
rather to expatriate control of her import-export trade. As long as the trade 
remained largely in British hands, Britain would absorb most of her products. 
Even when imported goods originated in other cotmtries, they arrived in Ghana 
through British intermediaries. Some non-British firms had branches in Ghana, 
but these were of Western European origin; no American firms traded in the 
colony. The control of trade by the expatriates, who also had considerably 
more access to the Colonial Government than did Africans, meant that not all 
opportunities for trade were exploited and Ghana's dependence on the colonial 
power was increased. 
141Interview, Gill and Duffus (cocoa brokers), London, December 1974. 
135 
Table 10. Ghana: Direction or Trade 
Q (Percentage Figures) 1900-1939142 
Year United u.s. and Other Western Total Kh1gdom Canada Commonwealth Europe 
1900 45 5 9 38 91 
1901 67 5 7 21 100 
1902 65 4 7 24 100 
1903 66 3 7 20 96 
1904 69 2 5 21 97 
1905 71 1 6 19 97 
1906 77 1 5 15 98 
1907 74 1 6 17 98 
1908 75 1 4 16 96 
1909 71 1 6 19 97 
1910 72 1 4 20 97 
1911 71 2 5 20 98 
1912 64 4 8 21 97 
1913 67 3 7 17 94 
1914 69 3 6 18 96 
1915 72 7 7 12 98 
1916. 68 11 5 14 98 
1917 66 19 4 9 98 
1918 65 21 10 1 97 
1919 59 27 3 9 98 
.1920 64 17 3 8 92 
1921 62 14 4 12 92 
1922 59 17 5 16 97 
1923 51 18 3 23 95 
1924 45 15 4 31 95 
1925 47 17 3 28 95 
1926 4o 19 7 28 94 
1927 44 18 4 28 94 
1928 41 17 3 31 92 
1929 37 23 4 28 92 
1930 43 14 4 29 90 
1931 50 15 3 25 93 
1932 51 17 3 21 92 
1933 49 14 4 22 89 
1934 56 13 4 16 89 
1935 55 13 5 20 93 
1936 23 63 2 9 97 
1937 48 17 4 23 92 
1938 6o 11 4 17 92 
1939 63 13 q 12 92 
142source: Raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 22a "Direction of trade, 
1900-1960, 11 p. 341. 
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143Based on Table 10. 
CHAPTER IV 
OLIGOPOLIZATION OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY 
Oligopolization, the control of trade by a few large firms, was a 
crucial aspect of the Ghanaian economy during the colonial period. Whatever 
possibilities for independent commercial action might have existed for Africans 
within the overall framework of the monocultural, peripheral economy were al-
most completely eliminated by the tight control which European entrepreneurs, 
through the process of oligopolization, accrued. The economy was dominated by 
a few large British firms which controlled the import-export trade, shipping, 
and banking. 
It must, however, be kept in mind that oligopolization alone was not 
responsible for the peripheral role which Ghana played in the world economy. 
Chapter III explained in detail the role which was created for Ghana by the 
early twentieth century as a- producer of raw materials and a consumer of light, 
cheap manufactured consumer products. Ghana was undeveloped, in comparison 
with Europe, long before she was taken over politically by Britain. Essential-
ly, Ghana became a peripheral nation in the world capitalist system because 
that was the only role she was fit to play. But even this role was limited 
after the initial integration into the world system by measures taken by 
European capitalists to safeguard their interests in Africa. African business-
men were denied opportunities for which they were actually fit by monopoly, 
price fixing, and product distribution agreements made by the Europeans. They 
were also denied access to banking and shipping facilities, or treated by the 
bankers and shippers on an unequal basis. This chapter will enumerate the 
steps by which this oligopolization took place. 
Again, it must be noted that the ev~dence of oligopolization and of 
137 
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practices which are generally considered illegitimate by those who adhere to a 
free-trade model of capitalism, is not entirely sufficient to explain the role 
of African entrepreneurs in late nineteenth and early twentieth century capital-
ism. They were indeed deliberately excluded from certain opportunities, the 
long-range effect of the exclusion being that an indigenous bourgeoisie ·was not · 
able to form as it might otherwise have done. But small-scale European traders 
were also excluded from the system, and indeed the history of the United Africa 
Company is largely, although by no means exclusively, the history of small 
firms which s~ccumbed to economic forces beyond their control and were then 
integrated into larger firms. Some of the evidence presented in the following 
pages of discrimination against small traders and shippers applied equally to 
Europeans and Africans; but there is also evidence of additional burdens put 
upon African entrepreneurs in some cases. 
Africans lost out in the struggle for control of trade and commerce be-
cause they did not then possess, and could not evolve at the level of economic 
development at which they then were, the institutions needed to compete ef-
fectively on a world scale. The development of the steamship in the 1850s was 
the beginning of a new system of trade in which individual traders sold their 
small sailing ships and either bought very large steamships, if they could 
afford to do so, or relied on large steamship companies. A new force therefore 
emerged on the capitalist scene, the shipping company which controlled trans-
portation. Only the largest firms were able to negotiate with shipping 
companies on an equal basis. With the elimination of small, individual 
shipping expeditions to the West Coast of Africa came the elimination of close 
personal contacts between European and African, whether the latter was sup-
plier or customer. Credit, previously giYen on a personal basis, became 
routinized. European traders stopped giving credit and the banks took over the 
c 
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A. Major Firms Forming tl1e Unjj;ed Africa Comoanv1 
African Association Alex. Hiller Bros. & Co. F. & A. Swanzy Niger Co. 
(1889)(1896)* (1865)(1868) {1789}(1789) (1884) 
._ _____________ A-fr-~-·c-an---a~n-d __ E_a-st_e_r_n ____________ ltaken over by Lever 
Trade Corvorationt Brothers in 1920§ 
(1919) (1919) ..~...1 _______ ,_..----' 
United Africa Company (1929)(1929}~ 
B. Principal Competitors of the United Africa Company after 19292 
British 
Cadbury Brothers Ltd. (1889)(1907) 
J. S. Fry and Sons Ltd. (1896)(?) 
(amalgamated with Cadbury 1918) 
J. Lyons and Co. (1894)(?) 
W. Bartholemew and Co. (1926)(1926) 
Busi and Stephenson Ltd. (?)(c.l930) 
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. 
( c.l86o )( c .1935) 
G. B. Ollivant Ltd. (1840)(1918) 
Paterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd. 
(1890)(c.l933) 
C. Principal Shipping Companies 
Other European 
Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afrique 
Occidentale (c.l845)(1909) 
Societe Con~erciale de l'Ouest 
Africain (1907)(1914) 
Swiss African Trading Company 
(1922)(1922) 
Union Trading Company (Basel ~fission 
Trading Company) (1865)(1865) 
Elder Dempster and Co. Ltd. (1899)(1899) 
African Steam Ship Co. (1852)(1852) 
comprising { and 
British and African Steam Navigation Co. (1865)(1865) 
Woermann Lines (1882)(1885) 
Elder Dempster and Woermann Lines joinei into the West African Shipping 
Conference in 1895. 
D. Banks 
Bank of British West Africa Ltd. (1894)(1896)--formed by Elder Dempster 
and Co. Ltd. 
Colonial Bank (1836)(1917), name changed to Barclays Bank, Dominion, 
Colonial and Overseas, 1925. 
Chart 1. European Fi~s in the Gold Coast 
*First parentheses indicate date of incorporation, second parentheses 
indicate date of entry into Ghana. 
tAside from those mentioned above, Africa.YJ. and Eastern included twenty-
six other West African comp~nies. 
§And joined to tvrenty-three other West Af::·ican companies previously or 
subsequently acquired by Lever Brothers. 
nies. 
NBetween 1929 and 1938 UAC acquired twenty-nine more West African compa-
1From "Notes on the United Africa Company Ltd., 11 in UAC Rankin flle. 
2Dat.a on UACs competitors, the banks, and the shipping lines, is from 
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function instead. But the banks had no way of 1mderstanding the African busi-
nessman, who was not conversant with or a practitioner of the rational, 
standardized bookkeeping procedures which had evolved over four centuries in 
capitalist Europe. They therefore completely avoided the responsibility of 
providing credit to Africans, because, indeed, by their criteria, Africans were 
unreliable. 
As the trade between Africa and Europe became more and more interna-
tional, Africans were placed at an ever greater disadvantage. Forward 
contracts on palm oil and cocoa for delive~J to Germany, France, or the USA 
were more thrul an African, without contacts beyond his own country, could 
handle. The agents through whom he worked vere often unscrupulous or dishon-
est. Nor could he buy from the myriad sources of imported goods for the 
Ghanaian market, and once he relied on an Englishman to buy for him in Japan 
or India or Germany or America it became easier for the Englishman simply to 
treat him as an employee, not as an independent client. 
The following chapter documents the process of oligopolization of the 
Ghanaian economy throughout the colonial period and, concomitant with this 
oligopolization, the disadvantages which accrued to Ghanaian entrepreneurs in 
competition with Europeans. The argument is made that at least part of the 
undePdeve l-opment of the Ghanaian economy wa~3 caused by the denial, even of such 
opportunities of which they might have been able to avail themselves, to 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs. The denial of opportunities to Ghanaian entrepreneurs 
reinforced the deleterious effects of monopoly, obliging Africans to play the 
roles of customers and suppliers to European firms with little hope of ever 
published sources and interviews. Question marks indicate that the exact date 
of incorporation or entry into Ghana is not known. The histories of many of 
the companies rivalling UAC remain obscure. 
c 
c 
achieving substantial economic independence for themselves. 
1. 01igopo1ization of Ghanaian Trade: 
The United Africa Company and 
Its Competitors3 
141 
It is anachronistic, no doubt, to refer to the United Africa Company as 
the most important of the companies trading in Ghana between 1886 and 1939, as 
the company was not actually formed until 1929. Nevertheless, the reference is 
appropriate since, although the Company itself did not exist until 1929, its 
predecessors not only existed but thoroughly dominated the Ghana trade from the 
early nineteenth century. This section will therefore briefly review thE:: his-
tory of the United Africa Company, and then consider what competitors it had 
in trade. 
The United Africa Company was formed as a conglomeration of several 
companies which had dominated the British West African trade, especially in the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, since the turn of the nineteenth century. Chart 2 
outlines in brief the major steps in the formation of the company. Orig:i.nally, 
on the Gold Coast, there had been many small trading firms. Competition was 
easy to enter because there were few advantages of scale; anyone who could buy 
a sailing ship could trade to West Africa. In the first half of the nim:teenth 
century, the major British firm in Ghana was that of Forster and Smith, with 
that of Swanzy, a firm which began trading in 1789, a close competitor. Swanzy 
and Forster and Smith made agreements together after 1852, when the invention 
of the steamship facilitated the regular carriage of small lots of goods and 
3Research for this section was conducted prior to the publication of 
Frederick Pedler's The Lion and the Uniaorn in Afr-iaa: 1~e United Afr-iaa Com-
pany 178?-1931 (London: Heinemann, 1974). Pedler's sources and this author's 
are similar, although of course Pedler's history is far more extensive. How-
ever, my conclusions as to the function of the United Africa Company as a 
contributor to the overall development of Africa differ radi.:!GI.lly from PE::dler' s. 
See my review of his work in Canadian Journal of A.froiaan Studies, forthcoming. 
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Date African and Eastern Side Niger Co. Side United Africa Company 
1789 F. and A. Swanzy founded 
in London 
1841 Establishment ofT. Harrison 
& Co., Liverpool (the lead-
ing firm in the formation 
of the African Assn. 1889) 
1865 Establishment of the Miller 
1885 
1889 
1890-
1894 
1899 
1919-
1921 
1920 
Companies in Glasgow and 
London 
Formation of the African 
Assn. by T. Harrison and 
eight other companies 
Formation of the 
Royal Niger Co., 
London 
Savage competition between African Association 
and the Niger Co. which ends by African As-
sociation withdrawing from the Niger River in 
return for a share interest in the Niger 
Company 
Absorption by African 
Association (now 
African and Eastern 
Trade Corporation) of 
Miller firms and 
Swanzy 
Cancellation of 
the Royal Niger 
Company's 
charter 
Acquisition of the 
Niger Co. by 
Lever Brothers 
Ltd. and consoli-
dation of all 
Lever West African 
interests 
1920 Abortive attempts at amalgamation of African and 
Eastern and Niger Companies 
1929 Amalgamation under the name of United Africa Company Ltd. 
1932 Eighty per cent 
Chart 2. Chronological Chart of Main 
control of UAC ob-
tained by Unilever 
Ltd. 
Events in the United Africa Company's History4 
4Adapted from 11Chronologica1 table of main events in the Company's 
History," in UAC Rankin file. 
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therefore the entrance of more small firms into the trade,5 Nevertheless, by 
1873 Forster and Smith had disappeared from the coast, leaving Swanzy a free 
hand. 6 Swanzy apparently was a more enterprising firm, willing to take more 
risks in the trade. It established a series of "factories" along the coast and 
was willing to send goods out unsold, ahead of time, to be sold on arrival, 
whereas the normal business practice before this change had been to send out 
" 
goods only after they had been paid for by commission agents.? Swanzy's main 
business was done not between the West Coast and Britain, but rather between 
Africa and the United States. Itsimports to Ghana in its earlier years in-
eluded such goods as rum (until the United States' declaration of prohibition 
in 1919), tobacco, lumber, medicines, and sewing machines. Swanzy exported 
gum copal, rubber, and palm oil, and sometimes more unusual items such as 
parrots and monkeys.B 
By the beginning of the colonial period the main rival to Swanzy in 
Ghana was a Glasgow-based firm, Millers Limited. Less is known of this company 
than of Swanzy. It had originally started as Alexander Miller, Brother and 
Company, and had been operating in the Gold Coast and the Niger area since 
1868.9 The two firms, Miller and Swanzy, were not long in direct competition, 
for they quickly began to come to agreements on prices and market distribution. 
Miller reorganized in the early t>ventieth century, forming Millers Limited, 
5Freda Wolfson, "British Relations with the Gold Coast, Nineteenth Cen-
tury" (University of London: unpublished Fh.D. Thesis, 1951), p. ii. 
6Ibid. , p. 106. 
7Henry Swanzy, "A Trading Family in the Nineteenth Century Gold Coast," 
Transactions of the Gold Coast and TogoZand Historioal Sooiety, vol. 2, part 2 
(1956), p. 113. 
8
"The Story of UAC in Ghana," The Unioom (House Magazine of the United 
Africa Company in Ghana), no. 3, vol. 16 (t•lay/June 1970), p. 2. 
9Rankin, op. oit., p. 60. 
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which traded in Ghana in 1904, and Miller Brothers (of Liverpool) Limited, 
which traded in Nigeria, in 1907. 10 In what can hardly have been a purely eo-
incidental development, in 1904 Miller also moved to take over control of 
Swanzy, which as a result of overinvestment in gold mines was then in financial 
difficulties. Miller decided to bail Swanzy out, on condition that it would in 
future have a say in Swanzy's policies. The board of Swanzy was increased to 
four, of which two were Miller nominees. Thereafter the two firms remained 
nominally distinct but they worked in the closest cooperation both at home and 
in Ghana. "IO]n the Gold Coast control was centred in the person of a single 
Supervising Agent. "11 For many years this agent was J. H. Batty, later to be-
come chairman of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation, and still later· 
chairman of Ashanti Goldfields. 1 2 
The main competitor to Miller and Swanzy after 1889 was the African As-
sociation, a conglomeration of companies which had been formed into one group 
in Nigeria in 1889 in order to be able to better compete with the Royal Niger 
Company. The most important of these firms was T. Harrison and Company; the 
others included the British and Continental African Co. Ltd. (Liverpool), 
Couper, Johnstone and Co. (Glasgow}, Hatton and Cookson (Liverpool), Holt and 
Cotterell (Liverpool), Richard and William King (Bristol), Stuart and Douglas 
Ltd. (Liverpool), Taylor, Laughland and Co. (Glasgow), and George 'ivatts 
(Liverpool). 13 The object of the formation of the Association was to obtain a 
charter in the Oil Rivers similar to that w:·J.ich the Royal Niger Company held, 
up to 1899, for the Niger River. In this object the company failed; it did, 
10 Ibid. ' p. 68. 
11 Ibid. ' p. 72. 
12Directory of Directors (1915, 1925, 1935}. 
13Rankin, op. cit., p. 73. 
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however, manage to reach a modus vivendi with the Royal Niger Company without 
which no doubt the several small companies would have gone under completely. 
This modus vivendi was doubly important because of the close connections be-
tween Miller and the Royal Niger Company. Alexander Miller had been appointed 
a Joint Managing Director of the National African Company, the Niger Company's 
predecessor, and for many years the business of the Niger Company and Miller 
Brothers was conducted from the same office in London. 14 An agreement was made 
in 1899 between the Niger Company~ the African Association, Alexander Miller, 
Brother and Company, and the Company of African Merchants that they would not 
intrude on each other's territory and that they would pool their profits and 
divide them in specified proportions. The agreement was investigated by the 
Colonial Office in 1900 and approved.l 5 
Thus although the United Africa Company itself was not formed until 1929 
it can be seen that the close connections between the various dominating firms 
in the British vlest African trade were formed very early in the formal colonial 
period. The African Association was a competitor with Miller and Swanzy in the 
Gold Coast, and as a group was fighting to maintain its existence against the 
competitive onslaught of the two large, closely organized and cooperating 
firms. Yet by 1919, the African Association, Miller, and Swanzy had all united 
into the African and Eastern Trade Corporation. The reason for this new organ-
ization was not simply that more cooperation was deemed necessary, but rather 
that all three firms by this point were worried about a new competitor, Lever 
Brothers. It seemed logical for the three firms to unite, as their histo~y hed 
been one of fairly close cooperation since 1900. The African Association 
11+ Ibid. ' p • 60 • 
1 5 Ibid. , p. 87 . 
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started its first store in Ghana in 1896. 16 By the early twentieth century it 
was making agreements with its two competitors to divide profits from a common 
pool on a pro rata basis. 17 The first agreement, in 1901, fixed prices for 
imported merchandise. In March 1904, an agreement was made to pool net profits 
and to divide them according to each company's capital worth. Later on, the 
three original companies joined with the Basel Mission Trading Company, J. J. 
Fischer and Company, and the German West African Trading Company (which was to 
disappear during the First World War) in an agreement to fix prices and pool 
profits on all staple exports. 18 The path to unity was further smoothed by 
cooperation during World War I, ·w-hen 11 a series of trade agreements started 
whose purpose was to regulate the purchase and division of produce. Nearly all 
the produce-buying houses entered into them."19 
The final impetus to unity, however, was provided by the introduction of 
Lever Brothers into the West African Coast, with its consequent threat of mo-
nopoly and de~truction of all the carefully-organized trade patterns built up 
by the older trading firms over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centur-
ies. Lever had had interests in West Africa from 1896, through the Oil Rivers 
and Exploration Company Limited. Shares in this company had however been sold 
in 1904 and Lever Brothers had not acquired any further interest in the trade 
until 1910, when it acquired the firm of Maciver and Company. 20 This firc;t 
acquisition was followed by a series of others, the purpose of all of them being 
to increase Lever Brothers 1 control over the world supply of edible fats 'N"hich 
16Dumett, 11British .•. ,"op. ait., p. 334. 
17Ibid., p. 320. 
18 Ibid.' p. 321 
19Rankin, op. ait., p. 90. 
20Rankin, op. ait., p. 5. 
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it used in its soap and margarine manufacture. The aim of Lever Brothers had 
originally been to start West African plantations. However in 1902 its request 
for land for plantations was denied by the Colonial Office, which was willing 
to offer only a twenty-one year lease in Sierra Leone, not considered adequate 
by Lever for mechanical developments and reorganization of production. 21 Lever 
then turned to the Belgian Congo for plantations, entering West Africa as a 
buyer, not a producer, in 1910. 
Realizing that Lever was out to acquire as much of a monopoly of oil 
palm supplies as it could, the African Association, Miller, and Swanzy united 
in 1919 to form the African and Eastern Trade Association to protect their own 
interests. In July 1920 Lever Brothers bought the Niger Company. According to 
a former director of Lever Brothers, Lever 
• • . wanted to make sure that he would get a certain proportion of 
his requirements for the soap firms .•.• He may have paid too much for 
it but the Niger Company strengthened Lever's hand by the quantity of 
produce that they were able to buy and import as against opposition. They 
had a land and a monopoly, the land belonged to them. If you wanted to 
establish on the river Niger, you couldn't do it then without the Niger 
Company .••• He ILever] had a monopoly. He didn't have the opposition 
that he had in other parts with the African and Eastern. . • . [A]n 
organisation such as Unilever, should not depend upon the market for raw 
material. . • • [T]hey ought to have something of their own to fall back 
on. . • . They could make a ring against Levers but with Levers having 
their own suppliers it made them independent of the ring--they could get 
together, but they couldn't stop the machinery for supplying the margarine 
firms or the soap plant.22 
Although Lever Brothers originally entered the African trade in order to 
guarantee supplies of palm oil and kernels to itself and its sister companies, 
2lcharles Wilson, 
1954), pp. 165 and 180. 
hering to its policy of 
II. 
The History of VniZever (London: Cassell and Co., 
In making this decision the Colonial Office was ad-
leaving land in African hands, as described in Chapter 
22Interview by Dr. P. N. Davies with W. K. Findlay, former director of 
Lever Brothers and Chairman of the Niger Company, Liverpool, 4 March 1964. 
Included in P. N. Davies (ed.), Trading E:;,perienees in West Afr•iea_, 1840-1914 
(London: Croom Helm, 1976). I am grateful to Dr. Davies for allowing me to 
use the original interview. 
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Jurgens and Van den Berghe of the Netherlands, it soon became evident 
that it would enter other aspects of the trade, particularly, in Ghana, the 
import-export trade based upon cocoa. The slump in cocoa prices in 1920 en-
abled it very quickly to buy up some of the smaller firms which had been trad-
ing in Ghana independent of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation .. It 
immediately tried to buy out African and Eastern as well, and a "nine-year 
struggle11 ensued. On the whole African and Eastern did better business than 
the Niger Company during the years 1920-28. But in 1929, with the onset of the 
Depression, African and Eastern lost its financial backing, while the Niger 
Company was able to continue because of its "fairy godmother," Unilever. 23 
Without credit, African and Eastern was forced to succumb, joining the Niger 
Company to form the United Africa Company on 3 March 1929. Originally the two 
companies entered the union on equal terms, each holding fifty per cent of the 
United Africa Company shares. But in its first few years the United Africa 
Company faced serious financial difficulties from which only Unilever could 
bail it out; consequently, by 1932 Unilever, through the Niger Company, had 
eighty per cent contro~. 24 
By 1929, therefore, a large number of independent British firms which 
had traded in the Gold Coast over the space of 140 years, had succumbed to the 
forces of oligopoly and had been joined together under the umbrella of the 
United ATrica Company, which to the time of political independence was to re-
main the single most important firm in Ghana. Lest it be thought, however, 
that the United Africa Company maintained complete control of the trade at all 
times, it should be noted that it never managed to incorporate into its empire 
23Rankin, op. cit., p. 108. 
24Ibid., pp. 128-29. 
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the independent manufacturing firms which were buying in Ghana: that is, the 
chocolate manufacturing firms vrhich bought cocoa for their own use and were not 
engaged in the import-export trade. 
The three chocolate manufacturing firms which became buyers in Ghana 
were Cadbury Brothers Limited, J. S. Fry and Sons Limited, and J. Lyons and 
Company. The latter was a giant concern which included many hotel and restau-
rant interests in England, while the former two were more strictly concerned 
with the manufacture of confections. Cadbury Brothers and J. S. Fry amalga-
mated their business on the Gold Coast as of 1918 (buying also for Rowntree) 
and in 1919 a holding company, the British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited, 
was formed with directors from and holdings in both companies.2 5 
Cadbury Brothers Limited was formed in England in 1900 and moved i~to 
the Gold Coast in 1907 (after deciding to stop buying cocoa from Sac Theme and 
Principe because of the Portuguese use of slave labour.) Cadbury, a business 
owned by Quakers, 26 was concerned to establish fair dealings in Ghana and not 
to be guilty of some of the trade abuses practiced by its competitors at the 
time. A recommendation made by their first Gold Coast agent firmly condemned 
the business practices of the firms such as Hiller, Swanzy, and the African 
Association, already on the Coast. "The Firm would need to offer a better 
price for good cocoa that was being paid by a ring of buyers whose main activity 
was trading in imported merchandise. Most payments were not in cash but in 
'chits' on the local store. Payment in cash was strongly recommended."27 
25stoak Exahange Yearbook (1939). 
26Cadbury's Quaker motives are questioned by Roger Southall, in his 
"Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1907-38: The Dilemma of the Model Firm in a Colo-
nial Economy" (University of Birmingham: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1975). I 
am grateful to Dr. Southall for having allowed me to read a draft of his dis-
sertation in 1974. 
27Norman Edwards, Cadbury on the Gold Coast (Bournville: Publications 
Department, 1955), p. 4. 
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Cadbury also made a strong resolution to buy only good quality cocoa, and to 
encourage the farmers, by the payment of higher prices, to invest more time and 
money in their produce. This policy, however, did not succeed, as the farmers 
found that Cadbury was rejecting poorer quality cocoa which they had often 
travelled miles to sell, and as a result they were embittered against the 
company. " ••• competition from trading firms had stiffened, and it was felt 
that the Firm's buyers had refused too much cocoa which, if not of the highest 
standard, was reasonably good. This had annoyed many African suppliers who had 
often brought the cocoa many miles • tt28 
The stiff competition against Cadbury was a result of its policies not 
to engage in trade abuses and not to buy poor quality cocoa. A transport boy-
cott against Cadbury was formed on its entrance into Ghana, but it was soon 
broken and by 1911 Cadbury was a leading cocoa buyer. After the sudden <imm-
swing in the cocoa market in 1920 (as a result of the post-war glut of the cocoa 
market) "Tempting offers were made to manufacturing firms and blatant attempts 
were made by trading companies to jeopardise the position of the Cadbury-Fry 
agency on the Coast. 1129 When the United Africa Company was formed, yet . . . 
another attempt was made to oust Cadbury from the Ghana trade. The company was 
obliged to charter its own ships because UAC pressure on the shipping companies 
resulted in its being denied space; further, the UAC outbid Cadbury for cocoa 
by as much as ls6d per cwt., then undersold it on both the Liverpool and the New 
York cocoa markets. (Cadbury and the other manufacturing firms customarily 
sold surplus supplies on the open market.) As a result negotiations took place 
in 1932-33, and an agreement was made on prices to be paid on the Gold Coast 
c 
28Ibid.' p. 14. 
29 Ibid.' p. 22. 
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and a system of regulating supplies in Europe. 30 By the time that the 1937-38 
Cocoa Pool was formed, Cadbury had joined the common organization of European 
firms, albeit with a certain degree of reluctance. J, S. Fry, as its partner, 
and J. Lyons independently, were also members of the Cocoa Pool. 
Along with the competition offered to the UAC and its predecessors by 
the manufacturing firms, was that offered by the few other British trading 
firms which were able to compete effectively with the UAC and retain their in-
dependence, at least for a few years, of its control. These firms, as 
indicated in Chart 1, were John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Limited, W. 
Bartholemew and Company, Busi and Stephenso~ Limited, Paterson, Zochonis and 
Company Limited, and G. B. Ollivant Limited. They were the largest of the 
myriad firms which were scattered all over #est Africa during the colonial 
period and which eked out, for the most part, a meagre existence. 
John Holt entered the i'lest African trade in the 1860s, beginning with 
the export of cheap manufactured goods to Nigeria and branching from that into 
produce buying. It did not enter the Gold Coast until 1935, although it had a 
factory at Keta, near the Togoland border, from the early 1920s.3 1 Its expan-
sion was rapid, however, and by 1938 it had sixty-one "selling points" and 
twenty-seven cocoa-buying stations in Ghana.3 2 The firm of John Holt had been 
a founding member of the African Associatio~ in 1889, but quarrels with the 
other members of the Association had resulted in its withdrawal in 1896.33 
30Ib'd 
"' • ' pp. 29-31. 
31Cherry Gertzel, Merahcmt Adventu1•e (Liverpool: John Holt and Company, 
1951), p. 48. 
32JH: Jacket no. 536 (ii). 
3 3H. D. Cotterell, "Reminiscences of One Connected with the West African 
Trade from 1863 to 1910," in Davies (ed. ) , Trading Experiences • . . , op. ait. 
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Thereafter, the firm remained independent, and as such it was a significant 
check on the monopolist tendencies on the West African Coast, even though it 
did not enter Ghana herself until the mid-thirties. 
W. Bartholemew and Company was formed in 1926 and entered Ghana in the 
same year, specializing not only in cocoa buying and merchandise selling, but 
more specifically in the importing of motor cars.3 4 Like Bartholemew, the 
firms of both Busi and Stephenson and Paterson Zochonis entered Ghana quite 
late, the former in the late twenties or early thirties, the latter about 
1933.3 5 But whereas Busi and Stephenson was not formed until that time, 
Paterson and Zochonis was, like Holt, a firm which had traded in other West 
African colonies for a considerable period of time, having been started in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1890.36 
It should be noted that many firms entered Ghana in the late twenties 
and thirties. The thirties was also a period of entry for Lebanese traders and 
for a number of independent Continental Europeans. 'l'his entry of new firms 
into the trade contradicts the theory that in times of economic depression 
small firms are pushed out of.trade in favour of larger firms. In Ghana, more 
firms competed for a diminished world cocoa market. One possible explanation 
for this phenomenon could be that, in order to keep their profits up, firms 
such as John Holt, formerly content with fewer sources of supply, sought to 
expand. Another explanation could be found in the fact that even during the 
Depression, comfortable dividend rates were being paid by the firms investing 
34stook Exohange Yearbook (1939). 
35Interviews with office managers, Paterson Zochonis and Busi and 
Stephenson, Accra, July and August 1974. 
36w. Bartholemew amalgamated with John Holt in 1957 and the company John 
Holt Bartholemew later became part of Lonrho. Paterson Zochonis and Busi and 
Stephenson are still independent fir1ns in Ghana. 
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in the import-export trade in West Africa. Oligopolistic organization, into 
which the newer firms joined, counterbalanced the effects of the Depression. 37 
The largest independent British firm to compete with the UAC was G. B. 
Ollivant, a Manchester-based concern which was started in 1858. In 1923 it was 
recorded as having three branches in Ghana, at Accra, Winneba, and Keta. 3S GBO 
was the firm most concerned with the import of Lancashire cottons into West 
Africa. In 1934 it became financially associated with UAC, but it continued to 
compete with the actual UAC organization until the 1960s; there was, in other 
words, regulated internal competition. 39 GBO was perceived as a separate or-
ganization by its African customers. 
But all of the companies mentioned above were to eventually cooperate 
with the UAC in the Gold Coast Cocoa Pool of 1937. Many had already cooperated 
with its predecessors. So also those few foreign firms (that is, non-British 
firms) which were able to establish themselves over significant periods of time 
in Ghana, cooperated with the UAC. Both the Compagnie Fran<_;aise de 1 'Afrique 
Occidentale and the Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain4 0 had extensive 
networks in Ghana, the former having entered the Colony in 1909, and the latter, 
37Maurice Dobb observes that in general, there was a ''most marked persis-
tence of the small firm" in Europe during the Depression years. He points out 
that one reason for their persistence might have been the liaisons which were 
made between the small firms and the larger firms which maintained the latter's 
controL He further remarks that the general dividend rate remained at about 
six per cent throughout the Depression years in Europe. Both these phenomena 
could be accounted for by the theory of increasing monopolization of capitalism 
in the twentieth century. Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York: 
International Publishers, 1963), pp. 341-42, 329. 
38
"Your Compa..r1y in Ghana," The Horseman (House Magazine of G. B. Ollivant 
(Nigeria) Limited), no. 7 (Aprill964), p. h. 
39 11 G. B. Olli vant Ltd. : A History," Link (Magazine of the UAC Group in 
Nigeria) no. 1, vol. 4 (March 1970), p. 1, and interview, G. B. Ollivant, 
Manchester, November 1974. 
1
+0Both companies still operate as in<iependent concerns in Ghana. 
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actually a breakaway firm from CFAO, in 1914. They engaged, as did the British 
firms, in general import and export trade, concentrating on cocoa. Lilce the 
British firms, they shipped through the Elder Dempster and Woermann lines. The 
only substantial difference they had with their British competitors was that 
they tended to be financed by European banks and a higher proportion of their 
goods and produce came from or was destined for the Continental market. They 
suffered no discrimination on account of their national origins.4 1 
A smaller Continental company, the Swiss African Trading Company, which 
entered the Gold Coast in 1922 specifically as a cocoa-buying firm with its 
headquarters in Kumasi, was bought out by the UAC in 1936, 42 although it re-
mained nominally distinct after that date. 
In general the policy of the Government, until the 1930s when the 
Depression induced a certain amount of protectionism, was to allow all compan-
ies equal access to Ghana. In the case of French firms (CFAO was a French 
firm, while SCOA was Swiss) this right was guaranteed by the Anglo-French 
agreement of 1898. There was in fact only one Continental company which 
suffered any discrimination in Ghana as a result of its national affiliation. 
This single exception was the Basel Mission Trading Company. This company was 
one of the largest and most successful in Ghana, even though, because it was 
mission supported, it had a stated and strict policy of not selling two very 
important trade items, arms and liquor. During World War I, many accusations 
were made both in England and in Ghana, to the effect that the Easel Mission 
Trading Company was a German firm; and indeed, although it was registered in 
Switzerland many of the members of the mission w>d of the firm's management 
were German. Pressure built up to confiscate the Company and turn over its 
41 Interviews, SCOA and CFAO, Accra, February and March 1974. 
42Interview, s,dss African Trading Company, Accra, March 1974. 
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assets to British firms; significantly, much of the pressure came from persons 
such as J. H. Batty, Chairman of the Combine firms of Miller, Swanzy and the 
African Association, who suggested that it only be allowed to operate under the 
supervision of an English company.43 
Although the Government acknowledged that the Basel Mission Trading 
Company was Swiss, it nevertheless confiscated its property in 1918, and turned 
the assets over to an independent British firm, the Commonwealth Trust Company, 
which was supposed to carry on the good work of the Basel Mission by devoting 
all of its profits above five per cent to the improvement of the "natives" of 
the colonies (the Company operated in India as well as in Ghana) in which it 
operated. The Mission Company, angered at the confiscation which it perceived 
as unjust, reformed under the title of the Union Trading Company in 1921. A 
long and bitter legal struggle ensued and eventually, in 1928, the company was 
paid £250,000 compensation. The Commonwealth Trust, however, was also allowed 
to continue its operations (significantly perhaps, it included among its direc-
tors R. L. Holt of John Holt and Company) and was paid an additi.onal £55,000 to 
help it over its immediate financial difficulties. All of this compensation 
money vTaS paid. not from the Imperial Treasure, although the Home Government had 
originally decided to confiscate the Mission's property, but from the colonial 
revenues, over the opposition of the Unofficial African members of the Legisla-
tive Council. 44 
This type of persecution of non-British companies in the Gold Coast was 
unusual, however. The informal, extralegal means of control of trade were 
43Letter from Hugh Clifford, Governor, Golo Coast, to Bonar Law, M.P., 
30 December 1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/141. 
4411Memorandum: 
Trust" (Gold Coast : 
1928. 
The Basel Mission Trading Society and the Commonwealth 
Goverr~ent Printing Office, 1928) and GCLegCo, 25 October 
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usually sufficient to guarantee that a large percentage of the trade was kept 
in British hands. The Government confined its role to bland statements that it 
could not interfere in arrangements made among the firms to regulate trade; it 
did not actively forbid outsiders or Africans from trade. In fact the primary 
aim of the Gold Coast Government, in regulating its trade policy, was to en-
courage as much trade as possible, with whatever country, in order to increase 
the revenues which it obtained from import and export dues. 45 Only during the 
Depression of the 1930s was there significant pressure to close Ghana to for-
eign traders, and this pressure was aimed not at England 1 s real rivals, that 
is, America, France, and Germany, but against the relatively weak rivals of 
Japan and Russia. The reason for this was that any pressure for restriction of 
imports from the three former countries would result in retaliatory measures by 
their governments against Gold Coast exports. Moreover, an agreement had ex-
isted between France and England since 1898 guaranteeing that each country's 
nationals would be treated equally with the other's in either British or French 
colonies between Senegal and the Cameroons. Although there were occasional 
complaints against this agreement by British traders, in general it was ac-
knowledged that in fact they benefitted greatly from the equality of treatment 
which they received in the French colonies. 
fThe Anglo-French Convention] had caused the granting of equal treat-
ment to British and French subjects in matters of commerce, tariffs and 
other fiscal affairs in the Colonies of the French Ivory Coast, the Gold 
Coast, French Dahomey and Nigeria (excluding Togoland) .••. [T]he 
Convention ..• had all along operated in favour of British trade. 
Statistics .•. show the strength of this argument. 46 
45This point is made by C. W! Newbury in "The Tariff Factor in Angle-
French West African Partition," in Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (eds.), 
Franae and Bt'itain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1971), p. 256. 
46Memorandum of the <Toint West Africa Committee, 7 March 1928, reported 
in ManCC, 9 May 1928. 
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On the whole French traders were more likely to oppose the Convention than 
British traders, since they felt more severely the impact of British manufac-
tured goods. 
No similar convention existed with Germany for equal trade for the two 
countries, however, except for one treaty regarding trade between the eastern 
Gold Coast and Togoland which was in effect from 1894 to 1904, and which was 
not renewed as the Germans decided to increase their duties for revenue pur-
poses.47 The hostilities which existed in Europe, however, between Germany and 
Britain, were reflected in Gold Coast policy. ~~ring World War I all German 
traders and their agents were expelled from the colony, and their property was 
auctioned off to British traders only, thus effecting a redistribution of com-
mercial properties in the eastern Gold Coast adjoining Togoland. After W::>rld 
War I the Gennan traders were allowed to re-enter the Colony under strict 
immigration procedures. No hostility was felt against them until the 1930s, 
when European Unoffical Hembers in the Legislative Council began to protest 
generally about the presence of foreigners in the colony. The Germans were 
accused of paying their European staff lower wages than the British, of hiring 
fewer Africans, and of selling British goods at lower prices than the British 
themselves could manage.48 However the Germans were not expelled, but were 
left to pursue their activities. During the 1937-38 cocoa boycott several 
German citizens offered to ship cocoa for Africans on a commission basis; at 
least one firm, Fuerst Brothers, was reasonably honest and might indeed h~ve 
been able to fulfil its promises. 49 Providentially for the large firms, 
47Newbury, op. oit., p. 256. 
48LonCC, 22 June 1931. 
49 Interview with a .former British barriste!', Accra, May 1974. 
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however, all Germans in the colony were interned in 1939. 
Rumblings were also heard in the West African trade community during the 
thirties against several other nations, all of whom were infringing on the now 
closely-guarded empire of the large British firms. The Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce tried, without success, to persuade the Home Government to place a 
prohibitive duty on Russian and Norwegian whale oil imports to Britain as whale 
oil was competing with palm oil. 50 The Sheffield Chamber of Commerce, through 
Manchester, tried to persuade the Gold Coast Government to place a tariff on 
Continental manufactures so that Sheffield could make more exports of agricul-
tural machinery, and road and mine-building equipment to Africa. 51 
Manchester, concerned for its textiles, pressured the Government for protection 
against Russian greys.s2 
But the only successful move against foreign competition was that 
against the import into Ghana of Japanese textiles, which began to increase 
during the mid-1930s. The Japanese share of Gold Coast trade was miniscule. 
Nevertheless its share of certain cotton imports started to affect British 
sales in 1934. For cotton piece goods imported into Ghana the shares were the 
following: 53 
Table 11. Japanese and British Cotton Piece Goods 
Imported into Ghana 
Country 1932 1933 1934 
United Kingdom 88% 76% 61% 
Japan 1% 5% 18% 
50Reported in ManCC, March 1933. 
51ManCC, 18 January 1934. 
52ManCC, 1934-35. "Greys" are bolts of raw cotton. 
53statement in the GCLegCo by the Comptroller of Customs, 12 June 1934. 
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Since Japan was not a customer for exported goods, it was easy enough to impose 
a quota on her imports, on the grounds that the economy of Ghana, and also of 
the Empire, would suffer if those who sold to her did not also buy from her. 
The Textiles (Quotas) Ordinance was passed in 1934, with the object 11 • to 
restrict the annual imports only of certain textile goods manufactured in 
Japan."54 
During the 1930s, pressure also began to be generated inside Ghana to 
restrict the number of non-Africans emigrating into the colony. Specifically, 
this pressure was directed against Italians and Lebanese. Italians were be-
coming a significant force in the internal economy as unlike the English, they 
were not afraid to perform manual labour and they were engaged, not in trade, 
but in contracting work. In 1931, forty-three per cent of the Government's 
small contracting·work was given to Italians and Syrians, and forty-eight per 
cent to Africans. 55 Because the Italians charged less than the British, cer-
tain Europeans felt that they must be doing shoddy work and paying poor wages 
to their employees. The Government, howeve:, argued that a significant per-
centage of railroad contracts still went to British firms, and moreover that 
all contractors were obliged to use British materials, and therefore refused to 
move against the Italians.56 
Similar objections were made against the Syrians (Lebanese) who began to 
move into the colony in increasing numbers in the 1930s. Always ready to in-
voke African interests when it helped their own case, the London Chamber of 
Commerce expressed the fear that Syrians would take over opportunities from 
54Importation of Textiles (Quotas) Ordinance 1934, in GNA Adm.29/6/8. 
55Statement by the Acting Director of Public Works, in GCLegCo, 23 
February 1931, 
56Memorandum from the Colonial Office to the Joint West African Committee, 
13 December 1929, reported in ManCC, ll FebTuary 1930. 
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11 the African trader, the African clerking class, the African Property Owner and 
the European Merchant."5 7 Africans also complained against the Syrians, whom 
they accused of unscrupulous pawnbroking and of denying opportunities to 
Africans for employment. 
Parents in this country feel that certain Syrians are ruining the youths 
of this country, and the youths must be protected .••• These Syrians do 
not scruple for a moment to take or pawn anything even from an infant; and 
the amount of gold which is carried away from this country, illegitimately, 
is enormous. 58 
I came across during my travels a Syrian who was a cook for himself, 
and who, one occasion, was unloading a lorry containing yams, pepper, and 
onions which he had bought for himself from another place. He would not 
even pay a farthing to a labourer to remove the things from the lorry. A 
man like this leaves nothing to the country. He is taking all the money 
away to a foreign country, and we get nothing from it. 59 
The Government was indeed concerned with the influx of Lebanese into the colo~r, 
but more for cultural reasons, one suspects (since Lebanese were certainly not 
black and yet not quite white) than for economic. Their incursion into petty 
trade did not affect the large European firms. 
On the whole, then, the policy of the Ghana Government throughout the 
colonial period was one of free access to all traders, of whatever nation. 
Restrictions on trade were imposed by the firms themselves, through their 
monopoly agreements, not by the Government. There were only two exceptions to 
this policy; the exclusion of Germans during and immediately after World War I, 
and the imposition of quotas on Japanese textiles after 1934. In both of these 
cases hardships resulted for the indigenous population as a result of the 
policy. The removal of German traders from eastern Ghana left trade there in 
57Letter dated 13 July 1933, from the Commonwealth Trust to the Lon1on 
Chamber of Commerce, in LonCC, 9 October 1933. 
58statement in GCLegCo by Mr. Korsah, 15 March 1937. 
59statement in GCLegCo by Nana Ofori Atta, 23 1~arch 1938. 
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the hands of a few British, who found it easy to collude against the African 
middleman trader. The removal of Japanese textiles from the market in the 
thirties imposed an additional hardship upon the already squeezed African con-
sumers. There was some opposition among Africans to the move, especially as 
they suspected that after the imposition of the quota they would be sold the 
same Japanese goods under a British label at a higher price. 
It is confidently felt that the Government cannot, after appealing to 
the people to join in putting this embargo on the Japanese, hesitate to 
bring down to the lowest ebb our present inflated import duty--the only 
cause for the rush after Japanese goods •••. It is stated that the 
Empire is analagous to a large fa~ily, the members of which should watch 
with jealous care the interests of each other. That being so, it cannot 
be conjectured that iw~ediately the Gold Coast Market is relieved of 
Japanese imports of cheap prices, then the same goods re-appear with 
different labels, and, with extortionate value in the same market.6° 
In cases in which the interests of African consumers conflicted with those of 
British traders, the interests of the latter took priority. It was more im-
portant to protect British textiles (and Lancashire textile workers, whose 
political clout was far more potent during the Depression, than that of African 
peasants) than to supply cheap cloth in Ghana. But where the interests of 
British traders conflicted with those of the Empire as a whole, the latter took 
precedence. Trade patterns with other nations had to be considered en bZoa, 
and protection for Ghana might mean retaliation against another part of the 
Empire. It was left to the business community to make its private deals to 
ward off competition, deals which were neither influenced by nor the responsi-
bility of the Colonial Government, and of which it could deny knowledge were it 
accused of not acting in the best interests of the African. 
60Statement from the Provincial Council of Chiefs, Eastern Province, to 
the Commissioner for the Eastern Province, l June 1934. In GNA Adm. 29/6/8. 
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2. Cooperation and Competition 
Many of the independent firms which had traded in Ghana from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards had amalgamated by the turn of the twentieth 
century. Further amalgamations took place in 1919 with the formation of the 
African and Eastern Trade Corporation, and in 1929 with the final amalgamation 
of A and ETC with the Niger Company into the United Africa Company. Ghanaians, 
well cognizant of the fact that despite their different names, the British 
firms were often legally amalgamated or at least acted in concert, referred to 
African and Eastern, Miller, and Swanzy, as the "Combine" firms. They were 
aware that the Combine firms and their inheritor, the United Africa Company, 
could not simply impose prices either for produce or for imported goods, since 
there were still a number of fairly large independent firms, both British and 
Continental, trading in Ghana. However, it was known, although difficult to 
substantiate, that it was common practice for the Combine firms to make agree-
ments both among themselves and with their major rivals. Such agreements 
usually covered both the prices to be paid for agricultural goods produced by 
Africans and the prices to be charged to them for imported manufactured goods. 
During the 1930s, the UAC, in concert with a number of its major rivals, 
formed a Merchandise Agreement group; that is a group of firms who agreed on 
prices and share of the market for a number of major imports into Ghana. This 
group of cooperating firms became known as the Association of West African 
Merchants (AWAM). Surviving into World War II and beyond, the Association was 
the centre of power in the Ghana (and Nigeria) trade. In Ghana, its membership 
was comprised of the UAC and its subsidiaries, John Holt, Compagnie Fran~aise 
de l'Afrique Occidentale, Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, Paterson 
Zochonis, the Union Trading Company, and the Commonwealth Trust.61 Again, 
61P. T. Bauer, West Afriaan Trade: A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and 
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Africans were well aware of the existence of the Association, and often refer-
red to it as the chief power behind the Colonial Government. 62 
The list of agreements made by the European firms to control import and 
export prices, as well as the share of the market to be allotted to each par-
ticipating firm, extends from the early twentieth century to 1939. The most 
well-known of the agreements was the 1937 Cocoa Pool, which precipitated the 
boycott by cocoa growers of the major European firms during the 1937-38 cocoa 
season, 63 but that Pool had many predecessors. Table 12 lists only some of 
these agreements. 
There is no reason to assume that even this list of agreements is ~om-
plete. It includes, for example, few agreements during the 1910s, yet the 
official historian of the UAC states that during World War I most of the large 
companies entered into agreements on the purchase and division of produce. 64 
The Nowell Commission in 1938 reported a series of agreements which more or 
less coincide with the list presented below; it concluded that periods of eo-
operation were interspersed with periods of intense and damaging competition. 
We have had described to us in evidence a cocoa Agreement entered .into 
in 1903 by the leading exporters in the Gold Coast, which had certain 
similarities, including the division of purchases, to the Buying Agreements 
with which we are concerned. A1 though the 1903 Agreement was apparently 
limited to one year, subsequent agreements were made in 1903 [sic], 1905, 
and again for a period of five years in 1906. From 1910 there followed 
Monopoly in a Changing Economy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 
66-67. 
62This author contacted a number of companies and jnstitutions, but was 
unable to locate any documents of the Association of West African Merchants. 
One reply to a request for information stated that AWAM documentation had been 
destroyed by bombing during World War II; other replies denied any knowledge of 
the existence of' the organization. 
63For a detailed discussion of the 1937 Pool and the cocoa boycott, see 
Chapter VII. 
6 4Rankin, op. ait., p. 90. 
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No. Date 
1. 01/05/1900 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
01/10/1901 
20/02/1902 
03/11/1903 
01/03/1904 
10/05/1906; 
11/07/1910: 
22/05/1913 
1905 
13/02/1906 
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Table 12. Trade Agreements in the Gold Coast65 
Description 
Agreement for pooling produce of West African business be-
tween the African Association, the Niger Company, and 
others. 
Pooling agreement between the African Association Limited, 
Alexander Miller and Company, and F. & A. Swanzy Limited. 
Agreement regarding palm kernels, etc. , between the African 
Association Limited, Alexander Miller, Brother and Company, 
and the German West Africa Company. 
Pooling agreement between Messrs. F. & A. Swanzy Limited, 
and Millers Limited. 
Agreement regarding sharing in proportion to the capital 
of each party the net profits of the businesses of the 
parties carried on in the Gold Coast and the German Colony, 
between F. & A. Swanzy Limited, Millers Limited, and the 
African Association Limited. Expired 31/12/1913. 
Agreements between F. & A. Swanzy, Millers Limited, and 
the African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited (the 
African Association). 
Accra Produce Agreement between F. & A. Swanzy Limited, 
Millers Limited, the African Association Limited, J. J. 
Fischer and Company, the [Basel] Mission Trading Company, 
and the German West A~rican Trading Company. 
Volta Produce Agreement for pooling purchases of cocoa, 
rubber, palm oil and palm kernels between the [Basel] 
Mission Trading Company, F. & A. Swanzy Limited, Millers 
Limited, and Chevalier and Company. 
1905,1909,1914 Sundry timber pool agr~ements between the Gold Coast Ma-
chinery and Trading Company Limited, F. & A. Swanzy 
Limited, Millers Limited, and the African Association 
Limited. 
10. 27/07/1912 
11. 1925/1926 
Agreements regarding staple articles between the Basel 
Mission Trading Company, the African Association Limited, 
Millers Limited, and F. & A. Swanzy Limited. 
Cocoa pool agreement. African and Eastern Trade Corpora-
tion and others. 
65This table is taken from listings of the United Africa Company archival 
holdings in London. Unfortunately the author did not obtain access to the 
actual agreements. It is presumed that the list is incomplete. 
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Table 12 (cont'd.) 
No, Date 
12. 01/01/1930 
13. 27/07/1934 
14. 18/05/1936 
15. 30/1111937 
16. 10/11/1937 
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Description 
Agreement for the purchase and sale of palm oil and palm 
kernels between the UAC, John Holt and Company (Liverpool) 
Limited, G. B. Ollivant, and Paterson Zochonis. 
Gold Coast Merchandise Agreement (and Supplement 
18/06/1937). 
Agreement regarding the Gold Coast Motor Business between 
Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afrique Occidentale, Societe 
Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, Union Trading Company, 
W. Bartholemew and Company, and UAC. 
Agreements covering the sale of palm oil and palm kernels 
between UAC, John Holt and Company, and G. B. Ollivant 
Limited. 
Agreement between W. Bartholemew and Company, UAC and 
others for division of cocoa in the Gold Coast (the Cocoa 
Pool). 
a period of cocoa buying and selling agreements [i.e., agreements in-
cluding provision for the pooling of sales as well as of purchases] 
which lasted until 1917. After the War, probably owing to the efforts 
at amalgamation between the two largest concerns, agreements were less 
common, but a cocoa Agreement of the earlier type was in force between 
1925 and 1927; and a cocoa buying and selling Agreement operated during 
the first three years of the United Africa Company's existence • 
• • • it appears from admissions to us in evidence that agreements have 
tended to be regarded as 'breathing spaces' between bouts of fierce 
competition, and that they have invariably broken down through competitive 
forces re-establishing themselves.66 
The companies argued that competition was irrational within the context 
of West Africa; that there was a limited amount of trade available, which could 
not be expanded, and that therefore it behooved them to organize and share out 
that limited amount among themselves rather than allow a dog-eat-dog situation 
to develop in which the weak would suffer. 
The Firms do not co-operate to make exorbitant rates of profit. They 
well know it to be impossible. What they seek is to stabilise trade and 
create such conditions as will enable them to obtain a modest but fairly 
66Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 49. 
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steady return on their capital. 67 
In new markets. You are there. Another man comes and sets up as well. 
Only a certain amount of trade to be done. Necessary to make double your 
profit. In new markets therefore competition does not keep down prices, 
for if there is only a little trade everybody has to ask for higher 
profits .••• Very few fortunes have been taken out of West Africa. As 
much money has been lost as made. There is an idea that merchants make 
large profits. But all this co-operation has not resulted in excessive 
profits, but has only arrested the downw·ard slide. No great profits 
during the last twenty years. Co-operation is not confined to British 
firms but is international--French, German and Swiss as well.68 
The point of the agreements which were made, according to the firms, was not to 
be able to make excessive profits, but rather to be able to guarantee a certain 
percentage of the trade to each firm and to guarantee a certain return. The 
prime aim was to create stability in a limited trade which, at least on the 
export side, was subject to extreme fluctuations in the world market. When the 
world market could not be controlled, the firms tried to establish control of 
the local market. 
Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact profit rates of the corn-
panies operating in Ghana during this period, what little evidence is available 
does suggest that the firms' argument was basically correct; that in fact their 
profits were not excessive. Nevertheless the profits were steadier, especially 
during the Depression period, than the firms maintained. Much of their profit 
came not from the cocoa crop but from the sales of imported goods, which could 
be bought at a consistently cheap rate from the suppliers but sold at whatever 
the market could bear. Money lost on the cocoa crop could be made up by im-
ports. 
Table 13 presents the actual profit rates during the mid-l920s for 
67Rankin, op. oit., p. 148. 
6 8Notes taken by Mr. Rankin at a conference with Mr. Muir and Hr. Samuel 
(UAC Directors), 24 November 1938. UAC Rankin file. 
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Table 13. Profit Rates in the ~-lid-twenties for Several 
Firms which Amalgamated into the United Africa 
Company in 192969 
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Firm Year Trading Stocks Turnover Profit 
Profit as % 
of Turnover 
The Tarquah Trading Company 
Limited 1924 
1925 
(9 mos.) 1926 
1927 
Gold Coast Machinery and 
Trading Co. Ltd. 1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
McLaren Brothers (Manchester) 
Limited 1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
Crombie Steedman and Company 
Limited 1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
The African and Eastern Trade 
Corporation Limited 1924 
1925 
(9 mos.) 1926 
1926-27 
£153,541 
166,440 
120,822 
123,381 
53,958 
70,549 
55,981 
56,291 
58,537 
50,150 
36,593 
39,243 
89,878 
82,061 
67,333 
46,420 
351,005 
380,066 
368,000 
322,971 
£ 369,712 
446,007 
404,693 
399,547 
131,880 
143,071 
119,635 
140,078 
99,153 
116,770 
114,398 
138,915 
166,639 
228 '093 
219,384 
225,574 
869,153 
1,081~,530 
650,253 
1,172,402 
£ 20,739 
12,432 
9,427 
31,908 
12,305 
7,827 
6,175 
14,606 
4,158 
-1,278 
3,905 
12,625 
4,162 
-2,911 
-1,780 
11,990 
104,727 
107,862 
66,026 
137,106 
5.61 
2. 79 
2. 33 
7.99 
9.33 
5.47 
5.16 
10.43 
4.19 
-1.09 
3.41 
9.09 
2.50 
-1.28 
-0.81 
5.32 
12.05 
9-95 
10.15 
11.69 
69Source: UAC Rankin file: reports 38 and 55 to Head Office, 1928, on 
state of affairs on the West Coast. 
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several firms which were amalgamated, in 1929, into the United Africa Company. 
Unfortunately several of these are smaller ~ompanies, albeit companies which 
had some reputation in the local community. The profits for the mid-twenties, 
a very prosperous period, varied around five per cent to ten per cent per year 
for these companies. 
Table 13a presents the profits for the United Africa Company itself 
during the period 1932-37, thus, along with section five of Table 13 (profits 
of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation for 1924-27), giving some indica-
tion of rates of profit for the largest firms involved in the Ghana trade. 
Table 13a. United Africa Comp&~y Profits 1932-193770 
Period Profit Dividend (%) 
April 30-September 30, 1932 £ 141,359 1 
1932-33 428,386 2 
1933-34 581,117 3-3/4 
1934-35 1,123,305 8 
1935-36 1,532,866 10 
1936-37 1,811,099 11 
Table 14 presents dividend rates for several companies including the 
African and Eastern Trade Corporation, the United Africa Company, the Niger 
Company, and Unilever. Dividend rates are of course not a completely accurate 
reflection of profits, especially because payments are made according to de-
cisions on reinvestment policies; moreover, in poor periods dividends can be 
paid out of reserve funds. Furthermore in the cases of J. Lyons and Unilever, 
the dividend rates reflect their overall business, not simply their business on 
the West Coast of Africa. It should be noted that the African Association/ 
African and Eastern managed to pay consiste~tly high dividends, with the single 
c 
70source: Rankin, op. ait., p. 131, and Stock Exchange Yeca•book, 1939. 
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Table 14. Ordinary Dividend 
1886-1939 'lJ 
Rates for Selected Companies, 
Niger African Commonwealth 
Year Co. Association/ Unilever J. Lyons Trust Bartholemew UAC 
A&ETC 
1886 nil 
1887 nil 
1888 6 
1889 6 
1890 6 6 
1891 6 7~ 
1892 1-~ 5 . 
1893 6 7~ 
1894 6 4 10 
1895 6 nil 10 10 
1896 6 4~ 10 nil 
1897 6 6 12~ 8 
1898 6 15 15 15 
1899 28 15 15 17~ 
1900 n. a. 15 15 23 3h 
1901 10 12 15 26~ 
1902 10 12 15 283/4 
1903 10 12 15 30 
1904 10 12 15 30 
1905 10 12 17~ 30 
1906 10 12 7~ 32~ 
1907 10 12 8 32~ 
1908 10 12 10 32~ 
1909 10 12 12~ 32~ 
1910 10 12 15 32~ 
1911 10 12 15 42~ 
1912 10 12 15 42~ 
1913 10 12 15 42~ 
1914 10 5 10 42~ 
1915 10 15 10 32~ 
1916 10 20 10 25 
1917 10 20 15 25 
1918 10 30 17~ 25 
1919 nil 30 17~ 35 
71 Source: Stook Exchange Yearbook (1895, 1905, 1915, 1925, 1935, 1939). 
N.B. n.d. ~no data. In several cases, fiscal years, not cal~dar years, are 
listed in the Stook Exchange Yearbook. For the sake of simplicity, in such 
cases the figure is listed under the calendar year, e.g., 1893-94 is listed 
under 1894. 
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Table 14 (cont'd.) 
0 Niger African Commonwealth 
Year eo. Association/ Unilever J. Lyons Trust Bartholemew UAC 
A&ETC 
1920 nil 17~ 20 42~ 5 
1921 nil nil 10 42~ nil 
1922 nil 8 10 25 nil 
1923 nil 8 10 25 nil 
1924 nil 8 10 25 nil 
1925 nil 8 nil 25 nil 
1926 nil 6 nil 21~ nil 103/4 
1927 nil 8 5 21~ 10 60 
1928 nil nil 5 221-1i 20 100 
1929 5 nil 10 221-2 10 60 
1930 nil nil 10 22~ 5 20 
1931 nil nil 10 22~ nil nil ~ 
1932 nil nil 15 22~ nil nil 1 
1933 nil nil 15 22~ nil nil 23/4 
1934 5 nil 15 22~ nil nil 33/4 
1935 10 nil 15 221-1i nil nil 8 
1936 10 nil 15 221-2 11~ nil 10 
1937 nil 7~ 10 22~2 10 nil 11 
1938 n.d. 11 n.d. 22~ 20 nil n.d. 
1939 n.d. n.d. n. d. n. d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
exception of 1921 following the cocoa market failure of 1920, until the Depres-
sion. And the United Africa Company, although it was formed on the verge of 
the Great Depression, managed nevertheless to pay some dividends and by 1937, 
the year it orgaDized the Cocoa Pool to protect itself against instability, it 
was paying dividends of eleven per cent. 
To keep these profit and dividend rates up, then, the large British and 
Continental firms in Ghana made a series of agreements which were rigidly en-
forced. The agreements (which never included any AfricaD firms) covered 
produce, including cocoa, palm products, rubber, a11d timber, as well as imported 
merchandise. Strong sanctions were imposed on those parties to agreements who 
did not adhere to the agreed structure. Employees who decided on their own 
c initiative to pay more for cocoa, or sell goods at less than the price agreed 
c 
c 
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upon, were summarily and angrily dismissed. 
An employee of one major firm '.ras d.ismissed in 1939, for example, in 
what became known inside his firm as the 11Club Beer price cutting case." As 
his superior reported: 
I had no idea whatsoever that Hr. _____ was cutting prices in the Shop. 
I had caught him only four days previously on Bergedorfbeer and told him 
in rather strong terms that this is against my instructions. Yet when 
the Local Committee investigated matters .•. it was found out that 
seven [cases] had been sold at 39/- instead of 40/-•.•• The only 
remedy is to replace this man, since I have caught him again undercutting 
the sale price of soap (agreed) after the incident. 72 
In this case the superior officer was particularly upset becat~e an employee of 
the United Africa Company had complained to the "general Hanager' s Commit tee, 11 
a local committee of all the firms which periodically set prices, that his par-
ticular firm was deliberately undercutting the agreement. Reports of this kind 
could endanger a small firm's chances of being included in price-fixing and 
share-distributing agreements. 
During the 1930s, the share-distributing agreement, confined to members 
of the Association of West African Merchants, covered many popular brands of 
goods imported in large quantities, including salt, sugar, dried fish, and 
dyes, as well as other consumer products. 73 Agents of each firm kept a sharp 
eye upon one another and informed their principals whenever there was any in-
fraction of the price- ~~d share-fixing rules. A letter from John Holt to his 
Agent in Accra in 1936, for example, complains that 11Messrs. Busi and Stephenson 
have told us that our agent in Kumasi has been paying up unnecessarily and 
spoiling the market for everybody without increasing our share of the tonnage 
72From a letter dated at Kumasi, 7 April 1939. Access to this letter wab 
obtained privately through a former employee of one of the major firms in 
Ghana. 
73Bauer, op. eit., pp. 131-132. 
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available. " 74 
Both educated Ghanaians and chiefs were aware of the amount of monopoly 
in the Gold Coast and frequently raised objections to it. The progressive 
amalgamation of so many firms into what eventually became the United Africa 
Company was viewed not as a benign development, but as a means both of limiting 
free competition and of squeezing out the indigenous African trader. 
Our interests demand that the trade of the Colony be open to as many 
competitors as possible, and I therefore strongly urge that anything 
tending to strengthen or to lend the support of the Government to the 
monopolistic policy under which the natives have suffered during the past 
years should be seriously deprecated and discouraged. 75 
The above speech by Nana Ofori Atta was made before any of the larger amalgama-
tions of firms had taken place; already, however, the African community was 
aware, even if only vaguely, of the many agreements which were made in re-
straint of trade, and was accustomed to refer to the large firms as the 
"Combine" firms. When the formation of African and Eastern was in the wind, 
Ofori Atta questioned "Whether the designed amalgamation of the already ex-
isting large trading firms [into the A&ETC] should not be viewed with grave 
apprehension from the point of view of the future of the countries wherein such 
finns are going to carry on their activities?" 76 T. Hutton-Mills, a representa-
tive of the educated Ghanaian community, was concerned that the European firms 
would squeeze the African community out of trade, and felt that the Government 
should assume obligations to make sure that the different commercial sectors 
should all have opportuni t:i.es in trade. 
74Letter from John Holt (Manager in Liverpool) to District Agent, Accra, 
19 November 1936. JH: Jacket no. 92. 
75speech by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegCo., 2 November 1918. 
76Question by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegCo, 30 December 1920. 
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There are three classes [in Ghfu!a] who are virtually entitled to 
participate in the trade of this Colony; the European merchant, company, 
corporation or firm on the one hand, the native trader on the other and 
the native chiefs with the concurrence and assent of their councillors. 
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In distributing trade amongst the inhabitants I would ask that the monopoly 
should not be given to any particular class and to avoid complication and 
unsatisfactory murmuring the educated classes should always be recognised 
--some of them at any rate--as being entitled to a share of the trade in 
their own country.77 
But far from responding to these requests and objections from the 
Africans, the Government made no attempt at all to restrain the increasing 
oligopolization of the Gold Coast economy. Britain was, on the whole, less 
concerned with problems of monopoly thru1 other countries, especially the United 
States; certainly within the colonies she would make no move to restrain any 
developments which might guarantee a higher share of trade to British firms. 
No matter how the African members of local legislative councils might object, 
the British firms, with regular access to the Colonial Office in London, were 
in a position to push their own point of view much more effectively than the 
Africans. 
Individual members of the Colonial Government, however, did sometimes 
object, especially later in the colonial period, to the amount of monopoliza-
tion of the economy and the takeover by the United Africa Company of so many 
smaller enterprises. One UAC Director complained that: 
There is a terror of what they call 'monopoloy' in Government circles. 
For instance, this Company was going to link up with an existing cold 
storage company in the Gold Coast, for the sake of econoF~; yet we had to 
go to extraordinary pains to prove to officials that the proposition came 
from the smaller cold storage company, as it is always assumed that it is 
this company which is eating up all the others. Amalgamations are formed 
not out of strength but out of weakness, as in the case of the amalgama-
tion of the Niger Company and the African and Eastern.78 
77Speech by T. Hutton-Mills in GCLegCo, 2 November 1918. 
78Notes of .fvl_r. Muir's (a UAC Director) and Mr. Mellor's (a UAC official) 
conversation with Mr. Lunn, undated. UAC Rankin file. 
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The United Africa Company was sensitive to the issue of its extensive 
holdings, sensitive enough that when its official history was written the his-
torian was advised not to stress its various properties. For instance, one 
director wrote to the historian that 11 the feeling of the Gold Coast Con-
trol is that the bakery at Accra should not be referred to in the History. 1179 
The bakery in question was only one of the Company's many holdings; holdings 
which included interests in motors, lighterage, mineral waters, chemists' 
shops, and machine supplies. 80 Where it did not have its own monopoly holdings, 
the Company often made agreements as to restrictions of trade with other corn-
panies. In 1930, for example, it made an agreement with Maypole Dairy of Accra 
that Maypole would submit to certain restrictions of its trading rights in 
return for shares in UAC. 81 Nor was it only in the 1930s, with the formation 
of the UAC, that this type of activity developed. The A&ETC, for example, had 
a monopoly of the distribution of petrol, kerosene, and packet candles in Ghana 
during the 1920s.82 It also owned various manufacturing companies in Europe 
which provided it with diverse goods for the West Africa trade, such as oil 
palm casks, and which processed goods from West Africa. The firm of A. J. 
Caley, purchased by the Combine of Miller, Swanzy, and the African Association 
in 1917, manufactured chocolate and cocoa.83 Joseph Dunkerley and Sons, 
purchased by .African and Eastern in 1919, manufactured handkerchiefs, shawls, 
and similar small articles of haberdashery to export to West Af'rica.84 Table 
79Ibid., letter from A. A. Cowan to Mr. Rankin, 9 November 1938. 
80A complete list of all companies acquired by the United Africa Company 
by 1938 is found in Appendix A. 
81UAC: "Agreement with Maypole Dairy Company." 
82UAC Rankin file: report 38 on A&ETC holdings. 
83Ibid.) document A&ETC, "Manufacturing and Miscellaneous Compa..'1ies." 
84Jbid. 
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15 lists a number of such firms owned. by African and Eastern in 1928. 
The vertical integration of the principal West African firms with manu-
facturing and processing firms in Europe was complemented. by the horizontal 
integration of the firms, not only with each other but also with various com-
panies in Britain, Europe, and other parts of the world. Table 16 presents a 
selected list of interlocking directorships in the West Africa Trade. From 
this list it will be noted that there were strong ties among shipping, banking, 
and trading interests in West Africa. There were especially strong ties be-
tween the Bank of British West Africa and the Elder Dempster shipping company, 
two firms which, as will be seen below, were extremely powerful in Ghana. 
There were also ties among these two firms, the United Africa Company, and 
Ashanti Goldfields, the foremost gold mine in the Colony. Added to these ties 
were a host of external connections to banking, shipping, railway and insurance 
companies in Britain, and to the international mining consortia. The network 
of interlocking directorships was a crucial mechanism in guaranteeing the co-
operation of the major European firms. Informal agreements ensured their 
successful domination of the West African trade. 
It was not only the smaller European firms, of course, which suffered 
from the oligopolization of trade by the United Africa Company and its allies. 
A number of mechanisms were also employed by the European firms to exclude even 
a minimal amount of indigenous Ghanaian competition. Africans who tried to 
engage in trade on their own could be, and were, easily undercut by their 
European competitors, with the help of the expatriate Government. As early as 
1887 legislation was passed which made it difficult for the small African en-
trepreneur to trade. This legislation imposed a licence fee of five pounds on 
all retailers and wholesalers in the Gold Coast Colony; a licence of five 
pounds, while almost irrelevant to a European wholesaler, could break an 
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Table 15. Miscellaneous Manufacturing Firms Owned by African 
and Eastern Trade Corporation, 192885 
Name of Firm 
Brice Whyte and Sons 
Ltd. 
Date Date 
Established Acquired Products 
palm oil casks 
176 
A. J. Caley and Son Ltd. 
Joseph Dunkerly and Son 
Ltd. 
1880s 
1863 
1915 
1917 mineral waters, chocolate, cocoa 
T. H. Harris and Sons 
Ltd. 
Joseph Holt and Sons 
Ltd. 
Hunt and Son (1920) Ltd. 
George Kay and Co. Ltd. 
Loders and Nucoline Ltd. 
1837 
1829 
n. d. 
1920 
1889 
n.d. 
T. Middleton and Co. Ltd. 1856 
Poulton and Noel Ltd. 1869 
Cia Pesquerias de San 
Cristobel S.A. 
Ribbleton Mills Ltd. 
Rice and Co. Ltd. 
1926 
1864 
1889 
A. J. Seward and Co. Ltd. 1919 
Thomas \>lelch and Co. Ltd. 1857 
Wenn Lim:i ted n. d. 
85Ibid. 
1919 
1920 
1919 
1920 
1917 
1920 
1919 
1919 
1926 
1920 
'1920 
handkerchiefs, shawls, small 
haberdashery 
household, laundry and toilet 
soaps 
cotton cloths 
mineral waters, toffee, boiled 
sweets 
calico printing 
fats and butter substitutes, 
crushing of copra and oilseeds 
coloured cotton cloth 
preserves, meats, vegetables, 
fish, cereals 
dried fish 
grey cloth 
coloured woven cotton cloth 
1919 pomades, perfumes, soap and 
toilet requirements 
1920 calico printing 
1919 boxes and cases 
c 
Table 16. Interlocking Directorships 
in the West Africa TradeE6 
Year Name of Director Companies Directed 
1905 Sir Alfred Lewis Jones Elder Dempster Shipping Limited 
Bank of British vlest Africa 
1905 Owen Harrison Williams Elder Dempster Shipping Limited 
Bank of British West Africa 
1915 Clifford Blackburn Edgar Bank of British West Africa 
Niger Company 
1915 Mazzini Stuart African Association Limited 
Bank of British West Africa 
1915 Lord Wargrave African Steam Ship Company 
British and African Steam Navigation 
Bank of British West Africa 
17? 
1925 James Henly Batty African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
1925 0. V. G. Hoare African and Eastern Trade Company Limited 
Colonial Bank 
1925 Lord Kylsant Elder, Dempster and Company Limited 
Bank of British West Africa 
1925 Mazzini Stuart African and Eastern Trade Company Limited 
Bank of British West Africa 
86This list is compiled from a total of 380 directors of thirteen major 
companies in Ghana, for the years 1885, 1895, 1905, 1915, 1925. The list is 
confined to interlocking directorships among these major firms, especially 
among trading, shipping, and banking firms. By 1935 the boards had been separ-
ated and there were no longer any interlocks among the major trading, shipping, 
and banking firms of Ghana, although interlocks among major firms and their 
subsidiaries, as well as to outside firms, remained. Appendix B is a select 
list of directorships showing connections worldwide to a wider variety of other 
firms and institutions. Directory ofJJireators (1885, 1895, 1905, 1915, 1925). 
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African retailer. As one European ar~1ed 
Increasing the duty to be paid for a Retail Licence to Five pounds 
•• would probably drive half of the small retailers out of the town. 
From his own personal knowledge as Agent to Hessrs. Swanzy and Co. , and 
having numerous transactions with small traders he was satisfied, owing 
to the smallness of the profits made during the year by petty retail 
traders that they were not in a position to pay this increased duty, and 
the proposed Bill would . • • cause great dissatisfaction amongst them, 
as they have to close their stores in town, and seek a new means of 
earning a livelihood.87 
There were also purely commercial means of forcing out the independent 
African from trade if legislative means failed. 
·The traders here would buy and sell from the European companies, some 
even imported en their own. But you could not get very big. There were 
no restrictions, but these monopoly companies could break you if you did 
well. Especially if you brought in a new line, which would compete with 
something they were selling. They had so many reserves, they could re-
duce their prices and show losses, until they forced you out of business. 
We could not do that because we did not have the reserves. 88 
Another method to undercut Africru1 competition was to offer the independent 
African a position as an agent for a European finn, with a guarantee of more 
custom than he could obtain on his own. 
Around 1900, the early part of the century, there were so many mer-
chants, especially in Cape Coast ••.• But then UAC and the other big 
firms would give them positions as agen+,s if they were competing. If 
they were selling something cheaper than the European firms, the firms 
would offer to give them jobs as their agents. And then the European 
firm would tell its customers that they had to go to this particular ~gent 
rather than direct •••• The firm absorbed Africans because it was well-
established in Europe. It would write Europe that it wanted to take on 
a particular man as an agent. And then it would name the man as dist:dbu-
tor and tell its customers they must apply through the distributor fo~ 
goods, instead of directly. UAC would have a catalogue, and they would 
have to order through the commissioned agents. 89 
87Speech by Mr. Waters in GCLegCo, 28 September 1897. The licence Bill 
was passed on 19 December 1887. 
88Interview with a retired African employee of UAC, also formerly an 
independent businessman, Accra, June 1974. 
89 Interview with a retired African employee of Union Trading Company, 
Cape Coast, June 1974. 
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Africans could also be tied to European firms through the passbook 
system. Under this system, African traders obtained "passbooks" which entitled 
them to make wholesale purchases on a credit basis from certain European 
stores. The amount of' credit which each African could obtain depended upon his 
record with the particular expatriate firm, but also upon the particular 
European official with whom he or she dealt. Thus often, the figure was arbi-
trary, and could be changed overnight if' an official were replaced. The 
African trader was also tied to the creditor firm for his source of supplies, 
since the granting of credit was contingent upon his spending his money in the 
store that granted it. The system continued even after the establishment of' a 
banking system in Ghana, as the European-cominated banks did not give credit 
to Af'ricans. The passbook system contained some abuses of its own. "These 
included ••• illicit behind the counter sales, cash sales by chits of essen-
tial goods, also m~~ing the sale of' scarce goods conditional upon the purchase 
of stagnant lines. n90 
The commercial system in Ghana quickly became one in which Af'ricans were 
tied, as agents or distributors, to individual European firms. They might be 
"independent" in the sense that they did not work on salary, but they were no 
longer independent importers and exporters as many had been in the precolonial 
period. Nevertheless,~even the opportunities to be such agents or distributors 
were limited. The table below demonstrates that in 1928 eleven of' the l~rgest 
European companies had at most 6,513 Afric!ill wholesale customers among them, in 
six West African territories. 
Often, independent Africans, having been pushed out of business, became 
"storekeepers" for Europeans, working on a commission basis or simply on 
90Nii Kwabena Benne III, Milestones in the Histor;J of the Gold Coast 
(Middlesex: Wodderspoon and Company, 1953), p. 65. 
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Table 17. Number of Stores and Customers at 31 October 1928 
(Gold Coast, Togoland~ Dahomey, Ivory Coast, 
Liberia and Fernando Po).91 
Stores Customers 
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Wholesale Retail Native European & Sundry Cocoa Traders Native Accounts Clients 
African and Eastern 
Trade Corp. 20 269 603 334 
F. & A. Swanzy Ltd. 27 389 6oo 774 
Millers Ltd. 27 354 722 747 
Ashanti & Obua.si 
Trading Co. Ltd. 3 23 89 169 
Tarquah Trading Co. Ltd. 6 101 278 665 
G. C. Machinery & Trading 
Co. Ltd. 7 14 671 
Kingsway Chemists 4 
Crombie Steedn\an & Co. 
Ltd. 2 62 33 27 
McLarens Ltd. 2 45 74 30 
W. D. Woodin Ltd. 9 43 195 271 
Ambas Bay Ltd. 1 13 100 60 71 
TOTALS 104 1,317 2,694 3,748 71 
91 uAc Rankin file. 
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salary. The job of storekeeper was not easy, ru1d required a fair degree of 
education and a practical turn of mind on the part of the man occupying the 
position.. One African agent in 1902 had the following job: "This gentleman 
was entirely in charge of the store, attended to the shipping of any palm oil 
or palm kernels and took delivery of any goods arriving by Cargo boats from 
England or the continent and kept proper books and accounts. "92 The store-
keeper was responsible for hundreds of different articles of trade • 
• [the] small stores in surrounding villages [were] all kept by 
mission educated natives, sales sheets had to be made out every day, 
cash paid in every week, stocks were taken at the end of every month 
and although there were hundreds of lines each article had to be 
accounted for .• ,93 
Although he was held responsible for any losses his store might incur, the 
storekeeper was given very little responsibility in buying and selling, and 
even less in financial matters. He could not, for instance, write cheques. 94 
To ensure his financial responsibility, he often had to post bonds of from £200 
to £500, or to mortgage his house to the expatriate company, before he could be 
employed. In addition, the company would withhold his first several hundred 
pounds commission (if he worked on commission basis), paying perhaps five per 
cent interest, as a guarantee against his absconding. 95 
Very strict regulations of employment (applying to European as well as 
African storekeepers) were enforced to ensure that employees could not go into 
trade on their own or change companies, taking "trade secrets" with them (and, 
92Martin, "Reminiscences . . . ," op. oit., p. 2. 
93Ib. ::1 -1-u. , p. 11. 
94Interview with a retired African employee of Union Trading Company. 
95Examples of such agreements can be found in UAC files entitled 
"Pickering a.TJ.d Berthoud Native Storekeepers Agreements~ ll and "John Walkden and 
Company." 
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in the case of Europeans who were allowed to grant credit, often taking African 
customers with them as well). Storekeepers had to sign contracts stating that 
they would not give away trade secrets or divulge the names of a company's man-
ufacturers or agents.9 6 These regulations were perceived by Africans as being 
in restraint of trade, but there was little they could do about them. 
In 1915, for example, Millers Limited sued a former European employee, 
one Crombie Steed.Ir..an, who had set up in business on his own and, Millers al-
leged, stolen some "native customers" in so doing. 
It is ll.r. Steedman who has to give his consent to this or that and 
who helps them [Africans] in one direction or another. The Company's 
name does not come forward but the personal influence of the man who 
represents the Company really controls and adds to the Company's 
interests so that if Mr. Steedman leaves us and ~oes elsewhere the 
natives wculd still naturally look to him •••. 7 
Millers won their case against Steedman, and the firm of Crombie Steedman was 
integrated into the African and Eastern Trade Corporation complex. The EastePn 
Star and Akuapem Chroniole, an African newspaper, editorialized about the 
Steedman case: 
It seems • most extraordinary to us that any injunction can be 
obtained seeing that the Colonial Building Company Limited, of which Mr. 
Steedman is the Managing Director has been competing with Millers Limited, 
since they commenced business in Timber and other materials. In fact 
Colonial Building Co. Ltd. must have the largest business in the sale of 
all building materials. It would be a sorry day for the Colony if all 
'Combine Firms' and firms of that class, were allowed to dominate the 
trade, and to continually gain the enormous profits they must have made 
this year. 
It is absolutely against the interests of the nation and the Govern-
ment should see to it that a check is put upon monopolies that prey on 
the industry of the people,98 
97uAC: file entitled "Millers Limited 1915." 
98Ibid., article entitled 11Monopolies,." dated 19 May 1915. 
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With such conditions laid upon their employment, many Africans working 
for expatriate firms found that their individual enterprise was stifled, not 
rewarded. Africans moreover were not promoted within the expatriate firms; 
although they were competent, the idea of using Africans for senior positions 
was unattractive to European businessmen. When, for example, all the white 
employees of Alexander Miller died in Ghana in the 1880s, the company was 
forced into the position of "devolving the care of the firm 1 s interests on the 
African staff, a condition of affairs which had never existed before and -Nhich 
Mr. Alexander Miller contemplated with much disquietude. • • • !l Rather than 
trust Africans with the business, the office was temporarily closed. 99 By 
1938, however, the United Africa Company claimed that it was willing and eager 
to promote Africans in its establishment. 
Let it not be thought ••• that the Company regards the African 
simply as a hewer of wood and drawer of water. The whole of the clerical 
service is open to the educated African. • • . No purely clerical wor'~ 
is performed by Europeans, but all by Africans •.•. There are Africans 
holding executive posi tlons as important as that of District Manager •1 00 
In reality, in 1939 the entire United Africa Company (not solely the company in 
Ghana) had only thirty-nine African managers.101 
Africans who held the sam.e jobs as Europeans were consistently treated 
less well and paid less. While records of Africans in employment are difficult 
to obtain, a report written by an African agent by the name of Coker, on the 
occasion of his retirement from the firm of John Holt in Nigeria, can be taken 
as indicative of the general European policy towards African employees. 
99R k" 't 66 an ln, op. o~ ., p. • 
100Ib'd 4 ~.,p.l5. 
101united Africa Company, Your Company (London: UAC, 1959), p. 60. 
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One of the irritating things in !Ugel:'ia and which helps to hinder the 
progress of trade at a statj_on occupied by a blackman is the tendency on 
the part of some of the authorities to give more credence to what a 
European of another firm tells them to that of a black man working for 
them. Take a station at which white and black are in charge of the 
factories and there be an agreed rule between the firms as to prices and 
dashes, in nine cases out of ten, the European will break the rules in 
order to get more than hi.s share of the produce, if your blackman were to 
report or do the same in order to get for you your full share of the 
trade no credence will be given to his report and he will be told stop. 
As a wire was once sent to a certain black man 'Stop buying produce with 
soap dashes else I remove you from charge'. In very truth the white man 
who reported him was giving out ten times more soap and tobacco dashes. 
[I]f one visits the stations he will see the difference; stations 
occupied by whites will be well-stocked, all facilities given for the 
success of the trade, and everything will be done for the European's 
personal comforts; on the other hand at Stations where blacks are in 
charge, you will see a poorly stocked shop, facilities not one tenth of 
that given to the European; personal comforts, ••• Sometimes not even 
a bed, a chair, or a table •••. 102 
Within the context of the import-export trade, there were of course also 
some roles for African middlemen to play as brokers, that is as persons buying 
cocoa on behalf of the exporting firms. 103 According to a census taken in 
Ghana in 1931, there were at that time 1,500 cocoa brokers and 37,000 "suo-
brokers" in the country. 104 The 1,500 brokers were obviously the more powerful 
of these two groups; they were the ones who had direct dealings with the 
European firms and who were able to receive credit from the firms in the form 
of cash advances, and use it to their own profit. The sub-brokers, on the 
other hand, were agents for the brokers who might simply be working on a few 
pounds advance, with little power of their ovm to wield. 
102Report by Coker to John Halt and Co., 28 March 1921. Included in 
Davies, Trading Experiences . • • , op. ait. I am grateful to Dr. Davies for 
allowing me to use the ori gine.l manuscript. ("Dashes 11 were gifts, or bonuses, 
given to customers to encourage their patronage.) 
103The role of cocoa brokers will be discussed in Chapter VII below. 
104United Africa Company, 11What Cocoa Means to the Economy of the Gold 
Coast, 11 Statistical and Economic Review, no. 2 (September 1948), p. 11. 
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In the face of European oligopoly, Africans were ingenious, untiring, 
and inventive in their attempts to become traders in their own right. Many 
Africans moved into more than one line of business, engaging, for example, in 
cocoa-farming, brokerage, timber exporting, and shipping. A typical career 
pattern, though more successful than most, was that of Nii Kwabena Bonne III, 
a Ga chief from Accra. During his youth, before being installed as chief, Nii 
Bonne worked as a clerk, a contractor, a builder, and a merchant. He became 
actively engaged in the import-export trade and in that capacity travelled all 
over the world, at one point making a journey overland from Europe to Japan in 
order to reclaim a debt from some Japanese customers. Nii Bonne formed various 
companies, none of which lasted for any significant amount of time, and all of 
which were plagued by various forms of swindling by both his British and his 
African colleagues. He also, at one point, tried to ship gold, but was ar-
rested and fir..ed for trying to export diamoads illegally as we11. 1 0 5 
Nii Benne's activities as a contractor included building drains, houses, 
and "factories" for Europeans, as 1-rell as building the Dodowa market on con-
tract to the Government. These activities indicate that Africans were not 
content simply to try the traditional means of enterprise in Ghana, the import-
export trade, but that they were also interested in developing some industry 
within their own country. As is well known, Ghanaian farmers often built their 
own roads and bridges in order to facilitate the export of their cocoa. But 
they also used their construction skills to build railroads for the Government 
and mines. "In the case of each Railway much of the work was done by minor 
contracts entered into with the natives. Contracts of this sort ranged in 
value from £1 to £30 and even more. nl 06 
105Nii Benne's fascinating career is recounted in his autobiography, Mile-
s tones in the History of the Go Zd Coast, op. ei t. 
l06McPhee, op. oit., p. 113. 
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Various other attempts were made to enter manufacturing or processing, 
but all met with discouragement either from Government or the expatriate firms. 
Far from granting help to ind.igenous manufacture, the Government from as early 
as 1887 imposed duties on all goods manufactured in the colony, 107 yet at the 
same time it allowed goods which were necessary for European industrial de-
velopment, especially mining plant, to be imported free of duty. When an 
African invented a palm oil processing machine in 1912, the Government refused 
to give him time off from his official duties with the Agricultural Department 
to perfect the machine. 1 08 Africans could not, of course, compete with 
European-made products and so indigenous industry declined in the face of im-
ports. African processes of manufacture were too simple and expensive to 
compete with European. In 1891, for example, Prince Edward Aggrey of Cape 
Coast tried to interest the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in an indigenous 
dying process. The Chamber dismissed his attempt, saying; 
Samples of red and black dyes, and specimens of the bark from which 
they were prepared, were ••• received from Prince Edward ft~grey of 
Cape Coast. It was reported that such dyes, etc., could be produced 
here in greater ~uantities from superior materials and at less cost 
than in Africa.l 9 
Thus it was not because of lack of initiative on their part but rather 
because their undeveloped economy could not compete with developed European 
capitalism that Africans were obliged, if they were at all enterprising, to 
enter trade as the only wa:y in which they could make large sums of money. Many 
of the most prominent of Ghanaians were active in trade as either their primary 
or their secondary occupation. But most of the companies which African entre-
preneurs set up failed; they could not compete with Europeans who had more 
107GCLegCo, 25 Ma:y 1887. 
108see the section on diversification, Chapter V! below. 
109LivCC, 41st Annual RepoPt, p. 91. 
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knowledge, financing, and resources. In the battle for primacy in the economic 
marketplace everything conspired against the African and for the European. 
Africans could not join European firms, they could not ship on European lines, 
tney could not get credit from European banks. The entire thrust of the poli-
cies of the two major shipping lines, and the two major banks, which dominated 
transportation and finance in Ghana from the late nineteenth century until 
1939, was to service the oligopolistic, European-dominated, import-export trade 
sector, not to encourage enterprise or trade by the indigenous inhabitants of 
the colony. 
3. Oligopolization of the Shipping Industry: 
The West Africa Conference 
By the turn of the twentieth century, shipping over most of the high 
seas was organized into a group of 11 Conferences," which set prices for shipping, 
organized scheduled services, and arranged which lines should be allowed to 
enter which ports. The West Africa trade was no exception: agreements on the 
control of shipping to West Africa were being made as early as the 1870s, and 
in 1895 an actual Conference was established. 
With the advent of the steamship in 1852, the need for regulation of the 
shipping industry had become evident. Steamships were fast and regular; they 
did not depend on the wind. With their speed they were able to transport 
previously untransportable perishable commodities. But they also required 
large investments, which most merchants could not afford. A new industry, that 
of shipping agencies, therefore developed and more and more merchants began to 
abandon their fleets of sailing ships and rely on the regular steamship lines 
to transport their produce. The advent of shipping lines facilitated competi-
tion because merchant houses could now send small, regular packages to the west 
0 coast of Africa, instead of sending large shiploads comprised completely of 
their own goods, which, if they sank, would bankrupt the merchant in question. 
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Small shippers who could not afford even to buy their own sailing boats were 
also able to ship by the regular steam lines. 
The roots of the West Africa Conference are found in the two earliest 
steamship lines which traded to West Africa. These were the African Steamship 
Company, incorporated in 1852, and the British and African Steam Navigation 
Company, incorporated in 1869.1 10 The two companies competed outright only for 
about a year, after which they came to an agreement. As of January 1870, they 
divided the West African trade between them.l 11 Both firms were based in 
Glasgow, but as most \-lest African shipping by the late nineteenth century was 
conducted through the port of Liverpool, control of the firms' actual opera-
tions was held to a large extent in the hands of their Liverpool agents, Elder 
and Dempster. 
In 1878 a new competitor entered the shipping trade. Alfred Lewis Jones 
established a firm under his own name in Liverpool, to trade to West Africa. 112 
He began by buying sailing ships, no threat to either of the two companies 
mentioned above, but within a few months he began to charter steamships. At 
this, the African Steamship Company and the British and African took fright, 
and Jones was asked to join the Elder and Dempster agency to preclude his be-
coming a successful independent competitor. 
By the time of his death in 1909, Sir Alfred Lewis Jones (he had in the 
meantime been knighted) was the single most important man in the British West 
African trade,113 so much so that he could announce to the Colonial Office, 
110P. N. Davies, The Trade Makers: Etder Dempster in West Afriaa~ 1852-
1972 (London: George All en and Unwin, 1973), pp. 41 and 51. 
111Ibid., p. 62. 
11 2 Ibid. ' p • 77 . 
l13For details of his career, see the rather laudatory contemporary biog-
raphy by A. H. Milne, Sir Alfred Lewis Jones K. C.M. G.: A Story of Energy and 
Suaaess (Liverpool: Henry Young and Sons, 1914). 
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when it was setting up a committee to investigate West African trade "I am West 
Africa."l 14 He had gained control of the two independent shipping firms by the 
simple mechanism of buying out their shares, and in 1894 he had taken over the 
agency of Elder and Dempster. Thus by 1894 control of shipping to West Africa 
from England was entirely in the hands of the Elder Dempster shipping line. 
Elder Dempster was to remain the single most important British shipping firm in 
the Gold Coast until 1939, and the only British firm within the West Africa 
Conference. In 1896, with its establishment of the Bank of British West 
Africa, 115 it became the most important expatriate firm in Ghana until the 
formal creation of the United Africa Company in 1929. 
Elder Dempster's most important rival in the West Africa trade, prior to 
1895, was the Hamburg-based shipping line, Woermann. The Woermann line was 
established by the merchant trading firm of Carl Woermann and began trading to 
Africa as early as 1849. 116 In 1885 the shipping side of the business was 
separated from the trading side and the (German) African Steamship Line Incor-
porated (Woermann Line) was formed. 117 The company remained in the hands of 
the Woermann family until after World War I, when the expenses of reconstruct-
ing the entire fleet, which had been either confiscated or destroyed by the 
British, compelled the family to abandon control to a North German syndicate.Il8 
Because of German state subsidies to shipping, Woermann, although it had far 
fewer connections in the West African trade than did Elder Dempster, and 
114Anecdote related to author by Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974. 
See Richard Fry, Bankers in West Afriea: A History of the Bank of British West 
Afriea (London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1976). 
115see section 4 below. 
ll 6The history of the Woermann Line is taken from the booklet "Deutsche 
Afrika-Linien: A Short History of the German Africa Lines" (Hamburg: Deutsche 
Afrika Linien, 1971). 
117 Ibid. , p. 9 • 
118Ibid.' p. 23. 
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although there were fewer established German colonies, managed to build up a 
large fleet in a relatively short time. 
It should be noted that Woermann lines had complete access to British 
colonial ports; the British Government never limited access to its colonies to 
its own nationals but instead relied on informal controls and cartelization to 
guarantee British priority in shipping. Agreements between British and German 
shipping lines were first negotiated in 1888, " ... to stop a mutually disas-
trous competition . 11119 The trade at this time was characterized, as it 
was to be throughout the colonial period, by an oversupply of tonnage. Both 
Germany and Britain predicated their tonnage needs on wartime, not peacetime, 
requirements; they encouraged their shipping industries accordingly, with the 
result that except during wartime, too many ships were on the high seas. 12 0 
Because of overcompetition, worldwide freight rates had declined by about forty 
per cent between 1889 and 1895. 121 
In 1895, therefore, Elder Dempster and Woermann Line joined in 
a shipping conference designed to ensure them adequate patronage and, with this 
1 patronage, adequate· return on their investments. Follow·ing the pattern of 
similar shipping conferences established elsewhere, they used the "rebate sys-
tem" as their main weapon in the control of trade. This was a system whereby 
traders who shipped only on Conference lines were guaranteed a ten per cent 
rebate on their shipping charges at the end of every six.months' The 
traders had to guarantee to ship only on Conference lines and no other; that 
is, not to ship either on their own boats or on "tramp" steamers. They also 
119Ib'd 10 't • ' p. . 
c 120Daniel Marx Junior, International S11ipping Cartels (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 38. 
1 21Davies, The Trade Makers . .• , op. cit., p. 91. 
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had to wait a total of two shipping periods, or twelve months, for each rebate. 
In return for their loyalty to the Conference system, traders were guaranteed 
regularity of service, which the tramp steamers could not provide. A Confer-
ence steamer, whether it had its full load or not, would sail according to its 
scheduled dates. The traders were also guaranteed security of rates; charges 
no longer fluctuated wildly as they had done under the system of free competi-
tion; calculations of costs could therefore be made on a long-term basis. 
According to the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, which investigated 
the West Africa Conference in 1909, along with all the other shipping confer-
ences in which British shippers were engaged, the exact provisions of the West 
Africa Conference were as follows. 
West African Conference: 
Area: The trade between the United Kingdom and the Continent and the 
West Coast of Africa as far south as and including Tiger Bay. 
Personnel: 
1. African Steamship Company (Elder Dempster and Company) 
2. British and African Steam Navigation Company (Elder, Dempster and 
Company) 
3. Woermann Line, of Hamburg. 
4. Hamburg-America Company, of Hamburg.122 
Lines one and two are exclusively entitled to the trade from the United 
Kingdom to West Africa and have equal rights with three as regards sailings 
from German and other Continental ports. 
Conditions: 
Amount of rebate: ten per cent. 
Periods~ Six months for account, and six months for deferment. 
Rebate on all shipments outwards, but only on palm oil and palm kernels 
homewards: but loyalty is required on other goods. 
122In 1904 Woermann signed an agreement with the Hamburg-America lina 
granting Woermann seventy-five per cent and the other line twenty-five per cent 
of trade to West Africa. Woermann however retained control of management, and 
the two German firms shipped under the name of Woermann. Deutsche Africa-
Linien, op. cit., p. 18. 
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Rebate to be claimed within 12 months of shipment, and to be claimed by, 
and is only payable to the principal, i.e. merchant who is the owner of the 
goods. Crown Agents are treated as pri~cipals in respect of Government 
goods. 
Disloyalty on outward shipments involves forfeiture of rebates on home-
ware shipments and vice versa.l 23 
This succinct summary of the provisions of the West Africa Conference revealed 
a number of provisions which seemed to have no reasonable basis; for example, 
that British ships could sail from Continental ports but not vice versa, and 
that "loyalty" was required on all goods shipped, i.e., that goods for which 
rebates could not be obtained must nevertheless be shipped only on Conference 
lines, even though rebates would be paid only on outward-bound goods (from 
Europe) and on returning loads of palm kernels and palm oil. 
Indeed the shipping industry of Ghana was a monopoly within the monopoly 
of trade by the Europeans; it was a monopoly which affected smaller European 
traders far more than it affected Africans who, by 1895, were more or less out 
of the running as far as international trade was concerned. In fact it was 
argued by many, including the Royal Coroo1ission, that better opportunities were 
provided for Africans under the Conference system than formerly, as they could 
be assured of regular shipping times and eq-..1al treatment for all traders, large 
or small. But a more cogent argument as regards the Conference's effect on 
Africans is simply that, because of its monopoly control, the Conference could, 
and did, charge as high freight rates as the traffic would bear. "Increased 
freight rates on imports have an effect similar to the imposition of a tariff. 
11124 Since ultimately, all extra costs in international trade were passed 
on to the consumers of imported goods or the producers of exported goods, 
Ghanaians were paying more for their store-bought belongings and receiving less 
1 23RCSR: Col. 4669, Part 1, p. 1. 
124Marx, op. cit., p. 29. 
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for their produce in return, under the Conference system. 
Moreover, the shipping pricing policy tended to reinforce the inter-
national division of labour. 
The policy often followed by liners, of charging what the traffic will 
bear, usually has the effect of requiring finished goods to pay higher 
rates than semi-finished articles • . • [L]ow ocean freights have bene-
fitted European industry by permitting raw materials to be imported at 
delivered prices only slightly higher than those which have prevailed 
at their sources.125 
The two shipping lines in the West Africa Conference had a joint policy of 
charging higher freight for processed than for nonprocessed goods, encouraging 
merchants to ship as much produce as possible in an unfinished state. (Unfor-
tunately, howeyer, this policy did not work in reverse and merchants did not 
ship unfinished manufactured goods to Ghana to be finished there.) Prices were 
not fixed according to real costs but according to how much the shipping cam-
panies thought they could extort from the shippers. 
The question arises as to why the large European firms such as the 
African Association were willing to accept such a blatant transport monopoly. 
In reply, it should be noted that the Conference was introduced more or less 
as a fait accompli, with only one month's notice to the traders. 126 They had 
no choice to agree as, if they had not, they would not have had shipping space 
for the cargoes they were planning to send out in the months ahead. Once they 
had agreed, they had no choice but to remain within the system, as they soon 
had thousands of pounds tied up in rebates, held without payment of interest by 
the shipping companies. John Halt, in his testimony to the Royal Commission, 
estimated that at any one time Elder Dempster probably held £6,000 in rebates 
for Halt alone, and a total for all companies of about £50,000.1 27 The 
125Ib'd 28 1, • ' p. • 
126Davies, The Trade Makers • •• , op. cit., p. 110. 
127RCSR: Cd. 4670, Q. 53'T8. 
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companies were willing to lose interest on these rebates if in turn they could 
be guaranteed regular shipping dates. " .•• we have no love for the rebate 
system at all: we do not care about it, and we do not like it, but if it is 
the only means of getting regular sailings, then as long as it is not abused, 
we consider that regular sailings are of even more importance . . • than low 
rates of freight." 128 
The abuses of the Conference system were investigated by the Royal Cam-
mission on Shipping Rings in 1909, and its successor commission, the Final 
Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Deferred Rebate System, in 
1923. 129 Although there were no reported cases of rebates actually having been 
forfeited owing to nonadherence to Conference regulations, the system was open 
to attack on several counts ,13 0 The first of these was that while "loyalty" 
was required on all goods shipped, that is, no goods could be shipped by other 
than-Conference steamers, homeward rebates were paid only on palm oil and palm 
kernels, the two products which comprised the bulk of homeward shipping at the 
time that the Conference was established. 1 31 But by 1909, when the investiga-
tory commission was set up, goods such as cocoa comprised a far higher 
percentage of the homeward cargo. These goods were still being shipped at 
rates imposed when they were only a small percentage of the cargo; fifty 
shillings a ton, for example, was being charged for cocoa. 1 32 The articles for 
which rebates were not enjoyed were all shipped at rates higher than the rates 
128Ibid., testimony of J. A. Hutton, Q.13513. 
129Cmd.l802 (1923). 
130RCSR: Cd. 4670, testimony of Sir Ralph Moor, Q.7009. 
l31RCSR: Cd. 4668, p. 16. 
132Leubuscher, op. ait., p. 22. 
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for palm oil and kernels.133 To many merchants, in any case, all that the re-
bates meant was that they paid ten per cent "primage" to the shipping companies 
at the beginning of a trip, which was returned to them six to twelve months 
later without interest: not, certainly, that they received an actual refund. 
The primage was being paid for goods such as cocoa without the refund. 
Many firms opposed to the Conference wanted to have a "free period" 
during which they would be able to charter ships or ship on non-Conference 
lines without forfeiting their rebate. In other words, after each six months' 
' accounting period, they wanted a breathing space in which they could, if they 
wished, re-evaluate their methods of shipping. 134 But such a breathing space 
would allow the large firms to break out of the system while the small firms, 
which could not charter entire ships, were still tied into it, something which 
would give the larger firms an advantage. And it was almost unanimously agreed 
that the one advantage of the rebate system was that small firms were given an 
equal opportunity; large shippers and small all paid the same rates . 
. • . the rebate system is of great advantage to the small shipper. It 
gives him security of equal treatment and regularity .... [I]f merchants 
were not bound, and were at liberty to charter steamers, such chartering 
could only be done by the wealthy merchants in a large way of business. 
This would cause the shipowners to run their steamers irregularly, at such 
periods as would give them full cargoes. The smaller traders would be 
wholly dependent on the shipowners.l35 
But in fact the small traders were not granted the same rights as the 
large; many secret deals were made by Elder Dempster with its largest customers 
simply in order to prevent them from branching out and acquiring their own 
ships. Preferential contracts were given to firms who were willing to 
133RCSR: Cd. 4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.4797. 
134Jbid., testimony of G. B. Zochonis, Q.l339l. 
135Ibid.' Q.l3289. 
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guarantee that they would ship by Conference lines for the next five years. 
Such guarantees, of course, could also be made by small shippers, but were less 
likely to be regarded as of any significance. Moreover, the 1909 Commission 
found that the liners did" .•. make contracts for the carriage of 
quantities at net rates considerably lower than those which would be charged to 
the general merchant shipping similar goods in small qua.ntities." 136 The John 
Holt Company, for example, had decided early in the Conference system to buy 
and outfit its own ships. In order to prevent it from becoming a general ship-
per, Elder Dempster agreed that Holt could fill its own ships with its own 
produce and still send the bulk of its cargo on the Conference lines at prefer-
ential rates. 137 From 1925 to 1929, the African and Eastern Trade Corporation 
bought and began shipping by its own steamers; not only did Elder Dempster 
tolerate this practice but an agreement was reached that whatever leftover 
cargo was carried by the Conference for African and Eastern would be given 
"most favoured" terms.138 
Not only were small traders, both European and African, in practice dis-
criminated against in favour of the large, but the existence of such favourable 
contracts served to discourage the existence of tramp or charter steamers which 
might otherwise have been able to undercut the prices charged by the Confer-
ence. Presumably, some of the larger companies would have been willing to 
forgo six months 1 rebate if they could charter tramp steamers to carry their 
bulk cargo, especially considering that prices for carriage of goods such as 
cocoa were for so long inflated. Daniel Marx argues that in fact this would 
136RCSR: Cd.4668, p. 26. 
l37Davies, The Trade Makers •.• , op. ait., p. 173. , 
l38Ibid.' pp. 225-228. 
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not be the case because liner and charter, or tramp, rates fluctuated in the 
same direction during most of the colonial period; from 1873 to 1908 there was 
a downward trend in both kinds of shipping, followed by an upward trend until 
1918 and then another downswing till 1937.139 Leubuscher argues moreover that 
in any case the West African trade was unattractive to tramps, as they had to 
call at a large number of very poor harbours to get a full load, and they were 
dependent on surf boats, owned and operated by the Conference lines, to load 
and unload their cargoes. 14 0 Nevertheless the merchants did feel a need for 
tramps' services, especially during the heavy cocoa export season when the 
liners could not fulfil the demand for immediate bulk transport. 141 But by the 
end of World War I, many tramps had been absorbed or bought out by regular 
lines as they were no longer profitable. There was no longer an available pool 
of shipping which could challenge the monopoly structure. 
The fact that all lighterage (that is, the surf boats which carried 
cargo between the large ocean-going ships and the Ghana shore) was controlled 
by the Conference system further discouraged competition. It was Elder 
Dempster's policy at the time of the Royal Commission's investigations to 
charge an extra five shillings per ton for lighterage services to its custom-
ers, whether or not they actually used the Elder Dempster service.l42 Under 
such circumstances there was no point in any of the firms' maintaining their 
own lighterage fleets, and indeed they rapidly sold what fleets they possessed 
to the monopoly shipping companies. Only the firm of Swanzy maintained its own 
139ap •t 4 
• (J£, ~ ' p • 2 2 . 
140op. cit., p. 18. 
141RCSR: Cd. 4670, testimony of Sir Ralph Moor, Q.7005. 
142Ibid., testimony of James Batty, Q.6934. 
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lighterage company, performing from 1908 on all lighterage work for the 
Woermann line.l43 All other lighterage was done by the Elder Dempster-owned 
West African Lighterage and Transport Company Limited, and its subsidiaries. 144 
Through its control of lighterage, the Conference controlled which ports 
could be used in West Africa. Similarly, the Conference controlled ports in 
use in Europe. The provisions of the Conference were that Elder Dempster could 
call at British and European ports, but that Woermann could call only at 
European ports and not at British ports. Hence anyone shipping into or from 
Britain had to ship by Elder Dempster, which implied shipping via Liverpool. 
Many traders, those based in Manchester, complained that they could 
not use any other harbour in Britain without forfeiting their rebate. If a 
tramp were from Ghana to Bristol, and the destination of a firm's goods 
was Bristol, it could not nevertheless use that tramp. It would have to ship 
to Liverpool by a Conference ship and then trans-ship to Bristol. Cargo, simi-
larly, which was ultimately destined for France had to be trans-shipped, since 
Elder Dempster landed only in England and Germany. Trans-shipment costs were 
very high. 145 
While British firms paid for trans-shipment costs, however, they had to 
endure the of American firms shipping to Ghana from America, on 
Conference lines, for the same price as British firms shipped from Britain. 
The object of such rate is to prevent either the establishment of a 
direct line under the American flag or the chartering of steamers for 
service between the ports concerned. The result is that American 
143Report on Swanzy's Lighterage Company to the Chairman, African and 
Eastern Trade Corporation, 19 December 1928. UAC Rankin file. 
144Including the Saltpond Boating Company, Winneba Boating Company, 
African Cold Company, Calabar Lighterage and Transport 
Cameroon erage Department, Accra Boating Company, Cape Coast Com-
pany Limited, Sekondi Lighterage and Hotel Company Limited, Davies, The Trade 
Makers ••• , op. ait., p. 116. 
l45RCSR: Cd.4668, p. 28. 
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Manufactures are thus placed on the same footing as British Manufactures 
in the markets of British West Africa. • 146 
While some argued that by granting preferential rates to Americans, African 
consumers benefitted by having cheaper American goods available, it was evident 
that the real reason for this concession was to prevent any American line from 
competing with the Conference. This tactic was only partially successful, how-
ever, as the American Bull Line did enter the West Africa trade after the Great 
War. But the Conference lines were successful in forcing the Bull Line to give 
up its New York to Manchester run.1 47 In the 1930s, the Barber Line began to 
cross the Atlantic to West Africa; with the support of UAC behind the Barber 
Line, the Conference was not able to force it off the seas.148 
One of the reasons that the Government was not as hard on the Conference 
system as its opponents might have liked it to be, was that it was itself 
benefitting from the system. The Crown Agents often complained because the 
system was so designed that the "Government" of all four West African colonies 
was regarded as one customer for rebate purposes; thus, if one colony was 11 dis-
loyal" in its shipments, all colonies would suffer a loss of rebate. On the 
other hand, however, the Crown Agents were charged lower rates than other 
customers. 14 9 In return, the Government made it its policy to conduct all its 
shipping by British lines, which, of course, meant Elder Dempster.l50 
Moreover, until the publicity of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings 
146Testimony of Mr. Batty to RCSR, recorded as his view in LonCC, 13 
February 1907. 
147Davies, The Trade Makers . •• , op. cit., p. 223, 
148UAC: document 559. 
149Leubuscher, op. cit., p. 18. 
150statement by the Government to this effect is found in GCLegCo, 16 
October 1905. 
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forced the discontinuance of the practice, the Government countenanced a system 
whereby all cement imported into the West African colonies was monopolized by 
Elder Dempster, ostensibly to prevent competition from "foreign" cement. 
. . . there is only one cement that is allowed to be taken by the local 
government, and that must come from the Burham Cement Company. . We 
[John Holt] used ourselves to buy from that company, and we 
several cargoes out before this rebate system was on, until one fine day 
we found out that we could get it no longer from them. We made inquiry 
why, and they said 'Because we have given Elder, Dempster and Company the 
monopoly of this brand'. So we are in this position, that we could not 
offer any other brand, because the Burham Company's brand is the only one 
allowed by the Crown Agents, and Elder, Dempster and Company had the 
monopoly of that one brand; therefore we were out of it.l51 
A similar monopoly on the carriage of coal was held by Elder Dempster from 1895 
to 1905; 152 even after this monopoly ceased to exist Elder Dempster could, and 
did, outsell all of the merchant firms in coal because it owned collieries in 
the Canary Islands and transported coal from there, charging itself only cost. 
The firms constantly complained about this practice of "trading on 1 s 
account," that is, of shipping companies' acting as traders as well as trans-
porters. 
The various abuses or inconveniences suffered by European traders under 
the Conference system were of course felt much more keenly by African traders. 
None of the independent Ghanaian firms was big enough to qualify for the special 
treatment afforded to European firms; certainly none was big enough to 
disregard regulations and charter its own ships. The extra expenses of trans-
shipment from Conference ports and overpriced shipping charges bore hard on the 
African. In addition, as the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings discovered, 
the African often did not even receive his legitimate rebate. Generally speak-
ing, British agents acting for Africans retained their rebates, although 
l51RCSR: Col. 4670, testimony of John Holt, Qs.5041,5043. 
152Davies, The Trade Makers . .• , op. cit., p. 150. 
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officially, rebates were only supposed to be paid to principals. 
Q. Do you know the course of practice in connection with your business, 
whether those agents who act for these African merchants retain the rebate, 
or credit their principals in West Africa with the rebates? A. Take a 
commission agent here in connection with natives out there, he would find 
great difficulty probably, in letting them have back, after six months or 
nine months . • . the rebate that he has received from the steamship 
companies, because, taking West Africa, native traders there, usually 
speaking, are only small natives that do a limited business. 
Q. You are speaking of an agent who acts for several natives? A. Yes. 
Q. Does he get directions from the natives themselves? A. A native 
writes to a firm that he has heard of in England, say, and he sends to that 
firm an order ... and he usually sends with that order a remittance. 
Then the commission here buys those goods and them to West 
Africa. 
Q. So that the native does not give his directions through an English 
firm settled in Africa, but he communicates direct with the English firm 
in England? A. Yes, that is one transaction, and then you will have 
another transaction, where he communicates with a firm here, but, speaking 
generally, the usual is for the native to communicate with the 
European commission 
Q. Then you say that the agent here might have considerable difficulty, 
often say nine or ten months, in returning the rebate to the native? A. 
I should think so. 
Q. In fact, do you not think he does [return it]? A. I should not 
say so in practice. 
Q. What is the difficulty? A. You see, these natives out there start 
trading with a small amount of money, it might be only £10, it might be 
£15, or more. He may order certain goods, and he finds after six months 
or longer . . . that his form of trading does not pay him. Then he ceases 
to exist and it would be extremely difficult to identify that native 
afterwards. 
Q. So that the agent here generally gets his commission and the benefit 
of the rebate? A. I should say so.l53 
Aside from the abolition of the cementmonopcily, none of the Conference 
practices complained of to the 1909 Royal Commission was rectified. The Con-
ference carried on in its monopoly until the outbreak of the First World War, 
when of course the assumption of hostilities between Britain and Germany pre-
eluded any further collusion between the two shipping lines. Elder Dempster 
was thus in the enviable position, during the whole of the war, of being the 
only liner agency travelling to West Africa, and therefore of also being able 
153RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of ~IT. Batty, Qs.6715-22. 
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to charge what rates it pleased. The records of the London, Liverpool, and 
Manchester Chambers of Commerce during the Great war are full of letters of 
complaint to the Colonial Office about Elder Dempster's exorbitant rates. Some 
companies went so far as to charter sailing boats to escape Elder Dempster's 
monopoly. 
For a few years after the end of World War I, Elder Dempster continued 
to have the field clear for itself. But German shipping was rebuilt quickly, 
and at the same time, Dutch shipping had been strengthened during the war (as 
Holland had been a neutral country) and now had to be taken into consideration. 
Following upon a rate war in the earlier 1920s, a new Conference was established 
in 1924. The terms of the 1924 Agreement were never published, but they con-
tained essentially the same features as the prewar Conference. The two 
Continental lines were still forbidden to use British ports, although they were 
now permitted to embark and disembark passengers at Southampton. The deferred 
rebate system was changed and confined only to outward voyages from Europe, but 
in effect this made little difference as non-Conference had trouble get-
ting outward cargo and in any case 11 • • • e~:teh shipper had to enter into a 
contractual to use only conference ships for homeward-bound cargo 
too. 11 154 Thus "loyalty" was still demanded, even where no rebates were award-
ed. 
Nevertheless the Conference monopoly on shipping was never as complete 
after as before World War I. There had always been hostility to the Conference 
and various efforts had been made to circumvent it, hence for example the spe-
cial arrangement mentioned above with John Holt. The smaller shippers had also 
organized into various associations to try to have some bargaining power with 
154Leubuscher, op. eit., p. 40. 
203 
the Conference lines. The Manchester Association of Importers and Exporters, 
for example, was formed in 1908 to counteract the influence of Liverpool in 
shipping and to press for shipping services through the Manchester Ship 
Canal. 15 5 The 1923 Commission on Shipping Rings regarded the establishment of 
such organizations as the only effective means of negotiating with and con-
trolling the Conference. On its recommendation the Association of West African 
merchants (AWAM) set up, in March 1930, the West African Merchants Freight 
Association, which made yearly agreements on behalf of its members with the 
Conference. 11 it may be inferred . . • that the principal concessions 
which the Merchants Freight Association obtained, was an assurance that its 
members would be charged freight rates no higher than those payable by other 
h . 11]56 s l.ppers. • • • Such an assurance, then, was merely a guarantee that no 
large shipper would be granted a privileged position. 
In 1930, the United Africa Company set up its own shipping line, drasti-
cally affecting the competitive position of the Conference lines. As early as 
1909, on the death of Alfred Lewis Jones, the "Combine" firms, who were later 
to form the UAC, had united to try to buy out Elder Dempster, without success. 
The other half of the UAC empire, Lever Brothers, had started the Bromport 
Shipping Line in April 1916 but in 1922 this line was taken over by the Confer-
ence. "In return for an exclusive freight arrangement, the shipping companies 
undertook to carry Lever's cargoes at a rate which was to be no higher than 
155Ibid., p. 43. In the mid-1890s the General Steam Navigation Company 
was formed in Manchester specifically to ship ~hrough the Ship Canal and out-
wards from Liverpool. As soon as it was formed, however, the Conference lines 
moved in with an offer of ten per cent rebates and regular services. In con-
trast, the GSNC said that the most it could do would be to "try" to guarantee 
one ship every three weeks. The Manchester merchants, despite their hostility 
to Liverpool, had no choice but to accept the Conference offer. ManCC, 20 
February 1895. 
l56Leubuscher, op. cit., p. 51. 
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paid by their rivals."l57 But in 1930 the Elder Dempster empire was rocked by 
scandal and imminent ~inancial ruin, a~ter the conviction o~ its Chairman, Lord 
Kylsant, ~or 11 juggling the books" in 1929. A major reorganization of the 
company followed. At the same time, UAC, under the control of Lever Brothers, 
was just beginning to consolidate its strength. It demanded several privileges 
from the Conference, including a special rate for its bulk-shipped palm oil, 
priority over other traders for cargo space, and the handing over of all Elder 
Dempster's West Coast agencies and lighterage ~acilities to itself. 158 At this 
point the United Africa Company already owned five steamers and it would seem 
probable that it deliberately made such exorbitant demands so that the Confer-
ence's refusal could provide it with an excuse to set up its own shipping 
company. The smaller traders opposed any takeover by the UAC of these facili-
ties as they would then be completely in the hands of their conglomerate rival. 
As ~ar as is known, the demands made by the UAC Ltd., on the Shipping 
Conference Lines in to agencies, lighterage, and large exclusive 
preferences, are still maintained, and it would be idle to deny that were 
they acceded to, the position of other merchants in the West African trade 
would be rendered difficult if not impossible. In fact, the position of 
twelve of these other traders has necessitated their forming an associa-
tion for the purpose of making general representations to the 
conference on matters the welfare of the trade, and I may say 
that this association so framed represents somewhere around fifty per cent, 
of the West African trade, and it is manifestly wrong, therefore, for the 
United Africa Company, Ltd., to indicate in any way that it is acting ~or, 
or supported by, the whole of the West African trade. 159 
For a short period of time the rivalry between UAC and Elder Dempster forced 
the latter company to reduce its rates to the trade as a whole, in order that 
UAC could not enter the West Coast trade as a general carrier and take away its 
157Davies, The Trade Makers • •• , op. ait., p. 221. 
158 Ibid., p. 241. 
159statement of Mr. Whitfield, European unofficial representative for the 
shipping interests, to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930, p. 174. 
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custom. B,y 1931, however, the rates were raised again when Elder Dempster and 
UAC reached a compromise in which it was agreed that UAC could continue to use 
the Conference ships for goods which it could not handle itself, and get re-
bates on this cargo, although it would not be given any preferential rates. 160 
Thus the establishment of a rival line did little to benefit the small traders, 
especially as most of UAC's space was taken up by its own empire. 
Whereas as late as 1924-25 one hundred per cent of the North Europe to 
West Africa shipping had been controlled by the Conference, by 1939, with the 
entrance of the United Africa Company and John Holt's independent line, the 
percentage had fallen to eighty. The figures in Table 17a indieate the extent 
of monopolization of transport between Ghana and Europe. Not only did the 
monopoly preclude independent shipping by small European or African entrepre-
neurs, but insofar as the monopolizing shipping firms granted preferential 
privileges to the large expatriate trading companies, it precluded the develop-
ment of an independent trading class, and especially of an African trading 
class. Transport was not, of course, the only aspect of Ghana's economy which 
was thus organized; finance followed a very similar pattern. 
4. Expatriate Banking 
Banking in Ghana, during the period of colonial rule, was 'closely tied 
in with other expatriate interests and functioned primarily as a resource for 
the European, not the African, community. Jntil 1896 no banks at all existed 
in Ghana and all monetary transactions were carried out by individual firms 
with their banks in London, entailing a great deal of inconvenience and expense. 
Africans were dependent for banking services upon the good will of the Europeans 
with whom they dealt. Feeling the need for more sophisticated banking services, 
160Leubuscher, op. ait., p. 52. 
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Table 17a. · Shipping Trade between North Europe and West Africal61 
Shipping Lines Number of 1,000 Tonnage as Per Cent Tonnage as Per Cent Vessels Gross Tons of Conference of Grand Total 
1913-14 
Conference Total 124 460 100 lOO 
Elder Dempster 95 344 75 
Woermann 29 116 25 
1224-22 
Conference Total 93 428 100 100 
Elder Dempster 70 342 80 
Woermann 9 38 9 
Hamburg-West 
Africa 14 48 11 
1238-32 
Conference Total 61 309 lOO 80 
Elder Dempster 42 220 71 57 
Woermann 14 71 23 18 
Hamburg-West 
Africa 5 18 6 5 
Non-Conference Total 21 78 20 
UAC 16 58 15 
John Holt 5 20 5 
Grand Total 82 387 lOO 
c 
161 Ibid., p. 99. 
• 
Millers Limited, under J. H. Eatty, attempted in the late 1880s to set up a 
string of small commercial banks in the western district of the Gold Coast. 
The function of these banks included the drawing and acceptance of bills of 
exchange, cash deposits, and the negotiation of cable and mail transfers.l62 
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But Millers' attempt to set up a bank was soon superseded by the crea-
tion of a bank in Nigeria by the Elder Dempster shipping company. In the early 
1890s the African Banking Corporation, a South African concern, had been in-
vited by the Government to set up a branch in Lagos. Because of African 
resistance in Benin at that time, however, the venture was not considered to be 
worthwhile, and the Corporation decided not to invest in West Africa when its 
assets could be more successfully deployed in South Africa. The Government, 
feeling the need for an agent to transact its currency needs for it, then de-
cided to employ Elder Dempster as a distributor of coin in the West African 
colonies. As a result, Elder Dempster entered the banking business and the 
Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) was set up by Sir Alfred Lewis Jones in 
March 1894. Three years later the Bank entered Ghana, establishing branches 
in Accra (1897), Cape Coast (1900), Sekondi (1901) and Axim (1901). 163 
During the early period of its history the BBWA did not have enough 
branches to supply the needs of all its customers, although it did its best to 
open branches anywhere where there was a large number of expatriate firms. (In 
1906 it had nine branches in Ghana; this increased to twelve during the 1920s 
and sixteen in 1930, but declined, with the Depression, to ten in 1935.)164 
Consequently, to fill the gap in services, it employed the larger trading firms 
162Dumett, "British ••• "op. cit., p. 332. 
l63RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 14. 
16 4Kay, op. cit., p. 419. 
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as its agents and authorized them to carry out banking services in its name. 
In 1905, for example, Millers agreed to act for the BBWA in Kumasi, Tarkwa, and 
Winneba, for a payment of £300 per year in Kumasi and Tarkwa and £10 per month 
in Winneba. Such arrangements were made on the strict understanding that the 
firms, in return for their payments, would help to ensure the BBWA's monopoly 
of banking in West Africa. In an agreement made between Millers and the Bank 
in 1903, for example, it was stated that neither the Company nor the Bank would 
directly or indirectly a} assist any third firm or company to 
commence conduct or be interested or concerned in banking business in the 
said colony [Ghana] and b} will not so assist or themselves conduct or be 
interested in a banking business in the West African colonies of the 
Gambia Sierra Leone and Lagos nor of any bank in the United Kingdom to 
compete with the Bank in the said colonies [sia].165 
By employing the major trading firms as its banking agents at a profit-
able rate, the BBWA ensured that they would not try to compete with it in the 
colonies mentioned above. Despite the agreements, however, the firms resented 
the BBWA because of its close ties with Elder Dempster. The BBWA had originally 
been formed as a "public" company, but in fact, of its 3,000 shares, 1, 733 were 
owned by Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, and 433 each by his two partners. 166 Offi-
cially, the Bank was supposed to be" •.• absolutely independent, and 
restricted from engaging in business other than banking business ."167 While 
the latter condition was fulfilled, the former condition was not. Until his 
death Jones had a controlling interest in the Bank. The first Board consisted 
entirely of persons connected with Elder Dempster. At its inception the Bank 
was to deposit about £10,000 in security with the British Government; it raised 
a loan of £30,000 to cover the debt and it was later discovered that the loan 
165UAC: document 588, "Bank of British West Africa." 
166Davies, The T:l'ade Ma7<.e:l•s ••• , op. ait., p. 118. 
167RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 7. 
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had come from Elder Dempster. 168 
The Royal Commission on Shipping R:i.ngs, when it investigated Elder 
Dempster in 1909, investigated the workings of the BBWA at the same time. Un-
fortunately, the Commission was forced to accede to the stipulation that the 
testimony of Sir Alfred Lewis Jones be kept secret, and it has never been ·pub-
lished. Leslie Couper, however, who spoke for the BBWA, as one of its 
Directors, admitted that he had formerly been an employee of the shipping 
line. 169 In admitting this connection he partly confirmed accusations that the 
Bank exerted power over its customers by threatening to have Elder Dempster 
withdraw shipping services if they did not comply with its regulations. Partly 
because of the difficulties of colonial banking, but also because it was in a 
monopoly situation, the Bank was accustomed to levy high charges for its ser-
vices. Even the Government was afraid to protest against these charges. "The 
Colonial Office was concerned about the high rates which BBWA levied on govern-
ment transfers to England, but decided that nothing could be done about the 
problem, because, if the colonial administrations tried to remit specie instead 
Jones would have been able to counter by raising his freight charges. " 1 70 The 
Bank also acted as Elder Dempster's agent, undertaking delivery of its goods 
and collecting payment for it.l71 
There was strong evidence in the Royal Commission report to suggest that 
the Bank was indeed giving preference to Elder Dempster, as well as actively 
168conversation with Richard Fry, London, November 1974. 
169RCSR: Cd.4670, Q.9128. 
170A. G. Hopkins, "The Creation of a Colonial Monetary System: The Origins 
of the West African Currency Board, 11 Afriaan Historiaa"l Studies, no. 1, vol. 3 
(1970), p. 113, fn. 51. 
171RCSR: Cd.466~ despatch from John Rodger, Governor of Gold Coast) to 
Secretary of State, 21 July 1907, p. 196. 
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cooperating with it. George Miller complained that 
• • • the bank • • • is one of those systems by which a shipowner who 
is also a banker can keep to himself a great deal of freight. 
Supposing I am a poor man, and I want an advance of 80 per cent, or 
90 per cent or lOO per cent, on my goods, the bank who owned [sic] the 
ships says 'All right, I will give you the advance, but you are to ship 
the goods by my steamers.•l72 
The Bank of course denied these charges, arguing that it treated all of its 
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customers (that is, its European customers) equally. It argued that the fact 
that it was connected to Elder Dempster in no way impeded or directed its busi-
ness. As with shipping, the conflict between large trading houses and smaller 
ones came into play to persuade the British Government to allow the close con-
nection between the two companies to continue. Smaller traders argued that 
without the Bank, they would not be able to compete at all because they would 
not be able to import specie into West Africa on their own. 173 The facilities 
offered by the Bank outweighed their complaints against its connection with 
Elder Dempster. 
Indeed, in analyzing the role of the BBWA in Ghana it must constantly be 
kept in mind that it was the first institution to provide any sort of coherent 
banking facilities in the colony, and that without it, each individual trader, 
whether African or European, would have had to conduct all his banking trans-
actions through a bank in London or Europe. Nevertheless, the development of 
banking in Ghana was constrained by the virtual monopoly held by the BBWA until 
the entrance of the Colonial Bank in 1917. The BBWA originally was set up in 
West Africa in order to take over from the Government the function of supplying 
specie to the merchants; a function which was becoming more and more important 
172RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.44o6. 
173For a discussion of the problem of importing specie, see below, Chapter 
v. 
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as the export of primary products increased, and barter was no longer an ade-
quate means of dealing with African producers and middlemen. Prior to the 
setting-up of the Bank, each merchant had to obtain Government permission to 
import specie; having obtained it, his costs of importation, on an individual 
basis, were often as high as 7~%. 1 7 4 In 1896, therefore, an Agreement was made 
between the Bank and the Government. 175 The Bank was allowed complete monopoly 
of the import of specie with the stipulation that it not charge more than one 
per cent commission to its customers. 
• • • the Bank shall not at any time during the contj.nuance of this 
Agreement charge to any customer or other person requiring silver coin 
to be imported into the Colony any higher premium in respect of the 
importation of such silver coin than one per cent .•.• The Government 
shall not at any time during the continuance of this Agreement give to 
any person or persons firm or Company except the Bank any facilities 
for importing silver or other coin into the Colony.176 
Arrangements were made for the Bank to transact the Government's business with-
out charge, in return for which the Government agreed to supply specie to the 
Bank free of charge. The Bank would then supply the specie to its customers at 
a charge of not more than one per cent. 
Many merchants objected to the above arrangement and asked why the Gov-
ernment could not supply specie direct to them rather than allowing the Bank to 
make a profit as an intermediary. 177 The Government's reply was that the BBWA 
was also assuming the risk of having to repatriate excess coin to England at 
its own expense. There was no note issue in West Africa, and moreover there 
was a constant demand for new coins as African customers often would not accept 
174RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 21. 
175
"Agreement with the Bank of British West Africa, Limited, as to the 
Transaction of the Banking Business of the Government (16 June 1896)" (Gold 
Coast: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
176Ibid. 
177RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.4558-63. 
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old.l 78 Because there were no notes, coins were legal tender up to unlimited 
amounts~ and in fact there was almost as much coin in the British West African 
territories as there was in the British Isles. The Government of the latter, 
then, worried that it might be saddled with extra coin, causing inflation, if 
uncontrolled repatriation of coin were allowed. The BBWA was to take the risk 
of holding unnecessary coin and keeping it out of the British economy, in re-
turn for its one per cent commission on new coin. However, it quickly became 
apparent that, far from there being a surplus of coin, it was being absorbed 
into the West African economy as soon as it arrived; the British had grossly 
underestimated the indigenous economy's need for currency. 17 9 The Bank was 
therefore being paid a large amount of money in return for which risk was ab-
solutely minimal. 
In 1909, recognizing the inadequacies of the monopoly provided for by 
the 1896 Agreement, the Government in London decided to end the specie arrange-
ment. But in the midst of negotiations for its demise, Lord Crewe, the 
Minister responsible, suddenly changed his mind, presumably under the benign 
influence of Sir Alfred Lewis Jones.l80 As a result, the silver monopoly was 
permitted to continue until 1912, when, Jones having died, the West African 
Currency Board was established and the BBWA lost its monopoly, although it re-
mained, until the 1950s, the agent of the Board. 
l78Europeans argued that the "childlike11 Africans enjoyed shiny coins and 
used them for decorative purposes. But it could also be that, with the plethora 
of coins in West Africa, the Africans insisted on new coins because they could 
easily be cheated by an old coin from a different nation. 
17 9Hopkins, "The Creation ••• ," op. cit., p. 116. 
l80conversation with Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974. 
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That the Agreement should have been withdrawn earlier is evident from 
complaints by independent merchants against the Bank. There were claims that 
in fact it charged more than one per cent for importing currency, 181 and also 
that it did not allow enough people credit. It was also claimed that the Bank 
put pressure on its customers by delaying or withholding currency. 182 In fact, 
as long as the Bank held the monopoly of services within the British West 
African colonies, there was little that it could not get away with. Traders, 
for good or ill, were at its mercy, since they were not permitted any longer to 
import specie on their own, even if they had the resources. 
In the light of the complaints which persisted against the BBWA and its 
connections with Elder Dempster, it is surprising that no new bank rose to 
challenge it in Ghana until 1917. An earlier attempt had been made to chal-
lenge the BBWA in Nigeria. The Bank of Nigeria was established by a few large 
firms, including the Niger Company, the African Association, Miller, and John 
Holt, in 1912. Because, however, it was dominated by these few giant concerns, 
it was viewed by the smaller firms as a closed group, even less likely to eo-
operate with them than the BBWA. In any case, the essential reason for the 
establishment of the Bank of Nigeria was to challenge the silver monopoly; as 
has been noted above, the large firms were willing to cooperate with BBWA, and 
indeed act as its agent, as far as other banking functions were concerned. 
When the West African Currency Board was established and took over the importing 
of silver, the sale of the Bank of Nigeria to the BBWA was quickly effected.l83 
From 1912 to 1916, then, the BBWA was once again the only Bank in 
British West Africa. In 1916, its monopoly was challenged by the entry of the 
181RCSR: Cd.4670, testimony of John Holt, Q.46oo. 
182navies, The Trade Makers . 
183Hopkins, 11The Creation . 
• , op. eit., p. 119. 
11 op. eit. , pp. 114-116. 
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Colonial Bank into Nigeria. The Colonial Bank was originally established in 
1836 in the West Indies. It was not, however, permitted to move outside the 
West Indies, until in 1916 an Act of Parliament was passed permitting it to 
open branches anywhere in the Empire. 18 ~ In 1917 it opened its first branch in 
Ghana, in Accra. Other branches followed in Kumasi, Koforidua, Nsawam, Winneba 
(all in 1919), Bekwai (1921), Takoradi (1930), Oda (1932), Tarkwa (1935) and 
Dunkvm (1939) ,18 5 The branches were opened in areas where expatriate trade 
flourished, where there were large cocoa-buying centres, and, later, in the 
largest mining centres. Given the small amount of banking business available 
in the colony, however, the Colonial Bank did not generally compete with the 
BBWA, but opened in towns where there were no BBWA facilities. It changed its 
name to Barclays Bank, Dominion, Colonial, and Overseas, in 1925 when the 
Colonial Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and the National Bank of South Africa 
were united into the Barclays 
Despite earlier attempts to closely safeguard their monopoly position, 
the BBWA seems to have been singularly unconcerned with the entry of Barclays 
into Ghana. According to its official historian, it was by that time a rather 
sleepy organization, little concerned with innovation or expansion.l86 Indeed, 
there seems to have been a gentleman's agreement between the two Banks not to 
compete with each other, or at least, to keep that competition to a bare mini-
mum. One official of Barclays who visited Ghana in 1925 commented that n 
although keen competition in business exists, the friendly relationship between 
the management staffs of the two Banks is most marked, and I personally, 
18~Barclays Bank, A Banking Centenary: BaroZays Bank (Dominion, Col-onial 
and Overseas) 1836-1936 (Pl~nouth: The Mayflower Press, 1938), p. 59. 
185Colonial Bank and Barclays Bank, D.C.O., Reports, for years mentioned. 
18 6conversation with Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974. 
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was most kindly received and entertained on many occasions by members of the 
Bank of British West Africa."l8 7 There is some speculation that there were 
actual written ag~eements between the two Banks, but there is no known evidence 
of this. Writing in 1954, and commenting on the very high rates charged for 
internal banking transactions in West Africa, Newlyn and Rowan commented that 
although banks were reluctant to reveal their charges, "There appears to be 
little inter-bank price competition and there are some signs of inter-bank 
collaboration."188 During the cocoa boycott of 1937, the two firms 
fear that new banks would enter Ghana, presumably upsetting whatever arrange-
ment might have existed.18 9 There was no fierce competition between the two 
Banks until, with impending independence in the 1950s, they became rivals in 
the race to open up new branches to cash in on the funds of the rising African 
elite. 
No doubt competition w~s not necessary in the Gold Coast since both 
Banks, even during the years of the Depression, good dividends. As an 
independent bank, the Colonial Bank made better dividends than it did when it 
joined with the Anglo-Egyptian and the National Bank of South Africa. 
Both the Colonial Bank, as a subsidiary of Barclays Bank Limited, and 
the BBWA were firmly tied into the British banking system. The BBWA had, as 
its own bankers, the Bank of England, Lloyd's Bank Limited, the Westminster 
Bank, and the National Provincial Bank.l 90 There were, of course, no African 
directors on the board of either of the two Banks, rather, the Banks tended to 
187Colonial Bank, Report, 23 May 1925. 
188w. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, Money and Banking in British Colonial 
Afriaa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 84. 
189Reported at a meeting of farmers and brokers in Nsawam, 31 January 
1938, GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
190stock Exchange Yearbook (1939). 
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Table 18. Dividend Rates (Ordinary Shares) of the Bank of 
British West Africa and the Colonial Bank/ 
Bar clays n.c.o.191 
Year BBWA Colonial Year BBWA Colonial Year BBWA Colonial 
1895-6 8 1910-11 9 1924-25 5 1 
1896-7 8 1911-12 9 1925-26 5 3 
1897-8 8 1912-13 9 1926-27 5 3!-z 
1898-9 8 1913-14 9!-z 1927-28 6 4 
1899-1900 8 1914-15 e--2 1928-29 6 4!-z 
1900-01 8 1915-16 8 7 1929-30 6 434 
1901-02 8 1916-17 8 7 1930-31 4 4% 
1902-03 8 1917-18 8 8 1931-32 4 4% 
1903-04 8 1918-19 8 10 1932-33 4 43/4 
1904-05 8 1919-20 10 10 1933-34 4 5 
1905-06 8 1920-21 8 10 1934-35 4 
1906-07 8 1921-22 6 8 1935-36 5 5!-z 
1907-08 10 1922-23 5 8 1936-37 5 6 
1908-09 9 1923-24 5 8 1937-38 5 6!z 
1909-10 9 
share their directorships with directors of other banks based in Europe, other 
colonial banks, steamship companies, railways, insurance companies, and various 
agricultural, manufacturing and mining concerns. 
From the selected list shown Table 19 it can be seen that not only 
were the two Banks closely connected with international banking concerns and 
financial institutions, but that, as well, they shared directors with the major 
trade firms of West Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Banks 
viewed their purpose as, primarily, to service the expatriate community, both 
Government and commercial. Their functions were to supply coin, to make ad-
vances for payment for the cocoa crop, and to repatriate profits for the firms. 
Basically, they assisted the import-export trade. Large sums of money were 
made available every year to the expatriate trading firms in order that they 
might buy the goods produced by Africans. This money was then disbursed by the 
191lbid. (1905, 1915, 1925, 1935, 1939). (Dividends of the Colonial Bank 
prior to its entrance into the Gold Coast are not included.) 
Table 19. Selected Examples o~ Interlocking 
Directorships: BBWA and Colonial/ 
Barc1ays Bank192 
Director 
Robert Edmund Dickinson 
Cli~~ord B1ackburn Edgar 
Sir Frederick E1ey 
Sir Austin Harris 
David Q. Henriques 
A1~red Lewis Jones 
Lord Kylsant 
Viscount Mi1ner 
George Neville 
Mazzini Stuart 
Director 
Colin Campbell 
George Cyril Cassels 
Sir Gilbert Fox 
0. V. G. Hoare 
Sir Earnest Oppenheimer 
Emile Pusch 
Bank o~ British West Africa 
Outside Directorships 
Standard Bank o~ South Africa (1925, 1935) 
Westminster Bank Ltd. (1935) 
Niger Co. (1915) 
P. & 0. Banking Corporation Ltd. (1925) 
Lloyd' s Bank Ltd. ( 1935) 
British Steamship Investment Trust Ltd. (1935) 
Rubber Estates o~ Ceylon Ltd. (1925) 
A~rican Oil Mills Co. (1905) 
British Cotton Growing Association (1905) 
Elders and Fyf~es Ltd. (1905) 
Coast Lines Ltd. (1925) 
Elders Insurance Co. Ltd. (1925) 
Lamport and Holt Ltd. (1925) 
Midland Bank Ltd. ( 1925) 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (1925) 
Southern Railway Co. (1925) 
London Joint Stock Bank (1915) 
Rio Tin to Co. L-~d. ( 1915) 
Ashanti Land Ltd. (1905) 
A~rican and Eastern Trade Corp. (1925) 
A~rican Association (1895, 1905) 
Colonial Bank/Barclays D.C.O. 
Outside Directors 
Westminster Bank Ltd. (1925) 
Bank of Montreal (1925) 
Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. (1925) 
Ashanti Gold~ields (1935) 
Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. (1935) 
African and Eastern Trade Corp. (1925) 
Anglo-American Corp. o~ South Africa (1935) 
de Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (etc.) (1935) 
Lazard Brothers and Co. (1935) 
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192Direatory of Direators (1895,1905,1915,1925,1935). A larger selected 
list o~ interlocking directorships ~or the West African trade can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
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firms to their producers, who spent it largely on imported goods. The money 
was thus returned to the hands of the firms who returned it back to the banks. 
Since there was no scope for investment in Ghana itself, at least in European 
eyes, the money was sent back to England to be invested there. Until 1912, 
West Africa used the same currency as did Britain; after that time, it had its 
own currency but as it was convertible at par with the pound sterling, there 
was no incentive to invest it in West Africa rather than return it to Europe. 
Decisions as to who was to receive credit based upon profits from the 
import-export trade were made not in Ghana out at the Banks' Head Offices in 
London. 19 3 Thus firms such as United Africa Company, who had their own London 
office, were at an advantage compared both to the small European firms and to 
the African trader. Moreover the two Banks engaged in the practice of gi Ying 
preferential rates to certain favoured customers, as also did BBWA' s parent 
firm, Elder Dempster. Large trading firms thus enjoyed financial advantages 
not only over Africans, but also over the smaller European firms. The system 
of "most favoured mercantile customers"194 was however kept secret, the Banks 
arguing that they charged the same rates to all. Non-British expatriate firms 
tended to obtain some of their financing through banks from their own nations, 
but to turn to BBWA and the Colonial Bank for large advances just before the 
cocoa season. Outside of the cocoa season, none of the firms borrm~ed to any 
great extent from BBWA or the Colonial Bank; they tended to be self-financing 
in their day-to-day needs. 
Aside from supplying coin for the buying season and then repatriating it 
193This description of banking services is taken from interviews with rep-
resentatives of Standard Bank of Ghana (formerly the Bank of British West 
Africa) and Barclays Bank of Ghana, as well as with representatives of several 
of the leading expatriate firms still in Ghana. 
194UAC: document 588, "Bank of British West Africa. 11 
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to London after the season was over, the two Banks had few functions to perform 
in Ghana. They did, however, trure charge of the actual physical transport of 
specie. Most of the cocoa crop was paid for in two-shilling pieces, which had 
to be transported to the cocoa areas by the truckload every season. Without 
notes, and without the widespread use of cheques (a use which was contingent 
upon widespread literacy) the supply of coin needed was phenomenal. No doubt 
had gold been used instead of silver, the actual physical costs of transporta-
tion of specie could have been lessened, but the gold produced in Ghana was 
shipped to England for Imperial use. Another of the Banks' functions was to 
escort gold from the mines to the harbours, there to make sure that it was 
safely loaded onto ships for export.195 
The idea of using the Banks to expand credit in Ghana, to promote in-
vestment and production, and to generalize the use of sophisticated banking 
services, was never entertained, either by the Banks themselves or by the 
Government. Their function was solely to service the expatriate community, not 
to participate in development projects. They neither saw themselves, nor were 
seen by others, as obligated to provide services for the African community. 
In their book on colonial banking written in 1954, Newlyn and Rowan 
argue that Africans were perceived as unreliable in their financial dealings, 
hence the Banks were not eager for their patronage. Reasons for not giving 
loans to Africans included the following: 
1. The generally poor reputation of Africans for commercial and fi-
nancial responsibility. 
2. The absence of organized accounts in most African businesses. 
3. The failure of many African businessmen to mrute full use of their 
banking accounts and their tendency to be secretive over business matters. 
195Memoirs (unpublished) of Oswald Garnish, manager of the Colonial Bank in 
Accra in the early 1920s. I am grateful to Mr. John Blandford, archivist of 
Barclays Bank, London, for allowing me to read this memoir. 
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4. The difficulties experienced by Africans in providing the banks with 
suitable security. 
5. The lack of close personal relationships between European banking 
executives and their African customers, and the absence of intermediar-
iesl96 
These perceptions of Africans were even more prevalent during the early part of 
the twentieth century than they were during the preindependence period of which 
Newlyn and Rowan write. It is true that African businesses often failed, that 
illiterate traders could not keep modern accounts, that few Africans had the 
kind of collateral which the Europeans desired, and that many were corrupt. 
Within this framework, however, there were means which could have been used to 
provide banking facilities. 
Indigenous traders who keep exact mental records of phenomenally large 
commercial empires are legendary in social science literature on West Africa. 
They are also legendary in West African banking circles, and it is obvious that 
in fact they were allowed credit, at least at a later date. European banking 
officials were trained to be able to evaluate an African's worth, even without 
written records, by visiting his premises and inspecting his business. Col-
lateral was based on stock turnover. 197 Before World War II, however, credit 
of this type was given not by the Banks but by the European firms with whom the 
African traders dealt. The Banks hesitated to give any kind of credit without 
solid collateral. 
Unfortunately, the European view of sound collateral was immovable prop-
erty such as land or housing. As explained above, Gold Coast Africans retained 
their traditional organization of property in land, a system which granted 
exclusive usufruct but forbade its outright alienation. 19 8 They therefore 
196Newlyn and Rowan, op. oit., p. 81. 
197Interview with an African director of Barclays Bank of Ghana, Accra, 
May 1974. 
198See Chapter II. 
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could not use land as a basis for credit. Nor were their productive capacities 
of interest to the Banks, which were both forbidden from and uninterested in 
taking over farmland and plantations. Traders depended upon the European 
import-export firms for credit, as banks were not willing to accept stocks of 
cloth or other imported goods as collateral. Africans, then, were left with 
only two resources if they were to obtain credit; houses and gold trinkets. 
There was a limit, however, to the amount of credit one could obtain in ex-
change for the "family jewels" and Europeans were reluctant to take houses as 
collateral as they often found it difficult to foreclose mortgages. 
It is difficult • to secure credit upon what they look to as their 
greatest asset--property in land and buildings. I am not entirely con-
vinced that the state of the credit system at present is not at least 
partly due to the attitudes of many persons who secured credit on the 
security of land or buildings. My reason for saying so is that it has 
been common for borrowers to place every possible obstacle in the way of 
a security being realised when that unfortunate contingency has been 
placed upon the lender.l99 
In other words, Europeans found it difficult to foreclose mortgages on property 
as borrowers could always claim that in fact the property involved belonged not 
to individuals but to entire families, and therefore could not be alienated. 
Nevertheless, there is some indication that the much-abused preference 
of Africans for building large houses (instead of investing in their farms or 
businesses) was at least partially a result of a European policy which insisted 
on real property as collateral. Money which might have been better invested in 
cocoa farms or in private roads to the farms had to be put into buildings be-
cause Europeans needed visible, tangible evidence of a man's wealth. No doubt 
had there been the "close personal relationship" between African bank customers 
and European bank executives, which Newlyn and Rowan discuss, such a need for 
tangible proof of a man's assets would have been considered less necessary. As 
199Statement by Mr. Mackay, a European unoffical member, in GCLegCo, 6 
March 1924. 
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it was, however, attitudes of racial prejudice overrode any chance for equality 
of treatment with European bank customers. As long as Africans were denied 
equal treatment in commercial matters, their chances of competing successfully 
with Europeans were minimal; but as long as they were viewed as uncompetitive, 
they were denied equal treatment. A vicious circle existed. 
Moreover, the Government's policy of paternalism towards the "natives" 
militated against equality in commercial transactions. The Government viewed 
Africans either as cheats or as gullible fools; in either case they were to be 
protected from the world of modern capitalism. The close personal and formal 
contacts between business and Government enabled the latter to influence the 
former in their decisions as to the financial reliability of Africans. 
It was the practice of the Colonial Government to exchange intelligence 
about African entrepreneurs with banks and investment houses. For example, 
Barclays Bank informed the colonial government of the financial status of 
all the Directors of the West African Co-operative Producers Ltd. The 
more serious consequence resulted when the colonial government communicated 
its jaundiced views, unoffically of course, to non-British banks and 
finance houses who, unlike British colonial banks, expressed a willingness 
to finance some of the more reasonable schemes of Gold Coast entrepreneurs. 
In very quiet, unobtrusive ways the colonial regime destroyed the prospects 
of would-be borrowers by suggesting that they were 'shady characters', 
'swindlers', and 'men of dubious character'. While more than a few met 
this description the uniformity of condemnation was not justified by reality 
and in many cases amounted to slander and character assassination. The 
result of this was that legitimate African entrepreneurs could not get 
loans through established commercial channels and had to turn to high-cost, 
informal loans sources. This greatly increased the cost of borrowing and 
encouraged them to engage in creating fanciful images of their own com-
mercial prospects.200 
No doubt, on the whole, Africans vrere not as good commercial risks as 
Europeans, given their minor role in trade, their lack of capital assets, and 
their isolation from the European business community. Banks interested prima-
rily in their own profits were bound to be cautious about their African 
200Alexander Baron Holmes, IV, "Economic and Political Organizations in· the 
Gold Coast 1920-45" (University of Chicago: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1972), 
pp. 113-114. 
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customers. But there is some indication that the Banks were overly cautious, 
that they did, in fact, discriminate solely on the basis of race and denied 
even the most elementary, risk-free, services to Africans. They were, natur-
ally, willing to take African deposits; in 1910, £263,000 of the Bank of 
British West Africa's £1,074,793 in deposits was owned by Africans. 201 (Tnus 
belying the prevalent notion that Africans did not save.) In other services, 
however, they encouraged Africans only on payment of a higher price than 
Europeans were expected to pay. While banks are unusually secretive about 
their rates, and information is difficult to find, access was obtained to a 
statement of BBWA rates for 1905 which indicated clearly the discrimination 
against Africans. 
Rates for Bank Drafts. 
1. On any coast Branch 1% premium or 1/- minimum. 
2. On Head Office or London 
a) Government Officials ~% or 1/- minimum. 
b) Other Europeans o/4% or 1/- minimum. 
c) Natives 1% or 1/- minimum. 
Rates for purchasing cheques or bills from 
- Head Office or London Offices -1% 
- Other English banks -1\% 
- Natives or African Trading Firms 2~ 
-for collecting cheques or bills from 
- Head office or London Office - ~% 
- Other English Banks 1\% 
- Natives or African Trading Firms 2% 
Gold 
1. To be given to Europeans without charge up to £10. 
2. Exceeding £10 a premium of 1% to be charged to Europeans. 
3. Natives to pay 1%. 
Bank of England Notes. 
1. Not exceeding £50 in value and of denominations of £5, £10, and 
£20 only to be accepted free. 
2. 1% premium to be charged for accepting Notes of denominations 
exceeding £20 and exceeding a total value of £50. 
3. Natives presenting Notes to be charged 1%. 
201Hopkins, "The Creation ..• , 11 op. ait., p. 112. 
Current a/c Turnover. 
Europeans V3% on the quarterly withdrawals m1n1mum 5/-. 
Natives £1.1.s. Op. to be charged annually and 1h% o~ quarterly 
withdrawals • 
Cable transfers. 
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1. On any Coast Branch 1~ premium or 5/- m1n1mum. Exception European 
firms 3h% for transfers to Gold Coast Branches. 
2. When a remittance is received from England with instructions to 
collect all charges this end from payee 1% commission to be collected from 
Europeans and 1~% from Natives, plus cost of cable in both cases. 2D2 
For the African, then, the monopoly of the colonial banking system by 
one Bank up to 1917, and its sharing by twc Banks in close agreement after that 
date, resulted not only in a denial of banking services on the grounds that 
Africans were not as sound commercially as their European counterparts, but 
also in deliberate discrimination on the grounds of race. The two British 
Banks had complete control over banking in the Gold Coast, but they extended 
only limited services, and those at high costs, to the non-European comm·uni ty. 
202List of BBWA charges, dated l February 1905, in UAC: document 588, 
11Bank of British West Africa." 
CHAPTER V 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT CO-OPERATION I...Til' GHJI,NA: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INF"RA'3TRUCTURE 
This chapter will consider the various institutions of co-operation 
which facilitated close contact between Europeans in the commercial, mining, 
shipping and financial sectors of Ghana's economy and the members of the 
British Gover:2ment establishment who administered the colony. Because the col-
ony was under the political control of the Bri t:i.sh, expatriate firiTls frorr the 
United Kingdo::n had far more say in the making of policy than did the Swiss or 
French firms ·.vhich were their colleagues ir:. the world of trade. 
The influence of the British firms is crucial for understanding tbe de-
velopment policy of the colonial Government. Several aspects of the 
Government's policy vdll be considered in this chapter and Chapter\~, with a 
view to understanding how the policy fulfilled the wishes and desires of the 
expatriate co"nmuni ty. In this chapter, two of the roost crucial concerns of the 
early colonial period up to World )far I, tJ:.e development of currency and the 
institution of a system of transport gearea to import-export needs will te dis-
cussed. In Chapter VI the investment policies of both the expatriate fi:rms and 
the Government >.;ill be discussed, along with an analysis of the development of 
monocul tural dependence after ·world War I. It will be argued that underce-
velopment and stagnation were the major fec.tures of the Ghanaian economy· during 
the inter-War period, as a consequence of the types of trr..nsport, investrrent, 
and agricultural policies which emerged. 
1. ~Institutions of Co-operaticn 
~ Although several formal means of co.IrJnlmication between the British busi-
"\.i 
ness conununi ty a..n.d the British administrative eorrJnuni ty were quickly set up in 
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colonial Ghana, none of them might have had much import had it not been for the 
informal ties of nationality, race, and, to a certain extent, class, whi~h 
bound the two communities together both at "home" and on the coast. There were 
very few whites in Ghana during colonial times; what white men there \>re re 
tended naturally to gravitate towards one another. Only in the larger centres 
such as Accra could they afford to be at all choosy about with which of their 
compatriots they would socialize. A European club in Accra was the focus of 
social events; no Africans were permitted into this club until independence in 
1957. 1 Here decisions could be made over cocktails at sundown, later to be 
translated into Government language for the benefit of the Africans whom both 
communities ontensibly served. 
In Bri~ain too, there were informal ties between the more powerful of 
the businessmen, for example Sir Alfred Lewis Jones of the Elder Dempster 
shipping line and the BBWA, and the men who made Government policy. Members of 
Parliament from Liverpool and Manchester were often also members of major 
trading famil:i.es. In London, there were close ties between the Africa Section 
of the London Chamber of Commerce and members in both the House of Lords and 
the House of Commons. Entries such as the following were common in the records 
of all three of the Chambers. 
Mention having been made of the necessity of keeping Members of 
Parliament fully acquainted with questions affecting the interests 
of British African trade, Mr. stated that he had the 
assurance of Mr. w. H. Holland M.P. that he would readily place his 
services to further these objects. 2 
Informal contacts such as those described above were reinforced by the 
ease with which former members of the colonial service could enter the business 
1Inter-new with an African director of Barclays Bank of Ghana, Accra, 
May 1974. 
2ManCC, 20 July 1892. 
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world, where indeed their familiarity with the West African coast was mo:;t 
appreciated. Occasional protests reached the ears of the.Government about 
this practice, usually from groups which were not themselves recruiting such 
former administrators. In 1918 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce protested 
to the Colonial Office that former Government men would possess confidential 
information about the competitors of their new employers. The Colonial Office 
replied that it was not worried about such an eventuality as any breach of 
confidentiality would result in the former officers' losing their pensions. It 
rejected Manchester's suggestion that it be made a condition of entering the 
public service that the entrant would not join one of the private expatriate 
firms after retirement. 3 In 1928 J. E. Casely-Hayford, an African, raised a 
question in the Legislative Council about the proposed directorship of a new 
diamond-mining firm, Alluvial Diamonds (Gold Coast) Limited, and the alleged 
presence on its board of two ex-Governors and three ex-officials of Ghana. 
Again, the Colonial Secretary replied that anyone with a pension must have the 
Governor's permission to sit on a board. 4 The constraint of the pension> how-
ever, must have meant little to such ex-administrators as many were not :i.n fact 
entitled to pens ions in the as yet disorgar~i zed Colonial Servic.e. 5 In any 
case, it would have been most difficult to prove that confidentiality had been 
breached. 
The informal contacts between Government and the business community in 
England were reinforced in 1905 by the este·.blishment of the Joint West k~rica 
Committee, a committee composed of two members each from the London, 
3ManCC, 12 March 1918. 
4GCLegCo, 1 March 1928. 
5Robert Heussler, Yesterday'sRulers: The Making of the British 
Colonial Serviae (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). 
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Manchester, and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce which was entitled to discuss 
matters of common interest to the three Chambers on a regular basis with the 
Colonial Office.G This Committee was set up only after a great deal of pres-
sure, from the early 1890s on, from the Chambers, especially in Manchester and 
Liverpool. Pressure on the Colonial Office for regular consultation regarding 
West African affairs grew concurrently with Britain's increasing military and 
administrative presence in that area. In August 1892 the Manchester West 
Africa Committee resolved "That a deputation be sent to the Foreign and Colo-
nial Ministers to place before them the importance of West African questions 
and asking that better attention be given to these in the future than in the 
past. n7 Pressure for the formation of a ccnsultative committee continued from 
this date, with the London Chamber of Commerce lagging behind in its desires 
for formal channels of communication, possibly because it was more powerful in 
the financial world, and also because it had more direct contact with the 
Government since it was situated in the capital and could more easily contact 
Whitehall. But it also pressured the ColoLial Government for details of any 
decisions made. In 1892 "The Colonial Government was ••• asked to inform the 
Chambers as to the details of any proposed treaties, and of any action proposed 
to be taken affecting commercial interests. " 8 Finally, in the early years of 
the twentieth century, after ten years of constant pressure, the Colonial 
Office acceded to the many requests which had been made for consultation. In 
1904, the machinery of the JWAC was instituted, with the proviso that onJy 
6Hereafter referred to as the JWAC. The .JWAC was in existence until at 
least 1956; the author was able to locate its Minutes for 1905 to 1919, but 
the Minutes for 1919 to 1939 appear to have been lost. 
7ManCC, 31 August 1892. 
8LonCC, Eleventh Annual Report (1892), p. 62. 
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matters on which the three Charriliers agreed were to be discussed with the 
Colonial Office. The Committee's p1.1rpose was to serve as an 
• • . informal means of communication between the Chambers of 
Commerce and the permanent staff of the Colonial Office ln the 
preliminary discussion of commercial, shipping, mining and 
industrial questions relating to the West African Colonies and 
Protectorates. 9 
There was a continual debate throughout the colonial period about the 
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exact function of the JWAC: the Colonial Office insisted that its status was 
solely as a consultative body while the Chambers wanted it made an official 
body with an official capacity. As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in 
1906, Winston Churchill stated that his willingness to meet with the Committee 
". • • is not intended to imply any right on the part of those bodies [ Cl.ambers 
of Commerce] to be consulted beforehand in regard to any policy that may be 
adopted."10 The merchants, however, contirued their pressure for the right to 
make decisions, arguing (correctly) that they were in fact far more important 
to the colonies than individual Governors or administrators. They felt that 
they themselves could, in fact, almost entirely run the colonies from England. 
Alfred Lewis Jones, referring to the members of the JWAC, argued with the 
Colonial Office that 
These men represent an enormous amount of capital which has been put 
into this trade to develop it, they were naturally anxious to assist the 
welfare of the colonies, and wanted to help the Colonies in any way they 
can. They feel a grievance and that is this--they think they have not 
had that consideration in being consulted which they think they ought 
to be, before money has been spent •..• It is not a very profitable 
thing for these men to come here and gjve their opinion after things 
have been done IsioJ,ll 
9LivCC, 31 January 1905. 
lOQuoted in JWAC, 20 June 1906. 
11 Statement made in a conference wit1l Lonl Elgin, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, JWAC, 7 March 1906. 
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That the Colonial Office had considerable regard for the power and in-
fluence of men such as Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, and recognized full well their 
' importance for the West African scene, is indicated by the fact that, on top of 
the consultative privileges which it granted to the JWAC, it also accorded to 
the Chambers the right to correspond directly with the Governors of all the 
colonies. A letter from R. L. Antrobus of the Colonial Office to the Liverpool 
Chamber in 1903 said 
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that, on the 
suggestion of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, he has authorized the 
Governors and High Commissioners of the West African Colonies and Pro-
tectorates to correspond direct with the Liverpool and Manchester Chambers 
upon subjects connected with British t:~ade. • • • He has also informed 
the Governors and High Commissioners that, except in case of urgency, he 
thinks that time should be allowed for the Chambers to express their views 
on any proposed legislation directly affecting the interests of the 
merchants ••• 12 
The only conditions were that copies of all correspondence between the Chambers 
and the Governors were to be sent to the Colonial Office, 13 and that urgent 
matters could be acted upon by the Goven1ment without consultation. The inter-
pretation of the word "urgent" was to resU:i.t in considerable conflict in the 
ensuing years, especially over matters of i.ariff changes. Attention to minor 
details by the . Chambers was frequent and intense; the slightest change in tar-
iffs could affect a firm's profits, and this was especially important fo~ the 
smaller independent firms which did not have the same capacity to withstand 
hard times as did the "Combine" firms .14 
12LivCC, 24 March 1903. 
13LonCC, TWenty-Seaond Annual Report (1903), p. 62. 
14In a confidential despatch from the Secretary of State to the Gold 
Coast Governor, dated 17 February 1905, concerning the matter of consultation 
with the Chambers of Commerce, the Secretary w~ote ". • • it was not intended 
to be applied to tariff bills, which must te treated as cases of urgency, and 
enacted without allowing any interval between the first and second readings." 
Presumably this was to prevent speculation and rush importing and exporting. 
GCLegCo, 24 April 1905. 
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The privilege of corresponding directly with Governors gave the Gover-
nors a certain independence of the Colonial Office, and it also gave the 
Chambers more freedom to put pressure on individual administrators. Confer-
ences with Governors who came home on leave were frequent, and the value of 
such personal contacts was very great. The historian of the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce, in fact, gave it as his opinion that "Probably the right to cor-
respond direct with the Governors of the West African Colonies, proved 
more valuable to Manchester merchants [than the JWAC]. nlS 
That the Colonial Office recognized the power and influence of the three 
Chambers was made obvious in 1919 when the question arose of allowing the soon 
to be infamous AWAM, the Association of West African Merchants, to have ~epre-
sentation on the J\vAC. The AWAM was an organization of merahants, trading to 
West Africa, which excluded bankers and shippers. In fact it had been set up 
partly as a counterorganization to the Chambers vrhich were felt to be too much 
under shipping and banking control. The Colonial Office agreed not to let the 
AWAM have any representation; only the Chambers should be allowed the privilege 
of consultation. 16 Implicitly, therefore, the Government recognized the pri-
macy of the interests of the monopolist shippers and bankers over those of the 
independent trading firms. 
Added to their ability to influence the Colonial Office in Europe was 
the representation which was given to the members of the European business 
community as "unofficial members" in the (',old Coast Legislative CounciL The 
Gold Coast Legislative Council was authorized, until 1934, to make decisions 
only for the Gold Coast Colony; after that date it was also the decision--making 
15Arthur Bedford, et al., MarwhesteP Merchants and Foreign Trade 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 193h), p. 70. 
16JWAC, 23 May 1919. 
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body for Ashanti and the Northern Territories. However, its actual powe:::- was 
limited as it acted, except in a few cases, essentially as a "rubber-stamp" 
for Colonial Office policies dictated from London. Merchants and miners were 
given representation on this Council, with its very limited :functions, as early 
as 1886, when two European unofficial members and two African unof:ficial mem-
bers were appointed. These four unofficials were the only legal representatives 
of their two communities until 1916, when the Council was expanded to include a 
third European unofficial and six Africans (three chiefs, one each from the 
Twi- Fanti- and Adangme-speaking areas of the Colony, and three "educated 
natives" to represent the Western, Eastern~ and Central Provinces). The third 
European unofficial was to be appointed specifically as a balance between the 
mining and the merchant. communi ties of expP,triates, two communi ties which often 
had serious differences of opinion especially regarding transport policy. The 
miners were concerned to build railways which could carry equipment into the 
mining areas, while the merchants wanted to invest in roads to facilitate the 
export of cocoa and other agricultural goods, and the import of consumer manu-
factured goods. 
In all probability, the new member will, in the first instance, be 
connected with the Bank of British West Africa; and he will be, to some 
extent, an impartial European member, vrho will be able to take an 
independent view as between, for example, the views held by merchants 
on certain questions in opposition to those held by the representatives 
of the Mining Interest. 1 7 
It was, however, no coincidence that the ne:w member would represent the most 
powerful expatriate concern in Ghana, the Bank of British West Africa and, 
along with it, the Elder Dempster shipping line. 
From 1916 to 1925 the merchants pressed for more say on the Council, 
because even though most policy was made in London, they hoped to have some say 
17Speech by the Governor, GCLegCo, 8 August 1916. 
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over decisions which might be left in the local Government's hands. As the 
local Ghana Chambers of Commerce were often concerned with issues which had no 
relevance to their parent branches overseas, so the Governor was concerned 
with, and made decisions on, certain issues with which the Colonial Office 
would have no concern except to ratify policy. 
Throughout the Legislative Council debates it is evident that whenever 
business interests would seriously be affected by legislation, extraordinary 
members representing the business community would be introduced. 18 But this 
extraordinary representation was still considered to be insufficient. At a 
meeting in London in 1919 in which Governor Guggisberg appealed for more reve-
nue to carry out his development programme in Ghana, the Chairman of the 
London Africa Committee implied that without more representation, merchants 
would not support his appeal for funds. 
• • . as these countries are developed it would be necessary to 
obtain public money, and if the Government of the Colony wished to 
obtain the full support of the merchants who subscribe to the loans 
required from time to time, they would ask to be fully represented on 
the Legislative Council, and thus have a voice in the administration. 
It was obvious that the Government shotud have a majority, but both the 
native and the merchant should feel thEt they have a fair representation 
on the Council, so that, both officially and unofficially their views 
could be placed before the Governor and registered and recorded. 19 
Partly as a result of such pressure, the Council was expanded again in 1926, to 
include five European unofficial members. One mercantile member was to be 
elected by a mercantile electoral committee, the members of which would be 
nominated by firms who were members of recognized Chambers of Commerce (in 
18For example for the meeting of 24 End 28 August 1912, in which the 
question of concessions was discussed, the Presirient of the Accra Chamber of 
Commerce, and representatives of Millers Ljmited, the Bank of British West 
Africa, and Prestea Block A Limited (a gold mine) vrere appointed. GCLegCo, 
24 and 28 August 1912. 
l9LonCC, 12 September 1919. 
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Ghana); one mining member was to be elected by the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines; 
and three Europeans were to be chosen by the Governor. "It is probable that 
among these three European Unofficial Members one will represent the banking 
interests, another the shipping interests, and a third the mining interests. " 20 
How much this additional representation had any meaning for the Q~offi-
cials was difficult to fathom. Certainly they did not consider themselves, nor 
were they encouraged to view themselves, as an unofficial opposition. While 
the Government often criticized the unofficials for not turning up to meetings 
and not taking their responsibilities seriously, the unofficials·replied that 
they were too rarely consulted, that they were not given adequate time to study 
bills to be presented to the Legislative Council, and that the Governmen·; often 
did not bother answering their questions or even recording their objections. 21 
Under the circumstances, the expatriate business community viewed its 
access to metropolitan decision-making bodies as far more important than its 
access to local ones. None of the commercial representatives on the coast, in 
any case, was an important member of his firm; indeed the directors of m<my 
"African" firms had never set foot in Africa. 22 The real powers, both commer-
cial and administrative, confined their contacts with each other to London. 
To supplement their power on the JWAC, the members of the business 
20Speech by the Governor, GCLegCo, 22 February 1926. 
21For example, Mr. Hunt, an unofficial member, said in GCLegCo, 29 
October 1909 11 • • • statements, however unpleasant, made by Unofficial Members 
on their own responsibility should be recorded •••• " 
2211 
• some reference was made to the difficulties which occurred 
owing to the restriction of authority in the case of commercial representatives 
on the Coast. The opinion was expressed that the Government had a real 
grievance because these representatives were not fully authorised to spe~Jc for 
the home concerns. It had on more than one occasion been suggested that 
Principals should themselves make regular visits to the Coast." Man CC, 22 
October 1928. 
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community were given a great deal of representation on the various Royal Cam-
missions which at various times investigated aspects of West African trade or 
development policy. The firms were given direct representatives, for instance, 
on the Private Enterprise Committee, (1924), the Committee on Trade and Taxa-
tion (1921) 23 and the West African Currency Board (which operated continuously 
from 1912). Whenever the Colonial Office informed the Chambers of Commerce 
that it welcomed their views and would like to hear from them, the Chambers 
replied that they wanted actual members on the Commissions on the grounds that 
they, the businessmen, were the most important people in the colony. Th~ 
Colonial Office did not always take kindly to this argument. In 1912, for in-
stance, it denied the expatriate firms representation on the West African Lands 
Comni ttee; 24 in 1936 it. denied theni representation on the Overseas Trade Devel-· 
opment Council. 25 Even in cases in which i;hey were denied representation, 
however, the firms were at least given ample chance to speak and present their 
point of view. With the exception of the testimony before the Belfield Cam-
mission26 by African chiefs and educated men, no such chance was given to 
Ghanaians. Although there were plenty of educated Ghanaians, and Ghanaians who 
were involved in trade and shipping, their views were never sought. De faato, 
a great deal of power accrued to the hands of the expatriate business community 
which through its expertise and knowledge of West Africa could often infuence 
tl• t' 1 11 • • 'tt' . .. . t' b d' ~mpar ~a comm1ss1oners s1 ~ng on ~nves~~ga ~ve o 1es. 
In pursuit of their goal of influencing policy, the British Chambers of 
23 Cmd. 2016 (1924) and Cmd. 1600 (1921) respectively. 
24ManCC, 8 July 1912. 
25LonCC, 31 January 1936. 
26See Chapter II. 
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Commerce encouraged the formation of local Chambers of Commerce within Ghana, 
which were recognized by the Governor as legitimate spokesmen for the eXJ.)atri-
ate mercantile community. 
Chambers of Commerce have been formed in the principal commercial 
centres in all our West African Colonies. They are of comparatively 
recent date and arose out of informal meetings which used to be held by 
the Agents of the various companies in order to discuss matters of local 
interest, and to fix prices to be offered for produce for stated periods. 
These meetings developed into Chambers of Commerce, which have proved of 
considerable assistance to the Governments. The existence of these 
Chambers has enabled a more effective liaison between unofficials and 
officials to become established, and ensures a method whereby collective 
rather than merely individual views of the trading community can be put 
forward. 2 7 
By the early twentieth century the network of Chambers of Commerce in Ghana 
was already extensive. In 1892 a Chamber existed in Cape Coast, and in l1ay 
1895 one was formed in Accra. 28 By 1902 there was a Chamber at Sekondi, 29 and 
in 1911 a Chamber was formed in Tarkwa. 30 Several of the Gold Coast Chambers 
affiliated to the British Chambers and used them as their spokesmen in the 
Colonial Office. Their preoccupations, however, were often of a petty nuture, 
concerned for instance with minor changes of regulations in the colony, and 
they could not always count on the support of the parent Chambers in such 
cases. 
The Chambers were specifically European bodies. It was not their in-
clination to accept or encourage Africans in their midst. African ente~)rise 
was a separate entity with clearly defined limits, and it was generally accept-
ed by Africans that they simply were not allowed to join the European Chambers 
27
"Report by the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore M.P. (Parliamentary Under-
Secretar.f of State for the Colonies) on his visit to West Africa during the 
year 1926" (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), p. 168. 
28LivCC, Fo~ty-Sixth AnnuaZ Report (1896), p. 89. 
29LivCC, 15 September 1902. 
30LivCC, 19 June 1911. 
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of Commerce, except as representatives of r~gistered firms. 31 Occasionally an 
African joined a Chamber as a representative of his own firm; more often he was 
the local representative of a European firm {in the smaller towns) and by 
virtue of this position he joined the Chamber. 
Although few records of the early Ghana Chambers of Commerce are now 
available, two Government files on the Cape Coast and Winneba Chambers indicate 
that most members were Europeans, with a fe-r.v Africans representing British 
·firms and the odd African representing himself. 32 The need for election to 
Chambers of Commerce would exclude many Africans whose behaviour did not meet 
with the approval of their European counterparts. The lists of members of the 
Chambers indicate the predominantly European composition of the bodies which 
had so much power on the Coast. Nevertheless; in 1922 the Secretar-y of the 
Winneba Chamber was able to write to the District Commissioner, regarding his 
inquiry as to African membership 
• • • "t-Ti th reference to representation of native traders on the 
Chamber, J: have to inform you that Mr. A. W. Yamoah, who is the largest 
native trader in Winnebah, is a member of my Chamber. The President also 
wishes me to state that the Chamber would gladly entertain any applica-
tions from any native traders of repute who desire membership. 33 
At least one attempt was made by Africans to set up their own Chamber of 
31At a conference between African leaders and European businessmen on 16 
December 1930, Nana Ofori Atta asked a question about the admittance of 
Africans to Chambers of Commerce. The reply from the Accra Chamber was 11 • • • 
the Constitution of the Chamber contained no colour bar and .•• all were 
open to election provided that they represented registered firms." GNA Adm. 
11/1070. 
32The author made extensive inquiries as to the whereabouts of such re-
cords and could locate only one file each on the Cape Coast and Winneba 
Chambers, recorded respectively as GNA Adm.23/l/255, Cape Coast, and GNA Adm. 
23/1/277, Cape Coast. 
33Letter from the Secretary, Winneba Chamber of Commerce, to the District 
Commissioner, Winneba, 15 June 1922, in GNA Adm.23/l/277, Cape Coast. 
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Commerce in Accra, not in opposition to the European Chamber but to complement 
it. In 1936 the Gold Coast Merchant's Association, as it was called, had about 
thirty members, and also had branches in Kumasi and the Western Province. Mem-
bership was open to "Any African concern established and directly interested in 
the commerce and trade of the Gold Coast, [Ashanti?], Northern Territories and 
Mandated Territory of Togoland."34 Most of the members were merchants, al-
though one or two were engaged in produce buying and some lawyers were 
attached to the organization. The principal object of the Association was 
stated to be the " ••• protection of African commercial concerns, "35 and it 
was envisaged that by acting together the members would have more credibility 
as businessmen, and would be able to get larger import licences, to have more 
access to information, and generally to be more influential. Both the European 
Chamber and the Government looked on this venture with a benevolent paternal 
eye; but unlike the European Chambers, the Merchant's Association was never 
considered a representative body nor consulted as to policy by the Government. 
Without the kind of access to Government, either in the colony or in 
Britain, which the European business community enjoyed, the African elite was 
obliged to concentrate on its representation in the Legislative Council and to 
press for reforms in the Legislative Council so that its voice could be heard. 
Although as of 1916 Africans were allowed six representatives on the Legisla-
tive Council, three more than the Europeans had by the 1916 Constitution and 
34Gold Coast Merchant's Association, Constitution. Information on the 
Gold Coast Merchant's Association was provided by }IT. N. T. Clerk of Accra, 
April 1974. Mr. Clerk was himself a photographer and trader with connections 
in Europe; he and his cousin were the guiding lights behind the organization. 
The GCMA existed until 1957, when it merged with the Eu~opean organizations to 
form the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce. I am indebted to Mr. Clerk for 
providing me with a copy of the GCMA Constitution and Rules. 
35Ibid. 
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one more than the European unofficials aft~r 1925, in practice this representa-
tion meant little. African opinion was simply not considered to be as valid, 
meaningful, or representative as Europe&~ opinion. In any case there was an 
official majority on the Council; and official members were obliged to vote for 
the policy put forward by the Government; that is, by the Colonial Office; they 
could not vote independently. "It is within the province of the Colonial 
Secretary to require, should he consider it necessary to do so, an offidal 
member to vote for the Government." 36 But in practice official members almost 
always voted with the Government without being so required. 
The policy of the Government with regard to the unofficials was not that 
they were, or should be, an unofficial opposition, but rather that they were a 
purely consultative group of people who were, indeed, privileged to be or:. the 
Council at all. If all the unofficials were opposed to a measure, Governors 
after the First World War would usually reconsider it. But what usually 
occurred was that the European unofficials Joined the official members, while 
the African unofficials were in opposition. Time after time in the Legislative 
Council Africans opposed a measure which all the Europeans approved. 37 In such 
cases, they had no power. 
The patronizing manner with which the Government regarded at least the 
African unofficials is shown in the following quote from the Governor in 1904 
in his address on the Estimates. 11The Governor concluded by saying that this is 
the first occasion on which he has presented Annual Estimates to the Council, 
36Statement by the Governor, GCLegCo, 26 November 1914. 
370ne of the few occasions when a bill was withdrawn was in 1930 when the 
cocoa cess (tax) bill, a bill to impose an additional seven per cent tax on 
cocoa exports to finance a cocoa marketing scheme, was introduced. African 
opposition to this scheme was reinforced by opposition from the home Challibers; 
hence the Governor withdrew the cess. GCLegCo, 4 December 1930. 
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and he is glad to see that they have been comparatively little criUcized, and 
that the unofficial members recognize the steps that are being taken for the 
development of the country. " 38 That the attitude did not change greatly in the 
ensuing years can be seen in the reply which one European unofficial made in 
Council in 1928 when J. E. Casely Hayford suggested that Africans be allowed 
even more unofficial representation than they already had. 
I would ••• tell the Honourable Municipal Member for Sekondi [Casely 
Hayford] that on the day on which an unofficial majority sits in the 
Council that will be the day when British, I might say European, capital 
will commence to leave this Colony •••• [T]he Honourable Member for 
Sekondi is, in my opinion, about one hundred years before his time i~ his 
desire for self-government. 39 
Whatever representative functions the African unofficials did enjoy, 
moreover, were further jeopardized by the offhand way in which Legislative 
Council meetings were run. The unoffi'cials were rarely given agendas to read 
before the meetings, and often were expected to make decisions on Bills which 
they had never seen before. Rules were almost always waived by the Attorney-
General so that the first, second, and third readings of a Bill could be held 
at the same meeting, thus not allowing any time for consultation or discussion. 
As one African argued" ••• if we were afforded the opportunity of longer time 
[to consider Bills] probably we might have been in a position to go more deeply 
and thoroughly into things after reading the papers. • , • " 40 In any case 
there were very few meetings of the Legislative Council: usually there were 
about three a year averaging one-and-one-half days each in length. And there 
was no African representation on the Gold Coast Executive Council, where the 
most important decisions which were independent of London were made. 
38GCLegCo, 27 September 1904. 
39stateh~nt by Mr. Youngman, GCLegCo, 9 March 1928. 
40Statement by Nana Ayirebi Acquah III, GCLegCo, 20 February 1936. 
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The types of complaints which African u:nofficials made against the 
Legislative Council often bore marked similarities.to the complaints made by 
the European u:nofficials. For, despite the fact that the lines drawn were 
usually racial, that is, African versus European, there was considerable con-
flict between the two European groups, the trading and the administrative, as 
well. The expatriate community in Ghana, white tight-knit, was by no means 
monolithic. The governing class was often motivated by an idealism, or e.t 
least a sense of responsibility to the "natives," which the commercial commu-
nity lacked. After the First World War, once all of Ghana had been con~uered 
or "pacified, 11 a change took place in administrators, and former military men 
were replaced by a group of people chosen for their "attitude of responsibil-
i ty. u41 These new African colonial civil servants tended to come from the "new 
poor" in Britain, the downwardly-mobile former landed gentry, or to be the 
younger sons of respectable families who often still maintained an attitude of 
looking down on trade. According to Robert Heussler, the laudatory historian 
of the colonial civil service, their chief characteristics were their honesty, 
gentlemanly conduct, and devotion to duty. 42 Whether such praise was warranted 
or not, it was the case that the social origins and ideals of the administra-
tive class differed to some extent from those of the trading class, and also 
that, as training in administration, forestry, and agriculture became conEon 
among the civil servants, their sense of responsibility to the colony as a 
41Heussler, op. ait., p. 25. 
42Ibid., p. 43. Heussler's view, however, should be contrasted with that 
of H. D. Perraton, "The Man on the Spot: British Officials in Late Nineteenth 
Century Africa," in The Theo1y of Imperialism and the EuPopea:n PaPtition of 
Af!'ica (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1967), 
pp. 146-147. Peeraton views the civil servants as social, fi.nancia1, profes-
sional and personal failures, often possesEed of a touch of sadism and a 
desire to dominate. 
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whole (or at least their capacity to see beyond the present and consider Gh&~a 
as a resource to be preserved} was greater than that of the profi t-seeki:v.g 
traders. 
In 1908, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, Sir William Brandford 
Griffith, gave a speech in the Legislative Council which was an impassioned 
defense of the traders in the Colony. 
He says that to the traders the whole Colony, Natives and Europeans, 
owe a debt of gratitude; that it is thanks to the traders that we now 
have this flourishing Colony; that when the Colony was struggling in its 
infancy it was the traders who pulled it through •••• [W]hat would the 
Colony have been without the traders to dep8t and to ship its produce? 
What would the Colony have done, what would the mines have done, without 
the shipping companies? ••• [I]n view of all that has happened since 
1900 it is perhaps a fortunate circumstance that the big traders and the 
shipping companies did not quit their uatural grooves of business. ~he 
merchants and shipping companies, however, are quite able to take care 
of themselves; they are not here like the missions for benevolent pur-
poses nor like the Government for the sake of civilization but for their 
own interests. Still, their welfare, specially in the case of the 
larger, one might almost say the historical firms, is largely bound ~p 
with the welfare of the Colony in general and that they fully recognise 
this has been shown both by the debates in this Council Chamber and ty 
their endeavours to develop the resources of the Colony. 43 
Such praise of the traders was rare indeed from the mouth of an administrator, 
for despite the fact that, to the African, the two groups appeared inseparable, 
there were severe strains between them. The issue of land ownership split 
them; so also did the increasing oligopolization of Ghana's trade throughout 
the twentieth century. The Government also made a few attempts to protect 
African cocoa farmers from the vagaries of the world market, attempts which 
were not appreciated by the firms and which were usually stifled after com-
plaints had been made to the appropriate officials at the Colonial Office. 
In 1900, for example, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce complained that 
Government traders were interfering in the marketplace by buying cocoa. 
43GCLegCo, 26 October 1908. 
c 
c 
The Gov-ernor admitted that his Government had given, and still 
proposed to give~ some a.ssistance to native planters, who had been 
offered only nominal prices for their produce at the ports, rather th~~ 
allow their plantations to perish from neglect, owing to their alleged 
unprofitableness. 44 
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The Governor was eventually obliged to agree, under Chamber pressure, that such 
Government cocoa buying would be only a temporary measure. 
In 1909, the Chambers again complained of Government attempts to help 
African sellers, this time only by informing the cocoa producers of what the 
prices for cocoa were in Europe. " ••• the Government Officials in the Gold 
Coast appeared to be habitually exhibiting to the natives at Coomassie, Accra, 
and elsewhere, information respecting the prices obtained in the markets for 
produce, and ••• such prices were exhibited to the disadvantage of the 
European merchants. • • . "4 5 The Secretary of State for the Colonies assured 
the Manchester Chamber, when it complained of this practice, that the Governor 
would be warned to include information as to the dates of the prices, and the 
costs of freight to Europe, in these notices. 46 
These incidents illustrate the types of conflicts which existed between 
the two groups in the colony. Both traders and administrators were directly 
responsible to their principals at home and in fact had very little power on 
their own. ~1ether they liked it or not, those officials who wished to help 
the Africans, in whatever ways they could devise, were aware that the Colonial 
Office was in frequent consultation with the expatriate business community and 
almost always put its needs and desires (which were so often congruent with the 
needs and desires of "the Em:pire11 ) ahead of those of the people whom it was 
44LivCC, Fift-ieth Annual RepoT't (1900), ~· 181. 
45ManCC, 3 May 1909. 
46Letter from the Earl of Crewe to ManCC, 27 May 1909, included in ManCC, 
14 June 1909. 
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supposed to be "civilizing." The :fact o:f oligopolistic control, the fact that 
c the Government had to deal with a very small number of people who had a great 
deal of power over the economy of Ghana (more so, no doubt, than the Colonial 
Office itself); and the :fact that without constantly heeding the Chambers o:f 
Commerce and doing their bidding the Colonial Office could have found its oper-
ations in Ghana disrupted, were very important. Insofar as the Government was 
concerned with other than business activities it still had to take the wishes 
of the expatriate firms into consideration. All Government decisions were cir-
cumscribed by the wishes of this sector. 
Moreover, the view of the home Government was that business, trade, and 
free enterprise were the key to the progress and wealth of the Empire. Britain 
by 1900 had lost her position as leader of the world system of capitalis~; at 
most she was p:r>imus inte:t' paT'eB with Germany, the united States, and France. 
The Empire was to provide resources to finance her industries at home, ru1d 
markets for her products. Companies such as Miller and Swanzy, and later the 
UAC; banks such as the BBWA and shipping lines such as Elder Dempster were 
what kept this vast profit-seeking Empire tvgether. The :function of the colo-
nial Governments was to mediate between the :firms and the peoples of the 
colonies, to ensure the smooth operations of the whole. Under such circum-
stances, their primary function was to institute the types of structures which 
would facilitate trade. 
Two of the most urgent needs of the expatriate commercial class in Ghana 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were for infrastructure; a 
means of exchange and a mode o:f transport. The Government provided these fa· 
cilities as a response to expatriate economic n~eds. 
2. The Development of Currency in Ghana 
-
In order that trade might progress profitably in Ghana it was necessary 
c 
c 
for the British that a convenient, efficient currency be used all over the 
Colony. Early trade in Ghana was carried out by a variety of currencies, some 
used merely as a form of barter and some used as an actual means of accounting 
and of exchange. The former included lengths of cloth and beads, while the 
latter included currencies traditionally in use among the Africans themselves, 
such as salt, cowrie shells, and gold dust and nuggets, as we 11 as currencies 
introduced by the Europeans, such as iron bars. Metal coins circulated freely 
over the colony, and before the British took over political control complicated 
systems of reckoning had been worked out anong the traders to accommodate coins 
from America, Britain and Continental countries such as France, Germany and 
Spain. Notes were not used because no notes could survive the climate ru1d the 
ants. Nor, until the establishment of the BBWA in 1896, were there any facili-
ties either for storing notes or for estab:Lishing a system of exchange based on 
cheques such as had developed in Europe over the preceding four centuries. 
Facilities for exchange in Ghana prior to the political takeover were indeed 
primitive. While they inconvenienced many, however, some traders preferred 
them as they were. The barter trade offered opportunities for making extra 
profits as "natives" could easily be cheated with shoddy goods. 47 While the 
majority of the business community agreed with the Government that a need for 
better currency was evident, a few argued for the old system. But by the end 
of the nineteenth century the Government i i;self wanted a more rational system, 
to facilitate payments for tax and customs duties purposes. 
One of the first tasks of the Government was to abolish all foreign 
coins from the colony and confine currency strictly to British coins. There 
was no West African currency until 1912; the currency which circulated in Ghana 
47H k' 11 Th C . 11 't op ~ns, e reat~on ••• , op. a~., p. 131. 
c 
c 
246 
was the same as that which circulated in Britain itself. But many other coins 
also circulated. The demonetization of these foreign coins was a gradual 
process; as parts of Ghana became more and more closely integrated into the 
network of trade with Britain foreign coins were removed from the lists of 
legal currency. As early as 1889 the Legislative Council saw fit to demonetize 
what was perhaps the only indigenous bullion, gold dust and nuggets, 48 which 
the Africans for years had used as a means of exchange and as a measure of 
value. The Government's reasons for doing this were apparently twofold; to 
protect the maximum amount of gold for export to Britain, and to force Ashanti 
traders away from their traditional contacts with the northern Sahara trade 
routes to the South, where they would have to acquire European coin and deal 
with European traders. Gold was the only convenient form of traditional 
African currency (cowrie shells were too heavy and cumbersome for large trans-
actions) and ~~thout it Africans became more dependent on the European mnrket. 
Having eliminated gold, the British gradually demonetized other European cur-
rencies, either by banning them or by imposing ad valorem duties of ten per 
cent or per cent on their importation. 49 Nevertheless as late as 1930 both 
French five-franc pieces, used in the cattle trade with French colonies, 50 and 
German coppers, left over from the German rule in Togoland, 51 were circulating 
48GCLegCo, 12 April 1889. 
49In 1909 there was a ten per cent ad valorem duty on all foreign silver 
imported into the colony. The London Chamber of Commerce asked the Colonial 
Office to remove this duty, arguing that it was in restraint of trade, but its 
request was refused. LonCC, 9 December 1909. 
50 In 1930 the five-franc piece was demonetized and a 12~ per cent duty 
imposed upon it. GCLegCo 2 4 December 1930. 
51 In 1930 it was decided to redeem 1,200,000 German coppers and replace 
them with nickel 1/lOd. pieces. GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. 
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in the colony and had to be declared illegal tender. 
As well as ensuring that all coins were of British origin, the Govern-
ment of Ghana was obliged, in order to facilitate trade and the acquisition of 
British goods by the ordinary African, to provide coins of a sufficiently small 
denomination for his use. Imported European goods were often divided and sub-
divided into smaller and smaller quantities before they reached their ultimate 
consumers. The purchaser in a small village market, for example, might be 
buying a few matches at a time, or one small can of sugar at a time. Hence, 
the Government periodically issued coins of ~' ~' or even as little as 1/10 pence 
in value. 
Unlike in Britain, however, where the populace had been used to dealing 
with silver coins for centuries, the idea ••as new to some Africans. With the 
plethora of foreigners in the colony came a plethora of coins, and it was dif-
ficult to distinguish the real from the fa1se. In such a situation, 
counterfeiting was easy. As late as 1930, for instance, the Basel Mission 
found to its chagrin that cardboard coins which it had issued to schoolboys for 
educative purposes at Koforidua were being sold as real coins. 52 Perhaps the 
fact that the Basel Mission had issued these coins was a sufficient guarantee 
of their value; or perhaps sufficient coins of low value were not available in 
the marketplace and the cardboard coins filled the gap. 
It may have been because instances of forgery or counterfeiting were 
commonplace that Africans quickly became Q~strustful of any but new coin3. By 
the turn of the twentieth century it was commonplace among West African traders 
that their customers would not accept old, used British coins. The traders 
assumed that the reason for this refusal was that Africans used the coins not 
52Reported in a docmnent signed by the Commissioner of Police, Central 
Province, 13 July 1931. In GNA Adm.23/1/599, Cape Coast. 
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only for exchange, but also for decoration. Another possibility was that some 
Africans could not distinguish between the intrinsic value and the exchange 
value of worn currency; hence once a coin had lost weight through constant use 
they thought that it would not be able to buy the same amount of goods. But it 
was also possible that Africans were wary of old coins because they could not 
recognize them and worried that they might be receiving demonetized foreign 
currency, or forged currency, instead of legal tender. British coins could not 
legally be recoined until they had lost nine per cent of their weight; but 
Africans would not accept coins up to nine per cent worn. 53 New coin, there-
fore, had constantly to be shipped to Ghana from England. 
Indeed this desire on the part of Africans for new coin was one of the 
prime reasons why, by 1900, the idea of setting up a West African currency sep-
arate from British currency was being considered in Rome Government circles. 
In that year a committee was set up to consider the question, but was unable to 
reach a decision. 54 The question was therefore left in abeyance until 1912, 
when a Committee under Lord Emmott 55 met and agreed to set up the West African 
Currency Board, 56 which would issue and supervise a new West African cur1·ency. 
The West African currency was designed to take away from the British Rome 
Government the responsibility for supplying West Africa with coins. The actual 
expense of such supplying was prohibitive; without paper money, all currency 
had to be shipped to Ghana in coin form and the weight alone was very great. A 
53This point was made in ManCC, 19 January 1912. 
54
"Departmental Committee Appointed to Inquire into Matters Affecting the 
Currency of the British West African Colonies anu Protectorates. Report, with 
a Despatch from the Secretary of State." Cd.6426 (1912), hereafter referred to 
as the Emmott Committee, p. 5. 
55 Ibid. 
56Rereafter referred to as WACB. 
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more important fear, however, was that the colony would not always be able to 
absorb the large amounts of coin which were being shipped to it and that the 
coin might have to be reabsorbed into the economy of the British Isles, causing 
inflation. While in 1886 West Africa as a whole had only about three per cent 
as much coin as the British Isles, by 1910 it had almost lOO per cent as much. 
Table 20. Coin in West Africa and the British Isles 57 
Average for the Period West Africa United Kingdom (i) as % £ (i) £ (ii) of (ii) 
1886-1890 24,426 920,088 3 
1891-1895 116,323 761,039 15. 
1896-1900 257,090 796,425 32 
1901-1905 262,786 234,150 112 
1906-1910 666,190 781,073 85 
This phenomenal increase in the supply of coin to West Africa over a 
twenty-five year period frightened the administrators of the Government, many 
of whom felt that Africans must be hoarding the cash and that if it were even-
tually released it would cause an inflationary disaster, a disaster which, 
unless the flow of coin back to the home country could be controlled, would 
spread direct to Britain. The idea that perhaps the coin was being absorbed 
into the local economy was not entertained, probably because the Europeans had 
a very unrealistic picture of local West African conditions and assumed that 
currency was used only in the import-export trade. (Thus, if the large 
European firms did not recover almost as much cash for imported goods as they 
paid out for cocoa by the end of every cocoa season, the assumption was that 
whatever cash was left over was being hoarded, never that it was being investeu 
or used for local market transactions.) 
c 
57Emmott Committee, op. ait., p. 6. 
c 
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In 1912 the Emmott Committee, after extensive investigation into the 
currency situation, 58 established a West African currency. This new currency 
was not repatriable to Britain, and thus could not threaten the stability of 
the currency there. The WACB was under strict regulation as to the amount of 
currency which it could issue; basically, it was obliged to have lOO per cent 
reserves in sterling to back its currency {see Table 21) and therefore could 
not increase the amount of coinage in circulation in the colonies at will. The 
object of the Board was not to provide for the internal needs of the colonies, 
but rather to safeguard British currency. Even when there were shortages of 
currency in the colonies, the Board was not empowered to create more currency 
or mi.nt more coins to overcome these shortages. 59 
Table 22 presents figures of the amount of coin imported to and exported 
from the Gold Coast from 1920 to 1938. From this table it can be seen that the 
amount of coin in the colony followed the cocoa crop fairly closely; when the 
prices were good, much money flowed into the colony, and when prices were poor, 
there was little currency available. During the 1930s there was a net export 
of currency, except during 1937 and 1938 which follow the bumper crop of 1936-
37. Table 23 presents figures for the amount of West African currency issued 
and redeemed from 1912 to 1939. Currency could be issued in West Africa only 
against payment in London; that is, the WACB had to deposit pound for pound in 
58But without hearing any testimony from Africans. The question of 
African representation was discussed in evidence to the Emmott Committee. 
"Q. It has been suggested that it vrould be of assistance to the Committee, 
though it seems impracticable, if the Committee could hear evidence from one or 
two of the natives themselves. Perhaps you can tell the Committee how very 
difficult it is to at the reason at the bottom of the black man 1 s mind? 
A. (D. W, Paterson, Chief Inspector, BBWA) It is very difficult indeed; :,rou do 
not know why. It simply just is so." Cd. 6427, "Minutes of Evidence," Q.lll4. 
59Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 51. 
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Table 21. Currency Liability Reserves of the West African 
Currency Board, 1923-3960 
Year Currency Liability (i) Reserve (ii) £MM £MM 
1923 10.60 10.30 
1924 11.00 10.90 
1925 13.00 12.80 
1926 12.81 12.84 
1927 14.74 14.82 
1928 15.23 15.88 
1929 14.86 15.52 
1930 13.66 14.15 
1931 9.46 10.10 
1932 9.07 10.20 
1933 9.57 10.94 
1934 8.13 9.61 
1935 9·95 11.96 
1936 12.54 14.21 
1937 19.27 20.11 
1938 18.06 19.79 
1939 11.76 12.74 
Table 22. Gold Coast: Imports and Exports 
of Silver and Alloy Coin61 
Silver Coin Alloy Coin 
Year Imports Exports Balance Imports Exports Balance 
£ £ £ £ £ £ 
1920-21 147,293 185,815 
1921-22 69,204 788,728 
1922-23 35,294 649,851 
1923-24 43,680 346,988 
1924-25 3,900 175,066 
1925-26 274 145,200 
1926-27 157 91,600 
1927-28 886 56,500 
1928-29 16 66,450 
1929-30 41 85,000 
1930-31 147 154,775 
1931-32 188 163,850 
- 38,522 522,400 
-719,524 994,800 
-614,557 1,789,200 
-303,308 nil 
-171,166 1,626,000 
-144,926 538,423 
- 91,443 2,585,165 
- 55,614 1 ,058 
- 66,434 246,684 
- 84,959 78,928 
-154,628 9,825 
-163,662 4,162 
nil + 522,400 
nil + 994,800 
200,000 +1,589,200 
nil nil 
100,000 +1, ,ooo 
nil + 538,423 
nil +2,585,165 
16,600 +1,105,458 
33,850 + 212,834 
916,000- 837,072 
917,300- 907,475 
501,700- 497,538 
(ii) as % 
of (i) 
97 
99 
99 
100 
101 
104 
104 
104 
107 
113 
114 
118 
120 
113 
104 
110 
108 
Total Balance 
£ 
+ 483,878 
+ 275,276 
+ 974,643 
- 3)3,308 
+1,354,834 
+ 3;J3,497 
+2,493,722 
+1,049,844 
+ 146,400 
- 922,031 
-1,062,103 
- 661,200 
60 source: Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 50. Percentages recalculated by 
the author. 
61source: WACB; Report, 30 June 1938. 
figures for 1912-19. 
author was unable to obtain 
c 
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Table 22 
Year 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
Year 
1912-14 
1914-15 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
1919-20 
1920-21 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
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(cont 'd.) 
Silver Coin Allo;y Coin 
Imports Exports Balance Imports Exports Balance Total Balance 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
14 114,900 -144,886 28 38,000 - 37,972 - 182,858 
46 99,550 - 99,504 9,708 16,200 - 6,492 - 105,996 
21 69,874 - 69,853 12,488 32,300 - 19,812 89,665 
33 50,254 - 50,221 16,970 534,500 - 517,530 - 567,751 
nil 21,825 - 21 '825 3,226 '200 6,200 +3,220,000 +3,198,175 
nil 31,025 - 31,025 1,874,611 470,000 +1,404,611 +1,313,586 
Table 23. Amount of West African Currency Issued 
and Redeemed, 1912-193862 
Currency Issued in 
West Africa against 
Payment in London 
£ (i) 
1,173,980 
112,871 
1,223,750 
951,743 
1,389,475 
3,949 '467 
9,099,824 
1,964,473 
369,500 
1,213,900 
1,137,400 
3,535,532 
2,705,175 
5,361,446 
4,600,725 
3,003,570 
3,062,240 
24,045 
1,580,105 
1,491,137 
25 
2,202,800 
2,502,200 
7,957,305 
nil 
London Payments in 
Redemption of Currency 
Deposited in W. Africa 
£ (ii) 
130,000 
530,000 
100,000 
nil 
nil 
nil 
3,651,000 
6,887,000 
2,003,425 
715,000 
1,220,200 
1,717,900 
3,030,600 
3,543,000 
4,149,500 
4,695,800 
4,262,500 
3,210,300 
2,074,000 
1,078,000 
1,511,800 
394,000 
nil 
729,200 
3,240,000 
Balance of 
Currency Issued for 
Use in West Africa 
(i)-(ii) 
+1,043,980 
- 417,129 
+1,123,750 
+ 951,743 
+1,389,475 
+3,949,467 
+5,448,824 
-4,922, 
-1,633,925 
+ lf98,900 
82,800 
+1,817,632 
- 325,425 
+1,818,446 
+ 451,225 
-1,692,230 
-1,200,260 
-3,186,255 
- 493,895 
+ 413,137 
-1,511,775 
+1,808,800 
+2,502,200 
+7,228,105 
-3,240,000 
62source: WACB, Report, 30 June 1938. 
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London, one sterling pound for one West African pound~ before it could expand 
its resources in the colonies. Merchants who returned West African currency to 
the Board could similarly redeem their money in pounds sterling in England. 
The amount of West African currency depended on the needs for colonial currency 
of those who could afford to pay for it in sterling~ not on the needs of the 
local economy. 
Despite the fact, however, that the WACB was originally set up to pre-
vent massive repatriation of currency from West Africa, such an eventual:i.ty 
never arose. Rather, the opposite situation was to occur with alarming fre-
quency in Ghana, causing considerable inconvenience to African farmers and 
traders. Currency shortages were common and provided considerable opportuni-
ties for profit by those who could take advantage of them. 
During World War I~ for example, there was a chronic shortage of coins 
on the Gold Coast, caused by the conversion of the Royal Mint to the produc-
tion of arms and ammunition. Because of the shortage, cocoa farmers were 
forced to sell their crops at lower prices than they had expected; and some 
firms, which did not have any cash on hand, had to step aside and watch the 
larger firms which controlled cash buy out the crop at prices which they 
practically dictated. 
The Combined Firms, as they are locally called, viz. Messrs Swanzy, 
Millers, the African Association and the Basel Mission--enjoy a great 
advantage and will mainly derive any benefit from cash put back into 
circulation through the purchase of the general merchandise, in which 
they are large dealers. One or two of their competitors will share this 
advantage, though to a smaller extent, and will be able to hold their own; 
but produce buyers puP et simple, such e.g. as Messrs. Cadbury, who ••• 
do not obtain any local income from a retail business, will have no 
alternative but to shut down all operations, and to allow themselves to 
be pushed out of the market unless some means can be found materially to 
relieve the situation. The position of advantage and preponderance uhich, 
in view of this restricted competition will be secured to the Combined 
Firms will unquestionably be used by them as a means of fore ing dmm the 
price of cocoa to as low a figure as the natives can be induced to 
0 
c 
t 63 accep . • • • 
• • • the Combines • • • are likely to get for ~ of a million the 
remainder of the crop which they apparently were prepared to take at 
about 2 millions. • . . 64 
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In 1919 the situation with regard to silver was so bad that the Govern-
ment decided to take drastic measures and introduced a Bill to make illegal the 
melting down or hoarding of silver coin. 65 The Government introduced the Bill 
because it attributed the currency shortage not to the fact that the local 
economy absorbed large amounts of currency which were not automatically return-
ed to the firms every year after the cocoa season was over~ but to irrational 
uses of silver on the part of Ghanaians. Unofficial members of the Legislative 
Council pointed out to the Government, however, that people hoarded precisely 
because they found it difficult to obtain silver, and also because they did not 
understand the European banking system.66 This particular Bill was therefore 
withdrawn and replaced by a milder Bill " .•. to prohibit the refusal to sell 
articles exposed for sale if payment is tendered in currency notes." 67 
Here the Government had hit the crux of the matter; although paper money 
might be considered useful and a logical solution to the currency shortage in 
the eyes of Europeans it was not so in the eyes of Africans. A report in the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1919 summed up African objections to notes 
and pointed out that their objections were reasonable enough. 
63Report to Bonar Law, M.P., from Hugh Clifford, Governor, 4 December 
1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/151. "Issue of British Currency Notes." 
64Unsigned memo, 1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/151. 
65GCLegCo, 17 November 1919. 
66Evidence presented in Chapter IV also indicates that the banks discrim-
inated against Africans, perhaps explaining their reluctance to use the banks 
better than a simple "misunderstanding" might explain it. 
67GCLegCo, 12 March 1920. 
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• the natives had no proper means of storing the notes. If they 
placed them in their dwellings there was great risk of fire; if they 
buried them the white ants would probably destroy the notes; and there 
was no means of carrying them on their persons ..•• 
A case was cited of a European carrying notes in his sun helmet 
throughout a journey, with the result that the notes were reduced to 
pulp at the end of it.68 
One author claims that with the necessity to use paper money, Africans 
were pushed into using the banking services available in the Colony.69 But 
this was not entirely the case, for aside from their justified suspicion of 
banks, Africans had to contend with the scarcity of banking services. There 
were few branches in the colony and most Africans were never near them. Farm-
ers and villagers had to go to money-changers to cash their notes; they could 
not avail themselves of the services so readily accessible to the European 
community. 
Yery soon after the issue of notes in West Africa began, the practice 
of 11 discounting" notes began as well. ThiJJ was a practice whereby the money-
changer would pay, say 15s/6d. in coin for a £1 note. The practice was 
declared illegal in 191870 but it nevertheless spread rapidly and continued 
throughout the colonial period, whenever and wherever there were shortages of 
coin. In 1919 the situation was so grave that farmers paid in silver were 
getting less than seventy-five per cent of the price of cocoa in notes in some 
parts of the colony. " serious differentiations fare] made in the valu-
ation of silver and of notes by the local Cocoa Buyers in the Colony. . at 
Nsawam 25/- in silver is paid for a load of cocoa while the current price is 
34/6 as paid on the 30th May in notes •••• " 71 That the practice of 
68ManCC, 12 May 1919. 
69McPhee, op. cit., p. 246. 
70acLegCo, 31 December 1918. 
71speech by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegGo, 30 June 1919. 
c 
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discounting continued until later dates is evinced by the fact that in 1932 the 
London Chamber of Commerce expressed concern to the Colonial Office about a 
rumour (later found to be untrue) that the French were going to introduce sil-
ver money into their colonies. The Chamber was afraid that this would divert 
trade away from British West African colonies where producers were paid in 
notes. 72 
On the whole, the introduction and organization of West African currency 
benefitted the European community far more than it benefitted the African. 
Ghana had become part of the world economy at a time when its own currency and 
credit systems lagged behind its capacities for production and exchange. It 
was in the interests of all parties in Ghana to have a better, more efficient, 
more mobile currency. But within the framework of their common needs, 
Europeans fared better under the system set up by the WACB than did Africans. 
For Europeans, with access to banks, notes were more mobile and cun-
venient than coin. 
the man who has to sell the goods and buy produce • • • is 
strongly in favour of the note issue with a view to relieving, or • 
reducing the cost of transport of the Eilver into West Africa, which 
remains not only very costly, but extremely slow. In parts of the Gold 
Coast it is impossible to move silver about from one town to the other 
without a police escort. When the produce season is at its height you 
may have to wait three to five to seven days before your police escort 
is provided, and when it is provided it becomes very costly. With these 
notes, it will be possible to send up, you might say, half the amount in -
notes, and the itself might be able to wait for two or three 
days. 73 
Moreover, while Africans had a hard time cashing notes into the coin they so 
desperately needed, Europeans had an easy time converting their West African 
notes to English notes. The West African currency had no independent 
72LonCC, 18 February and 18 April 1932. 
7 3
'J'estimony of 1>1r. Pickering of Pickering and Berthoud, Manchester, to 
the Emmott Committee, Cd.6427, Q.1927. 
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existence, nor was it based on a gold standard. Its reserves were held in 
sterling and it was based on the pound sterling. When the pound rose or fell, 
so also did the West African pound. In 1951, W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan 
wrote of the Board that it was n. • • precluded from following an independent 
monetary policy •••• From a broad point of view, the Board is a money-
changing and accounting device. n74 
Indeed, it was only on condition that West African currency would be so 
easily exchangeable into British currency that the expatriate business community 
had accepted independent West African currency in the first place. It was much 
easier for a European than for an African to change the notes, since the 
European generally was based in Europe, often in London, while the African had 
few outside contacts and could not easily bank his British notes, or indeed use 
them, even if he presented currency for redemption in West Africa. The pounds 
sterling he received in exchange for West African notes were paid to him in 
London, not in Ghana. 75 Lacking European contacts, he had no use for the pound. 
In essence, he was limited to soft currency while his European competitors 
moved easily between soft and hard currency. 
The colonies did derive one very small benefit from the WACB, however, 
in the form of profits for the seigniorage of the currency the Board produced. 
Seigniorage profits were the difference between the cost to the Board of 
minting the coins and, the price at which the coins were sold. In the late 
740p •t 
• en. • ' p. 51. 
75
n ••• merchants are able to pay the coin in West Africa to the Cur-
rency Officer and receive its sterling value from the Board in London. • .• " 
Ormsby-Gore Report, op. ait., p. 176. See als~ GCLegCo, 1 June 1912, summary 
of recommendations of the Emmott Committee. "Holders of coin of the new cur-
rency and of the silver Imperial coinage will have the legal right to tender 
them in British West Africa for conversion at a fixed rate of exchange into 
sterling money issuable in London. 11 
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nineteenth century, the Royal Mint. because of a sudden fall in the price of 
silver, had been making very large seigniorage profits, and one of the reasons 
for the investigation of a possible separate West African currency system in 
1900 had been the Colonial Office's desire to get control of the seigniorage 
profits on coin for West Africa made by the Imperial Treasury. 76 The idea of a 
separate currency board had been rejected at that time because it was feared 
that the Colonial Office might overissue coins, causing inflation in the colo-
nies (and possibly therefore at home if the coins were repatriated) in order to 
make profits. Between 1901 and 1910 the Colonial Office calculated that the 
Treasury had made two million pounds in seigniorage on West African coins; 77 it 
therefore pressed all the more strongly for a separate Board in 1912. 
While the Colonial Office eventually won its battle for the distribution 
of seigniorage profits to the colonies, the actual returns were very small. 
The Gold Coast Government received no income from the WACB until 1923; from 
that date until 1939 it never received even as much as £200,000 a year from the 
Board 1 s profits. 
Table 24. Ghana Government Revenue from Profits 
of the West African 
1923-193978 
Currency Board, 
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amour1t £'OOOs -£ 1 000s £1 000s 
1923 112 1929 194 1935 86 
1924 110 1930 151 1936 42 
1925 107 1931 72 1937 40 
1926 119 1932 115 1938 
1927 140 1933 199 1939 
1928 156 1934 105 
76H k. 11 Th C t• " . op ~ns, e rea wn ••• , op. cnt., p. 125. 
77Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 36. 
78Sourc(~: Kay, op. ait., Table 24a, "Government Revenue by Source, 1900-
60,11 pp. 350-51. 
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One reason for the small amount which the Government earned from the WACB •,vas 
that its profits had to be placed in reserve to cover possible future costs of 
redemption of coinage. 79 The Board was required to keep 100 per cent of its 
issue as reserves. From 1926 to 1939, it held over 100 per cent as reserves, 
reaching a high of 126 per cent in 1935 (see Table 21). With such a conserve.-
tive reserve policy, the WACB was hardly an agent for investment and development 
in the colonies which it ostensibly served. The reserves, moreover, were not 
invested in colonial Government securities but in Imperial Government securi-
ties; they therefore were used not for the benefit of the colonies but for the 
benefit of the home country. The Board held. only securities which could be 
easily marketed in London. 80 
Thus on the whole, while the introdu::!tion of a standard West African 
currency and the regularization of the means of exchange facilitated trade and 
commerce within the country, it benefi tted the European commercial class far 
more than it benefi tted the Ghanaian peasant or trader. Similarly, the con-
struction of the transportation infrastructure was to benefit the expatriate 
community far more than the Afric~~. 
3. The Development of Transportation 
in Ghana 
Even without pressure from European commercial concerns, no doubt the 
Colonial Office in London would have regarded it as its business to build 
railroa.ds and roads in Ghana. The colony had to be self-supporting, and in 
order to support itself it needed revenues trhich could only be generated by 
trade. But the contact which the British b11siness interests had with the Gov-
ernment in Ghana helped to generate transport policy, to determine the types of 
79Emmott Committee, Cd.6426, p. 9. 
80Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 1~9. 
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transportation which were to be constructed and where they were to be cor--
structed. 
The earliest concern of the colonial Government was to build railways 
which would facilitate the development of the mining industry by allowing the 
importation of sophisticated technology. As long as the only form of transpor-
tation inland to the mines was by head-loading, all machinery had to be broken 
up into pieces weighing not more than sixty pounds. During the first 11 gold 
rush11 of the 1890s, when hundreds of small companies were floated to exploit 
the gold resources of Ashanti, then seen as vast, it became obvious that such a 
form of transport was inefficient. The Colonial Office began to experience a 
great deal of pressure to develop railways. 81 The first railway line in Ghana 
was built in the late 1890s and early 1900s, from the port of Sekondi to the 
gold mining area of Prestea-Tarkwa, and thence to Obuasi, the centre of Ashanti 
Goldfields. 82 
According to Dumett 
The chief aims of railway construction had been the promotion of 
profitable mining ventures which, more than any other form of enterprise, 
could be expected to stimulate the economy of the entire Colony through 
the mobilization of a wage labour force [by releasing carriers for other 
occupations], the attraction of British capital, and the provision of 
increased revenue for other development projects. 83 
Preferential rates were charged for mining equipment, which was seen as an 
81 As early as 1891 the Live1~ool Chaffiber of Commerce was pressuring the 
Colonial Office, on behalf of the Gie Appantoo Mining Company, to build rail-
ways. The Company presented the Chamber with a memorial 11 • • • on the subject 
of improvements in the way of access to their properties, desired by the Gold 
Mining Companies of the Gold Coast." LivCC, For·t;y-First Annual Report (1891), 
p. 90. 
82Details as to the dates of construction of roads and railways in Ghana 
can be found in Peter R. Gould, The Development of the Transportation Pattern 
in Ghana (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1960). 
83Dumett, "British ••• ," op. cit., p. 276. 
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investment conducive to development. 84 Railway construction was financed by 
the Government from its own revenues, or through the floating of loans. The 
Government did not view Ghana as a good location for private investment in 
railway construction, as the land was not properly surveyed, and there were 
problems with climate, labour, and supplies which private investors could not 
handle. It discouraged the idea of private investment in railway construction 
although it let out contracts for construction to private individuals (includ-
ing Africans) 85 and allowed mines to construct their own railways when the 
Government lines did not fulfil their needs. Between 1902 and 1913, the 
British Government granted three loans totalling £3,163,000 to the Gold Coast 
Government for railway and harbour construction. 86 Additional financing was 
obtained by the floating of loans on the London market, as ". • • ordinary com-
mercial investments."87 
But private interests, although they acknowledged the difficulties of 
building railways in a tropical country, were often dissatisfied with Govern-
ment policies and argued that a system of private investment and construction 
would be better. They urged that the Government invite tenders for railways. 
Petitions were constantly sent to the Colonial Office urging both private con-
struction of railways and the taking over of already constructed railways by 
private firms on the grounds that Government administration was inefficient. 88 
84Ibid.' p. 287. 
85McPhee, op. ait., p. 113. 
86D. K. Greenstreet, "The Transport Department--the First Two Decades 
(1901-20)," The Eaonomia Bulletin of Ghana, no •. 3, vol. 10 (1966}, p. 35. 
87McPhee, op. ait., p. 114. 
88In 1911 the London Chamber suggested leasing the Nsawam-Accra railway to 
a private concern on the grounds that it would be better run. LonCC, 12 January 
1911. 
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':'he Government did in fact :nGl:e several Yentures into the contract syst.ec:1 on .!\ 
large scale; !'or example in 1909 it agreed to give a contract to "the firm of 
. W. H. Murphy, in Dublin, to build the Accra-Mangoase line.B9 On'the w·hole, 
hm1ever, it found that the cont:ract system, al thoug.ll it might provide goocl 
opportunities for profit (or graft) to private firms, vas not satisfactory. 
The argument as to who was to construct railways, Governncmt er p.:ri:" te 
enterprise, went on until 1923 when the ~ueation was investigated the Pri-
vate EnterpriHe Comrni ttee. 90 This Conrm:i ttee argued t!'lat the car:ty railii ~,ys 
built by contract had been too costly because the Government lu;.d ha.d no co;rtJ·, .. L 
over spending; complete constrtJction by Government was a better system. 91 
• • • ,;e feel assured that at the present sta.ge of 
wholly private company would be tempted to embark upon r:::.:'.l>ray ·::et::·: 
without special inducements· in the form of la.."ld cor~cessicnu, l~~inf;:::et1 
rights, or a guarantee of interest at a rate which vlOuld render cc:-
struction by the State itself a more economical alternative . • . 
• • • it is not to be anticipated that private enter:: . se \Jil1 be 
found wiLling to finance, construct and operate re.il vays u.'lr,:L c.ed 
Government in the present stage of development in Tr~pics~ Africa .. 2 
By 1923, hovrever, the railway infrastructure necessary for in-.,·e2tors in 
Ghanaian trade had already been created, so that the question of vJho ;;as t::; 
finance it waa no longer a live issue. Moreover, the Gove:n:.lliEmt 
connecting to the Government railway lines when necessary, as .E~s 
89Reported in the JWAC, 1'7 February 1909. 
90
"Report of the Co:mmi ttee appointed to consider and rer:Jrt i.'nsthcr, 011 
if so what, measures c01.1~d be taken to encourage Private Enter1)rise in the 
Development of the British Dependencies in East and West Trqdee.l A;.'rica~ 1-r:!."':h 
special· Referemc-e to Existing ~::md Projected Schemes of Tran.sport:.tion. n Cn.ci. 
2016 (1924). 
92Ib·d 
' 1- • J pp. 18 and 21. 
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charged reasonable rates to the general public,9 3 To encourage such private 
construction the Private Enterprise Railways Construction Bill was passed in 
1907, stipulating that 11 ••• the provisions of the Public Lands Ordinance 
shall apply to lands required for such a railway, and the Government are there-
by empowered to acquire such lands on behalf of the licensee. "94 This Bill 
confirmed an earlier Bill passed in 1905 which retroactively gave the Prestea 
Railway Limited the right to compulsory purchase of land on which it had al-
reaqy built its railway. 
Owing to a mistake on the part of the engineer in charge, the line was 
built before all the land on which it was constructed or through which it 
passes, was formally acquired; and although most of such land has been 
privately purchased, the object of the present Bill is to confer powers 
of compulsory purchase in respect of those portions of land which the 
Company has been unable to acquire privately. 9 5 
African members of the Legislative Council -vrere of course against this Bill, 
arguing that it was yet another infringement of indigenous property rights. 
• • • some of the lands proposed to be compulsorily purchased by the 
Company for this Railway are Stool property. If the Company is allowed 
to purchase land absolutely, other Companies will come and ask for a 
similar privilege and the precedent now laid down may be followed. The 
result of this will be that in the course of time the Chiefs may be com-
pelled to alienate all their ancestral property. 9G 
Such opposition on the part of Africans to private railways was supported 
by that section of the expatriate commercial community which was more concerned 
with the import-export si de of the Ghana.i an econolllY than with the mining si de. 
The merchants, cocoa-buyers and general traders felt that road-building 
93JWAC, 25 July 1906. 
94GCLegCo, 30 December 1907. 
95Statement by ~~. Hunt, a. European Unnoficial Member, in GCLegCo, 23 
November 1905. 
96statement by Mr. Brown, an African Unofficial Member, in GCLegCo, 23 
November 1905. 
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suffered at the expense of railway- (and, later, harbour-) construction. They 
saw the' gold-mining companies as having extra access to and pull with the 
Colonial Office. This view was especially reinforced in 1903, when it was dis-
covered by accident that in 1901 the Government had made an Agreement with 
Ashanti Goldfields for the completion and working of the railway between 
Sekondi and Kumasi so that it would go through the Ashanti Goldfields head-
quarters in Obuasi. In 1900, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation had approached 
the Government " • with an offer of a guarantee of interest upon the capital 
which would be required if the Government U."'ldertook to extend the railway from 
Tarquah to Coomassie n97 The Agreement eventually settled upon included . . . 
the following terms: 
That the Government have the right to convey troops and all stores 
over the whole line at 'cost of conveyance'. 
That if in any year the excess of gross receipts over working expenses 
is less than £30,000, the Corporation shall pay to the Government a sum 
equal to the difference, but not exceeding £30,000. 
That while in the case of a deficit the Corporation are liable to the 
extent of £30,000 per annum, on the other hand, if in any year the re-
ceipts shew an excess of over 4~~ on the outlay, the Corporation are to 
receive a fifth of such net profits. 98 
Both the traders and other miners, once they heard of this Agreement, protested 
vigorously, over a period of several years, against it. Under the provisions 
of the Agreement for low freight charges for Government, the traders felt that 
they would be subsidizing the transport needs of Ashanti and the Northern Ter-
ri tories. Further, they felt that "Ashanti Goldfields • • • would practically 
·fix the rates" 99 so that high charges for imported manufactured goods and for 
97Letter to the London Chamber of Commerce from R. L. Antrobus of the 
Colonial Office, in LonCC, 21 March 1904. 
98LonCC, 11 July 1904. 
99Ibid. 
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cocoa, palm oil, and other exports would subsidize low charges for mining 
equipment. With all of its other adv~~tages, it was the last straw that Ashanti 
Goldfields was entitled to a share of the railroad's profits in return for 
accepting responsibility for a deficit which never, in fact, occurred • 
• • • the liability of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation under the 
Agreement to recoup any deficits on the Railway to the extent of 
£30,000 per annum, ha(s] not come into operation owing mainly to the 
high rates for traffic which the various Companies ha[ve] paid upon the 
goods forwarded by them over the railway.lOO 
The opposition from both the traders and rival mining firms to this Agreement 
was so intense that the Government was eventually obliged to cancel it. Nego-
tiations took place over a period of several months to settle upon a lump sum 
which Ashanti Goldfields should pay the Government in return for having had the 
railway built through Obuasi; eventually, however, the Agreement was cancelled 
without any payment at all by the firm. As soon as the Agreement was cancelled, 
the Government revised the rates on the Sekondi-Tarkwa railway. 101 
That such an Agreement as the one referred to above could have been made 
in the first place was merely a reflection of the Government's overriding con-
cern, in the early colonial period in Ghana, to facilitate the development of 
mining and of railways, controlled by Government, which would provide it with 
revenue. Table 25 indicates the percentage of Government revenue which c~e 
from railways. Between 1904, when the Sekondi-Kumasi line was completed, and 
1927, when competition from road transport began to undercut railway car-
riage,102 railway revenue fell only once below twenty per cent of Government 
100Report of a sUbcommittee of the London Chamber of Commerce on the 
Ashanti Goldfields Agreement, LonCC, 15 November 1904. 
101statement by the Governor in GCLegCo, 6 February 1905. 
102competition between road and rail transport in Gh~~a is discussed 
below. 
c 
c 
266 
Table 25. Government Revenue from Railways, 1900-1939103 
Year Total Government Revenue Revenue from Railways (ii) as % of {i) £000 IS ( i) r.ooors {ii) 
1900 383 
1901 496 
1902 512 
1903 578 65 11 
1904 682 147 22 
1905 586 130 22 
1906 683 172 25 
1907 709 168 24 
1908 752 150 20 
1909 779 182 23 
1910 1,007 249 25 
1911 1,112 295 27 
1912 1,231 329 27 
1913 1,302 357 27 
1914 1,332 381 29 
1915 1,456 446 31 
1916 1,886 506 ~7 
1917 1,624 494 30 
1918 1,299 453 35 
1919 2,601 664 26 
1920 3,722 736 20 
1921 3,016 796 26 
1922 3,357 892 27 
1923 3,743 1,012 27 
1924 3,971 1,073 27 
1925 4,116 1,106 27 
1926 4,365 1,156 26 
1927 4,122 134 3 
1928 3,914 134 3 
1929 3,397 
1930 2,671 .,.. 
1931 2,284 
1932 2,671 
1933 2,685 
1934 2,778 
1935 3,268 
1936 3,775 
1937 3,792 
1938 3,780 23 1 
1939 3,734 
103Source: raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 24a "Government Revenue 
by Source, 1900-60, 11 pp. 348-55. 
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revenue and was generally above twenty-five per cent. By increasing or de-
creasing railway rates on various products the Government could control 
development policy as well ·as increase or decrease its own income. 
267 
Given the Government concentration on railways~ road construction often 
seemed like a neglected step-sister. A Department of Roads was created in 
Ghana in 1894; in 1901 this became the Department of Transport. But it would 
seem that for the first two decades of its existence the Transport Department's 
function was not to build roads so much as it was to find labourers to act as 
Government carriers or to work on Government railways.l0 4 Such neglect of 
actual construction occurred despite much pressure from the Manchester and 
Liverpool business comnn.mities, who, because they were so involved in import-
export trade, were anxious for roads to be built to the cocoa-farming areas of 
the colony so that farmers could get their produce out and so that traders with 
imported goods for sale could go deeper and deeper into the "bush. 11 Yet as 
late as 1926 the policy as regards roadbuilding was still to give priority to 
roads feeding the railways, then to roads serving other useful trade purposes, 
and finally to roads built for administrative purposes. 105 The primary ~urpose 
of roads was to act as feeders to railways even when railways were not con-
veniently located for trade purposes. 
Until 1918, of course, the Government could argue that wide roads were 
not a necessity, since the most predominant forms of road use were head-
carriage and cask-rolling. For either of these activities, narrow paths were 
preferable to wide roads which could not provide adequate shade for the African 
labourers engaged in carrying or rolling. There was no transport by beasts of 
104Greenstreet, op. ait. 
l05statement by the Governor to GCLegCo, 22 February 1926. 
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burden, whose susceptibility to the tse-tse fly rendered them useless. After 
1918, however, European firms, and also the Government, began to import light 
lorries in large numbers. The demand for roads increased concomitant with 
these imports. Traders began to oppose other forms of investment in transport, 
especially the Central Province railway which was constructed in 1923, on the 
grounds that more roads should be built first. 11 • • • in the Western Provinces 
there [is] ••• a large area of available land suitable for the cultivation of 
cocoa, where there [are] ••• neither adequate roads, or adequate transports.-
tion facilities ••• " 106 
Much of the construction of roads which took place was not a result of 
Government initiative, but rather of African initiative. "So great was the en-
thusiasm for road-building that in Ashanti, for example, it was not unusual for 
villagers to give road engineers a free hand to demolish houses or cut thelr 
way through cocoa farms, provided the road passed through or near the vll-
lage."l07 
Villages even went so far as to give contracts to European firms to 
build roads for them. 1 0 8 The Government grew to rely on such African 
106Thus the London Chamber of Commerce argued, futilely, against the con-
struction of the Central Provinces Railway, LonCC, ll Ja...'1uar,y 1923. 
107K. B. Dickson, "The Development of Road Transport in Southern Ghana and 
Ashanti since about 1850," T:Pansactions of the Historical Soaiety of C!hana, no. 
5 (1961), p. 38. The Krobo people also built their own roads in order to be 
able to tap all their plantations. See speech by Nene Mate Kale in GCLegCo, 
22 February 1926. 
108see the statement of the Governor describing the employment of Italian 
contractors in the Akwapim hills, GCLegCo, 23 October 1916. " ••• the natives 
of some of the now flourishing towns situated on the summit of the JL~wapim 
range of hills, recently employed an Italiun contractor, at their own charger:>, 
to contruct a motor-road, 10 miles in length and costing £800 per mile, leading 
down to and forming a junction with the PWD 1 s road from Adawso to Mangoase. 11 
But the Governor went on to say "This work, it should be noted, was designed, 
not to serve any immediate commercial purpose, but to enable the wealthy cocoa-
farmers of this division to spend as much time as possible with their families 
in the hills." 
0 
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enterprise for the upkeep of roads. Early transport poJ.i~y was that all vil-
lages were to contribute compulsory quarterly labour on the roads in return for 
a sma.ll payment; later the Government came to expect that villages would also 
:finance road construction. Indeed, whenever the issue of land concessions was 
raised the Government argued that concessions rent!! obi!.adiJ.;ed by the various 
tribes should be invested in roads, which no doubt wmwd benefit the Africans 
concerned but which would also benefit the European t~~ers. African initia-
tive removed much of the burden of financing local t~ailll.\Z:rJ)Urlation routes from 
the shoulders of the Government. 
Maps 2 and 3 indicate that despite the fact t:halt Gtrvernment investment 
policies concentrated more on railways than on road's·~· a.. c0nsiderable network of 
roads was built up in Ghana during the colonial perl.o'dl.. At the same time, the 
maps indicate the north-south orientation of the t~spoTtation network. Both 
roads and railways were geared for t.he export trade·,, a tr~e which was fa::::ili-
tated by the construction of the modern Tak:oradi lmrbow in the late 1920s. 
The railways were built to promote the southerly fiow o.f goods a."ld the rates 
charged reflected the directional flow; low rates cm ~gricultural produce going 
to the ports, and low rates on imported goods co~ tro~ the ports. The rail-
va;y network as it eventually vas established consi:s;te(il of a line from Kum::J.si to 
Sekondi, a line from Kumasi to Accra via the cocoe,-prod'u.c:ing Eastern Region, 
and a line along the coast from Accra to Sekondi am;d Ta.koradi. Neither rail-
ways nor roads adequately criss-crossed the countrJ i::tt an east-west direction. 
Table 26 presents figures for railway traf!'iie· !1!1 percentages for the 
years 1900 to 1939. This of course is not a completely accurate refl~ction of 
trade patterns of the colony, since many goods were tJfalllsported by roads. 
Nevertheless it does present some idea of the trade pa,tte.rns. Except for the 
years 1911 to 1922, the percentage of local traffic ea;rr:iied on the railways wa.s 
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c Table 26. Usea of the Railway by Different Sectors of the Economy: Tonnages and Percentages (Main 
Products Only), 1900-1939111 
Local Goods Cocoa Exported Goods Imported Goods Total % 
Year Imported and Tons % Tons % Tons % Tons % Exported Goods 
(OOO's) (i) (OOO's} ( ii) (OOO's) (iii) (OOO's) (iv) (iii + iv) 
1900 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1901 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1902 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1903 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1904 0.9 41 0.1 45 1.3 59 n.d. 
1905 o.4 1 0.6 2 7.0 22 24.8 77 99 
1906 0.6 1 0.1 0 5.7 12 41.1 87 99 
1907 0.6 1 0.6 1 12.6 25 37.9 74 99 
1908 4.8 10 0.8 2 9.0 19 32.4 70 89 
1909 5.7 10 1.8 3 3.2 6 46.6 84 90 
1910 6.3 8 1.9 2 4.0 5 72.1 88 93 
1911 89.6 49 5.1 3 7.6 4 85.0 47 51 
1912 83.2 42 20.8 11 24.9 13 89.3 45 58 
1913 74.9 32 :37.4 16 47.3 20 108.8 47 67 
1914 91.5 35 41.1 16 48.9 19 118.2 46 65 
1915 115.7 43 60.3 22 61.4 23 92.1 34 57 
1916 134.8 45 57.4 19 63.1 21 99·9 34 55 
1917 151.9 45 79.7 24 113.5 34 69.7 21 55 
1918 169.7 54 73.8 23 100.8 32. 45.9 15 47 
1919 143.9 41 111.9 32 149.3 43 54.7 16 59 
1920 145.0 39 95.5 26 145.2 39 81.2 22 61 
1921 155.9 44 109.1 31 123.8 35 77.9 22 57 
1922 131.2 30 143.1 33 235.3 54 72.6 17 71 
1923 110.8 19 164.3 28 364.7 61 120.2 20 81 
1924 123.7 18 156.1 22 442.5 63 136.4 19 82 
1925 118.1 15 150.3 19 534.5 67 144.3 18 85 
1926 120.7 15 149.2 19 552.8 69 131.7 16 85 
1927 128.6 16 131.2 17 520.3 66 141.0 18 84 
1928 120.7 15 165.6 20 542.2 67 145.9 18 85 
1929 135.8 15 139.5 15 657.1 70 139.3 15 85 
1930 108.1 14 132.5 17 537.3 71 113.5 15 86 
1931 107.5 20 123.5 23 335.9 64 82.9 16 80 
1932 99.6 25 122.0 31 200.7 51 n.d. 
1933 118.1 18 125.9 19 466.9 70 79.2 12 82 
1934 129.0 18 122.4 17 496.3 68 104.6 14 82 
1935 143.6 16 130.6 14 611.2 67 156.9 17 84 
1936 164.9 17 140.1 15 597.7 63 192.7 20 83 
1937 138.1 13 134.6 12 718.3 65 248.5 22 87 
1938 113.0 14 207.8 25 484.0 58 233.7 28 86 
,.,... 1939 23.8 3 115.5 12 590.4 63 n.d. 
~ 111source: Based on raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 32a "Railway 
freight traffic (excluding livestock), 1900-1960," pp. 388-89. N.B. n.d.=no 
data. 
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c low; generally between ten and tw:enty per cent. Much of this carriage consist-
ed of internal trade among different markets, and also of the supplying of food 
to the mines.ll2 The falling off of local carriage in percentage terms after 
about 1922 is also reflected in its slight decline in absolute terms; however 
this decline may have been a reflection of a switch to carriage of goods by 
road. 
With the exception of the years 1911 and 1918 (in the latter year a 
quota on cocoa exports was imposed by the Imperial Government in order to save 
wartime shipping space) over fifty per cent of the railway carriage was of 
imported or exported goods in all years. In the 1900s, before roads were 
built, the percentage was very high. It dropped in the 1910s but rose again in 
the 1920s and 1930s. However, much of the export tonnage in the latter two 
decades consisted of manganese from the mine at Nsuta. Cocoa rarely accounted 
for more than thirty per cent of the total tonnage. Imported goods declined 
as a per cent of railway carriage between 1900 and 1939 although the absolute 
amount of imported goods carried rose fairly consistently. In the 1900s, of 
course, a large percentage of the imported goods would have been mining equip-
ment; railway cars might have been bringing in mining equipment and leaving the 
mining areas empty for lack 9f exportable goods, at least until a system of 
feeder roads was developed. Later on, the composition of the imported goods 
was more varied; but at the same time lorry traffic began to compete with rail 
traffic for the carriage of goods to marketplaces which might not be on main 
railway lines, so that the total percentage of imported goods on the railways 
fell. 
The development of a fairly complete north-south system of roads, both 
c 
ll2ao ld • · 2 u , op. cn..-z;., p. . 
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as feeders to the railways and as independent routes to the coast, provided 
opportunities for the setting up of transport companies both by the large 
European firms and by independent Africans. "The pioneers in motor traction 
were not the Government, but the merchants. The motor-lorries belonged to 
private mercantile firms, who used them for carrying their own goods, although 
a passenger traffic vras springing up. nll3 Large firms such as CFAO and the UAC 
ran their own fleets of lorries. " •.. Ithe UAC] carries on extensive road 
motor transport services, chiefly for its own use, for the carriage and dis-
tribution of merchandise and native produce between main centres and points not 
served by sea, river, or railway. "114 Elder Dempster also ran a road transport 
company with garages and workshops at Nsawam.ll5 
African transport firms could not, of course, compete with the European · 
firms either i.n size or in scope. Often an African entrepreneur had just one 
lorry which he ran on a shoestring budget, making the down payment on the lorry 
to a European firm and having enough money for running expenses only. The 
Government argued that "shoestring competition" by Africans was unfair; that 
the railways suffered because Africans offered poor quality services at low 
prices. 
in certain places, it is possible to obtain a 30 cwt. lorry on 
first payment of probably £20. That £20 is the only capital the purchaser 
possesses. We also ~now that there is a very large trade in one-gallon 
tins of petrol. The reason is the lorry-owner is only able to produce, 
when he starts the day's work, sufficient money to buy one gallon; he then 
proceeds with that gallon in the hope that he will collect a few shillings 
in fares to purchase a further supply; if he does not, he remains on the 
road until his brothers come and help him. • • • no organised system of 
l13McPhee, op. ait., p. 116. 
114UAC Ranki.n file: "Notes on the History of the United Africa Company," 
p. 3. 
11 ~he Elder Transport Company is mentioned in a speech by the Governor 
in GCLegCo, 3 February 1925. 
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transport, ~ether it be road or rail, can possibly compete successfully 
with motor transport as it is run to-day in the Gold Coast • • • the 
competition between road and rail is unfair.116 
The "unfair" competition to the railways from African lorry drivers, 
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combined with the presumably slightly fairer competition from European firms, 
was great enough to cause the Government considerable worry in the late 1920s 
and 1930s. The percentage of Government revenue supplied by the railways fell 
from~twenty-six per cent in 1926 to 3\ per cent in 1927; from 1928 to 1938 the 
Government received no revenue at all from the railways. While presumably at 
least part of this drastic decline in resources was caused by the Depression of 
the 1930s, evidently it was also caused by a drop in the percentage of goods, 
specifically of cocoa, which was carried by the railway. Table 27 presents 
statistics on the percentage of the cocoa exports carried by rail and by other 
forms of transport (after 1918 "other" was presumably almost exclusively by 
lorry). A decline in the percentage of cocoa carried by rail after 1930 eo-
incides with the decline in railway revenues from cocoa. 
Because of declining railway revenues, the Government moved in the 1920s 
and 1930s to take measures to guarantee traffic to the railways at the expense 
of road traffic. Its aim was to curb competition on roads competitive with 
railways, such as the road between Nsawam and Accra. In the early 1920s. the 
Government tried reducing charges for various goods travelling on the railway; 
however, since one of the goods for which rates were reduced was petrol, corn-
petition continued as before. In 1927, the Government changed its policy and 
raised the duty on petrol by 100 per cent,ll7 in order to raise the costs of 
lorry transport firms, Parallel to this it decided to stop making repairs on 
116Speech by the Secretary for Native Affairs in GCLegCo, 8 March 1932. 
l17Reported in LonCC, 20 September 1927. 
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c Table 27. Cocoa Exported by Road and Rail, 1900-1939118 
Total Cocoa Exports Rail Exports Other Exports (Roads) 
Year 000 tons 000 tons % 000 tons % 
{i) (ii) (iii} (iv) (v) 
1900 0.5 n.d. 
1901 1.0 n.d. 
1902 2.4 n.d. 
1903 2.3 n.d. 
1904 5.2 0.1 2 5.1 98 
1905 5.1 0.6 12 4.5 88 
1906 9.1 0.1 1 9.0 99 
1907 9.5 0.6 6 8.9 94 
1908 12.9 0.8 6 12.1 94 
1909 20.5 1.8 9 18.7 91 
1910 23.0 1.9 8 21.1 92 
1911 40.3 5.1 13 35.2 87 
1912 39.2 20.8 53 18.4 47 
1913 51.3 37.4 . 73 13.9 27 
1914 52-9 41.1 78 11.8 22 
1915 77.3 60.3 78 11.0 22 
1916 72.2 57.4 80 14.8 21 
1917 91.0 79.7 88 11.3 12 
1918 66.3 73.8 * * * 
1919 176.2 111.9 64 64.3 36 
1920 124.8 95·5 77 29.3 23 
1921 133.2 109.1 82 24.1 18 
1922 159.3 143.1 90 16.2 10 
1923 200.6 164.3 82 36.3 18 
1924 223.3 156.1 70 67.2 30 
1925 218.1 150.3 69 67.8 31 
1926 230.8 149.2 65 81.6 35 
1927 210.0 131.2 6.2 78.8 38 
1928 225.1 165.6 74 59.5 26 
1929 238.1 139.5 59 98.6 41 
1930 190.6 132.5 70 58.1 30 
1931 244.1 123.5 51 120.6 49 
1932 233.7 122.0 52 111.7 48 
1933 236.1 125.9 53 110.2 47 
1934 230.3 122.4 53 107.9 47 
1935 268.9 130.6 49 138.3 51 
1936 311.1 140.1 45 171.0 55 
1937 236.2 134.6 57 101.6 43 
1938 263.2 207.8 79 55.4 21 
1939 280.7 115.5 41 165.2 59 
,- 118source: Kay, op. eit. , Table 2lb, "Volume of Major Exports , 1900-1960," 
'-" pp. 336-37 (col. i), and Table 32c "Railway freight traffic (excluding live-
stock) 1900-..1960, 11 pp. 388-89 (col. ii). N.B. n.d.=no data; *Shipping quota 
imposed 1918-cocoa stored at port. 
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certain major roads, so that lorries could no longer travel on them. 
Government is at present incurring a large expenditure in establishing 
motor transport routes in parts o~ the country where the railway does not 
exist, and therefore it does not appear that it would be justifiable for 
us to maintain alongside the railway a motor road for the convenience of 
private interests strictly limited to a small area in the whole country. 119 
At the same time, the Government instituted a 11road-gap 11 policy, designed to 
deliberately leave gaps in major roads to force exporters and importers to ship 
by rail. Diagram 1 indicates the gaps which existed in major roads. 
The "road-gap" policy was ~ormally abandoned in 1929, 120 but in 1935-36 
several of the gaps were still extant, for instance the gaps between Anyinam 
and Wiresei on the Accra-Kumasi road, between Agona and Simpa on the Ta.koradi-
Tarkwa road, and between Brofoyedru and Fomena on the Cape Coast-Kumasi 
road.JZl In that year, the Governor decided to definitely fill in the gaps, 
but only on condition that a new policy o~ "scheduled" roads be instituted. On 
31 July 1936 "An Ordinance to regulate the Carriage of Goods over certair.. roads 
within the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti" was passed.122 This ordinance pro-
vided that on new roads, the Government could, if it wished, prohibit the 
carriage of imported goods inland from the coast, and the carriage of export-
able goods, especially cocoa, south to the coast. The "scheduled-roads 11 
policy, as it became known, was not rescinded until 1945 and resulted in con-
siderable hardship not only ~or the independent lorry transporter, whether 
A~rican or European, but also ~or the cocoa farmer. 
11 9Governor to GCLegCo, 22 February 1926. 
120Governor to GCLegCo, 26 September 1929. 
121 Governor to GCLegCo, 19 March 1935 and.20 February 1936. 
122GCLegCo, 31 July 1936. 
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IMPORTANT ROAD GAPS 
Kumasi 
MILES 
0 50 
Obuasi 
Diagram 1. Gaps in Ghana's Major Roadsl23 
• • .. • take a man who has a large estate between Nkawkaw and Anyinelll.; 
if he wants to go to Koforidua to replenish his stocks of say soap, rice 
and other commodities, and sell his cocoa, he would have, according to 
this Bill, to take his cocoa up north to a Railway Statior.: he cannot 
bring it down to Anyinam; he must take it to Nkawkaw or the nearest 
station up. On getting there, as the passenger train will not take his 
cocoa, he has got to wait for the goods train, which may not travel that 
day, to bring the cocoa down to Koforidua, and as he is not allowed to 
travel on the goods train, he has to wait until the next passenger t~ain; 
all this means delay. At Ko:foridua he sells his cocoa, makes his pur-
chases of goods. These he cannot take by lorry, so he has to wait until 
there is a goods train going, by which he will consign the goods, after 
which he takes the passenger train himself, whereas by a lorry he could 
accompany his products and do it all in one day •.•• And, at the same 
time, although the lorry industry is principally not in the hands of the 
Africans, yet those who do run these lorries pay licences and after all 
is said and done, if they earn money it is not a loss to the cou~try, 
because it is in the country,l24 
The institution of the road-gap and scheduled-road policies indicates 
clearly that in the matter of transportation, although on the whole the Govern-
ment was concerned to build a transportation infrastructure which would 
facilitate trade, yet in matters of detail it was more than willing to 
123Gould, op. ait., p. 71. 
124speech by Mr. Christian, an African Unofficial member, in ibid. 
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sacrifice the needs of the expatriate commercial community and of indigenous 
African entrepreneurs to its own needs. 
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Although, then, the business community had considerable powers of con-
sultation with Government, acceptance of its views was not automatic. Its 
wishes could be superseded by the needs of the colony as a whole, as represent-
ed by Government policy. Nevertheless, in the largest sense of policy, 
Government and business were usually in accord and the mechanisms of consulta-
tion provided for the emergence of consensus, within certain bounds, as to the 
directions colonial development, or lack of development, should take. Once the 
basic infrastructure for trade had been established, little else was done for 
the economy of Ghana. Chapter VI investigates investment policies and the 
emergence of monocultural dependence in Ghena in the post-World War I period to 
illustrate the stagnation into which the economy fell once the basic pattern of 
trade had been established. 
0 
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CHJ\PTER VI 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS-GOVEffiH.ffiNT CO-OPERATION IN GHANA: 
THE PERi'?ETUATION OF MONOClJLTURAL STAGNATION 
In Chapter III the basic import-export structure of the Ghanaian economy 
during the whole of the colonial period was described. The economy was charac-
terized by its peripheral nature; its dependence on exports of minerals and 
arboricultural and agricultural goods, especially cocoa, and its imports of 
manufactured goods of which a high percentage was for consumer use, not in-
vestment. It was also seen that the structure of the economy became firmly 
established by about 1915 and changed very :ittle after that date; as soon as 
cocoa became a steady earner of income for both farmers and expatriate traders 
other products were neglected. Ghana fell into a pattern of monocultural de-
pendence from which she has not yet emerged. 
Chapt~r IV described the takeover of the economy's import-export sector 
by Europeans, and the gradual squeezing out of both small European firms ~md 
African entrepreneurs as the trading sector became more and more oligopolized. 
In Chapter V, some of the mechanisms by whieh the Government established infra-
structure suitable to European (and only to a lesser extent, African) needs, 
were described. The hypothesis was that once a structure which could facili-
tate import and export of the products which were such good income earners was 
established, little more would be done by a Government which operated primarily 
for the benefit of the "Empire, 11 and within that Empire, for the benefit of its 
capitalist class. And indeed, Ghana retained her peripheral status until World 
War II, partly because of budgetary constraints on the Government and partly 
because there were no significant pressures on the Government to change Ghana 1 s 
role in the world economic system once she had been integrated into the 
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international network. The Imperial colonial policy was to stress self-
sufficiency for each colonial Government, so that there was little investment 
by the Government in any projects beyond an essential minimum. The interna-
tional firms invested little in the economy because its extractive nature 
facilitated profits without investment. 
The most significant attempts which were made to change Ghana's role in 
the world economy were in the direction of diversification of her exports and 
of upgrading her produce so that she would be less reliant on the world market. 
Both attempts were constrained by budgetary problems and by the power of a 
business community which was largely content with the economy the way it had 
been set up by 1915. This chapter will describe the financing of the colony 
and the failure of Government attempts to reduce Ghana's almost completely 
monocultural dependence by agricultural diversification programmes. Chapter 
VII will describe the attempts made by Africans, in the form of boycotts of the 
cocoa firms, to remedy their dependence on the world market in the face of 
Government reluctance and incapacity to act. 
l. Government Attempts at Diversification 
and Quality Control 
From 1915 on Governments in Ghana became increasingly aware of her mono-
cultural dependence and made attempts to rectify the situation. As of 1916~ 
export duties were levied on goods leaving the colony, and they provided a 
significant proportion of the Government's revenue. As long as the Government 
depended on cocoa export duties then it suffered whenever there was a drop in 
the cocoa market. To decrease its own reliance on cocoa revenue, if for no 
other reason, the Government was interested in diversifying exports. 
Under Governor Guggisberg (1919-1927), many projects for agricultural 
diversification were begun. The revenues of the colony were high in the buoy-
ant 1920s and the time for speculative investment seemed right. In 1920, for 
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.example, Guggisberg started a. plan to cultivate sisal on the Accra plains, and 
by March 1925 had 900 acres under cultivation. 1 His project was ambitious, 
involving as it did tvo-to_;.three-year investments before the plants were ready 
for cultivation, and projecting not only a factory in Accra to process the 
sisal into hemp, but also a tramway from the plains to the factory. 2 The first 
exports of sisal hemp were made in early 1925, and earned a profit of £22-23 
per ton; 3 but this profit owed itself primarily to abnormally high prices 
caused by "disturbed" conditions in Mexico. By 1926 the price for sisal had 
declined and Guggisberg was considering selling the plantation to a private 
enterprise if a proper deal could be made with the chiefs holding the land on 
which the plm1tation was located. 4 No such sale was ever made, however, and in 
1930 the Government discontinued its experiment with sisal, at a total loss of 
some n4 ,000; because it could not find the funds necessary for the expansion 
which might guarantee profitability.s 
The sisal plantation was only one of several experiments in agricultural 
diversification, most of which failed. Africans persisted in growing cocoa as 
long as the price was good, and the Government found that it was fighting a 
rear-guard action as long as it tried to persuade Africans to return to the 
crops, such as palm oil and rubber, which h~d been popular in the 1890s. Lack 
of initiative and incentive to diversify had by the 1930s to cope further with 
1
"Dispatch of First Consignment of Sisal Hemp from Accra Sisal Planta-
tion to Europe," Journal of the Gold Coast Ag:t'iouUu:ral and Commercial Sooiety, 
no. 3, vol. 3 (April 1924 to March 1925), p. 204. 
2Ibid. 
3Speech by the Governor to GCLegCo, 3 February 1925. 
4speech by the Governor in GCLegCo, 22 February 1926. 
5Speech by the Goven10r in GCLegCo, 17 :F'ebruary 1930. 
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a lack of Government funds, once the Depression started. In February 1930 a 
coconut plantation started by the Government at Aburi was handed back to its 
owners o 6 Vague discussions ' . .-ere held throughout the 1930s to consider projects 
such as a fishing industry, 7 but none of these projects was to prove success-
ful. 
More serious attempts were made, in conjunction with Elder Dempster and 
its subsidiaries, to start exporting fresh fruit, and indeed by the end of the 
1930s a banana export industry had been pu~ into operation. 1ne history of 
Ghana's banana export industry is of some interest inasmuch as it was first 
proposed in the late 1920s (the exact date is not known) to the Government by 
the firm of Elders and F,yffeso Elders and Fyffes was a subsidiary of Elder 
Dempster but since 1907 it had also been party to an agreement on the banana 
trade with the United Fruit Company which, moreover, bought £550,000 worth of 
shares in Elders and Fyffes in 1913. 8 In 1931 the Manchester Chamber of Cam-
merce, considering the possibility of establishing a banana industry on the 
Coast, noted that 
o •• a few years previously, Messrs. Elders and Fyffes Limited had 
enquired into the possibility of establishing a banana industry in the 
Gold Coast, but • • o as the Governor had not been prepared to give an 
assurance that, on the industry being started, rival competition would 
not receive Government support, negotiations had been broken off. 9 
Elders and Fyffes therefore were interested in starting the industry only if 
they were to be the sole recipients of Government aid. vfuen the Government 
tried to set up the banana industry on its own at a later date, and even went 
6Noted in GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. 
7GCLegCo, 19 March 1935. 
8P. N. Davies, "Sir lllfred Jones and the Development of West African 
Trade"~ (University of Liverpool: unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1964), p. 272. 
9ManCC, 12 February 1931. 
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so far as to consider canning and storage operations in the colony itself, 10 
Elders and Fyffes argued that the industry would not be viable.ll Eventually, 
however, the Government was able to negotiate with Elder Dempster for special 
carriage of bananas and the industry vras started in 1936. "An agreement has 
been entered into with Messrs. Elder Dempster Lines, Ltd., for the carriage to 
England of ,000 bunches of fruit during the first year and 50,000 bunches 
during the second year. The Company's mail steamers have been fitted with 
special cool chambers for the accommodation of the banana crop. "1 2 
Various other exporting projects, including copra and coconut produc-
tion, were tried by the Government in the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, one 
private expatriate entrepreneur at Abakramba, in the Cape Coast area, started 
the export of lime juice and lime products.l3 But for the most part the at-
tempts were minor and did little to move Ghana from its basically monocultural 
dependence on cocoa. This of course was not surprising, for although the Gov-
ernment was concerned not to be too dependent on cocoa revenue, nevertheless 
its first priority, as long as cocoa was its main export earner and the crop 
with which the expatriate firms were most concerned, was to invest what IG.eager 
funds it had for agricultural development in the cocoa crop. In 1926, the 
Governor pointed out " ••• the first point in Government's agricultural 
policy--the protection, improvement, and development of our staple product--
Cocoa!"14 
10speech by Mr. Auchinleck, Director of Agriculture, to the GCLegCo, 8 
March 1932. 
11ManCC, 29 July 1931. 
12Governor to GCLegCo, 20 February 1936. 
13Governor to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. "Rose's Lime Juice" is still 
produced in Gl1ana for export to Europe and North America. 
14Governor to GCLegCo, 19 July 1926, italics in original. 
c 
c 
285 
In 1935~ Nana Ofori Atta quoted a speech made by a late colonial secre-
tary in the Legislative Council, complairdng of the "distressing" attitude of 
the speech, which again stressed Ghana's agricultural nature. "A country's 
wealth can be increased either by manufacture, that is to say, by converting 
raw products into finished articles, or, alternately, by production and expor-
tat ion. Of these two, the latter is, obviously, the Gold Coast's metier." 15 
Thus Ghana was seen solely as a peripheral nation in the world economy. 
The external orientation of the Gold Coast bureaucracy can readily be seen in 
the operation of the 11 Gold Coast Intelligence Bureau, 11 a trade-promotion bureau 
which was in existence from 1926 to 1930. It first opened in 1926 with a win-
dow display of minerals, timber, and agricultural products obtainable in Ghana, 
and" ..• an exhibit showing manufactured articles chiefly in demand in the 
Gold Coast. ni6 There was no suggestion that Ghana might have the capacity to 
process and manufacture finished products on her own, even when she could 
supply her own raw materials. 
Moreover there was little mention made in the many development plans 
put forward by various Governors of Ghana of projects to diversify into light 
industry or processing of raw materials. This was considered the privilege of 
the private traders in the colony, who were free to invest in light industry 
if they saw fit. Small industries such as the Dunkwa sawmill, which were con-
sidered necessary to Government's well being, were occasionally established 
(although the Dunkwa sawmill itself eventually lo3t money and had to be sold to 
a private buyer). 17 The Government's interest in this type of industrial 
15GCLegCo, 19 March 1935. The author vms unable to identify the origina]_ 
speaker. 
l6GCLegCo, 19 July 1926. 
17Speech by the Governor to the GCLegCo, 3 February 1925. 
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diversification extended only so far as was necessary to ensure the adequate 
functioning of its Public Works Department. Otherwise it followed the poliry 
set down in writing by Lord Lugard and reflective of administration in all of 
the various British colonies. 
Our present task . . . is to promote the commercial and industrial 
progress of Africa, without too careful a scrutiny of the material gains 
to ourselves, that we may not incur the accusation of having inflicted 
upon Africa the grave economic wrong for which our commercial policy in 
India is alleged to have been responsible in that country. 
[But d]iscrimination .•. must be exercised in order to avoid 
deflecting labour which would be more profitably employed in growing or 
collecting raw materials for export than in competing ~o;ith the output of 
organised industry and power-driven machinery in civilised countries. 18 
The Government's reluctance to consider diversification into light in-
dustry was matched by a similar reluctance on .the part of the expatriate 
investors in the colony. Most of the companies' investments in Ghana were in 
the form of buildings and transport equipment. Buildings were necessary to 
house their goods, to store their cocoa, and for the conduct of retail trade. 
As well, the expatriate firms had to provide for the fairly extensive housing 
requirements of their own European staff. After World War I, there was also 
significant investment in fleets of lorries to carry cocoa and other exported 
and imported goods in competitio~ with the state-owned railways which were 
often not as able to reach far into the "bush" as were the light lorries. 
In 1959, the United Africa Company argued that no investment in indus-
trialization had taken place in West Africa under its aegis prior to World War 
II because the time for such investment was not propitious. 
In the early 1930s every ir-dustrial country in the ·world was concerned 
with avoiding unemployment and not duplicating existing manufacturing 
facilities, with the result that the time was not propitious for intro-
ducing industrialisation into tropical Africa. Indeed it is questionable 
whether at that stage the local population would have had tbe necessary 
18F. D. Lugard, The Du a Z Mandate i.n BP1: tis h Tropical Africa (London: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1929), pp. 509, 513-14. 
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skills or whether government finances could have tolerated the consequent 
loss in import duties. 
A further important factor was that prior to 1939 African purchasing 
power was so low that local markets vrere seldom large enough to susttdn 
an economic manufacturing unit •.•. Criticism of the lack of industri-
alisation in the past has largely arisen from ignorance of such factors 
as these. 19 
It was, in the Company's own words, simply uneconomic to start factories in 
West Africa when goods could be produced much more cheaply in Europe, where a 
trained labour force used to factory work already existed. The UAC saw itself 
" ••• primarily as a merchant" 20 (as presumably also did its competitors, with 
the exception of the chocolate manufacturing firms such as Cadbury) and there-
fore had no reason to expand into manufacture; indeed, during the 1930s it 
divested itself of many of its textile manufacturing concerns in Europe in 
order to be able to buy more freely and co~~etitively on the open market. 21 
Moreover, it may well have been true that while the Government occasion-
ally was willing to oppose expatriate business, for the benefit of Africans, in 
such matters as cocoa price, when it came to questions of industrializat~on 
Government was more conservative than the firms. The fear of loss of import 
revenues was real. As shown in Table 31 below, a very high proportion of Gov-
ernment revenue was derived from import duties. Although this proportion 
declined steadily from the inception of the colony until 1918; it remained 
high, varying from forty-five per cent to r;ixty per cent of the revenue, up to 
World War II. If indigenous industry were allowed to develop, imports and 
import duties 'vould decrease. The Government would be obliged to find an al-
ternative tax base, no easy task in a country which had steadfastly refused all 
19Uni ted Africa Company, Your Corrrpany, op. c·it. , p. 23. 
21 Ibid. 
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forms of hut tax, head tax or income ta,x sL1ce 1852. Merchants were constantly 
obliged to urge Government to support the few private industries in which they 
did invest. In 1930, for exa.'nple, the bm merchant members of the Legislative 
Council argued that Government should support the infant mineral water industry, 
arguing that its linkage effects were such as to benefit the colony, and more 
important, to provide GoverrLment revenue. 
Now I want you to realise how important it is to foster this [mineral 
water] industry; let us consider what it does for us. It employs local 
labour, the manufacturer I have in mind employs British ex-servicemen 
throughout. The ind1.lStry pays a good S'Jlll of money for the water it uses, 
it pays an import duty on practically I its ingredients and essences; 
its label is the only article it obtain3 free of duty; it distributes its 
manufactured article by railway and by road thus using petrol and paying 
railway freight. In fact, it is an asset to the colony ... 22 
But GoverrLment, protective of its customs revenues, was unwilling to make con-
cessions to encourage either the mineral water industry or the new brewery 
which was started in Accra in 1932 by Overseas Breweries Limited and whic~ was 
to employ a good 100 to 120 Africans. 23 Ev~n though the brewery was one of the 
few industries in Ghana, the Government expected it to pay the same duties and 
contribute as much to Gover1~ent revenues as imported beer. In 1933 an Ordi-
nance was passed imposing an excise tax of ls.6d. per gallon on beer, so that 
Overseas Breweries Limited would not have a.1y price advantages over imported 
beer and thus divert the beer market.24 
Some independent attempts by firn1s to diversify out of the traditional 
import-export trade did in fact take place, when it was thought that a sub-
stantial profit might be available. In the light of recent (1974) Ghanaian 
22Speech by Mr. Youngman, a European unofficial representative, to 
GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. 
23Governor to GCLegCo, 1 March 1932. 
2LtGCLegCo, 23 March 1933. 
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attempts to discover oil off the Atlantic Coast, it is interesting to note that 
oil explorations were carried out in the eolony in the early 1920s by the 
Societe Fran<;aise de Pet:ro1e, which had a concession over about 185 square 
miles of land in the Cape Coast area. The Societe was taken over in 1926 by 
Gold Coast Petroleum Ltd. (eventually to become part of the UAC empire), which 
spent a total of £85,434 drilling for oil, without success, although there were 
signs of oil all over the concession. In 1929, when the Company joined UAC, 
work on the concessions had stopped although rent, to the amount of £186 per 
annum, was still being paid to chiefs for the land. 2 5 
One attempt to revive palm oil exports and even to introduce palm oil 
processing was made in 1912, when Lever Brothers tried to obtain a monopoly on 
palm oil processing in Ghana. In the early part of the twentieth century, 
Lever Brothers, in its search for a constant, controllable supply of paln1 oil 
for its factories, had asked the Colonial Office for permission to buy la.nd in 
West Africa. Consistent with its overall land policy, the Colonial Office re-
fused permission but did offer Lever a twenty-one year concession in Sierra 
Leone, which was rejected. Lever then proceeded to invest in the Belgiar, Congo 
where terms were more profitable.26 But by 1912 Lever was anxious to begin 
processing palm oil in Africa instead of Europe, because although freight 
charges for processed oil were higher than for unprocessed palm nuts, and. al-
though there was no market for palm nut cake (the residue from the oil, used as 
cattle feed) either in Africa or in Britain, the quality of the oil processed 
in Africa was much higher than the quality processed in Europe after a long 
voyage on the high seas. 
25Report on the Gold Coast Petroleum Ltd., UAC Rankin file, report 36. 
26Digby Report, op. ait., p. 248. 
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Lever began negotiati::ms with the Colonial Office for the right to 3et 
up a processing factory and obtain a mono_;_)oly, over an area within a ten-~nile 
radius of its factory, of all :mechanical oil-palm processing. Africans within 
that ten-mile radius could bring their palm nuts to the factory for processing 
but they could not give their nuts to any other Europeans for processing nor 
could they use any mechanical means of processing themselves. 27 To facilitate 
the acquisition of such monopoly rights, in 1912 the Gold Coast Legislature 
passed the Palm Oil Ordinance, which empowered the Government 11 • • • to grant 
to any person, within such area not exceeding a circle within a ten-mile radius 
and for such period not exceeding twenty-one years • • • the exclusive right to 
construct and work mills, to be operated by mechanical power, for expressing or 
extracting oil from the pericarp of palm fruit." 28 
This Ordinance, however, was passed with considerable opposition. Some 
members of the Government objected to it because they were suspicious of Lever's 
possible influence in the Colony, and they were joined in their opposition both 
by Lever's European competitors and by Africans. The former argued that if 
Lever were to have a monopoly of palm processing, it would be impinging on the 
established nut export trade. 29 The latter objected because the Governor, not 
the chiefs in charge of the land, would have sole authority to grant proc.:;ssing 
monopolies, vri thout even consulting the native authorities. 30 The Ghanaian op-
position also viewed the monopoly as a threat to any future plans by Africans 
to process their own palm fruit by mechanical means. It so happened that in 
p. 252. 
28Ibid. , p. 245. 
29A statement to this effect was made by Mr. Grey, of the "Combine" firms, 
in GCLegCo, 28 January 1913. 
30Digby Report. op. oit., p. 250. 
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1912, coincidentally just when the :rr.·ocessing monopoly Ordinance was being ap-
proved by the Government, one W. Essu~an Gwira, an Afric~~ employee of the 
Government Agricultural Service, invented a machine which was cheap, easily 
manufactured, and easily operated, and which could have been used for small-
scale palm processing by Africans. The Aborigines' Rights Protection Society 
pressured the Government to invest funds in perfecting this machine for African 
use, and even went so far as to have its potential verified by an independent 
expert in London. The Government, however, not only refused to invest funds in 
the machine, but it denied its inventor leave from his job to perfect it. 31 At 
the same time the Government argued that concessions such as demanded by Lever, 
and as provided for in the Ordinance, were necessary because the "natives" had 
not yet reached the stage at which they could process oil themselves. 
Opposition to the processing monopoly Ordinance was so intense that it 
lay dormant for several years. In 1917, the Digby Commission investigating land 
law in West Africa recommended that the Ordinance be repealed. 32 The Ordinance 
was not repealed, however, but remained law and was used in 1930 to grant a 
palm oil processing monopoly in the Manya Krobo area to Lever's successor, the 
UAC. The Government in this instance not only granted UAC a monopoly of all 
processing within a radius of ten miles of its factory, but also agreed that if 
the projected supply of 3,000 tons of palm nuts per year could not be obt~ined, 
it would, once the supply fell to less than eighty per cent or 2,400 tons, pay 
UAC £1.16s. for every ton of fruit lacking. 33 This monopoly project eventually 
failed for lack of supplies: Africans simply did not bring in their palm nuts 
31 Documents concerning this invention can be found in GNA Adm.ll/1/223. 
32Digby Report, op. ait., p. 270. 
3 3statement by the Governor to GCLegCo, 17 Ii'ebruary 1930. 
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for processing but rather continued to sell them in their unprocessed form. 
The Government on its part refused to pay the promised subsidy because it 
argued that low world prices, not lack of supply, actually caused the eventual 
closing of UAC's processing mills.34 
Thus in general the Government was lax in its attempts to encourage 
diversification in Ghana in order to reduce its dependence on the world cocoa 
market. Projects designed to promote new agricultural products depended both 
on the whim of individual administrators ru1d on the overall economic situation 
of Ghana. When the economic situation was good and revenues (based mainly on 
cocoa exports and the consequent ability to import more) were high, the Gov-
ernment would try to encourage diversification. But in such periods of "boom, 
the African farmers, content with cocoa prices, were not interested in chang-
ing crops. In periods of depression, when they looked for new products to 
relieve their overdependence on cocoa, the Government had no revenues for new 
diversification schemes of any consequence. 
While Government may have been lax, however, in its attempts to diver-
sify the produce of Ghana, it did invest a considerable amount of energy in 
endeavours to increase the world price of cocoa by improving its overall 
quality. The issue of adulteration of produce and poor quality produce was an 
important one in Ghana. From the earliest days of export of prima~J products 
it was evident that poor methods of preparation, poor storage, and deliberate 
adulteration were seriously affecting the quality of goods such as palm oil 
and rubber. As early as 1898 an !!Ordinance to provide for the prevention of 
adulteration of palm kernels" was passed. 35 But palm cil and rubber were not 
34GCLegCo, 1 March 1932. 
35Reported in GCLegCo, Ordinance no. 15, 20 July 1898. 
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subject to any such legislation, although by 1905 it was becoming evident that 
at least the rubber trade vras seriously affected by poor quality. Rubber was 
being sold in a wet, sticky form instead of in the dry, "biscuit" form pre-
ferred by customers; palm oil was sometimes poorly prepared and dirty, and 
sometimes (in order to increase its bulk) it had added to it adulterants such 
as sand. The merchants pressed the Government to remedy the situation by pro-
viding agricultural instruction; the Government replied that it was unwilling 
to provide any instruction until and unless the merchants were willing to 
offer higher prices for higher quality produce. "It will be for the local 
merchants to co-operate with the Government by offering improved 
the better grades of rubber. 11 36 
ces for 
The adulteration issue, never ~ully resolved with regard to rubber 
(which declined drastically as an export after 1910) was to linger and to 
plague the cocoa export trade up to World War II. It was sometimes argued 
that there was no need for control of quality of Ghana cocoa, since it was 
used as a base in chocolate manufacture and there was no need for its quality 
to be raised since whatever the quality, it. could not compete with the finer 
grades of chocolate produced in Trinidad and Grenada. 37 Indeed, G. B. Kay 
argues this position in his The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana. 
On the issue of quality the department [of agriculture) was , •• 
incorrect ••• (It] was wrong because it mistook Ghanaian cocoa for a 
crop equivalent to West Indian cocoa, 'N"hereas the two are in fact quite 
36Letter from Mr. Antrobus, of the Colonial Office, to the JWAC, reported 
in JWAC, 10 June 1909. 
37According to A. W. Knapp, The Cocoa an,d Chocolate Industry (London: 
Isaac Pi tman and Sons, 1930), Gold Coast C)COa was of the Calbacillo variety, 
inferior to both the F'orastero and the Criollo. :Modern manufacturers, be 
maintained, wanted an 11 • • • absolutely standard product in large quanti ties 
for sale at a reasonable price--hence the tendency to use those not too ex-
pensive cacaos of which a large, reliable, and regular supply is available. 11 
West African cocoa was regularly used as a fifty per cent backir.g in cocoa 
production. P. 97. 
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distinct and have separate uses in the confectionery industry . • • 
[H]ad it understood more about the uses to which Ghanaian cocoa was put, 
it might not have persisted with the groundless belief that improvements 
in quality would have to lead to substantial increases in price •• 
Both farmers and the European buying :firms knew that the return on 
improved quality was often less thm1 the cost of grading •••• 38 
Kay is correct in arguing that Ghanaian cocoa could never reach the 
quality of or, more correctly, could never become the same type as, West 
Indian cocoa. Nevertheless there were other reasons for being concerned with 
quality. Ghanaian cocoa was often of such poor quality that it simply could 
not be sold on the New York cocoa market, as the United States' Government 
maintained more stringent :food control measures than did the British and 
Continental Governments. 39 Until the First World War, much of Ghana's poorer 
quality cocoa was shipped to Germany, instead of to the American and British 
markets, apparently because Germany had the resources and equipment to process 
the poorer quality whereas the other two nations did not. 40 During the war, 
Britain was obliged to take in all the imports of cocoa (exports to Germany 
having of course been banned) without the facilities for dealing with th2m. 
It may well have been that, as the merchants argued, there was no commercial 
demand {at least until the Americans instituted their regulations) for differ-
ent grades of cocoa. But there was a great deal of dissatisfaction about 
Gha<'1aian cocoa, which often did not reach even the lowest standard which the 
merchants wished to buy. 
As early as 1905 the Accra Chamber of Commerce complained of the poor 
quality of cocoa to the Colonial Secretary, and asked for a system of produce 
38K 't 4 ay , op • 01., • , p • 1 . 
39In 1925-26 the United States rejected several shiploads of Gold Coast 
cocoa because it contained mouldy and wor~y beans. de Graft-Johnson, op. ait., 
p. 56. 
40LonCC, Twenty-8eaond Annua7. Report ( 1903), pp. 62-63. 
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It is an undisputed fact that the quality of Cocoa grown in this 
Colony is naturally of m.ost excellent quality and that if proper 
attention were given to its cultivation and preparation that it would 
rank very high indeed in the markets of Europe and the United States 
of America. 41 
While the business community constantly argued with the Government that " 
even the best Gold Coast cocoa could not be compared, so far as flavour was 
295 
concerned, with that from Sao Thome and Grenada in the manufacture of choco-
late . • • n42 they acknowledged that Ghana cocoa suffered, within its OWl?. 
cZass, because of its impurities and especially because much of it, improperly 
fermented and dried, was sold "wet." Slate and weevils were two devils of the 
cocoa industry, even before the cocoa blight became so prevalent in the 1930s. 
It was known that Gold Coast cocoa often did not come up to the levels of 
purity demanded even in the English markets. Between 1928 and 1931, for in-
stance, Gold Coast shipments of cocoa averaged eighty-five to eighty-eig~1t per 
cent purity, while the Liverpool market demanded no more than ten per cent 
impurities. 43 The firms were concerned especially about wet cocoa. In March 
1936 the London Chamber of Commerce received a letter from the Hon. Mr. 
Stockdale, Agricultural Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
inquiring hm-r the elimination of wet cocoa would affect the price to the pro-
ducer. The Chamber replied that 
a) the world price would rise as more cocoa could be sold as "Gooi 
Fermented Accra. . •. The improvement in the world market price would inevi-
tably be reflected in the price paid to the producer. n44 
41Accra Chamber of Commerce to the Colonial Secretary, 29 June 1905. 
Reported in .TWAC, 4 October 1905. 
42statement by Mr. Holloway, of J. S. Fry and Sons, in LonCC, 5 January 
1931. 
43Speech by Mr. Auchinleck, Gold Coast Director of Agriculture, to 
LonCC, 15 June 1931. 
44LonCC, 2 March 1936. 
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b) Gold Coast cocoa 1vould be more ~ompetitive with cocoa from else-
where. 
c) With regard to \vet cocoa " • • at present, when 'wet 1 cocoa is 
bought a rough estimate is made of moisture content and a margin deducted from 
the current price for dry cocoa, probably to the disadvantage of the producer 
as few firms care to handle wet cocoa. 11 45 
d) Most defects, such as mould a~d weevil, rise because cocoa is wet. 
Dry cocoa would result in one commercially perfect grade. 
d) There was no commercial demand for different grades of cocoa. 46 
Despite, therefore, their public pronouncements as to the irrelevance 
of cocoa grading, the firms were aware that a minimum standard of purity was 
essential and that it was not always available in sufficient quantities. The 
Nowell Commission found that the firms did indeed distinguish, in their own 
buying practices, between different grades of cocoa. 
Sufficient proof that all cocoa is not 1 just cocoa' is provided by the 
facts that some of the firms attach importance to their own private 
grades and that differences in quality are recognized in the official 
forms of contract in use in the world markets. The point was also ad-
mitted to us in effect by some of the firms' representatives who 
complained that 25 per cent or more of the cocoa tendered in a normal 
season is below Government Grade 1. 47 
Moreover, despite Kay 1 s argument that farmers knew that returns on im-
proved quality were often less than the cost of grading, it would seem that at 
least a few Africans were concerned that the quality should be improved. 
Konor Mate Kole of Manya Krobo, for instance, who consistently produced high 
quality cocoa on his own farms and instituted quality control measure among 
45Ibid. 
46Jbid. 
47Nowell Corr...mission, op. crit., p. 36. 
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his people, just as consistently received higher prices for his cocoa than did 
other Gold Coast farmers. 48 Konor Mate Kole, however, sold most of his cocoa 
to Cadbury, which was known to encourage higher quality cocoa because it was 
buying directly for its own chocolate factories. Aware that other farmers who 
tried to upgrade their quality were not so fortunate in their buyers, Konor 
Mate Kale urged that the buyers should discriminate consistently between dif-
ferent grades Bnd that, if they did so, better cocoa would be produced. 
If the merchants will instruct their agents to discriminate, when 
buying, between the different qualities of cocoa, paying high prices 
for cocoa of good quality and refusing all the bad product, they ••• 
will be doing a good deal for the industry. As soon as the natives 
realize that no cocoa, except of exceptionally good quality, is 
accepted by the merchants they will take trouble to produce good cocoa. 
The buyers for merchants are in the habit of following and urging the 
farmers to sell all kinds of cocoa to them. They do not care for the 
quality as for the quantity. 49 
It would seem, then, that while the firms ackno-vrledged their need. for 
good quality cocoa, they were nevertheless willing to accept any cocoa. 
Partly this may have been a function of the high demand for cocoa on the world 
level; no doubt it was also a function of the fact that some countries -were 
willing to accept a lower quality than others and moreover that poor quality 
cocoa could always be mixed with better quality to produce an acceptable grade 
when necessazy. But the crucial point here seems to be, not that better 
quality cocoa could not have fetched a better price, but that the firms were 
in a position to dictate what price would be paid to farmers no matter what 
48Mr. Grey, Buropean unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 6 October 1913, "The 
merchants differentiate between the price of well and badly prepared cocoa and 
the native Unofficial Member Konor Mate Kale will bear me out that he has for 
years realized from £1 to £3 per ton more for his cocoa, than the natives in 
his district producing inferior qualities." 
49Speeches by Konor Nate Kole in GCLegCo, 1 December 1914 and 30 October 
1915. 
0 the quality. Konor Mate Kole was the exception, and part of the reason why he 
was paid more may have been the very friendly terms on which he was with one 
of the Cadbury brothers. Most other farmers, whatever they produced, however 
good their product, were obliged to accept the prices which the firms set; as 
Chapter IV demonstrates, periods of competition among buyers in Ghana were 
brief and normally only one price was offered by all firms. As one firm 1 s 
spokesman said "When the price is high anything sells; when it is low, the 
good sells no better than the bad. '' 50 The expatriate firms bought Ghana 1 s 
cocoa at prices they dictated, and sold it on the international market to 
countries or manufacturers who needed bulk cocoa. While they knew there was a 
demand for better quality bulk cocoa than Ghana produced, it was not worth 
their while to promote upgrading of exports when, with monopoly buying, they 
could make good profits no matter how low a price Ghana's poor quality product 
commanded on the international market. 
The expatriate firms were unwilling to take any of the responsibility 
of quality controls upon themselves. 'lbey were willing neither to offer price 
differentials nor to accept penalties by the Government if they bought poor 
quality cocoa. They were, however, willing to accept quality controls which 
they did not have to pay for, as they knew they could better prices for 
higher quality cocoa on the world market. They constantly urged penalization 
of the Africe~s who sold poor quality cocoa, not of the Europeans who bought 
it. In 1905 the JWAC complained to the Governor of the Gold Coast about the 
poor quality of both cocoa and rubber. "It has been said that the low quality 
of that produce was the result of the attitude of the merchants. The merchants 
50Edward J. Organ, 11The Gold Coast Cocoa Industry and Its Recent Develop-· 
ments 11 (Bournville Works: Publicatlons Department ( Cadbury Limited), June 
1921) ' p. 14. 
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did what they could to buy the best produce possible but they could only buy 
what was offered. " 51 The Governor replied that 
••• to a very great extent it was the fault of the merchants 
themselves, because some of the very best of the planters complained 
that having taken the trouble to grow their produce properly and to 
send it down to Accra in good condition they had not received six pence 
more than the hinterland n~::ti ves. 52 
This type of debate, between the administrative and commercial classes in 
I 
Ghana, was to be a constant refrain for the next thirty years, as each tried 
to place responsibility for what was considered a serious problem upon the 
other's shoulders. The firms were all in favour of fining Africans who tried 
to sell poor quality produce; they even suggested that the merchants be ap-
pointed graders and be empow·ered to fine farmers on their own authority. But 
they were not willing to accept any fining system for themselves. 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the expatriate firms gradually 
began to come round to accepting some sort of system of cocoa inspection and 
grading as it became evident that too much poor quality cocoa was be:ing sold. 
They favoured inspection up-country, so that the first producer or the African 
cocoa broker would take the loss if the cocoa were rejected. The Government 
favoured inspection at ports of shipment, "rhich would place the burden of loss 
upon the firms, who might have cocoa rejecoced after they had paid for it. In 
1923 the basic position was that the Government wanted inspection at ports, 
the Farmers 1 Associations wanted inspection up-country (but presumably on the 
assumption that inspection would be accompanied by grading and higher prices 
for higher grades), and the merchants want~d no inspection at all.5 3 By 1930, 
51 statement by Mr. J. H. Batty of MLLlers and Swanzy in JWAC, 4 October 
1905. 
52Reply by Governor Rodger in ibid. 
53ManCC, 14 March 1923. 
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especially because of competition f1·om Nigeria where cocoa was inspected, the 
Chambers of Commerce in England were in fav-our of a modified inspection system 
but specified that it was " ... essential that the inspection should be car-
ried out before merchants actually bought the cocoa, in other words, it shotlid 
take place up-country.54 
By 1930, when the above statement was made, a system of voluntary inspec-
tion at the ports had already been in operation for three years. In January 
1927 voluntary inspection was initiated at five ports, and by 1928 all ship-
ments were being inspected and given certificates of quality according to both 
American and European standards.55 In 1930 a cocoa cess bill, which would have 
imposed an extra export tax of lOs/ton on cocoa (seven shillings to go to a 
cocoa publicity scheme in Europe and the other three to up-country inspection) 
was defeated in the Legislative Council. By 1934, however, the situation was 
serious enough that Bills to provide for inspection and qua_l:ity control cf 
cocoa and copra 1-1ere finally passed, although palm oil and kernels were still 
not subject to any control. 56 In 1937, the Government introduced a scheme for 
the presale inspection and postsale grading of all cocoa, with inspection to 
take place up-country by inspectors trained by the Department of Agriculture 57 
(thus refusing an earlier suggestion that the cocoa inspectors be the cocoa 
buyers of the merchant firms). 58 But the cocoa boycott of 1937-38, follovred by 
54LonCC, 15 April 1930. One member argued that 11 • • • Gold Coast cocoa 
had found it difficult to compete with Nigerian cocoa owing to the improvement 
of the quality of the latter as a result of the system of inspection. • • . " 
55Governor to GCLegCo, 15 February 1929. 
56GCLegCo, 19 March 1934. 
57Governor to GCLegCo, 15 March 1937. 
58Suggestion made by Stockdale to JWAC, reported in LonCC, 7 April 1936. 
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World War II and the introduction of the Cocoa Marketing Board, reduced all of 
these many plans to a relic of the past. In effect, during the entire period 
of colonial rule to 1939, cocoa was being sold in an uninspected, ungraded 
form. As long as Ghana was the only country to supply Calbacillo cocoa in 
large amounts, the firms could get away with supplying such poor quality; but 
as soon as competition from Nigeria was evident, reforms had to be made. 
It should be noted that even during the brief period when some sort of 
inspection was taking place, there was no compulsion on the firms to get rid of 
cocoa adjudged to be substandard. "If examination by the Department yields 
figures which do not agree with the grade marks, the exporter will not be re-
quired to change the marks. The only action of the Department will be to 
communicate with the exporter notifying him of. the differences. " 59 Thus it was 
left to the discretion of the exporters as to whether or not to adhere to regu-
lations. No doubt this also explained the very common practice of watering 
good cocoa with rejected cocoa, so that the final mix adhered to the lowest 
standard. 60 
Failing to control cocoa quality either by compulsion or by persuasion 
of the producing and marketing communities, the Government turned to officially-
supervised but voluntarily-organized co-operatives as the solution to Ghana's 
economic ills. There was much pressure from educated Africans on the Govern-
ment to improve the quality of agricultural education and to provide the 
facilities whereby Africans could remove themselves from the complete control 
of the expatriate firms. The attempts made by the Aborigines' Rights Protection 
tion 
59JH: jacket no. 92, document dated 9 October 1936, concerning inspec-
Ku.masi. 
60 Interview with a former African buyer for W. Bart.holemew, Accra, 
August 1974. The practice vas also noted in GCLegCo, 19 March 1935. 
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Society to sta.rt an agricultural training programme early in the century61 had 
by 1937 still not yielded any concrete results. Ghana, an agricultural country, 
provided little by way of training for its farmers . 
. . . Government, ••. knowing that this country is an agricultural 
country • • . has failed to provide for us an Agricultural College 
capable of affording the youths of this country such scientific knowl-
edge of agriculture as will act as a bulwark against the disaster which 
has been threatening us all the time and of which we have heard so 
often. 6 2 
The Government's reply to such complaints by Africans was that in fact it would 
train Africans, if it could find farmers who were willing to learn and who were 
responsible. Farms were often worked by hired labour, or else they changed 
hands so frequently that there was no point in training whoever was in posses-
si on. 
So many farms are left more or less completely in charge of migrant 
labourers, and so many are in the hands of receivers whose only interest 
is to gather the crops, that there is nobody, in a large number of cases, 
permanent enough to receive education or to apply it. Even where the 
farmer himself occupies his farr11 the incentive to careful cultivation and 
harvesting is frequently removed by his having pledged the usufruct as 
security for a loan.63 
While it might be easy for Government to ignore complaints about agri-
cultural facilities made by the educated spokesmen of the Gold Coast through 
official channels, it was less easy for it to ignore the attempts made by often 
less educated, but far more active, Gold Coast farmers and entrepreneurs to 
organize co-O]Jerative business ventures designed to step outside the tradition-
al trading pattern of the colony and to deal direct with cocoa consumers, 
especially in New York. Crumerican buyers were anxious to make direct contact 
61 see Chapter II. 
62Speech by Mr. Korsah, Africar. unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 15 March 
1937, PP· 94-95· 
63No'·Tell CO"!'""}.' ~Sl'on Repo""t op n~'t 2] <. -=· - ~ ' . '-' '· . ' p. . . 
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with African producers to circlUllvent tbe British and Continental monopoly on 
buying within Ghana.) The Government v:i.ewe1 such organizations wit.h 
assuming that the members >wnld not have the resources or the to 
deal direct with foreign markets. By there were already a few small 
trading and thrift societies in the Gold Coast, for example the Aburi-Nsawam 
Cacao Growers Association and the Abokobe Farmers Association. The Government 
argued that "To a friendly cri tic, their defects appear to be that the contri-
butions of members are far too large, and that they have given too little 
attention to standardising and improving the product in which they deal, and 
laid too much stress on the purely commercial side." 64 
It would seem that Government with regard to indigenous self-help 
associations, of whatever kind, was motivated by two factors; a genuine sus-
picion, with some backing in reality, tbat local farmers would be cheated or 
would simply not be able to manage their own finances; and pressure from the 
expatriate trading firms who insisted that African organizations should not 
with the trading networks which they themselves so successfully 
monopolized. The Government turned to the idea of establishing a 
movement as a means of providing agricultural education and self-help pro-
grammes (with the idea of eventually starting a co-operative bank) 65 without 
interfering with existing trade relationships. It also decided that the best 
means of improving cocoa quality would be through co-operatives.66 Farmers 
64Report by G. G. Auchinleck, Deputy Director of Agriculture, on Co-oper-
ative Societies in the Gold Coast, in GNA Adm.ll/1436. 
65
" •• , whatever be the final form assumed by the co-operative movement 
locally, it is certain that a small peasant farmer, working three or four acres 
and without valid title deeds, cannot be, as an individual, an acceptable cus-
tomer to an-y t-ype of bank. His first step must be to join a society which may 
later be able to borrow on the joint security of its members." Statement in 
GCLegCo, 23 February 1931. 
66Governor to GGLegCo, 1 March 
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were to be taught business methods by honest, reliable, colonial officials, 
not by persons such as one \Hn:i.fried Tete-Ansa, a Ghanaian entrepreneur, whose 
unusual, if indigenous, methods of business practice were beyond the realm of 
the acceptable. In 1931 Tete-Ansa came up with a scheme to start district 
co-operatives under paramount chiefs vrhich would eventually amalgamate and 
engage in collective marketing.6 7 
Schemes such as that proposed by Tete-Ansa were regarded with genuine 
fear by the local expatriate firms, who wanted to be assured that all eo-
operatives, whether privately or publicly organized, would be kept clearly 
away from the trading and marketing end of the cocoa industr.y- &~d engage only 
in productioG. ~~en the Gold Coast Co-operative Societies Bill was under dis-
cussion in 1930, the London Chamber of Commerce stated its position thus. 
The Bill provided that any ten persons whose object was the promotion 
of the economic interests of themselves in accordance with co-operative 
principles could have the:rr..selves formed into a co-operative society. In 
so far as co-operative societies -vrere formed for the purpose of improving 
the production of cocoa, we should favour them, but under the Bill, 
Societies could be formed for trading and other purposes and as they 
were granted special protection, it would enable them to compete unfairly 
against the merchants houses already established. 6 8 
In fact, when it instituted the co-operative societies, the Government 
assured that all cocoa would continue to be sold through the local firms. The 
idea •ras simply to improve the coco:::t quality in order to obtain a better price, 
and the firms agreed to pay a premium on the better quality cocoa which was 
sold. The actual co-operative movement was started in 1927, and by 1936 there 
were some 4oo societies with 9,000 members, marketing about 4,000 tons of cocoa 
67West African 'l'imes, Accra, 16 July 1931. Clipping in GNA Adrn. 11/1436. 
For more information on Tete-Ansa, see Cha.pter VII. 
68LonCC, 2 June 1930. 
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per annum (barely two per cent of the total cocoa crop). 69 Such a small move-
ment could hardly have provided a serious ~hreat to the firms, yet there was 
intense opposition to it. ·Some Europeans actively sought to subvert the eo-
operatives. In 1932 a Government Assistant Inspector of Plants had to file a 
complaint against one Mr. Hartland, a UAG agent, who refUsed to deal with eo-
operatives and asked to deal with individual farmers instead . 
. he has no interest for the co-operative Societies' cacao as he 
could get cacao at a cheap rate from the farmers direct. . • . He further 
directed his attention to one Thomas Die, a Treasurer of the Anyinam 
Go-operative Society, ..• [and claimed] that the Department of Agricul-
ture is trading for itself; and is not assisting the farmers in any form, 
and that the Department will do the farmer no good by instituting the 
Co-operative movement) but that the C-o·.rernment is seeking the mea.11s to 
know the output of each farmer and to impose taxation on each farmer hence 
the Co-operative Societies are being instituted, therefore the Treasurer 
should try to discontinue the Co-opera"~i ve movement over this area, and 
therefore if any firm offers the highent tender the Society should not 
just sell the cacao to the said firm, but that he Mr. J. A. Hartland 
should be notified so as to offer more and clear the cacao. 70 
Government cy was to offer the cocoa produced by co-operatives for sale by 
tender to the highest bidder. This policy annoyed the firms who, although 
they always pressured for better quality, were unwilling to pay for it. Many 
African farmers left the co-operatives because the price being paid for their 
cocoa simply did not cover the extra expenses of producing the high quality 
which Government agricultural officers had assured them would be rewarded. 
The highest premium which the firms were Wllling to pay was 6d. per load, or 
approximately the amount of brokers' connnission which they saved by buying 
through the C~vernment (that is, they were not actually paying for higher 
quality at all) , while the average extra e},:penses of co-operative cocoa 'l·rere 
69Shephard, op. ait., p. 125. 
70Report included in GNA, Adm.29/1/91. 'lne prejudice of Government 
officials is evident in a reply to this report dated 8 December 1932. "Conduct 
of this_ sort we expect from certain African Brokers but not from Europeans 
holding responsible commercial positions." 
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11 3,i.d. per load. 71 Moreover the expatriates were in the habit of distributing 
the buying of co-operative cocoa to each firm in turn; it was considered a 
burden, not an advantage. The 1937 Cocoa Pool Agreement 72 included the fol-
lowing terms. "Co-operative Cocoa. Local Committee to allocate and decide 
which member should take it in turn; a fixed premi urn to be paid, not exceeding 
6d. per load--maximum to be fixed by local committee ." 73 Some farmers alleged 
that 
••• before buying Co-operative Society Cocoa the Merchants depress 
the public purchasing price by 6d. and then buy the Co-operative Socie-
ties Cocoa at the true market price, and then immediately afterwards 
depress the price again to give the im~ression that they are paying 6d. 
more for Co-operative Societies Cocoa. 4 
But in their defense the firms argued that in fact not all co-operative cocoa 
was of high quality; some was definitely of poor quality and they suspected 
that nonco-operative cocoa was being included in co-operative lots in order to 
obtain the premium. 
It was easy for the firms to make such accusations as the above, 9...r:td to 
refuse to pay more than 6d. per load premi urn, since in order to placate them 
the Government had agreed that only the principal European firms, not the 
smaller firms or any African firms which might emerge, would be allowed to sub-
rnit bids for co-operative cocoa. Winifried Tete-Ansa complained of this 
practice thus: 
That section 29 of the Societies Ordinance precludes them from dealing 
with any outside person or Firm without the consent of the Governor which 
71Nowell Commission Report, op. ait., pp. 42-43. 
72See Chapter VII. 
73Cad: 288/12. 
74Report by the Corr.unissioner of the Eastern Province to the Colonial 
Secretar.t, 5 July 1938. In GNA Adm. 29/6/14. 
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directly introduces administrative interference in trade, and those re-
strictions become a fillip to the 'Pool' and gamblers in our Cocoa who 
after speculating all the year round will be able to fix the local prices 
for the cocoa, practically under the auspices of Government to the detri-
ment of the Farmers. 
The Societies do not introduce corr.petition which is very necessary in 
any industry, but rather control agricultural products indirectly, there--
fore controlling the lands yielding those cocoa crops for the benefit of_ 
the local merchants, meaning the Pool, with the huge capital behind it. 7 ~ 
Tete-Ansa's view, as an independent cocoa buyer, is perhaps somewhat biased, 
but it is confirmed by J. C. de Graft-Johnson in his African Experiment. 
When selling the cocoa of co-operators, they [the Government] 
circularized all the principal merchants, secured tenders, and, without 
consulting the peasant proprietors, decided which tender to accept. 
Gold Coast Africans asserted that European firms 1-rere favoured in these 
sales. However, although there was no deliberate discrimination against 
African merchants, the fact that only the principal exporting merchru1ts 
were circularized, and that these were all Europeans, resulted in the 
virtual exclusion of all the smaller African exporters from the sale of 
co-operative cocoa. 76 
The firms, then, were able to subvert the growth of the co-operative 
movement inasmuch as they both limited the movement's possibilities for expa.'1-
sion into new aspects of the cocoa industry, specifically trade~ and refused 
to pay adequate differential prices •..rhich would cover the higher costs of eo-
operative cocoa. Their attitude to co-operatives was entirely consistent with 
their general attitude to the problem of quality control. For the large ex-
patriate firms, Ghana was primarily a supplier of low-cost, large quantities 
of cocoa. W11ile the firms acknowledged a need for better quality cocoa, they 
were unwilling to pay for it. Government attempts at diversification a..Ylcl 
quality control, such as they were, could not withstand the indifference and 
sometimes hostility of the expatriate commercial sector. The firms' 
75Quoted in the West Afncan Times, Accra, 18 July 1931. Clipping in 
GNA Adm.ll/1436. 
76op. a-it., p. 69~ italics in original. 
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unwillingness to invest in better quality cocoa was only one aspect of their 
general unwillingness to invest in developlient in Ghana, 
2. Investment in Ghana 
A Government, however benign, cannot operate without funds. Colonial 
Governments in the British Empire were constantly constrained by an Imperial 
policy which decreed that colonies must be self-supporting, that they should 
contribute to, but not take from, the Impe~ial Treasury. Without large 
amo~~ts of administrative funds, the Ghana Government had to look for alterna-
tive sources of financing. But the colony as a whole had little to offer the 
European investor, in the area of gold-mining. The import-export trade 
was a low-cost industry which required little in the way of flmding. Rail-
ways, such as they were, were costly, and the few miles of track in Ghana were 
not a priority investment for the coupon-clippers of the Western world. Most 
of the financing of the Gold Coast colony 'lvas, in the end, done by its African 
inhabitants themselves through their (indi~ect) payment of import and export 
duties. 
As has already been pointed out in Chapter V, colonial Governments were 
not entrusted with their own monetary policy. They were not allowed to create 
currency and thus to create credit; rather, the WACB was compelled to keep re-
serves of 100 per cent or more. The budget had at all times to be balanced 
and deficit financing was not allowed. The Government was allowed to issue 
bonds and to borrow on the London market, 1mt its highest priority in terms of 
spending was its repayment of the public debt; development projects were cur-
tailed if the public debt was not paid, 
On the other hand, the Imperial Government, while limiting the amount 
which it was willing to allow the colonial Government to spend, did not c-:>mpen-
sate for these limits by gi v'ing that Government grants. In Table 28 it can be 
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c Table 28. Government Hevenue by Selected Sources (Percentage Figures), 1900-1939 77 
Grants from Interest on Rents of 
Year Imperial Invest::nents Government Lands Royalties 
Goverm:tent and Loans and Buildings 
1900 13 0 0 
1901 5 0 1 
1902 4 1 0 1 
1903 4 0 0 0 
19014 5 0 0 1 
1905 2 0 0 
1906 1 0 0 1 
1907 1 0 0 3 
1908 0 0 2 
1909 0 1 3 
1910 0 0 2 
1911 0 0 2 
1912 0 0 2 
1913 0 0 2 
1914 1 0 2 
1915 1 0 0 ,_ 
1916 1 0 1 
1917 2 0 1 
1918 2 0 2 
1919 1 0 1 
1920 9 0 1 
1921 5 0 1 
1922 2 0 1 
1923 1 0 1 
1924 1 0 0 
1 0 1 
1926 4 0 1 
1927 3 0 1 
1928 3 0 1 
1929 3 1 1 
1930 1 5 1 3 
2 4 1 3 
1932 0 3 1 2 
1933 0 3 1 1 
1934 0 3 1 3 
1935 0 3 1 2 
1936 0 3 1 1 
1937 0 4 1 3 
1938 1 4 1 2 
1939 5 . 1 1 4 
-·-
c 77source: Based on Raw Figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 24a, "Govern-ment Revenue by Source ( 1900-1960), 11 pp. 348-55. 
N.B. -=none, 0 = sQme but less than 0.5 :per cent. 
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seen that the percentage of Ghana Government revenue which came from grants 
from the Imperial Government was miniscule, except for 1900 (and the pre-1900 
period), The percentage steadily declined between 1901 and 1907, and from 
1908 to 1929 nothing at all was given to the colony in the form of direct 
grants. The Depression-exerted needs of the colony after 1929, combined with 
the new "development" policy of the home Government in the same period, as 
exemplified in the Colonial Development Act, resulted in small grants during 
the 1930s, actually reaching as high as five per cent of the colonial revenue 
in 1939. But on the whole, a most conservative policy was espoused by the 
home Government. 
The trustee was not to use his own money to make the ward's estate 
more productive. The most he might do was to use his own credit to 
guarantee a loan. Colonial revenues must be able to meet the service 
of any loans they were permitted to raise, and the salaries of any 
staff they were permitted to employ. 7 8 
The "trustee" was of course the Imperial Government, while the ward was the 
colony. In fact the trustee hesitated to guarantee all but the safest of 
loans, and would not guarantee loans of substantial sums of money to finance 
development projects. Development was to be financed out of colonial revenues; 
since these revenues, as will be shown below (Table ) , consisted primarily 
of import and export duties the capacity for development fluctuated with the 
state of the import-export economy. 
The Ghana development policy, according to Peter Sederburg, also de-
pended very much on the individual Governor, Aside from Guggisberg, most 
Governors were conservative in their policy and preferred to have a balai'1ced 
budget or a surplus. Between 1901 and 1939, in Ghana, there were fifteen 
78Kenneth Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of Britiah 
Colonial PolJoy bev.JJeen the ~lars (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
p. 26. 
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years of deficit and twenty-three of s.urplus.. ''. • • the period as a whole ran 
a surplus of approximately £2~439,000 despite a world war and two trade depres-
sions." 7 9 The Gold Coast did raise several loans on the London market for 
capital projects, but had to pay the high rate of interest of four to six per 
cent. Sederburg describes the general revenue and expenditure policy of the 
Government in the following way. 
The Gold Coast Government appeared to be most interested in its own 
self-maintenance as an order-preserving framework 1-ri thin which the 
foreign firms could operate fairly free from restrictions. These 
operations were to be achieved at minimum cost to the British taxpayer. 
• . . This general goal was manifested through the pursuit of inter-
mediate ends indicated by the expenditure data. 'l'hus, state operations 
were kept simple; the colonial regimes' role in social and economic 
development was relatively circumscribed, as shown by a low rate of 
capital expenditure. There was practically no state involvement in 
directly productive activities, such as agriculture and industry. 80 
Hhile the Government received little by way of income from its Imperial 
trustee, equally little cruae its way as a result of its dealings with the ex-
patriate commercial classes, either through rents or royalties. In Chapter II 
it was argued that African landmrners in Gh·ma lost a substantial amount of 
their potential income because, until 1919, rents on urban land were paid to 
the Government, not to the original owners of the properties. Nevertheless, 
the sum, while it may have been significant to an emerging African landowning 
class, was of li ttJ e significance to the Government. Rents on Government lands 
and buildings never constituted more than one per cent of the colonial 
revenue. A few thousand pounds, never more than £30,000 a year, was all 
that the rents amounted to in absolute terms.. Similarly royalties on mining 
and timber concessions, pegged at five per cent of pretax profits, varied 
79Peter C. Sederberg, "The Gold Coast under Colonial Rule: An ExpEndi-
ture Analyq,il?./ .4f;ri;ean Studies Review., vol. 14 (1971} , p, 192. 
80L~ .. d 200 01,. • ' p. . 
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between only one and four per cent of Goverrooent revenue. 
The expatriate firms might have tried to argue that their contribution 
to the colony as a whole, not the actual Government, was far more signifi-
cant than appeared at first glance, since their entrepreneurial activity within 
the territory had backward and forward linkages which stimulated growth. In 
fact, however, it seems that the expatriate firms were essentially parasitic. 
Aside from providing a few opportunities for a brokerage class, and a group of 
small shopkeepers and agents who sold the goods which the Europeans imported, 
they did little to stimulate the economy. No industrial production was needed 
to facilitate trade, nor was any processing, either of goods to be exported or 
of goods imported, engaged in. 
Moreover, very little investment was required to maintain the European 
retailing establishments necessary to induc::: the African to buy cheap manufac-
tured goods. The sole investments made by the trading firms (aside frorr. 
investments by some of the firms in their o·..;rn transport businesses) were in 
buying and selling stations ("mucky little stores"), 81 a few sheds for storage 
of cocoa along the docks, and bungalows for their European staffs. i-v'hile it is 
difficult to obtain accurate figures of total investments, the following table 
gives some indication of investments by some large European firms in Ghana just 
prior to their amalgamation into the UAC, The total investment in all of 
Africa in 1928 by both Miller and Swanzy, t.:1e two oldest and largest European 
firms in Ghana, was only £628,729. Similarly, in 1937 Cadbury, J. S. Fry, and 
Rowntree had a total investment in the Coas·;:, of only about £175,000, invested 
" in the provision of stores, offices, weighing apparatus, transport, 
living quarters, and other necessary equipment." 82 
81These words were used by a former E'.lropean eocoA. buyer when describing 
his companyls premises in an intervievr. Accra, August 1974. 
82cad: 288/74. 
c 
c 
Table 29. Values of' Properties of Various Firms in Ghana 
30 September 192883 
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======================~~=====~==·=-s~-==c=w ..==:=-=-~·~====·==-=-============================= 
Company Value of Property (£) 
African and Eastern Trade Corp. 
Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Co. 
F. and A. Swanzy Ltd. 
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Co. Ltd. 
Millers Limited 
Tarquah Trading Co. 
161,483 
23,256 
357,905 (all African properties) 
6,656 
270,824 (all African properties) 
59,039 
The only significant amounts of money invested in Ghana by expatriate 
businessmen were to be found in the gold mines. Even with regard to minE:s, 
however, it must be kept in mind that large numbers of mines existed in name 
only, or, even when their nominal capital seemed to be significant, their 
actual subscribed capital was a very minor amount. Between 1880 and 190h, for 
example, some 476 companies ·..rere registered for mining and exploration ir. West 
Africa, especially Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Their nominal capital tot~lled 
some £43 million, but much of this capital was never subscribed. Despite the 
mining booms only thirteen compa..'1ies reported any production in 1904, anc. only 
four of these had produced over £10,000 worth of gold. 84 Nevertheless, mining 
was a substantial percentage of investment: Frank.el estimates that of all the 
non-Government capital issues in London for Africa as a whole between 1900 a.lld 
1936, capital issues from mining and exploration companies constituted sixty-
six per cent.85 
83UAC Rank.in file: Reports. It is possible .that some of these proper-
ties were overvalued as the purpose of the valuation was to indicate the worth 
of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation upon its amalgamation with the 
Niger Company in 1929. 
84Frankel, op. ai t., p. 162. 
BSibid., p. 181. 
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Frankel presents the following fignres for the total capital invested in 
Ghana between 1870 and 1936, dates roughly corresponding with the dates of this 
thesis. 
Table 30. Amount of Capital Invested 
in Ghana, 1870-193686 
Public Listed Capital 
Private Listed Capital 
Total Listed Capital 
£13,462,000 
£20,160,000 
Nonlisted Capital (estimate five per cent of 
listed) 
Total Capital 
£33,622,000 
£ 1,681,000 
£35,303,000 
= 
With the limited amount of capital which it was able to raise, the Goverr;.ment 
was obliged to seek alternate sources of financing for its activities. Taxa-
tion was the answer, although direct taxation was not possible, as both 
Europeans and Africans opposed it. The only experiment in direct taxation 
which had ever been implemented in the Gold Coast took place in 1852, when the 
Governor, aft.=r consulting with the various paramount chiefs along the coast, 
imposed a head tax of one shilling on every man, woman, and child in the 
Colony. It was hoped that this tax would finance British expenditures, id th as 
much as £20,000 per annum, but it aroused much indifference and some active 
protest, so that the highest figQre ever raised was £7,567 in 1853, and the tax 
was aba~ndoned by 1861. 87 The Sierra Leone hut tax rebellion of 1898 reinforced 
the Governmen-c in its policy decision not to risk disruption by imposing any 
more taxes. A system of municipal taxation was introduced in the 1920s in the 
86Ibid., p. 158. 
87McPhee, op. cr~t., p. 210. 
c 
c 
315 
major towns of Cape Coast, Sekondi and Accra, and direct taxation was intro-
duced in the Northern Territories in 1937, 88 but the country as a whole never 
suffered the burden of direct taxation. 89 
Without direct taxation as a means of financing its activities, the 
Government had to turn to indirect taxation; primarily, to import and export 
duties. Table 31 below presents total Government revenues, total import duties, 
and total export duties for the years 1886 to 1939, stating import and export 
duties as a percent age of Government revenue. It can be seen that with the ex-
ception of the single year 1918, when wartime shipping losses restricted 
imports and exports, these indirect taxes always constituted at least fifty per 
cent of the Government revenue. For the first ten years, import duties alone 
constituted some eighty per cent or more of Government revenue; later the per-
centage declined gradually to little over fifty-five per cent until export 
duties were introduced as well in 1916, after which point their joint contribu-
tion to the colonial revenue generally vmvered between the sixty and seventy-
five per cent marks. A substantial part of the Government's funds, then, came 
from the import-export trade, and in this sense the colony was tr1liy self-
financing. 
It should be noted that until 1916 there were no export duties in the 
colony, although it would have seemed administratively easier to tax the few 
large colonial exports than to tax the multi tu de of imports. One cause of this 
anomaly was that the British merchants repeatedly and insistently opposed any 
attempt by the Government to impose an export tax. They constantly reiterated 
88 Announcement made by Governor in GCLegCo, 15 March 1937. 
89Details of the taxation system t.aken from McPhee, op. ait., p. 207 ff, 
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Table 31. Import and Export Duties as Per Cent 
of Government Revenue, 1886-193990 
Total Government Import (ii) as % Export ( iv) as % 
Year Revenue Duties of (i} Duties of (i) Total % ( i) (ii) (iv) (iii)+(v) 
£000s .tOO Os ( iii) £000s (v) 
1886 123 103 84 84 
1887 122 105 86 86 
1888 98 80 82 82 
1889 111 95 86 86 
1890 156 133 85 85 
1891 186 166 89 89 
1892 183 162 89 89 
1895 202 178 81 81 
1894 218 191 88 88 
1895 230 198 86 86 
1896 237 205 8'( 87 
1897 238 200 84 84 
1898 304 225 74 74 
1899 423 279 66 66 
1900 383 281 73 73 
1901 496 351 71 71 
1902 512 382 75 75 
1903 578 370 64 64 
1904 682 384 56 56 
1905 586 334 57 57 
1906 683 386 57 57 
1907 709 414 58 58 
1908 752 490 65 65 
1909 779 459 59 59 
1910 1,007 611 61 61 
1911 1,112 663 60 60 
1912 1,231 736 60 6o 
1913 1,302 780 6o 60 
1914 1,332 769 58 58 
1915 1,456 828 57 57 
1916 1,886 1,150 61 32 2 63 
1917 1,624 683 42 21.1 13 55 
1918 1,299 489 38 131 10 48 
1919 2,601 1,253 48 419 16 64 
1920 3,722 1, 711 46 571 15 61 
1921 3,016 979 32 798 26 58 
1922 3,357 1,494 45 541 16 61 
90Source: 1886-1899, Gold Coast, Bl-u.e Books; 1900-1939, Kay, op. cn~t. ~ 
Table 24a, "Government Revenue by Source, 1900-1960, 11 pp. 348-49. 
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Table 31 (cont'd.) 
c =:::::: Total GoYernment Import (ii) as nf Export (iv) as % tO 
Year Revenue Duties of (i) Duties of ( i) Total % ( i) {ii) (iv) (iii)+(v) 
£000s £000s ( iii) £000s (v) 
1923 3,743 1,682 45 473 13 58 
1924 3,971 2,000 50 283 7 57 
1925 4,116 2,165 53 274 7 60 
1926 4,365 2,075 48 318 7 55 
1927 4,122 2,890 70 272 7 77 
1928 3}914 2,264 58 321 8 66 
1929 3,397 2,185 64 284 8 72 
1930 2,671 1,427 53 296 11 64 
1931 2,284 1,166 51 300 13 64 
1932 2,671 1,362 51 279 10 61 
1933 2,685 1,366 51 439 16 67 
1934 2,778 1,393 50 481 17 67 
1935 3,268 1,858 57 539 16 73 
1936 3~775 2,332 62 589 16 78 
1937 3,792 2,288 60 '463 12 72 
1938 3:780 1,856 49 810 21 70 
1939 3:734 1,679 45 911 24 69 
that they were opposed "in principle" to export taxes. In fact, of course, 
they opposed all taxes simultaneously with their desire for more development of 
infrastructure in the colony and their pressures on the Government to spend 
more money on transportation. Retrenchment in other expenditure, not taxation, 
was seen as the way to finance colonial development. 
But given that they had to accept some form of taxation, the merchants 
preferred impcrt duties. Their logic for this argument was that" ••• import 
duties, ••• affected more than one particular commodity, and the taxation was 
not a direct burden on the native." 91 'l'he :merchants, in other words, saw the 
taxes as a burden not on themselves so much as on "natives," i .e. , they admitted 
that all taxes, except for import duties on mining equipment were passed on to 
c 91ManCC, ll February 1930. 
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the consumers, and they feared the consequences of imposing a high tax on the 
cocoa producer, as againGt spreading taxes among all the consumers of the col-
ony. It would also seem that, given the very inexpensive cost of many imported 
goods, a tax on these goods 1wuld still not raise the price beyond what the 
average African could pay, whereas a tax on exported goods might reduce the 
buying price below that at '1hich the average African was willing to sell. 
Several attempts made by Government to introduce export duties fell 
through because of the opposition of the merchants. In 1911, for exampl~, the 
Government was considering imposing an export tax of l~d. per pound on rubber 
and 10/- per log on timber.9 2 The proposal created a furore in commercial cir-
cles, and eventually the Governor announced that it would be withdrawn because 
there was so much opposition. 93 
With the beginning of World War I, however, conditions changed, and even 
the British Chambers of Commerce were willing to support the Government when it 
introduced a cocoa export tax in 1916, albeit they insisted on it only aH a 
wartime measure. 
Resolved that the Colonial Office be informed that whilst the 
[Liverpool] Committee still adhere to their previously expressed 
opinion against the imposition of export duties for revenue purposes, 
they recognize that the present circumstances are abnormal and do not 
propose at the present time to oppose the imposition of this tax, 
especially as it is understood that it is only a temporary measure. 91• 
But a tax once ed is difficult to remove, and in Ghana the export tax 
soon became a permanent feature of the economy. Moreover, after World War I 
the revenue from the tax was necessary to replace revenue previously earned by 
the import tax on trade spirits. The tax on trade spirits had been the 
92Reported in Lance, 13 April 1911. 
9 3speech by Governor to GCLegCo, 6 November 1911. 
May 1916. 
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backbone of customs revenue prior to World War I, but whereas it constituted 
sixty-four per cent of customs revenue in 1913, in 1920, after the signing of 
an International Convention limiting the importation of trade spirits, it 
comprised only six per cent of customs revenue. 9S Even the commercial classes 
realized that Government revenues had to be protected after this falling off 
of import duties. Leslie Couper of the BBWA (which was, of course, not itself 
affected by customs duties) argued that "He thought it necessary for the Colo-
nial Government to broaden the basis of taxation now that the Revenue from the 
Trade Spirits had ceased. " 96 The Government was f1..llly aware of the relation-
ship between the two types of taxes. "When the liquor revenue ceased to exist, 
the Government had to look about for substitutes for it and they kept on export 
duties, & in some cases had later to increase them, although they were origin-
ally imposed as a war only. " 97 Occasional attempts were still made 
after 1920 to have the export tax removed, but the Colonial Office refused to 
entertain such notions and often the business community could not, in any case, 
achieve unanimity among its various members. In 1933, for instance, the 
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce asked for the London Chamber's support in c, bid 
to remove all export taxes in order to increase the African's purchasing power, 
but the London Chamber refused its support~ citing the current Depression as 
precisely the reason why export taxes should be retained.9 8 
Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in all the debates about whether taxes 
should be imposed, removed, raised or lowered, ;vas the awareness that it vTas 
95M • 8 cPhee, op. a~t., p. 22. 
96LonCC, 24 May 1921. 
97
"CoillEli ttee on Trade and Taxation in British West Africa," ov. ait., 
Minutes of Evidence, Q.l249, speech by the Chairman. 
96LonCC, 4 December 1933. 
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the African consumer or producer who bore the burden of the import and expert 
duties; that it was the Africa..11s themselves, in fact, who financed what devel-
opment of their coUntry occurred through the payment of indirect taxes. If 
import duties were raised, the cost of imported goods was raised corrnnensurate-
ly; while if export duties were imposed or raised, the price paid to the 
African producer for his crops was lowered. But the convers~ was not always 
the case; when import duties were removed prices did not go down, nor were 
African farmers necessarily paid more when the export duties were lowereu (as 
they were by the Governor in 1924 on condition that farmers' prices be 
raised). 99 
The Government, the educated AfricarJ. corrnnuni ty, and the expatriate busi-
ness community all, at various times, indicated their awareness and 
ackn~edgement of the fact that in the end, it was the Africans who paid the 
import and export duties of Ghfl-na. As early as 1893, with regard to a petition 
presented by the principal merchants of the Gold Coast against a ten per cent 
import tax, the then Governor reported 
• • . with regard to the • • • 'grievous tax upon trade' I have been 
informed by a gentleman • • • that at one of the meetings convened by 
Messrs. Swanzy with the object of obtaining signatures to the Complaint, 
one of the persons present refused to sign it, stating that there was 
not a merchant in the Colony who had not added more th&'l ten per cent to 
his prices and was consequently making more money by it, and if anyoue 
objected it should be the consumer. 
[A 'native gentleman' said] • if the ten per cent duty was taken 
off it would not lessen the cost of goc,ds • • . to the consumers, but 
would go into the pockets of the trading community just as the old four 
per cent duty [abolished as of 1887] did when it was discontinued.lOO 
99 Governor to GCLegCo, 26 March 1924. The Governor reduced the cocoa ex-
port tax to l/8d. from \d. per pound because at a conference at the Colonial 
Office in 1923, Mr. Batty, head of the A&ETC, had promised that "any further 
reduction of the duty on cocoa would at once go to the price paid to the 
native." 
100Gold Coast, "Despatch from Govemor Griffith" (1893) (Xerox, Balme 
Library, Legcn, Ghana), p. 49. 
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Complaints by Africans that they dia not benefit from reductions of duties were 
a constant refrain throughout the colonial period. As lata as 1938, Nana Ofori 
Atta argued" ••• I think I can say that certain commodities which were sold 
at lesser prices have been increased in price with the removal of duty or sold 
at the same price," 101 The business corr..munity, certainly, never denied that it 
passed the full burden of the duties on to the Africans; its sole concern was 
that if the burden became too high, Africans would stop buying or selling. The 
Sekondi Chamber of Commerce argued in 1921 that 
.•• with the existing (export] tax, large quantities of Cocoa in the 
country would never be brought to the market, as owing to the cost of 
cartage, the amount the producer vrould get for his produce would not pay 
him for the cost of labour. The repeal of the present tax would just 
make the difference between a profitable and non-profitable industry. 102 
Similarly Mr. Batty, head of the A&ETC, argued in 1921 before the Committee on 
Trade and Taxation in West Africa that 
If the Government are going to derive their revenue by direct taxation 
on production, there is a great do.nger-··i t may not be before us today--but 
there is a. very great danger that we may find ourselves in a position of 
the native refusing to produce because we cannot pay him a price sufficient 
to induce him to do so. , . , 1 0 3 
This prediction foreshadowed the man:r small cocoa boycotts which w·ere to 
take place within the next ten years, and which were to climax in the dramatic 
and well-organized boycott of 1937-38 against a Pool of European firms which 
refused to pay the African producers prices which they considered reasonable 
for cocoa, Yet, although both Government and business realized that the burden 
of indirect taxation was born by the Africo.n, such a burden was considered 
legitimate and there was no suggestion that someone else, perhaps the firms 
101Speech in GCLegCo, 15 September 1938. 
102Reported in LivCC, 6 June 1921. 
103Committee on TrE...de and Taxation, op. oit., Minutes of Evidence, Q.648. 
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themselves, perhaps the European consUt'Ylers of the exported produce, should bear 
the full or even partial weight of the tax. A committee which investigated ana 
accepted the proposal for export tax in 1916 justified the tax on the grounds 
that the money made by Africans was clear profit. 
The Comndttee fully realized that the direct effect of this tax would 
be felt by the cocoa planter inasmuch as he would receive so much less per 
[head] load (1/3) than he would otherwise receive, but it must be borne 
in mind that in this Colony the cocoa industry is wholly in the hands of 
natives. have not such items as share-holders' dividends or the cost 
of European supervision to bear, and, outside the actual cost of headload 
transport from the farms to the raihray, the money they receive for their 
crop is a clear profit.l04 
Seemingly the costs of labour, organization, and enterprise (plus the cost of 
waiting five years for the cocoa crop to mature) were legitimate costs only for 
Europeans, not Africans, to claim. 
Just as the African population of Ghana was ultimately held responsible 
for such issues as crop improvement, so also it was ultimately responsibJe, to 
a large extent, for the financing of the colony. Outsiders contributed little 
to the Ghana Government revenue in comparison to Africans. It would seent that 
in terms of production, Africans were certainly able to both organize them-
selves and to create sufficient surplus to fund development projects. Except 
for the gold mines, in which Africans had little interest as a possible 
source of employment, little significant investment was made in Ghana by 
European entrepreneurs. The cocoa boycotts which will be discussed in Chapter 
VII, illustrate both the ability of the African farmers and independent entre-
preneurs to organize in their own interests, and their awareness that the 
rewards they were receiving for their endeavours were not commensurate i·ri th the 
burdens of production, risk-taking, and tax-paying which they bore. 
104Speech by the Treasurer in C~LegCo, 26 September 1916. 
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CHAPTER VII 
AFRICAN RESISTANCE TO EXPATRIATE ENTREPRENEURS: 
THE COCOA BOYCOTTS 
The post-World War I period in Ghana witnessed a number of attempts by 
African farmers~ in conjunction with chiefs and aspiring African entrepreneurs, 
to circumvent European control of the economy by engaging in economic boycotts 
against the major European firms. The objects of the boycotts were to increase 
the price for cocoa paid to the actual producer, and to reduce monopoly control 
of both buying and selling. The boycotts also provided opportunities for cer-
tain Ghanaians (and a few Europeans not connected with the agreement firms) to 
enter cocoa buying and shipping. Although the boycotts failed in their con-
crete objectives, their impact upon colonial administration was considerable, 
and they were a major cause of the reorganization of the cocoa export trade 
under the Cocoa Marketing Board after the Second World War. 
The following pages will describe the 1930-31 and the 1937-38 boycotts 
with a view to discovering the limits to the potentialities for success of this 
type of politicoeconomic action in a peripheral economy dependent for its 
living on an agricultural crop sold on the world market. It will be seen that 
the structure and nature of the cocoa industry, combined with the development 
of differing class interests among Ghanaians, constrained the boycotts and 
limited their capacity for positive results. 
1. The Cocoa Market 
In Chapter III the organization of production for the international 
cocoa market was described, but little attention was paid to the actual mar-
keting of the cocoa;· that is, to the distributive network. But an 
understanding of that network is crucial to the analysis of Ghana's place in 
323 
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the international economic system. The many intermediaries who handled the 
cocoa between the producer and the ultimate manufacturer had each their role to 
play and their profits to extract. 
Chart 3 outlines the stages through which cocoa had to pass before fi-
nally being transformed into a finished product ready for the consumer market 
in Europe or America. In all the stages thus outlined cocoa was being bought 
and sold in its raw form; other than fermentation, which was the responsibility 
of the seller-farmer, no processing of cocoa was done inside Ghana. 
There was very little contact between the producers of cocoa and the 
Europeans who ultimately bought it, although in major centres such as Nsawam 
farmers could bring their cocoa directly to the European store to be exchanged 
for cash or European goods, rather than sell it to brokers. As transportation 
improved and roads and railways reached further into the "bush," more and more 
farmers were able to circumvent the brokers. Conversely, however, as the 
cocoa-producing area expanded and the demand for cocoa rose, farmers further 
and further away from the major routes began to produce cocoa, which was bought 
by itinerant brokers who sought out farms and supplied cash advances to the 
farmers until their crops could be harvested. 
Some of those agents who operated combination buying stations and retail 
stores in large centres such as Accra, Nsawam, Kumasi and Koforidua were 
Europeans, but as the cost of keeping Europeans in the colony rose1 the expatri-
ate firms tried to hire Africans as much as possible to man these stores, 
reserving Europeans only for advisory and supervisory positions. Brokers, 
however, that is the agents who travelled into the countryside to gather up the 
1 
1For each European position, two employees had to be hired, as all were 
entitled to six months' leave a year. In addition, housi~g had to be provided, 
school fees paid for children, etc. 
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cocoa for the firms, were Africans. Two types of brokers existedt salaried em-
ployees and independent entrepreneurs who received commission from the 
Europeans. 
In 1938 the Nowell Commission2 investigated the marketing structure of 
cocoa in Ghana, and in doing so it discovered that the vast network of agents, 
brokers and sub-brokers, each one in debt to the next, was extracting large 
amounts of wealth from both the farmers and the expatriate firms for seemingly 
unproductive reasons. The Nowell Commission divided the brokers into the fol-
lowing categories. 
1} Scale-buyers. These were salaried buyers who, with their scales, 
went to the farms to buy cocoa for cash. By 1939 their use was declining as 
the brokers opposed their invol Yement in the trade; in any case they often 
bought not from the actual producer but from the petty broker. 
2) Sub-brokers. These were petty brokers, buying between 100 and 300 
tons of cocoa a year, who were dependent for advances on larger brokers, yet 
might themselves have even smaller suba.gents to work for them. As the number 
of roads increased fewer of these sub-brokers were evident, as larger brokers 
could reach further into the bush. 
3) Brokers. These were usually buyers engaged directly by European 
firms on a commission basis. Their pay consisted mainly of commissions, but 
also, often, of retaining fees, bonuses regulated by a sliding scale according 
to the quantity of cocoa they acquired, and various perquisites, such as free 
bags or storage tarpaulins. Brokers gave 1:1dva.nces to sub-brokers • 
4) Factors. This special category, which the Nowell Commission includ-
ed, existed only late in the period, probably in the 1930s. They were Africans 
20p. cit. 
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or Syrians (who became numerous in the colony in the 1930s) who not only bought 
and delivered cocoa.but also performed fUnctions such as grading which would 
normally be performed by the European buyer. 
5) Independent buyers. Again, these were Africans or Syrians who 
bought with their own capital, and of'ten had their own agents as well, and sold 
the cocoa to the Europeans. Some of these independent buyers were also in-
volved in small-scale independent shipping. 3 
Quite possibly, therefore, a headload of cocoa could go through two or 
three hands before it reached Accra or Takoradi for export. At each stage a 
profit was made in return for the functions of marketing; each link in the 
chain took a bit of the price offerred to the seller so that the surplus was 
eventually extracted directly from the producers. Thus many viewed the brokers 
as a parasitic class. 
But it was not only inside Ghana that brokers handled cocoa, nor only 
inside Ghana that parasitic profits could be made. Very little of the cocoa 
was bought at the port o:t: shipment by those who were actually going to use it 
for production. Cadbury and Fry (in conjunction also with Rowntree} and J. S. 
Lyons were the only major European firms who bought directly for production. 
The other firms bought for export and resale, either direct or through yet an-
other broker, to those producers who did not buy direct, such as, for example, 
the gigantic American corporation, Hershey. In addition, any surplus stocks 
which the manufacturing firms might possess were released through brokers in 
Europe for resale. The market was especially volatile because cocoa had a low 
capacity for storage and all products had to be bought during the short October 
to February cocoa season. 
3
:tbid., pp. 27-29. 
0 
0 
328 
Sale and resale of cocoa was regularized after 1925 with the establish-
ment of the New York Cocoa Exchange and, shortly thereafter, .of the London 
Commodity Exchange. These exchanges were set up specifically to guard against 
the ''boom-and-bust" nature of commodity markets • 
Establishment of a cocoa futures market in 1925 by the cocoa industry 
was a natural development that filled a vital need. Production and 
consumption had been rapidly expanding since the turn of the century and 
cocoa was becoming one of the important commodities of world commerce. 
The problem of moving the crop from producing areas in the tropics to the 
consuming countries involved continually greater financial risks on the 
part of those engaged in cocoa marketing. • • • Mbst cocoa is produced in 
four months of the year--October through January. For proper storage, it 
was necessary to move the cocoa from the tropics to temperate zones 
quickly. Thus, the intermediary merchants were forced to 'carry' the 
crop until desired by the processors. 
It was obvious to the trade--before the century was many years old--that 
a futures market, for hedging purposes, such as already existed for wheat, 
cotton, coffee, and sugar was needed. 4 
Many Africans noted that the New York and London Exchanges often traded 
in far more cocoa than actually existed. In New York, for example, between two 
and eight times the amount of cocoa consumed in the United States was traded on 
the market between 1928 and 1937. 
Table 32. Cocoa Traded on the New York Cocoa Exchange (in Tons) 5 
Total World Estimated Total Quantities Bought and Sold Percentage 
Year Production U.S. Consumption on.New York Cocoa Exchange of {iv) of (iv) (000 Tons) (000 Tons) (000 Tons) 
(i) {ii) {iii) (iv) to to (ii) (iii) 
1928 511 152 514 101 338 
1929 530 185 632 119 342 
1930 479 175 364 76 208 
1931 550 185 375 68 203 
1932 564 178 466 83 262 
1933 555 192 658 119 343 
1934 590 215 732 124 340 
1935 676 265 552 82 208 
1936 702 290 1,039 148 358 
1937 657 232 1,808 275 779 
4unaerstanding the Coooa Market (New York: Commodity Research Publica-
tions Corp., 1971), pp. 6-7. 
~owell Commission, op. oit., p. 125. 
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Similar figures were given for London. 
Table 33. Cocoa Traded in the London Produce 
Clearing House (in Tons)6 
Quantities 
329 
Total World Estimated Total Registered by Percentage of Percentage of 
Year Production U.K. Consumption London Produce (iv) to {ii) {iv) to {iii) 
(000 Tons) (000 Tons) Clearing House 
(i) (ii) {iii) (000 Tons) 
(iv) 
1934 590 74 235 40 318 
1935 676 83 230 34 277 
1936 702 103 102 15 100 
1937 657 96 352 54 367 
The profits from these paper transactions were going into tlie hands of the 
brokers and members of the Exchange, but also into the hands of speculators who 
had no inherent interest in the cocoa market peP se. Cocoa sold for a forward 
contract. at one price could yield a substantial profit if to fulfil the con-
tract it was bought at a lower price at a later date. It was the speculators' 
business to deal in cocoa futures and many of the paper transactions which 
occurred on 'the exchange were of this type. But because of speculation, false 
va.:;Lues could be put upon cocoa. Commodity speculators, according to the New 
York Cocoa Exchange,''. • • are concerned only with making a profit on their 
transactions. " 7 
The Nowell Commission found the cocoa speculators responsible for flue-
tuations in cocoa prices which affected the cocoa farmer, and, furthermore, 
accused the merchant firms, who ostensibly were interested only in straight 
buying and selling on forward contracts, of such speculation. ". • • the buying 
6 Ibid., p. 129. 
1fJndePstanding the Coooa MaPket, op. cit., p. 4. 
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policy of manufacturers has on cccasion appeared to be largely speculative, and 
has even been described to us as perhaps the most important of the various 
speculative elements which had together been responsible for excessive fluctua-
tions in the value of cocoa. ne The firms, in reply, argued that they were 
simply victims of the manipulation of the markets by brokers, and had to engage 
in buying and selling activities extraneous to their actual need to cover them-
selves. 
This was the world market, then, with which the Ghanaian farmer had to 
deal, and with which any indigenous protest movements and attempts to control 
cocoa exports would have to come to terms. Nothing similar existed in Ghana 
itself, and in contrast to the relatively simple systems of advances on cocoa 
from firm to broker to farmer, the system of hedging, forward contracts, and 
speculation in New York and London seemed incredibly complex. One of the most 
articulate of Gold Coast spokesmen, I~ana Ofori Atta, complained of the system 
in the Legislative Council in 1924, even before the Exchanges had been set up. 
If 
. . . I was surprised to hear • • • that before the cocoa trees began to bear 
fruit in this country all the cocoa had been sold already, and that there are a 
number of persons who deal in cocoa trade, and sell cocoa in England without 
ever seeing a bean. " 9 Similarly the GoJ.d Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, 
which in 1930 led the boycott against the firms, complained of "Secret Forward 
Contracts." 1 0 
The farmers, then, who by their actions such as boycotts were trying to 
8Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 126. 
9Nana Ofori Atta, Speech in GCLegCo, 6 March 1924. 
10conference between the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation and 
representatives of the European mercantile community, 16 December 1930, report 
in GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
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gain control of the marketplace, were faced with an extremely complicated 
system of organization designed to assure maximum profits not only to the ulti-
mate manufacturer of cocoa but also to the European middlemen. Beside the 
profits of the European middlemen the profits of their African counterparts 
seemed negligible. Africans were well aware, also, that the producers received 
only a fraction of the ultimate price paid for raw cocoa at the terminal 
stages. While in general, as can be seen from Table 34, the farmers received 
the fairly substantial percentage of about two-thirds of the Liverpool cocoa 
price, in both the boycott years of 1930-31 and 1937~38 the percentage they 
received declined sharply from the year before, as also did the absolute amount 
they received. The absolute amount paid to the farmers dropped from £8,071,000 
to £3,697,000 between the 1929-30 and 1930-31 seasons, and from £10,680,000 to 
£2,663,000 between the boom 1936-37 season and the 1937-38 season. No doubt 
the worldwide Depression was responsible for much of these declines in the 
cocoa price, but the farmers, even while acknowledging this, nevertheless laid 
a substantial proportion of the blame on the expatriate firms. In fact the 
firms claimed, and the Nowell Commission, on the basis of their evidence, con-
curred with the claim, that they had been buying cocoa at uneconomic prices, 11 
that competition was so strong in Ghana that in order to obtain the share of 
the crop which they were committed to sell they were often obliged to buy at 
prices above what was being paid in Europe. Nevertheless, even when they were 
obliged to pay more than the ruling price for cocoa, the European firms still 
managed to show a heal thy income. What was lost on cocoa was gained on prices 
of manufactured goods sold to Africans; the UAC admitted that most of :i. ts 
profits were in fact made on such sales. 12 Although it was a fledgling concern 
11Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 101. 
l2Ibid. 
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Table 34. Cash to Farmers as Per Cent of Liverpool Price13 
Cash to Value at Value at 
Tons Cash to Agricultural Port When Liverpool at (ii) as 
Year Marketed Farmers Community Marketed Time of Export per cent 
(ooo•s) (£000 1s) (£000 1s) (£000 1s) (£OOO's) of (v) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
1926-27 238 10,877 11,350 12,066 17,100 64 
1927-28 207 9,688 10,020 10,620 13,149 74 
1928-29 242 8,233 8,570 9,202 12,187 68 
1929-30 232 8,071 7,420 7,886 9,635 84 
1930-31 223 3,697 3,960 4,388 5,658 65 
1931-32 212 3,398 3,650 4,055 5,764 59 
1932-33 256 3,929 4,240 4,724 6,537 60 
1933-34 220 2,411 2,670 3,070 4,792 50 
1934-35 276 3,654 3,960 4,427 6,464 57 
1935-36 285 4,392 4,700 5,162 7,156 61 
1936-37 300 10,680 10,980 11,460 14,oo4 76 
1937-38 232 2,663 2,970 3,267 5,302 50 
the dividends of the UAC rose consistently during the Depression years. 
Year 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
Table 35. The United Africa Company: Dividend Rates14 
Dividend Rate (Per Cent) Year 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
Dividend Rate (Per Cent) 
8 
10 
11 
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Although dividend rates are not a precise indicator of a company's profitabil-
i ty, the :fact that the UAC was able to pay such rates during its infancy 
suggests that it was not suffering overly much :from the Depression. The 
Africans' perceptions of that profitability, furthermore, were coloured by the 
observed lifestyles and luxuries which the European employees of the 
13This table is taken from Baron Holmes, op. ait., p. 37. His source is 
Dept. of Agriculture Files: W. H. Beckett, Memo.2/12/37, GNA. 
lltsource: Stock Exch.ange Yearbook (1939). See alto Table 13a. 
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cocoa-buying firms enjoyed inside the colony • 
It was assumed by many Africans that had the European business community 
consisted indeed of men of goodwill, they could have used their position as 
monopoly buyers in the internal cocoa market to manipulate the world market in 
Ghana's favour. But representatives of the expatriate business connnunity 
denied that such control was possible. "The Pool's Control of World Prices. 
Mr. Harris explained that the Pool last year dealt with approximately only 24% 
of the world's supply and was not in a position, therefore, to command the 
world price. nlS In fact, as Table 36 indicates, far more than twenty-four per 
cent of the world supply of cocoa came from Ghana. Between 1919 and 1939 Ghana 
controlled, at the lowest ebb, thirty-four per cent of the world's supply; in 
the season prior to the statement made above, forty per cent of the world's 
cocoa came from Ghana. Of this the UAC controlled, on its own, about fifty per 
cent; with its colleagues in the various pools and combines which it formed, 
the percentage rose to about ninety-eight. 16 
The Nowell Commission was of the opinion that indeed the Gold Coast 
firms did have a certain amount of leeway on the world market. It argued that 
the UAC might be able to influence the smaller London market, and even have 
some slight effect on the large New York Exchange. Controlling as it did about 
half the Gold Coast and Lagos supply of cocoa, the UAC was bound to have some 
effect especially if it oversold • 
• • • while the market is in normal circumstances too wide, and the 
influences upon it too complex, for any one firm to acquire a continuous 
control over prices, there are none the less times when it [the market] 
15Conference between the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation ana rep-
resentatives of the European mercantile community, 16 December 1930, report in 
GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
16Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 8. 
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is vulnerable and open to attack, and ••• in the absence of a good 
consuming or speculative demand there would be nothing to prevent shippers 
from forcing prices down by means of heavy sales. 18 
Further, the Nowell Co:rmnission argued, without naming the firm, that 
It appears to be the generally accepted view in the trade that the 
market suffers, in the sense of being rendered unduly narrow, from a 
certain shortage in the number of merchants and dealers vi th ca.pi tal 
prepared to carry stocks and also from the concentration in the hands 
of'a single shipper of an unduly large tonnage of the Gold Coast and 
Nigerian crops. 
Critics of the [United Africa] Company ••• maintain that its purchases 
on the Coast are habitually used as the basis for a policy of unscrupulous 
speculation carried out in the New York and London Markets and involving 
numerous transactions in which the Company's identity is carefully con-
cealed.19 
Thus the general picture which emerges is of an export crop not only 
dominated on the buying side by a tightly-knit monopoly of expatriate firms, 
but also dominated on the marketing side by a complex and exclusive system of 
international exchanges. Those few Africans who managed to by-pass the UAC-
dominated buying Pool, and to ship cocoa direct to London or New York, would 
find that they must sell through brokers and/or speculators dealing on the 
cocoa exchanges. While farmers worried about price, African entrepreneurs 
worried about this manipulation of the buying at the European end. They were, 
thus, often as willing as the farmers to join in economic boycotts against the 
Europeans. 
2. The Early Cocoa Boycotts 
In the face of continued expatriate domination of their principal trad-
ing commodity, Ghanaians turned to organization within the colony to try to 
overcome their relatively powerless position. Boycotts, that is, the refusal 
either to sell their products to or buy imported consumer goods from the 
18Nowell Commission, op. oit., p. 137. 
19Jbid., pp. 128 and 132. 
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principal expatriate firms, were the course of mass political action to which 
they most frequently resorteC.. The use of boycotts (or "hold-ups," as they 
were often called) against European businesses came into prominence in Ghana 
after World War I. Although the most organized and effective of these boycotts 
were those of 1930-31 and 1937-38, several lesser boycotts also took place. 
Prior to World War I it would seem that at least one boycott, on a very 
small scale, had taken place. In late 1915, the Governor mentioned such a 
boycott in conjunction with current problems with low prices. "It would be 
within the recollection of Honourable Members that some time ago when the 
natives could only obtain low prices for their Cocoa they were able to hold 
back their stocks, with good results ultimately. "2 0 In 1915, with similar low 
prices, cocoa was again being held back. In this case the low prices were 
caused partly by a currency shortage entailed by the necessity to convert the 
Royal ll..int in England to munitions manufacture. The Governor apparently felt 
that the merchants would exploit the shortage and offer low prices for cocoa, 
and he therefore, with the previous boycott in mind, advised the farmers to 
hold back their cocoa once again. To this, of course, the business community 
of the colony objected. 
I was sorry to hear at the Public Meeting which was held at the High 
Court Your Excellency advise the Farmers to hold back their cocoa for 
good prices. That seems to me most dangerous advice. The natives have 
no means of storing their cocoa in large quantities and the only way they 
could follow Your Excellency's advice would be by leaving the cocoa on 
the trees unplucked. It will be readily recognized that the result of 
this would be disastrous to the industry. 21 
After the war the price of cocoa was low because the amount of shipping 
space had not yet caught up, after the war shortage, with the amount of cocoa 
20speech by the Governor to GCLegCo, 13 December 1915. 
21 Reply to the Governor by Mr. Parker, a European unofficial member, in 
GCLegCo, 13 December 1915. 
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available. But the prices of imported goods were high and there was an attempt 
in the Central Province to rectify the situation by a boycott. 
I come now to the question of the increased cost of living due to the 
daily mounting up of the prices of goods and other articles. I understand 
that in some districts in the Central Province, the Chiefs there have been 
beating gong-gong to the effect that their people should not sell cocoa 
for less than £2 a load. They have been forced to take this action in 
view of the fact that the Merchants are unduly inflating the prices of 
goods, for example, the price of a piece of cloth is now, from £2.10 to 
£3 which used to be from 9s to 13s6d.22 
Shortly after this incident the cocoa price boomed to phenomenal heights during 
the 1920-21 season. But an abrupt crash followed the general world economic 
decline in late 1921, so that, once again in 1922, the price of cocoa was very 
low and farmers were resorting to boycotts. Commenting on the 1922 boycott, 
the Accra Chamber of Commerce blamed the Government for interference by inform-
ing the Africans of the price of cocoa in Europe. 
The question of the Cocoa Farmers not bringing the Cocoa to the markets 
for sale. The reason for the action of the Native Farmers appeared to be 
that the Commissioners were advising the Farmers of the Home market prices. 
The Accra Chamber decided to write to the Governor pointing out that it 
was inadvisable to interfere in business transactions between the Merchants 
and the Native farmers, as apart from the injury to trade interests, harm 
is rendered to the Colonial revenue by the limitation of shipments. 23 
Although in the 1915 incident the Governor had encouraged the hold-up, in 1922 
the new Governor denied the charges by the Accra Chamber that he was assisting 
in the hold-up. 
A novelty as far as the Gold Coast is concerned, in the agricultural 
year has been the refUsal of the Union of Farmers to sell their cocoa at 
the low prices which have obtained. Government action in the matter was 
limited to informing the farmers that they had a perfect right to hold up 
their cocoa, but at the same time it was pointed out to them that such a 
22Statement by Mr. Brown, an African unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 17 
November 1919. 
23Extract from the Minutes of .the Accra Chamber of' Commerce, reported in 
LivCC, 30 January 1922. 
c 
0 
338 
procedure would be unwise unless they have the means for storing and safe-
guarding their crops. 2 4 
The Union of Farmers referred to in the above quote was the Gold Coast Cocoa 
Federation. 25 This Federation, started by John Kwame Ayew, a wealthy farmer, 
in 1921, was to play a crucial role in all future boycotts, with Ayew at the 
fore of all the farmers' struggles. The original aims of this Federation were 
not simply to hold up the cocoa in order to obtain a better price for it, but 
also, more generally to improve the situation of cocoa in the world market. 
The Federation advocated the rejection of all bad cocoa on the market, the 
paying of a standard price throughout the cocoa season, immediate warning if 
the international cocoa market entered a decline, and the deduction of the 
cocoa export duty not from the price paid to the producer but from the price 
paid to the merchant. 26 In general it was opposed to the "Combine" firms. The 
1922 boycott was, however, effective only in a few small strongholds such as 
Asuboi, Mangoase, Adawso, and Tinkong, and was soon broken when a price of 14s. 
per load was offerred. 27 
After 1922 Ghana entered a period of prosperity, congruent with tha gen-
eral situation of prosperity in the western world. World sales of cocoa rose 
from 366,000 long tons in 1920 to 535,000 long tons in 1929, and Ghana's share 
of the total market rose from thirty-four to forty-four per cent. 28 There was 
therefore no need for the type of boycott action which had been taking place in 
order to improve the prices paid to the producer. However, some of the more 
24Address by the Governor to GCLegCo, 27 February 1922. 
25Renamed the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation in 1930. 
26Ho1mes, op. cit., p. 86. 
27Ib .d 1- •, P• 93. 
28see Table 36 above. 
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prosperous farmers were aware of the disparity between prices paid in Ghana and 
prices obtained in Europe~ and they made at least one attempt to break out of 
the European monopoly of shipping. The attempt was made in 1924, when John 
Kwame Ayew and the Gold Coast Cocoa Federation made an agreement with one Mr. 
Strickler, an American, to ship cocoa through him to New York, paying him on a 
commission basis • 
• • • during the year 1924-25 one European named F. D. Strickler 
arrived in the Colony from America and arranged with the farmers to ship 
their cocoa to a firm named Willard Hawes and Company. Chief Farmer 
John Kwame Ayew stood on behalf of all the farmers and collected the cocoa 
for this F. D. Strickler for shipment with a promise of giving the farmers 
a fair price in consequence of which this F. D. Strickler and the Company 
made use of the cocoa amounting to £350,000 and action was taken against 
them •••• 29 
A New York solicitor by the name of Slater was engaged to take action against 
Strickler after he absconded with the Federation's funds, and judgment was 
finally made in 1939; however, after deductions for lawyers 1 fees, very little 
of their loss was ever recovered by the farmers. For years thereafter, both 
the Government and the established European firms used this case as justifica-
tion for actively discouraging any contracts between Africans and "outside" 
expatriate businessmen, as well as any organized attempts by farmers' associa-
tions to ship on their own. The firms, who no doubt were threatened on the 
initial appearance of Strickler and the seeming competition he offerred, were 
relieved that he absconded with the money. A report by the Cadbury historian 
indicated the danger he had presented to them: 
A determined attempt was made [to ship cocoa on their own] ••• in 
1924 by the 'Gold Coast Farmers' Association', a group of merchants led by 
an experienced farmer, named Ayew. The objects of this body were to obtain 
control of a large tonnage of cocoa, hold it off the market and then to 
negotiate its direct sale--preferably to the U.S.A.--at a considerably 
enhanced price. Contact was made with an American named Strickler, who was 
29Police Report on a Farmers' meeting at Suhum, 10 October 1938, which 
discussed the affair, with a view to further legal action. In GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
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in the Gold Coast for much of the 1924/25 season. This gentleman appar-
ently offered to take all the cocoa the Association could offer at a price 
some lOs. per cwt. higher than the current world market price. Enthusi-
astic meetings of farmers were held in places like Nsawam, Mangoase, and 
Koforidua. Strickler was the hero of the hour and ordinary buyers, in-
cluding Cadbury-Fry, were lef't out in the cold. 30 
During the two large boycotts of the 1930s, similar attempts, still led by 
.Ayew, were to be made to initiate independent shipping schemes. The memory of 
Strickler was constantly evoked by the established firms in order to combat 
these moves. 
From the history of these early boycotts, several facts emerge. The 
first is of course their coincidence with downswings in the world market for 
cocoa. Boycotts occurred during the war, when little cocoa could be shipped 
out of Ghana owing to shipping space regulations, and again after the recession 
of the early 1920s. The two major boycotts were to take place in 1930-31, just 
after the Depression began, and in 1937-38, after the apparent resurgence of 
gpod times with an extraordinary upswing in the price in 1936-37, followed by a 
crash the next season. The 1936-37 upswing had been caused by certain specula-
tive manoeuvres on the New York Cocoa Exchange. A "bull" market had been 
encouraged by the belief that the consumption in America that year would be 
high while the Ghana crop would be small. But "Later forecasts of a heavy 
rather than a short crop in the Gold Coast, combined with the general business 
setback and a decline in cocoa consumption, especially in the U.S., led to a 
sharp fall in price after January, 1937: by the end of June the whole of the 
earlier advance had been lost." 31 
Aside from the two large boycotts, a minor boycott also took place in 
1934, with little success. 32 This boycott was a result of the continued decline 
30Edwards, op. cit. , p. 24. 
31Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 8. 
32This boycott was reported in Cadbury's evidence to the Nowell 
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in prices since 1930. 33 The following table gives average price for Ghana 
cocoa from 1925 to 1939; unfortunately, however, as the figures are given not 
per season, but per calendar year, the full force of seasonal declines is 
unapparen t. 
Table 37. Average Annual Prices (Cents Per Pound) 
New York for Fair Fermented Main Crop 
Ghana Cocoa Beans 3 '+ 
Year Price Year Price Year Price Year Price 
1925 9.5 1929 10.4 1933 4.4 1937 8.4 
1926 11.5 1930 8.2 1934 5.2 1938 5.2 
1927 15.8 1931 5.2 1935 5.0 1939 4.8 
1928 12.8 1932 4.4 1936 6.9 
A second aspect of the history of the early boycotts is the role of the 
Government. In the 1910s and '20s, Government tried to maintain neutrality in 
disputes between farmers and merchants, a neutrality which, at least according 
to the merchants, sometimes bordered on outright inciting of the farmers to 
boycott. Such a position on the part of the Government was not to continue into 
the 1930s, however; by the time of the 1930 hold-up business pressure on Govern-
ment was sufficient to compel it to use leg6.1 means to discourage combination 
among the African producers. 
3. The 1930-31 and 1937-38 Boycotts35 
Both the 1930-31 boycott and the 1937-38 boycott, as previously noted, 
were results partly of the downswing in cocoa prices which occurred shortly 
Commission. Cad: 288/78. 
33Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 8. 
34source: Gill and Duffus, op. ait., Table 14, "Cocoa Beans--Fair Fer-
mented Main Crop Ghana, Average Annual and Monthly Spot Prices New York," p. 35. 
35The following two sections are not intended to be a history of the two 
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before their inception. The first of the two boycotts, however, neither lasted 
as long nor was as successfUl as the second. Whereas the 1937-38 boycott 
lasted through almost the entire season, that is from October of 1937 until an 
agreement was negotiated with the expatriate firms, through the Nowell Commis-
sion, in late February 1938, the 1930 boycott petered out quickly; the entire 
movement lasting only from 22 October 1930 to 6 January 1931. 36 
Perhaps one of the most important reasons why the 1937-38 boycott lasted 
longer, with more support from a wider variety of people, was that the European 
firms were perceived much more clearly as a bloc which had to be defeated. 
While in both cases a price-fixing Pool existed among the major buying firms, 
in 1930 it was perceived as less nefarious, especially since in 1930 the manu-
facturing firms, Cadbury-Fry, Rowntree, and Lyons, were not part of the 
price-setting agreements. A buying agreement was implemented in October 1929 
and continued until December of 1931, but Cadbury did not sign because the 
agreement " ••• was accompanied by a selling agreement which obliged signator-
ies to put their purchases of Cocoa into a common Pool which was to be sold 
under the directions of a selling Connni ttee • . . [ Cadbury] formed the opinion 
that the merchants' intention might be in the direction of raising world prices 
to an uneconomic level. 11 37 
Moreover the drop in cocoa prices in 1930 did not immediately coincide 
boycotts but rather to bring out salient points for discussion. For an excel-
lent analysis of the 1930-31 boycott, see Sam Rhodie, "The Gold Coast Cocoa 
Hold-up of 1930-31," Transactions of the Historical .Society of Ghana, vol. 9 
(1968). A detailed study of both boycotts and the actors therein can be found 
in Baron Holmes, op. cit., and Southall, op. cit. Josephine Milburn 's nThe Gold 
Coast Cocoa Crisis: British Business and the Colonial Office," African Histor-
ical Studies, no. 1, vol. 3 (1970), is a slightly apologetic account of the role 
of business and the Cocoa_Agreement in the 1937-38 boycott. 
36Holmes, op. cit., p. 143. 
37cad: 288/78. 
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with the implementation of the oligopolistic agreement, as it did in 1937. 
During the Main Crop season 1929/30 the approximate value of Gold 
coast cocoa cif basis was 42/- per cwt., and the agreement operated 
throughout that season without the slightest murmur on the part of the 
Africans or any suggestion that it was operating to their disadvantage. 
The existence on the Agreement was well known in the Gold Coast. 
343 
During the Spring and summer montns of 1930 there was a steady decline 
in the value of Cocoa and at the opening of that season (say September 
1930) the value was approximately 35/- and declined during December to 
29/-. The first that was heard from the Africans regarding the operation 
of the Agreement ~as in September/October of 1930 and on that occasion, 
as in the recent happenings, the fall in the market was attributed to 
the 'Pool' and a hold-up was engineered which lasted till the early days 
of January. 38 
Although the perceived exploitation of the farmers was less in 1930 than in 
1937, there was nevertheless a clear perception of the effects of the Pool and 
the boycott was organized specifically to counteract those effects. At the 
first meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation (revived from 
1924), Mr. T. Hutton-Mills, a noted Gold Coast barrister, explained the posi-
tion to the farmers. 
Within four years from 1927 to 1930, among other things, I have visited 
England about three times with regard to the marketing of our farmers 1 
cocoa in this country. Now what I have found during my journey and my 
activities amount to this; that the European firms out here have so 
combined themselves in such a wa:y, both in England and America and every-
where, even including this country, that I can only say one thing, 
namely, their object is to buy cocoa cheaper in this country and sell 
dearer to manufacturers in Europe, and unless we help ourselves, we shall 
only be mere slaves to the European merchants 39 
He encouraged the farmers to hold up their cocoa, claiming that such a hold-up 
alone would be powerful enough to stop the European "Speculators." 
••• the farmers need have no fear about the 'Speculators' with their 
huge Capital continuing speculating with our Cocoa Crop on the American 
and English markets, since the farmers have the absolute control of the 
situation in that, if they continue now and always to hold their stocks 
of cocoa, the Cocoa 'Speculators' in the paper [money] markets abroad 
38JU.d. 
39Minutes of the First Meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Fed-
eration, held at Nsawam, 21 and 22 October, 1930. GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
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and everywhere would . . • be defeated if no cocoa is sold to them at 
their dictated low prices. Prices, therefore, are bound to improve if 
we continue to hold cocoa at least for a while. 40 
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This statement by Hutton-Mills reflects the prevalent belief that the 
Pool was responsible for the low prices, even in the face of the evidence that 
low prices were not a problem in the previous season, when the Pool agreement 
also existed. 41 The merchants time and again pointed out this fact, and also 
pointed out the limited amount of the market which was controlled by Gold 
Coast cocoa. In reality,however, Ghana cocoa comprised over forty per cent 
of the world supply in 1930,42 a fact which could hardly escape the attention 
of both farmers and merchants. Moreover, there was clear evidence that the 
merchants were actually fixing prices paid for cocoa to the farmers; that any-
one who tried to pay above the agreed price was quickly disciplined. Nana 
Ofori Atta brought two pieces of evidence before the Legislative Council in 
December 1930 to prove his charges of price-fixing. The first was a reference 
to a statement reported in West Af:ric:a by Major-General William Henry Grey, a 
director, at the time the statement was made in 1925, of the A&ETC. He 
"· •• stated that they Ithe CombineJ fixed the buying price in Africa and the 
selling price in Europe, and the companies followed the policy dictated by the 
committee." 43 A more damning piece of evidence was brought to light when the 
Cocoa Federation managed to get hold of a telegramme indicating not only that 
prices were fixed, but that prices could have been higher had the firms been 
40Report of the General Committee Meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti 
Cocoa Federation, held at the Palladium, Accra, 4 November 1930. GNA Adm. 
11/1070. 
41 For a list of price-fixing agreements in Ghana, see Chapter IV, Table 
12. 
42see Table 36 above. 
~3GCLegCo, 4 December 1930. 
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freely competing. 
In the speech Mr. Ocansey submitted to the Federation at Nsawam ••• 
was a telegram which Mr. Youngman Ia European unofficial member of the 
Legislative Council] is reported to have sent to a certain Mr. Nicodet 
of the S.C.O.A. that knocked the bottom out of the whole thing:-
'Nicodet 
s.c.o.A. 
Lome 
Chauveur Saltpond increased his prices without consulting local 
committee causing losses to other firms and strong protest by Cadbury 
regret found it necessary to point out this serious breach of regulation 
to London by Cable. 
Youngman' 
According to this we got to know that even if a European who may be in 
the Group or otherwise to-day attempts to offer a price a little more 
than agreed upon by the Pool, he is arraigned before his superiors, and 
I do not know what would be his fate. That shows that the Group were in 
a position to offer more than what they were offering at the time. I do 
not think a man coming out here would be so foolish as to do something 
deliberately which he knew would bring loss. I believe, he knew he 
could offer a little higher price with profit to himself. It means there 
is something which has been kept from the knowledge of the African 
farmer.lf 4 
Not only did this telegramme, "W:hich Mr. Youngman' s extreme anger when it was 
read in the Legislative Council confirmed as genuine, reveal the absence of 
free competition in the cocoa market, but it also indicated that Cadbury, al-
though i.t had not signed the actual agreement, was co-operating in price-
fixing activities. If, as the firms claimed, price fixing was a method of 
protecting the farmers, by shoring up prices in a declining market, it was no 
doubt difficult fo~ the Africans to understand why one ftrm should be disci-
plined for offering an even higher price. 
Gold Coast Africans were unwilling to accept the view that it was the 
international economic crisis which had, in the final analysis, facilitated 
both the formation of a monopoly structure in the Gold Coast , and the decline 
44Ibid. 
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in the cocoa price. Rather, w::tth such scraps of evidence as have been pre-
sented above, which witnessed that at least within a narrow range the Pool 
could influence price, they concluded that the congruity in time of the Pool 
and the price decline indicated that the former had at least partially caused 
the latter. Although prior to 1930 there had been a great many agreements 
among the firms which limited competition, some Ghanaians viewed the past as 
a time of unlimited competition with resultant economic prosperity in the 
colony. 
At the time when the merchants were buying individually and indepen-
dently there was keen competition and trade was in a flourishing 
condition. During those days we bought our goods from any firm who 
offered us a good price but to-day it is not so but just the opposite--
only one common price rules at the stores of the firms who are in the 
Pool. We had Millers, Swanzys, MacLaren Brothers, African and Eastern 
Trade Corporation etc., working independently with better results but 
immediately these firms came together and were known as the Combine firms 
cacao business prospects started to be very gloomy and trade also began 
to decline. After the Combine we have now had the United Africa Company, 
and the last but not the least is the Pool.45 
The 1930 boycott, therefore, was a reaction against lowered cocoa 
prices which seemed to be at least partially caused by the oligopolistic or-
ganizations of the major expatriate firms. An attempt was therefore made to 
hold up supplies of cocoa in the hope of forcing up the price. At the same 
time, at least a partial boycott of retail stores was instituted, to indicate 
opposition to the practice of oligopolistic fixing of the prices of impcrted 
goods. At a meeting of the Cocoa Federation in Accra in November 1930, the 
question of boycotting the retail shops was raised and it was agreed that such 
action should be taken. The Ga Manche of Accra agreed to "beat gong-gong" to 
stop his people from buying from European stores after" ••• a farmer of 
Koforidua ••• stated that since they come to Accra they witnessed that 
45Speech by Nana Ayirebi Acquah. of liinneba, an unofficial member, in 
GCLegCo, 4 December 1930. 
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people were buying from stores and women were seen hawking European goods. He 
asked that the Federation should see that this is stopped. "46 
The 1930 boycott was, however, not successful, even within the context 
of the limited range of influence which a political movement in Ghana could 
have. It had disintegrated by early January 1931, and although the Pool ar-
rangement was cancelled shortly thereafter, the cancellation was not a result 
of the boycott. Rather the Pool was found to be unable to cope with the 
difficulties which the European firms were experiencing on the international 
market, and other arrangements were tried to restore their profits. 
The operation of the 11929] agreement dealing with the buying on the 
Coast worked quite satisfactorily but owing to the inability of the 
merchants to see eye to eye on the selling policies to be pursued the 
whole agreement came to an end after two years. 
Year by year during the period 1931/7 attempts were made between a 
number of merchants to minimise their buying losses by undertaking to 
maintain agreed prices, ••• but again owing to the absence of sanctions 
all these attempts proved abortive.47 
Thus from 1931 to 1937 there was no clear object of hostility or target at 
which Ghanaians could aim the frustrations they felt at the low price of cocoa 
on the international market, although it was assumed that the Pool still ex-
isted in some form, as the Combine firms had been known to exist in the pre-
UAC period. Protest during the mid-1930s ~entred around more political 
issues, namely those of municipal taxation and of freedom of the press.48 
Nevertheless the issue of price fixing was dormant, not dead, as the minor 
attempt at a boycott in 1934 indicated. When the Cocoa Agreement of 1937 was 
46Report by Detective Sergeant S. A. Amable, Criminal Investigation De-
partment, Accra, on a meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, 
29 November 1930. GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
47Cad: 288/78. 
48Agbodeka, op. cit., Chapter V. 
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announced, an experienced group of Ghanaian leaders, who had learned their 
lessons from the 1930 boycott, was ready to spring into action once again. 
One reason for the success of the 1937 boycott, which actually resulted 
in the appointment of an investigatory commission, was that the issue itself 
was much more clear-cut and the Agreement made by the firms touched more 
people than the 1930 agreement. To begin with, Cadbury-Fry and Lyons joined 
in the Pool, to the chagrin of many chiefs and farmers who had assumed that 
Cadbury, with its strong Quaker background, was a firm more dedicated to the 
welfare of the African than the others. 11What the country mostly worries 
about in this cocoa buying pool is that the two cocoa firms of Cadbury and Fry 
and Lyon IhaYeJ joined themselves in the Pool. nl+9 In fact Cadbury had con-
sented to enter the Agreement only after enduring substantial pressure from 
the other firms. Cadbury argued that in reality the reason for the Agreement 
was to corner the market for the UAC and to keep out any possible competition. 
It is obvious that the UAC are losing ground with their cocoa pur-
chases, to other competitors, amongst whom of recent years Lyons and 
ourselves have made the largest increase. They are anxious to retain 
their present position, and the only way they see of doing this is to 
agree with other firms that no one shall increase their tonnage •••• 
They believe that an arrangement such as they outlined either by 
entire pooling or by a pooling and tonnage agreement would keep the 
Cocoa market in West Africa as 'a little corner' ••• so 
In fact, according to Cadbury, it was not the intention of the UAC to raise 
profits as to do so would attract more competitors to the Coast; rather it was 
interested in making sure that it was guaranteed a certain percentage of the 
market and that it could effect some savings in its buying price, hopefully 
about one shilling per cwt. 51 Cadbury, when it entered the Agreement, did so 
'+ 9Document (undated) entitled "The several reasons which have caused our 
refusal to trade with the merchants who entered into the cocoa buying agree-
ment ••• , 11 GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast. 
50cad: 288/2. 
51 Ibid. 
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with the stipulation that it could leave after one year if it so desired, a 
stipulation which backfired when the boycott began and Cadbury feared that if 
word of this loophole got out the onus would be on it to cancel the Agree-
ment. 52 
The major provision of the Agreement itself, which was to run for four 
years starting in 1937, was the division of the cocoa market. All major ex-
patriate firms in Ghana joined in the Agreement. Each firm was to buy no more 
than its stated tonnage; should it buy more, it would be obliged to sell it at 
an agreed-upon price, which might be less than it had paid, to any firm which 
had less than its tonnage. The division was as shown in Table 38. Since the 
UAC by this time had controlling interests in both G. B. Ollivant and the 
Swiss African Trading Company, 53 it controlled in actual fact forty-nine per 
cent of the main crop and seventy-four per cent of the intermediate crop. In 
toto, the thirteen firms controlled almost ninety-eight per cent of the Ghana 
cocoa crop. Many small firms had disappeared from the colony in the previous 
few years, and it was argued that the dividing up of the market into shares 
would guarantee that no more firms would leave, thus eliminating competitive-
ness, while, somewhat contradictorily, it was also argued that no more 
"wasteful" new f'irms would come in. "Newcomers to the business have the ef'f'ect 
of further intensifying competition and add indirectly to the cost of buying 
by the introduction of capital for unnecessary duplication of existing handling 
facilities."54 Along with their Buying Agreement the merchants had also, as 
52Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 60. 
53see Chapter IV. 
54cad: 288/78. 
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Table 38. Members and Shares in the Produce Agreement: 
Gold Coast, 10 November 1937, Covering Cocoa 
Purchased in the Gold Coast, Ashanti, and the 
British Mandated Territory of Togoland.ss 
Members 
W. Bartholemew and Co. Ltd. 
Busi and Stephenson Ltd. 
Cadbury Bros. Ltd. } 
J. S. Fry and Sons Ltd. 
Cie Fran~aise de l'Afrique Occidentale 
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. 
J. Lyons and Co. Ltd. 
G. B. Ollivant Ltd. 
Paterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd. 
Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africaine 
Swiss African Trading Co. Ltd. 
Union Trading Co. Ltd. 
The United Africa Company Ltd. 
Percentage of 
Main Crop 
1.54 
4.05 
17.92 
9.33 
3.93 
4.36 
10.64 
1.93 
3.08 
2.85 
4.51 
35.86 
I Percentage 
Intermediate 
none 
9.12 
1.80 
3-95 
5.17 
none 
19.82 
3.29 
none 
2.63 
2.69 
51.53 
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in 1930, instituted a Merchandise Selling Agreement, or, more accurately, they 
had continued their policy of formulating agreements as to merchandise sel-
ling, and these agreements had become more obvious during the political 
ferment preceding and during the boycott. Data on merchandise selling agree-
ments in Ghana are even more difficult to obtain, on the whole, than data on 
buying agreements, partly because there was no committee of investigation into 
the subject and partly because arrangements for such agreements were made 
locally, not in London, on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis. The Nowell 
Commission, however, confirmed that such a Merchandise Agreement did exist. 
• • • the existence of a Merchandise Agreement only became generally 
known in the Gold Coast as a result of Press articles when the campaign 
against the Buying Agreement began, but • • • the idea has now taken 
deep root. The Africans attribute to the Merchandise Agreement the 
general rise which, they claim, took place in merchandise prices in 
1936-37, and they have pointed out that in spite of losses that the 
55source: JH: Jacket 536(ii}. 
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firms claim to have made in cocoa in that season, the total profits from 
West Africa trade were considerable. 56 
(The latter claim is confirmed in part by UAC dividend rates listed in Table 
35 above.) The companies were worried that knowledge of the Merchandise 
Agreement would become general, inciting even more hostility to the cocoa-
buying Pool, and also reducing the amount of support they could obtain from 
the Government, which, while willing to accept the argument that price 
stabilization on the international market was necessary for a primary c.ommod-
ity such as cocoa, would be far less willing to accept the argument that price 
fixing for imported goods on the local level was necessary. "Witnesses before 
the {Nowell] Commission report that they are being asked awkward questions, 
indicating that the Commission have, so far, formed the conclusion that the 
Merchandise Agreement is nothing but a link in the chain of policy which in-
cludes both agreements. " 57 And indeed the local Government officials were far 
more hostile to import price fixing than they were to cocoa price fixing, if 
only because they themselves were directly affected by the former policy. The 
Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, for instance, was very upset when in early 
1938 he sent his "boy" to buy iron sheeting, and discovered that a bundle 
which in 1937 had cost 37/6 now cost 65/-. "His boy told him that the price 
was the same at all stores and the reply to his query was--the price is fixed 
by the UAC." 58 
More seriously, a report filed by the Acting District Commissioner of 
Saltpond in January of 1938 showed that there was a clear correlation between 
the prices being paid for cocoa and the prices charged for imported goods in 
56Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 123. 
57Letter from the Board of John Holt (Liverpool) to Rawlings, manager of 
John Holt, Accra, 8 April 1938. JR: Jacket 536(ii). 
58Document dated 8 February 1938, GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
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the shop~. 
A comparison between cocoa and store prices shows a connection. 
Merchants admit that it is their practice to raise store prices when 
cocoa prices rise. Merchants meet once or twice per month in Saltpond 
and fix prices for their principal goods. An 'Approved Price List' is 
produced, and merchants are expected to adhere to these prices. 
The total trade of each district is divided amongst the merchants, 
and a firm is allowed to sell a certain percentage only of the total 
district sales of any of the principal goods. 
eg. flour UAC 60% 
GBO 10% 
me 10% 
SCOA 5% 
CFAO 5% 
remainder 10% 
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If at the end of the trading year any firm's sales have exceeded this 
fixed percentage, and other firms have not sold up to their percentage, 
the former pay a penalty to the latter. This adjustment is made in 
London. 59 
This same District Commissioner later reported a case of price fixing by the 
UAC, in which the Company tried to undercut a competitor, presumably an inde-
pendent Syrian, who was selling sugar at less than the monopoly price. 
Tate and Lyle Sugar: 
UAC have been unable to get Tate and Lyle to agree to their terms for 
sugar, and could not put pressure on a firm of such standing. Bikhazi 
Brothers buy Tate and Lyle's sugar for cash and UAC are attempting to 
stop this. Last month the case price for sugar in Saltpond was 21/6, 
the price is the same this month in Accra, Nsawam, Swedru, etc. the case 
price of UAC sugar has been reduced to 16/6. The reason for this 
drop in price is that Bikhazi Brothers are landing a few thousand cases 
of sugar at Accra shortly and by forcing down the price UAC hopes to 
leave this consignment on Bikhazi's hands.GO 
Thus the evidence that price fixing was occurring on all sides was 
quite clear during the 1937-38 boycott, and even some elements of the Govern-
ment were opposed to such practices. The situation was clearly aggravated by 
59Handwritten memo dated 12 January 1938, GNA Adm.23/l/956, Cape Coast. 
60Memo dated 15 January 1938, GNA Adm.23/l/956, Cape Coast. 
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the £act that the expatriate firms, although they argued consistently that 
there was nothing harmful to the African community as a whole in the buying 
Agreement~ just as consistently refused to allow the Agreement into the hands 
o£ those who could read and/or publicize it. Originally, the firms had ad-
vised the Colonial Office of the Agreement's existence and requested that the 
Colonial Office advise the Gold Coast Governor to publicize it and explain 
that its provisions would not harm the colony. This, however, the Governor 
refused to do, especially as he himself did not see and never obtained a copy 
o£ the document. Josephine Milburn argues that "The primary agreement was 
published in the Gold Coast simultaneously with a fall in the world price of 
cocoa. n6J In fact this is incorrect; the actual Agreement was never made 
public until its inclusion in the Nowell Commission Report, and even then the 
actual shares to be allotted to the firms were not included. This refusal to 
publish the Agreement was, of course, a ~ajor bone of contention between rep-
resentatives of the Africans and the Europeans. 
Throughout the course of the boycott and the several meetings which 
were arranged between chiefs and the representatives of the European firms, 
the subject of access to the Agreement was frequently brought up by the chiefs 
and refused by the Europeans, on the grounds that should it be publicized, the 
" ••• document would be submitted to lawyers Iand] find its way into scally-
wag press be quoted out of its context and distorted."62 The universal 
reaction of the chiefs was that if the document could not be produced, then it 
was obviously suspicious. For example at a meeting in Kumasi it was argued 
••• you have drawn up an agreement and you refuse to produce a copy. 
When you are asked to give explanation in regard to certain clauses. in 
the agreement you say 'no'; then we think there is something dubious 
6lap. cit. , p. 61. 
62cad: 288/57. 
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about the agreement. {Asantehene] 63 You have made us to understand that 
the agreement was drawn up in our interest; if so, why is it that you do 
not want us to see a copy? {Kyidomhene]64 
Milburn argues that 
The failure of the Coast administration to publicize the Agreement 
immediately, as anticipated by London, led to misunderstandings by the 
farmers and the chiefs about the intentions of the Agreement and aided 
in the developmei~ of suspicious attitudes about the firms ..•• The 
hold-up might very well not have occurred had the farmers been better 
informed, as was prevented by the lack of adequate communication between 
the Colonial Office and the Coast administration . 6S 
In arguing thus Milburn is accepting at face value the position of the compan-
ies involved in the Pool. Cadbury, for instance, believed that it was the 
duty of the Government to advertise the beneficial aspects of the Pool for 
them. " ••• nearly all the troubles and certainly any real hold-up could 
have been avoided if the Government, and, of course, the Governor in particu-
lar, had been willing and ready to take the view of the Cocoa scheme ••• 
H.E. and others on the Coast said it was not their job to advertise our Scheme 
for us • n66 In fact, however 1 the document could not be publicly sup-
parted because the actual provisions of the scheme did not coincide with what 
the firms had been arguing were its provisions. The provisions for sharing of 
the market and price "stabilization" were rarely if ever mentioned in their 
publicity. Rather the firms stressed that their attention was focussed on 
"abuses" in the trade caused by the overpayment of commissions and other 
remunerations to the African brokers from whom they bought cocoa. The firms 
63From a discussion following an "Address Given to a Representativ-= 
Meeting of Ashanti Chiefs and Farmers at Cadbury Hall Kumasi on December 7th, 
1937, by Mr. Frank Samuel," GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
64Ibid. 
650p. cit., P• 73. 
66cad: 288/26. 
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argued that the overpayments to the brokers were a loss to the farmer; if, 
through provisions to eliminate these abuses, there were fewer brokers, the 
~armers would suffer less. Yet this particular aim of eliminating abuses was 
not mentioned in the Agreement. It seemed as if the expatriate firms hoped, 
by stirring up resentment amongst the chiefs and farmers against the brokers, 
who did indeed make fortunes at the expense of the producers, to divert at-
tention away from the real provisions of the Agreement. As one Cadbury 
official confirmed, "Elmination of abuses the indirect benefit of which to 
Farmers has been heavily stressed is not dealt with in [the] Agreement. " 67 
Furthermore, the firms had also argued that the setting of prices 
under their Agreement would be based only upon the taking of a "reasonable 
profit"; that is, the farmer would be paid the full terminal price (New York 
or London) minus only set expenses and an allowance for a "reasonable profit." 
Again, the set expenses were never published, even in the copy of the Agree-
ment appendaged to the Nowell Commission Report. "Intention to pay full 
market price is in preamble only and any interpretation we could give of words 
reasonable profit could not possibly carry any weight."6 8 
While Milburn, then, in her apologetic article takes the view of the 
firms, that the Government was much to blame for the boycott because it never 
publicized the Agreement and explained its provisions to the farmers, in fact 
the firms should have been grateful that such action was never taken. It was 
not by accident that not a single copy of the Agreement was ever in the 
colony. 69 The Nowell Commission agreed with the firms that in the end, it was 
67Cad: 288/57. 
68Ibid. 
69cad: 288/26. 
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better that the Agreement was not published as it would have hardened the at-
titudes of the Africans, thus encouraging political and economic strife. In 
mild tones, it argued 
' The Agreement was not in itself fully explanatory; it would be diffi-
cult to convince African critics, especially lawyers, that it was the 
firms' intention to operate the Agreement in the manner in which they 
had explained to the Colonial Office that they would; and even if the 
letter of instructions were also published to explain the abuses which 
the Agreement was intended to eliminate, critics would rightly reply 
that the letter was not binding upon the parties. 
The disclosure of the clause referring to Messrs. Cadbury Brothers' 
right to withdraw on the 31st of May, 1938, would put the complete onus 
of continuing the Agreement after that date on the shoulders of that 
firm. 
Publication was • • . more likely to harden opinion against the 
firms. 7 0 
Unwittingly, therefore, by refusing to publicize the Agreement at the firms' 
request, the Government had probably done them a good turn. In this particu-
lar instance, the good turn was an unintentional outcome of the Government's 
annoyance with the rather strange request that it publicize an Agreement to 
which it had never itself had access. But on the whole, the Government was 
far more willing to take the side of the expatriate firms than the side of 
Ghanaian producers during the conflicts and boycotts over prices. Indeed, 
part of its function was to use legal means to suppress African organizations, 
while allowing a free hand to European organizations. 
During the 1930-31 boycott, the chief weapon which the Government used, 
in aid of the firms, was a law passed defending the 11Liberty of the Subject. 11 
This was a law which denied to chiefs the right to pass laws prohibiting their 
subjects from selling cocoa to the Europeans or from buying imported European 
goods. Under the Native Jurisdiction Ordi~ance, which had been passed in 
70Nowell Commission, op. oit., p. 60. 
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1925, chiefs had been given the right, under the system of "indirect rule," to 
pass local laws. One method of passing a law was to swear a "chief's oath"; 
that is, an oath binding on all members of the community, the violation of 
which could entail imprisonment. Another method was to "beat gong-gong," pro-
hibiting a certain action. In fact neither method was generally used unless 
the chief was expressing the will of his people, as to go against their will 
would engender the risk of destoolment. But the Government argued that the 
swearing of oaths or the beating of gong-gong was a usurpation of powers on 
the part of the chiefs which violated the liberty of the subject to engage in 
commercial transactions as he so pleased. 
Now I wish to state clearly that for a Chief or State Council to 
proclaim that people who sell their cacao below a certain price, or 
people who buy certain imported goods, will be liable to be punished by 
a tribunal purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the Native Ad-
ministration Ordinance, is an interference with legitimate trade which 
no Government in a British Colony can tolerate. 71 
To ensure that this edict had force, the Government promised that "any person 
using violence or threats in order to compel another to abstain from selling 
cacao, which is a lawful act, is to be sent to prison. " 72 On their asking 
about the coercion used by certain firms to ensure that other firms did not 
outprice the Agreement, however, the chiefs were informed that such an oli-
gopolistic situation with its economic san•::tions was permitted in Ghana. 
To further its control over the boycott, the Government also institu-
ted, in both 1930 and 1937, a policy of police supervision of all farmers' 
meetings, as the many police reports of meetings in the Ghana National 
Archives attest. Such supervision was partly a response to business pressure 
71Governor's Message to GCLegCo, 4 December 1930, reported in the GoZd 
Coast News, 9 December 1930. GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
72Contained in a notice, dated 6 November 1930, signed by G. H. Gibbs, 
District Commissioner, GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
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on the Government. The unofficial European members of the Le~islative Council 
were vociferous in their demands for such surveillance. ·In tre Council on 4 Decem-
ber,l930, Nana Ofori Atta presented evidence of such pressure in the form of a 
letter from Mr. Youngman, a European unofficial, to the acting Colonial Secre-
tary, a letter which Youngman did not deny sending. 
Sir: 
May I call your attention to a meeting that is to be held on Tuesday 
next ••• under the auspices of Mr. A.J. Ocansey. 
You will observe that Mr. Ocansey makes reference to European Merchants 
showing a desire to exploit and destroy the cocoa industry. If it is Mr. 
Ocansey's intention to address the meeting on these lines may I suggest 
that you instruct a political officer to attend the meeting in question 
and make a verbatim report of the speeches that are made. 7 3 
And, indeed, at the first executive meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti 
Cocoa Federation, on November 28, 1930, a police officer was present. 
During the course of the meeting Mr. Ocansey stated that he was aware 
that there Iwere] some people at the meeting who came to listen as spies 
for the Chamber [of Commerce] and the Government. Upon this anyone who 
was not well known was closely questioned. The Detective Constable who 
accompanied me and who gained admission into the meeting was recognised • 
• • • He was requested by Mr. T. Hutton Mills Jr. to get out as they did 
not want detectives present, the detective constable replied that he had 
resigned the force and that he was accompanying his uncle the Omanhene 
of Effiderase to the meeting. He was allowed to remain. 74 
During the 1937-38 boycott, similar methods of control were employed 
by the Government. One of the first acts it took when the boycott started 
was to issue a long statement reaffirming the position on the liberty of the 
subject taken in 1930. 75 That the Government political officers took this 
position seriously is clear from the complaints which were made by various 
73Quoted in GCLegCo, 4 December 1930. 
74Report by Detective Sergeant S, A. Amable, 29 November 1930. 
Adm.ll/1640. 
75The complete text of the Government's message to the people 
published as an appendix to J. B. Danquah 1 s ''Liberty of the Subject: 
graph on the Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up and Boycott of Foreign Goods" 
1938). 
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African leaders, that political officers were interfering with their rights 
over their citizens. In many of these cases, the political officers were ex-
ceeding their powers and contravening actions which the chief's, even under the 
restricted powers granted them, had a perfect right to take. Thus a meeting 
of Omanhene at Adabraka, Accra, complained to the Government in January 1938 
that the political officers were making extensive propaganda about the position 
of the chiefs, criticizing paramount chiefs, and constantly bring.ing the 
farmers together and haranguing them about the f'utili ty of the boycott • One 
Omanhene had beaten gong-gong to say that prices should be moderated on food 
so that the people could live during the course of the boycott, and then a 
political officer had had the gong-gong beaten to say that what the chief had 
just said was untrue. They also complained about a case in which the District 
Commissioner had refused to convict a labourer who stole cocoa, on the grounds 
that he had stolen the cocoa to obtain cash since his employer, participating 
in the hold-up, had not been able to pay him. Finally, they charged that the 
Government was urging labourers to bring action against the farmers for non-
payment of wages, while the police were threatening brokers who did not 
deliver cocoa to the expatriate firms. 76 
The chiefs of' Ghana were, on the whole, inclined to feel that the Gov-
ernment was against them and an ally of the firms; expressions of the 
neutrality of the Government and the disinterestedness of its spirited defence 
of the liberty of the subject did not impress them, especially when the liber-
ty of the firms who had entered the cocoa Agreements was never questioned. 
Monopoly was permitted, while organization against monopoly was not. 
The Omanhene [Nana Ofori Atta] asked whether monopolies were legal in 
this country. He was informed that they were. The Chiefs were very 
76omanhene to the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, 21 January 1938. 
GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast. 
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bitter against the Pool but more so against the UAC. They also were 
not satisfied with what Government was doing and the Omanhene of Winneba 
stated that the rumour was very strong that the UAC was a part of 
Government. 77 
Rumours were rife as to the power of the UAC, and its plans for eventual take-
over of the entire economy. One rumour had it that the Company would soon be 
taking over all the farmland, although it was known that Europeans could not 
buy land in Ghana. At a cocoa meeting at Nsawam in April 1938 it was said by 
one farmer that 
The UAC had opened account for 'loan' against advance for the farmers 
with an object in view that if farmers receives an advance from the firm 
the firm during the season will drop the price of cocoa in such a manner 
that a farmer would not be able to meet the advance. The firm would 
auction the farm which the firm itself would arrange to buy. This would 
continue until all the land would go into UAC and by the way the farmers 
became labourers to the farms. As the UAC had already proclaimed to 
their buyers in Europe that the Gold Coast cocoa is for them [sia].78 
The situation, therefore, during both boycotts was the following. 
Chiefs, farmers, and other members of the African community were aware not 
only that the price paid for cocoa was limited by agreement among the Euro-
peans, but also that retail prices were set in consultation among the various 
firms. They were also aware that despite its protestations of neutrality the 
Government was partial, in its actions, to the European firms. Finally, in 
1937, the situation was aggravated by the outright refusal of the firms to 
publicize the Agreement which they so often argued was ultimately of benefit 
to the farming community. Although they might not have been able to control 
the international economy and its effect on the cocoa commodity market, the 
farmers were well aware that they might, by political action, be able to 
77Meeting of Chiefs with a Government Official, 20 December 1937. GNA 
Adm.ll/1640. 
78Police Report of a cocoa meeting at Nsawam, 22 April 1938. GNA 
Adm.29/6/14. 
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remedy some of the abuses in the colony. Their anger and militancy was sue-
cinctly displayed in a large pink poster, printed and distributed in Dunkwa, 
entitled the 11 Farmers' 'D' Slogan of Cocoa Crisis." 
1. Down with Pool Firms. 
2. Drown Pool Firms in their Pool waters. 
3. Dry pool waters with cocoa conflagration. 
4. Doom cocoa buying agreement. 
5. Drag away plutocrats. 
6. Drill the unscrupulous capitalists. 
7· Disband cocoa trade monopolies. 
8. Do hold-up absolutely and persistently. 
9. Dictate your price. 
10. Dignify your position and that of posterity. 7 9 
4. Participation in the 1930-31 and 1937-38 'Boycotts 
The 1930-31 and 1937-38 boycotts were both characterized by two acts of 
protest against the European firms; the hold-up of cocoa supplies and the re-
fusal to buy imported European goods, except for essentials such as matches 
and kerosene, from either European or African shops. In addition, in 1937-38, 
a small amount of cocoa was actually burnt during the later stages of the boy-
cott as a symbolic protest. The latter boycott was also the object of 
sympathetic strikes by market mammies and lorry drivers. 
On the whole the 1937-38 boycott was better organized and more success-
ful than its predecessor. As analyzed above, part of the cause of this 
success was that the issues were more clear-cut and the exploitation by the 
European firms more obvious. A second reason was that, although by the end of 
the boycott some conflicts had occurred among the different sectors of the 
African population, during the course of the action there was more cohesion 
among the different groups and regions of Ghana than there had been in 1930-31. 
Sam Rhodie, in his article on the earlier hold-up,80 has written an 
79This poster can be found in GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast. 
800p. oit. 
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excellent analysis of the conflicts a.m.ong the various groups who were origin-
ally engaged together in political action. He argues in essence that "It was 
the middle and wealthy farmers and chiefs who were behind the hold-up and even 
they were far from united ••.• Their hold-up was a revolt of a nascent rural 
bourgeoisie against a monopoly power which they regarded as a brake on their 
own enterprise. us1 He maintains that in fact the small farmers were not as 
eager as their richer compatriots to boycott the expatriate firms and were 
therefore only too willing to listen to the British political officers who 
informed them that, according to the laws on the liberty of the subject, they 
were not obliged to obey their chiefs. Further, the chiefs and rich farmers 
were engaged in group selling projects which were designed to eliminate the 
brokers, whom they regarded as a parasitic class. Finally, Rhodie argues, the 
cocoa labourers, who bad little to gain and much to lose from the boycott, 
were eager to sell as much cocoa as they c~uld to the firms. 
Rhodie's well-documented article needs little elaboration here: un-
fortunately, however, a similar work, analyzing the class interests and 
conflicts in the Ghanaian community, does not exist for the 1937-38 boycott. 
This section will therefore be concerned with the different groups which 
participated in the latter event , in an endeavour to show that there was more 
support for the boycott as a whole and that conflicts were mitigated by a 
greater over-all perception of exploitation. 
The 1937-38 boycott was much more widespread than was its predecessor, 
covering not only the Eastern Province, the original cocoa-producing area, but 
also Ashanti and even the northern part of the Central Province. In 1930, the 
hold-up had been less successful in Ashanti because the Asantehene, who had 
81Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
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returned from political exile in the Seychelles Islands only recently, was un-
willing to take any action which might put him in the bad graces of the 
colonial Government. In fact, the Asantehene was known at that time only as 
the Kumasihene, as by Government decree he had been stripped of the right to 
rule the entire Ashanti nation. But in 1936 the "Kumasihene" died and was 
replaced by Nana Otumfoo Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, a man more willing, because 
he had never himself been exiled, to assume the role of king of Ashanti and 
thereupon to support the boycott.8 2 Along with Nana Ofori Atta of Akim 
Abuakwa, he became one of the most articulate spokesmen of the Ghanaian cocoa 
producers. There was also some participation in the boycott in the cocoa-
growing areas of the British Mandated Territory (Togoland) but, as one business 
agent wrote "We must remember that the British Mandated Territory native is, 
in himself much less subversive than the Accra native. • "8 3 The John Holt 
papers indicate that the chiefs of this area, especially around Hohoe, were 
quite willing to sell cocoa and only boycotted because of pressure from chiefs 
from other regions.84 
On the whole the chiefs were more willing to use their powers of sane-
tion to encourage the hold-up in the later boycott. The Nowell Commission 
reported that not only were they swearing oaths and beating gong-gong, but 
also they were denying their people the traditional functions of the chiefs, 
threatening to withdraw funeral rites and refusing claims to adultery fees if 
the people did not support the boycott.85 This situation contrasts with that 
82Danquah, op. ait., p. 11, considers the Asantehene's support a crucial 
factor in the success of the boycott. 
83Hohoe Agent to District Agent, Accra, 24 March 1938. JH: Jacket 536 
(ii). 
84Ibid. 
85Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 67. 
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of 1930 when pressure had to be put on the chiefs to encourage them to support 
the boycott. 8G 
But chiefs were not only chiefs, they were also large farmers in their 
own right, sometimes money-lenders or cocoa brokers on a large scale and, 
also, entrepreneurs who were interested in buying up the stocks of cocoa which 
accumulated during the boycott at cheap prices and selling and/or shipping 
them at a profit. The Europeans, failing often to recognize the multiple in-
terests of the chiefs, sometimes assumed that they were being coerced by 
educated entrepreneurs from the Gold Coast Colony into taking positions of 
support for the boycott. At other times, however, recognizing the conflicting 
aims, they managed to interfere with the chiefs' positions qua chief. Nana 
Ofori Atta, one of the most articulate spokesmen for the cocoa producers 
during both boycotts, was a target for European bribes in his capacity as a 
large cocoa farmer and would-be shipper. It was in fact claimed by Cadbury 
that the 1930-31 hold-up was broken when Nana Ofori Atta agreed to sell his 
cocoa at a premium. 
We are intending to ask UAC to-morrow if they would support our 
offering a premium, say of 1/-:- per cwt. or so, for a certain limited 
quantity of Cocoa or for a limited time, as a gesture of goodwill, 
especially in view of the approach of Christmas. You may recall that in 
the Farmers' Federation hold-up of 1930-31 it was a gesture of this kind 
on our part which broke it up, Ofori Atta himself, while the Farmers' 
Federation were deciding whether to sell, offering us a small parcel at 
a premium of l/6d. per cwt. which we accepted at 1/-, and when this Cocoa 
was seen moving by lorry it started off the renewal of selling,8 7 
In 1938 similar accusations were made against Nana Ofori Atta, that he, as 
well as other chiefs, was deliberately encouraging the boycott in order to 
8GThis type of pressure was put on the chiefs by John Kwame Ayew at the 
21 October 1930 meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Farmers' Association. 
GNA Adm.ll/1070. 
87Letter to J. Cadbury dated 1 December 1937. Cad: 289/131. 
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get "rake-offs" against the cocoa which was being held up. In other words, it 
was argued that the chiefs' role as entrepreneurs superseded their traditional 
role. One Government Officer reported 
Had an interesting talk with a cocoa man from Somanyah. He is also a 
lorry owner, and has come down here to get a contract on the road •••• 
I asked him what was the cocoa situation, and he told me that the reason 
the cocoa was not being sold was because the chiefs headed by Ofori Atta 
wanted a rake off from the farmers amounting to as much as six shillings 
a load and because the farmers refused to let them have it the chiefs 
had stopped the sales. He said further that the United Africa Company 
were approaching Ofori Atta with a large bribe to let the cocoa sales 
proceed. He said the chiefs wanted to appoint Agents through whom all 
cocoa should pass to ensure the rake off and the farmers wouldn't agree. 
This is probably all wrong but may be of interest.BS 
An accusation such as the above is difficult to substantiate; it might easily 
have been made by a jealous farmer. In any case cocoa was not sold until the 
end of February, despite any such bribes as may have been offered to Nana 
Ofori Atta by the UAC. But the accusation indicates a degree of suspicion of 
the powerful chiefs of the colony, even of those who, like Nana Ofori Atta, 
verbally supported the movement. A great deal of debate took place among the 
Europeans as to whether it was simply the chiefs, or the farmers themselves, 
who were behind the boycott. The UAC preferred to believe that it was simply 
the chiefs who were the instigators of the boycott, but the Nowell Commission 
found rather that the farmers were "throughout" in sympathy with it. 8 9 And 
indeed it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise, given the de-
gree of suspicion of chiefs, who were recognized as also being concerned with 
their profits as large farmers and possibly shippers in the event of a com-
plete boycott • 
For it was well-known during both boycotts that some leaders, including 
88Extract from the Confidential Diary of the District Commissioner, 
Keta, 16 January 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
89ap. ait., p. 68. 
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John Kwame Ayew, A. J. Ocansey, T. Hutton-Mills, and various other officials 
of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, were engaged in attempts not 
only to circumvent the monopolizing European buyers, but also to circumvent 
the European shippers. Many contacts were made with outside businessmen, 
mostly Americans, who were willing to ship cocoa on contract for the striking 
farmers. The Government, invoking memories of the 1924 Strickler affair,90 
cast doubts on the honesty of these contacts, but it would seem that at least 
some were legitimate businessmen. It would also seem, from what little evi-
dence is available, that the large American chocolate manufacturing concern, 
'Hershey, was behind some of the independent attempts to ship cocoa. One Mr. 
Canalize, whose name often cropped up as an advisor to African entrepreneurs, 
was reputed to be an agent for Hershey. Try as they might, Government offi-
cials were unable to ascertain proof of this rumour, but it seems that certain 
persons in America were definitely urging the Ghanaians to continue their 
hold-up of cocoa in 1938. One official reported that there had been ". • . 
several meetings (Accra) • about the monetary assistance offered by an 
American firm on the condition that a certain amount of cocoa should be sent 
to them to be kept in store pending the time when good price would be offered 
n91 At one of these meetings, participants were 11 • • • informed of pos-
sible agreement with persons in America to buy their cocoa and that these 
persons ask the farmers to continue their Hold-Up until arrangements are com-
pleted. " 92 After the boycott was over, a buyer from Hershey arrived in Ghana, 
90see above. 
91District Commissioner, Dunkwa to District Commissioner, Cape Coast, 
10 July 1938. GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast. 
92Report by the Superintendent of the Eastern Province Police, of a 
meeting at Mampong, 3 February 1938. G!lA Adm.29/6/14. 
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apparently to purchase the cheap held-over cocoa. 
I have the honour to inform you that an American by the name of Mr. 
Schwarz arrived in Accra this morning and in Koforidua this afternoon. 
He left America 10 days ago. 'He is a representative of Herchey [sic] 
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and Baker, the big cocoa merchants of New York. The purpose of his visit 
is to ascertain the quality of Gold Coast cocoa awaiting purchase and 
shipment. There are rumours in New York that most of the cocoa is of 
bad quality owing to storage by Africans and the hold-up of sale of 
cocoa.9 3 
The purpose of the Hershey visit, as reported above, was seemingly innocuous. 
But the possibility remains that Africans were encouraged through Hershey 
representatives to try direct shipping schemes, thus giving them a false view 
of their capacity to break out of the international monopoly. For although 
the aims of all the various organizations connected with the boycotts included 
the desire to make direct shipments of cocoa, 9 ~ in fact no large shipments 
ever came off. The Africans were at the mercy of the Europeans with whom they 
were dealing. African entrepreneurs " .•• created a never-ceasing string of 
limited liability companies to break into trade in a big way. These schemes 
were almost uniformly unsuccessful because of insufficient capital and 
skills." 95 
Anthony Hopkins has traced the career of one Ghanaian entrepreneur, 
Winifried Tete-Ansa, who was prominently involved in many of the various ship-
ping schemes put forward during the 1930s. Tete-Ansa, having been trained in 
business methods in England and America, put faith in limited liability com-
panies as a means of mobilizing African savings on a group basis. But in a 
situation in which there was little capital in the first place, in which 
93Report by the Superintendent of the Gold Coast Police, Koforidua, 11 
May 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
9 ~The Rules of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, 1930, in-
cluded the aim of acting as a "Bureau" for the selling of cocoa. GNA Adm.ll/ 
1640. 
95Holmes, op. eit., p. 72. 
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entrepreneurs were not united, and in which, moreover, there were hints of 
corruption about Tete-Ansa himself, 96 there was little hope that the Africans 
could successfully compete with the Europeans. 
The chiefs, then, along with certain rich farmers (or in their own 
capacity as rich farmers) and the urban trading class which, according to 
Rhodie, 97 was interested in entering the cocoa trade to replace the large bro-
kers, had an interest in supporting the boycott in order to corner the 
distributive network for their own gain. Such an aim, however, was unattain-
able, except in the short run for very small amounts of cocoa. The most that 
could be achieved in the long run was in fact the sort of result which did 
occur; that is, the investigation of some of the abuses of the immediate situ-
ation and the recommendation of a new mode of distribution. 
Any new mode of distribution which might be set up would impinge upon 
the brokers, however. During the 1930-31 boycott, the brokers were not partic-
ipants because they regarded any attempt to by-pass the expatriate firms as also 
an attempt to by-pass them. Furthermore, many brokers were strangers , known 
collectively as "Lagosians 11 because they tended to be from Nigeria, and there-
for~ susceptible to resentment on ethnic grounds. As strangers and as economic 
middlemen, they did not wish to have attention called to themselves. In 1934 a 
chief of Akim Abuakwa tried to issue a proclamation prohibiting his people from 
trading with Lagosians at all, on the grounds that the Lagosian brokers bought 
poor quality cocoa. He passed a "Village Cocoa Buying Prohibition Order" the 
"Objects and Reasons" of which were the following. 
96A. G. Hopkins, "Economic Aspects of Political Movements in the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria 1918-1939," Jou:m.aZ of Afriaan History, no. 1, vol. 7 (1966). 
97ap "t 3 • en • , p. 11 . 
Gold Coast Cocoa in the World :Markets is given bad repute year by year, 
attempts tending to improve the quality of the industry have been of no 
avail, and this giving rise to the low price of the industry it is found 
expedient to trace out the cause and provide a remedy. 
It is known from recent experience that the source of the trouble is at 
the Villages of the Farmers to which the petty cocoa buyers go for buying 
competition, and failing to distinguish between good and bad qualities, 
they buy and mix together :moulded, salt and damp cocoa. A tendency towards 
the degradation of the quality of the industry. In aid of the restrictions 
passed by the Government for the improvement of the industry in the inter-
est of all concerned a prohibitory measure against village cocoa-buying is 
the only safeguard. Buying at the Villages creates stealing habits and all 
kinds of crime among the strangers who are petty cocoa-buyers, and care-
takers of cocoa farms. 98 
This chief, then, perceiving that the poor quality of Ghana cocoa was a cause 
of its receiving a relatively low price on the international market, and unable 
to influence the Europeans who willingly bought poor quality cocoa, thought to 
attack the problem at its source, the stranger cocoa-buyers. 
The 1937 cocoa-bey:ing Agreement, however, cont.a.fued such a clear threat to the 
position of the brokers that for their own sake they were obliged to uphold the 
boycott. Although they were aware that certain chiefs and entrepreneurs were 
trying to usurp their position, they were also aware that the primary aim of 
the boycott was to attack the Agreement, an Agreement which was constantly 
vaunted by the Europeans as a means of eliminating the "abuses" of the broker-
age system and of therefore providing more payments to the farmers. One of the 
"abuses" most stringently objected to was the practice of dela¥ing declarations 
of stocks. The ~rice of cocoa changed from day tc day on the international 
markets, and as it changed, new prices to be paid for cocoa were wired out from 
London to the firms' Accra agents, who then informed their various agents in 
the other stations of Ghana. Brokers were usually given a few days to bring in 
98proclamation by the Omanhene of New Juaben, 20 October 1934. GNA 
Adm.29/6/8. 
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their cocoa at the old price as the agents were not able to inform them of the 
new price immediately. The brokers often took advantage of this practice; if 
they heard that the price of cocoa had risen they would declare cocoa which 
they had actually bought at the old, lower price at the new, higher price; if 
they heard that the price had fallen they would buy at the new price and then 
declare that they had bought at the old, higher price. This practice was 
ubiquitous and a source of rankle to all the European agents, yet to keep their 
brokers the firms were required to put up with it. 99 A provision of the new 
Agreement was to be that the brokers would have only forty-eight hours to de-
clare their stocks, to cut out their chances for over- or under-declarations. 
In order that their brokers could not leave the firms in a pique when denied 
these opportunities, provision was also made that no firm would hire a broker 
previously employed by another firm in the Agreement.lOO 
The firms argued moreover that the prices they were paying for cocoa 
were higher than they should be because of all the extra perquisites which they 
were required to pay to the brokers in order to keep their contacts. These 
perquisities, or "abuses," as the firms insisted on calling them, included such 
p~ents as the following: rent allowances to brokers or buyers for stores, 
repair allowances, weighing machine and tarpaulin allowances, labour allowances 
for clerks, watchmen, etc.; the loan of bags, free transportation, the payment 
of an "over-riding c01mn.ission" on tonnage above a certain amount; and outright 
gifts to brokers, the most well-known gift being a motorcycle.~Ol 
99The author was informed of this practice in several interviews with 
former cocoa buyers, both African and European. 
100Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 209. 
101cad: 288/65. 
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The firms tried to persuade the chiefs that the brokers' support of the 
boycott was based entirely on their desire for the unwarranted profits obtain-
able through false declarations of stocks and through the various abuses listed 
above. They argued that the farmers would obtain more for their cocoa if only 
they would join the firms in eliminating, or putting under control, the broker 
class • 
• • • constantly increasing abuses ••• have--inter alia--resulted in 
the remuneration of brokers and middlement in the form of varying commis-
sions and allowances, becoming far in excess of the value of the services 
rendered by them. 
To the extent that overpayments have taken the form of direct or indi-
rect over-remuneration to brokers, the actual producer has not benefitted, 
and it is the intention ••• that such overpayments to intermediaries 
should be suppressed as soon as possible, thereby ensuring that out of the 
fair price paid for Cocoa the full and proper proportion reaches the 
pockets of the actual producer.102 
The chiefs, however, were not taken in by this argument, partly because some of 
them were themselves engaged in brokerage activities, and partly because they 
were aware that brokerage was a risky business and that fortunes could be lost 
as easily as they could be made. 
the merchants have given evidence before the Cocoa Enquiry Com-
missions and accused the brokers for being the cause of low price of 
cocoa therefore they entered into agreement so as to exclude them and 
deal with the farmers direct. This being their defence for the formation 
of the pool, the chiefs have got to support the brokers who are sons of 
this country and keep fighting.l03 
Indeed the firms were as aware as the farmers and chiefs that brokerage was a 
precarious business; so aware that they argued to the Nowell Commission that the 
chief reason for the opposition of the brokers to the Agreement was that the 
brokers had overpaid advances for the 1937-38 season, thinking that the season 
102Extract from the GOZd Coast News dated 14 December 1937. GNA Adm.29/6/9. 
1 03statement by Nana Akua.moa Akyeampong { Omanhene of Kwahu State), at a 
meeting in Winneba, 1 April 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
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would be as prosperous as 1936-37. The firms argued that the brokers were in 
no position to buy the cocoa crop at the prices that they had promised; there-
fore they were encouraging·the boycott to del~ payment of their debts • 
• • • it can readily be seen that the brokers have a very good reason 
for conducting a hold-up this year in the hopes of thereby creating a 
shortage calculated to increase prices • • • the brokers are an active 
factor in the present situation • 
• many chiefs are directly interested in the cocoa trade. Many 
are actual brokers, and many indulge in large-scale loans on the farmers' 
crops. • • • The innumerable instances of disciplinary measures taken by 
chiefs against those farmers wishing to sell their cocoa can only be 
against those who have been independent of their finance. They have no 
difficulty in controlling the others who have already lost to them their 
interest in their cocoa.I04 
Thus the firms professed interest in the welfare of the ordinary peasant who 
was in debt to the brokers because of the notorious system of advances. The 
firms advocated, they claimed, a system of direct producer to shipper selling, 
so that the producer might earn the maximum possible. Their propaganda, 
throughout the course of the boycott, was directed towards this contention and 
was accepted as such by the Nowell Commission. 
In the light of such professed concern, it is interesting to note that 
one expatriate firm, when faced with the real possibility of eliminating the 
broker from the distributive network, rejected the idea. In a letter to the 
John Holt headquarters in Liverpool, their Accra agent wrote that their system 
of giving credit was in fact unnecessary. 
To the general surprise it has been found recently, that, far from 
having to continue advances for cocoa buying, we could all actually buy 
cocoa on credit from the middlemen and farmers on the promise of payment 
to them when the Banks replenished their stocks of currency. 
I need not here reiterate the well known arguments against such a system 
[of advances] which involves unsound credit for a crop which does not 
1 °4Anonymous memorandum on the reason for the Pool. JH: Jacket 536 ( ii) • 
0 
0 
373 
really need financing, which is very easily transportable by adequate 
existing transport facilities to a nearby buying post; and which is of 
such a high value that, advances or no advances, it is bound to find its 
way into the merchants' hands as soon as it is ready for marketing. In 
fact, it could find its way into the merchants' hands very much quicker, 
since it has been proved by our own and to everybody's experience that 
cash advances merely provoke brokers and producer with means of gambling 
with our money against us on a 'Heads I win, tails you lose' basis. 105 
In reply to this letter advocating elimination of middlemen, John Holt wrote 
that if they were eliminated, the European firms would no longer have control 
over the cocoa market. If they were not tied through credit to the Europeans, 
the Africans would be able to ship cocoa on their own. 
If the native cocoa dealers of the Gold Coast can in fact finance the 
cocoa crop without credit facilities, how long do you think the exporting 
houses can remain in business without forever paying a higher price on the 
Gold Coast than the African shipper can get on the home market? A direct 
shipper can hypothecate his cocoa shipments through the Bank. 
In the long run does it not come down to this--that the exporting 
houses have got to choose between paying more on the Gold Coast than the 
average home market and relying for their profit on successful market 
gambling [this would be if Ghanaians could sell direct] or alternatively 
financing the market of the crop, in the hope of getting a substantial 
proportion of tied customers, and being able to buy at a rather lower 
price than they would have to pay if all the cocoa were free cocoa. In 
the merchandise trade, I hold very strongly the view that it is the 
function of Importing houses to finance its distribution. This is the 
practice all over the world, and more particularly in primitive coun-
tries. • • • From time immemorial the West African trade has been 
conducted on credit, and built up on credit. How can trade expand 
otherwise? The im~ortant thing is to see that credit trade is sanely 
conducted •••• 10 
By the same conduct of the credit trade, John Holt was referring to the conduct 
of the trade in such a way as to keep the brokers, and through them the, pro-
ducers, tied to the European firms at a minimum cost to those firms. His fear 
105Letter from the Accra District Agent to Holt and Company, dated 11 
February 1937. JH: Jacket 92. 
106Reply to Accra District Agent from John Holt, dated 17 March 1937. JH: 
Jacket 92, italics the author's. 
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was that the producers might be able to finance themselves through the banks 
and sell on their own. It was imperative that whatever cash the banks brought 
to Ghana. should be channelled through the firms, not given direct to producers 
or to African brokers or traders. No clearer statement could be made of the 
absolute necessity of keeping all Africans, down to the lowliest producer, 
firmly in the debt of the expatriate companies. 
The lowliest producers, indeed, were well aware of the exploitation in-
herent in the cocoa distribution system, but they were constrained in their 
ability to boycott by the hard necessities of life. In debt as they already 
were to cocoa brokers, who had advanced them money before the season began, few 
farmers had capital to sustain them over the long period of the 1937-38 hold-
up. Part of their hardship was relieved by their ability to grow some food-
stuffs, such as yams, along with their cocoa. But they could no longer retreat 
into the self-sufficiency of which they had been capable forty years earlier; 
imported consumer goods were a necessity. 
In fact, the leaders of the boycott realized that farmers could be self-
sufficient only within certain limits; it was always clearly stated that 
boycotts of European goods were not meant to include such basics as sugar, 
kerosene, matches, or tobacco. The market mammies who upheld the boycott were 
thus able to make some income in the continued sale of these basic commodities. 
At the same time, they supported the boycott not simply out of sympathy with 
the farmers, but because it was in their own interests. Mammies were tied to 
the European firms through systems of credit similar to those which tied the 
brokers; in order to finance themselves they borrowed from the European firms, 
who in return had guaranteed customers for their supplies. But those same 
firms who sold goods to the mammies also competed with them, in their large 
"department store" retail establishments in the coastal cities and regional 
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centres, and in the lorry-loads of goods vhich they transported to the bush. 
• • • you [the mammies] take certain articles so as to take them up-
country to retail at some little profit but before you get to the 
up-country a lorry belonging to the same firms loaded full,· vi th the 
same articles vould have gone ahead of you and disposed of them at the 
same prices and sometimes a little cheaper. 107 
Mammies vere especially urged to boycott the West African prints vhich 
vere manufactured in England and then exported to Ghana, at prices inflated by 
the acts of imperial protection vhich had denied Ghana cheap Japanese cottons 
since 1934. That the boycott of these cloths had no little effect is indicated 
by the following report of the sufferings of the Lancashire cotton trade. 
In conversation vith A. Jones yesterday he mentioned that Lancashire is 
having a bad time vith cotton goods for West African trade. 
A considerable number of firms in the cotton trade have shipped nothing 
to West Africa for a long time and Lancashire people are blaming the price 
of cocoa for it. He says that this comment is pretty widespread. It is 
supposed too that the West African native is boycotting British goods, 
particularly Lancashire cotton goods,l08 
Many of the mammies vho boycotted the foreign firms were married to 
lorry drivers who also participated in the boycott. Again, it was not sheer 
altruism in support of their farming brothers which induced the lorry drivers 
to boycott; rather, they had specific grievances of their own. They were 
afraid that if the Europeans got control of the internal marketing of cocoa, 
there would be less transport work available for them, and they were also 
afraid that the Pool would result in a permanent reduction of cocoa prices, 
affecting freight rates. 109 They vere moreover already suffering from the 
107speech by Mr. Moore at a meeting in Cape Coast, 15 February 1938. GNA 
Adm.23/1798, Cape Coast. 
108Letter to P. s. Cadbury from F. Pountain, 4 February 1938. Cad: 
289/325. 
109Report by the District Commissioner, Winneba, 29 November 1937. GNA 
Adm.23/l/956, Cape Coast. 
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policy of "scheduled roads" which diverted cocoa traffic from the roads to the 
railway. 11° Finally, they were generally in debt to the expatriate firms for 
the lorries themselves. In fact, although they were militant in their stand in 
support of the boycott, and although chief drivers made it their business to 
ensure that all their men participated in the strike, the,lorry drivers were 
not as able to hold out as other groups and were forced by early 1938 to renew 
their licences for lorries and resume their work. 111 A similar sympathy strike 
by the surf-boat men of Saltpond did.not last long.l 12 There was also a short 
but unsuccessful strike by the workers who were engaged to supply palm fruit to 
the UAC Palm Oil Mill at Sese, near Takoradi. 113 
The general boycott and strike against Europeans from all sectors of the 
community no doubt encouraged small far.mers who might otherwise have been 
tempted to give in to the firms to hold out longer than they had intended. For 
indeed the boycott was a strain on such farmers, and it was they, along with 
the hired labourers from the Northern Territories and French colonies who 
worked on the richer farms, who were the first to let out small trickles of 
cocoa in sales to the Europeans. During the 1930-31 boycott, there had been 
fairly frequent complaints against the richer farmers by the poorer ones, who 
felt that the boycott was a plot to facilitate the acquisition of large stocks 
of cocoa for shipment rather than a genuine attempt to alleviate the lot of all 
the far.mers. Konor Mate Kole of Manya. Krobo, who had begun a co-operative 
110See Chapter V. 
111 Information on the lorry drivers' strike is taken from GNA Adm.ll/1656 
and GNA Adm.29/6/13 • 
. 
112Doc~ent dated 21 November 1937. 
me in the evening that the boat crews at 
work." GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
'
1Whi.tfield of the Lighterage informed 
Saltpond had agreed to return to 
113Report from Western Province, 13 December 1937. GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
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marketing scheme ostensibly for the benefit of all his people, was especially 
singled out for such suspicion. 114 Although such claims were less frequent in 
the later boycott, the suspicions still existed. But the farmers were on the 
whole more willing to take militant action, and indeed began, in February 1938, 
to burn small lots of cocoa in support of their claims. Although only an es-
timated total of about 400 tons was burned,llS the incidence of such protests 
was sufficient to panic the Government administrators, who were instructed to 
keep a close watch on all burnings, however small the lots destroyed. 
It is more than likely that whatever small lots of cocoa were actually 
sold during the 1937-38 boycott, as compared to the 1930-31 boycott, were sold 
not by the small farmers but by the migrant farm labourers. As in 1930, the 
labourers were not convinced that they would profit from the boycott. They 
knew that the price of cocoa was low, but living as they did on a season-to-
season basis, and required, as those from the French territories were, to p~ 
yearly taxes, it was more important to them to acquire whatever cash they 
could. When they were not paid, they often "stole" cocoa (which was actually 
theirs, since normal payment for a season's work was one-third of the produce) 
and sold it to the Europeans. ll6 The leaders of the boycott tried to exhort 
the farm labourers not to sell, but with limited success. When John Kwame Ayew 
tried to persuade them to discontinue their selling at Asamankese in February 
11 ~eport from the District Commissioner, Akuse to the Commissioner for the 
Eastern Province, 21 January 1932. See also Rhodie, op. cit., p. ll5. 
11 5Nowell Commission, op. oit., p. 62. 
116on 29 January 1938 the Assistant District Commissioner of Cape Coast 
wrote that he had had to try a labourer accused by a farmer of stealing his 
produce. When it was discovered that he had stolen only his actual one-third 
share the case was dismissed. The District Commissioner" ••• expressed the 
hope that the farmers would see that their labourers did not suffer while they 
held up their cocoa." GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast. 
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1938, he was shouted down with cries of" •• belly trouble too much to wait 
any longer." 117 The labourers had no leaders to constrain them, as their 
chiefs remained at home in the north and their Zongo headmen were as dependent 
on cocoa revenue as they were • Further, they came from tribes whi eh, if not 
actually despised by the Ashanti and other southern peoples, were not regarded 
as genuine members of the Gold Coast community. Thus social pressure could 
have little effect on them. 
While southern farmers expressed concern for, and made arrangements for, 
their fellow tribesmen who encountered difficulties, on the whole there was 
little sympathy among them for the stranger labourers. At a meeting in Suhum 
.in April 1938 the question of strangers was discussed. The Chief Farmer, 
"Teacher Atta, 11 advised 
It appears that some of the farmers who employed those Zabramas [a 
stranger tribe] as labourers pay them by cash and some also by loads of 
cocoa, and these led the labourers to possess cocoa, which may be those 
that came to the market. 
He then suggested to them that it will be better if a farmer who 
employed any of these labourers will turn them out from his village. 
This advice was taken by the farmers. 11 8 
Despite such callous indifference to the plight of the migrants, on the 
whole very little cocoa was actually sold to the firms during the boycott. The 
farming group, chiefs, and brokers managed to stick together enough to make the 
effect of the boycott serious, as the following table indicates. The boycott 
was not successful in breaking down the collusion between the major European 
firms, nor was it successful in raising the price of cocoa, a price which was 
dependent on factors not completely within the firms' control. But it was 
. successful in ·eliminating the actual cocoa Agreement, and in obliging the 
ll·7Report dated 10 February 1938. Cad: 289/63. 
118Report dated 21 April 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14. 
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Table 39. 
Dates 
1 October-25 November 
26 November-25 December 
26 December-31 December 
1 January-27 January 
28 January-3 February 
4 February-10 February 
11 February-17 February 
Amount of Cocoa Bought by Members of the 
Cocoa Agreement, 1937-38 Season1 19 
Tonnage 
21,606 
. 508 
63 
829 
280 
326 
235 
379 
Government to reconsider the method of marketing the crop in Ghana. The Nowell 
Commission negotiated a truce between Africans and expatriates in February 1938. 
With the outbreak of war in 1939, a Government marketing scheme was perforce 
introduced, a scheme which was refined into the Cocoa Marketing Board estab-
lished in the late 1940s. 
5. Limits to Economic Action in Ghana 
Throughout the colonial period in Ghana, African resistance to colonial 
political rule and expatriate economic rule concentrated on two crucial dimen-
sions of the economic system; production and distribution. In the struggle for 
control of productive resources, Africans were by and large successful, in that 
they maintained ownership of the land of the colony, although in doing so they 
sacrificed their right and ability to evolve private ownership of land, and 
with it capitalist forms of enterprise which could compete more successfully 
with the Europeans. In the second struggle, Ghanaians were not successful. 
Neither in competition with Europeans nor as their adjuncts in the distributive 
system could Ghanaians make an impact on the economic organization of their 
country. The cocoa boycotts, as attempts to remove the distributive network 
119Report dated 26 February 1938. GNA Adm.ll/1640. 
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from foreign hands, failed, 
The boycotts failed for two reasons. First, the economy was too depen-
dent upon the world market for cocoa for an organization whose only weapon was 
hold-up, boycott and strike to make any impact upon it. While a significant 
percentage of the world's production of cocoa came from Ghana, those who con-
trolled its marketing were not willing to act in the ultimate interests of the 
producer of cocoa. Moreover, cocoa was not an essential commodity; as such, 
the world's consumers were well able to withstand a short boycott of one sea-
son. It was obvious to the colonial Government that something should be done 
to control the violent fluctuations in cocoa prices, with their concomitant 
risks of loss of revenues and,political upheaval in times of depression, but 
action was only to be taken in conjunction with the expatriate firms. Africans 
possessed neither the political nor the economic power to force significant 
changes. 
Second, internal contradictions within the Ghanaian community acted to 
impede a long-term boycott or indeed any long-term planning for economic 
change. Rich farmers were pitted against poor; all farmers were pitted against 
the migrant labourers. Brokers were sometimes also rich farmers or chiefs, 
sometimes strangers making a petty existence by exploiting the farmers who 
borrowed from them. Chiefs had economic interests of their own which encour-
aged them to join the boycott, but they also were constrained by the necessity 
to keep hold of their "traditional" power which depended ultimately on the 
goodwill of the colonial Government. African entrepreneurs acted ostensibly 
in the interests of the farmers, but often their real motive was to become com-
petitive on the international capitalist stage by using precisely the same 
methods of exploitation as an expatriate capitalist would use. As will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VIII, the develo:p:alent of class relations within Ghana 
0 
381 
coincided with the development of an international capitalist system geared to 
keep Ghana in a peripheral producer's role, with the result that no significant 
economic change could be realized. 
0 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
IN GHANA: 1886-1939 
In order to analyze the effects on Ghana of her integration into the 
world capitalist-dominated economic system, effects which were compounded by 
her position as a colony, a framework incorporating theories of development and 
underdevelopment is best applicable. The obvious import of the empirical data 
presented in this thesis has been to provide evidence for the argument that 
Ghana's "underdevelopment" during the period 1886-1939 was a function of both 
the political and the economic imperialism which she underwent. In the follow-
ing pages, this point of view will be elaborated. 
It must be noted that when considering the concept of development in the 
context of Ghana or in the context of the "Third World" as a whole, this author 
is referring solely to the development of capitalism. In much of the litera-
ture development i.s considered in a vacuum: it is used as a descriptive term 
implying some form of economic growth (sometimes concomitant with "political 
modernization") which is independent of the form of economic organization and 
the mode of production in existence.l However, in many cases, what is actually 
being considered is capitalist development, or the lack thereof. In this the-
sis the term development is used specifically to refer to the growth of 
capitalism. Underdevelopment is defined as the process by which an economy's 
realistic possibilities for capitalist ec9nomic growth are thwarted and dis-
torted, usually by contact with a more developed economy. 2 The central 
1 For example W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Eaonomia Growth (Cambridge: at 
the University Press, 1960). 
2These definitions follow the :practice of Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism 
382 
0 
c 
383 
argument of this chapter is that while Ghana might have developed, during the 
colonial period, into a capitalist economy in her own right through her inte-
gration into the world trading economy, imposition of oligopolistic economic 
control and foreign political domination prevented her from doing so. 
It should by no means, therefore, be understood tha~ Ghana became a 
capitalist country in the same manner as European and North American countries 
became capitalist. Rather, Ghana in the colonial period was undergoing certain 
changes in her economy which introduced in her the potential, which might or 
might not be realized, for capitalist economic growth in the future. She was 
emerging out of a purely precapitalist economy, that is an economy". where 
landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order and con-
sequently the economic object is the production of use values. " 3 Much 
of the research conducted on the development of capitalism in Europe indicates 
that the European transition from the precapitalist economic formation of 
feudalism to capitalism took a considerable period of time; some argue at least 
three centuri.es. 4 Therefore, one cannot at any one time pinpoint an economy 
and argue that it is precapitalist or capitalist, if it is still in such a 
period of change. Most economies undergo long periods of transition from pre-
, 
capitalism to capitalism, if they become capitalist at all. Ghana was 
following such a path in the colonial period, but her situation as an imperial-
ized economy inhibited her capacity to develop from a precapitalist into a 
capitalist system. 
and UndePdevelopment in Latin AmePiaa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 
and E. R. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa {London: 
Heinemann, 1973) and others. 
3Karl Marx, PPe-Capitalist Economic FoPmations (New York: International 
Publishers, 1965), p. 80. 
4A leading proponent of this view is Dobb, op. ait. 
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In order to analyze an economic system one must consider the mode of 
production, that is the " ••. way in which people produce and exchange their 
means of life, • " the ownership and control of the means of production, 
that is of " • all those means which are necessary to produce the finished 
product, • " including land, labour, and capital, and finally, the relations 
of production, that is the" ••• relations which people enter into with one 
another in the actual production process itself •••• " 5 In other words, in 
order to determine the social classes which are likely to arise in a system of 
capitalist production, one must consider how things are produced, who owns the 
productive apparatus, and what the relations are between those who act upon the 
productive apparatus and those who merely own it. In the developed capitalist 
West, the major social classes which have arisen have been the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is the class which owns the means of produc-
tion and which organizes them on a mass scale with the eventual aim of 
producing enough surplus value to make a profit which remains in private hands. 
". • • the excess of the value of the product over the value of its constituent 
elements, is equal to the expansion of the capital advanced or to the surplus-
value produced." 6 This surplus value is produced by the proletariat, the class 
which does not itself own any of the means of production but which operates 
upon the means of production for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, the owning 
class • 
• • • the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to whom 
his labour belongs • • • the product is the property of the capitalist 
and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer •••• The 
5Maurice Cornforth, Histor-iaaZ Materialism (New York: International 
Publishers, 1962}, pp. 35 and 37. 
6Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 
p. 212. 
0 
0 
labour-process is a process between things that the capitalist has 
purchased •••• 7 
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The basis of profit in a capitalist society is surplus value, that is the dif-
ference between the cost of production, especially the cost of labour power 
(to which all other costs can be reduced), and the eventual exchange-value of 
the goods produced. That difference becomes the profit, which remains in the 
hands of the bourgeoisie. 
Not only the mode of production, but also the development of the two 
classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, is crucial in defining a capitalist 
economy. Ghana in the colonial period did not reach a stage in which her pro-
duction was based on the use of capital, or the acting on constant capital by 
variable capital in order to produce a surplus, 8 nor, as a consequence of this, 
did a bourgeois or proletariat class develop. Ghana was integrated into a 
world trading system which was dominated by the full-fledged capitalist powers 
of the West, and in which she played a peripheral role. 9 That role was one of 
producing primary products, all of which were either mineral or agricultural 
and which were sold to the capitalist nations; and of buying manufactured con-
sumer products from the capitalist nations. Within Ghana herself, certain 
social differentiations resulted from this role in the world trading system. 
However, it is certainly clear that the two defining classes of capitalist 
society, a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, did not develop. No class arose 
which owned and controlled all of the means of production; no class took into 
1Jbid., pp. 184-185. 
8Marx defines constant capital as "That part of capital • • • which 
does not, in the process of production, undergo any quantitative altera-
tion of value." Ibid., p. 209. Conversely variable capital, which is labour 
power, creates more than its own value. 
9rn using the expressions "core" and "periphery" I am adopting the 
terminology of Wallerstein, op. cit. 
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its own hands land, labour, and capital. Primarily, what developed in Ghana 
was a class of traders who bought up indigenously-produced primary products 
and sold them to the capitalist traders from Europe; and, on the other hand, a 
class of peasant producers who were not dispossessed of the means of produc-
tion, who retained land in their own hands, but who were differentiated into a 
wealthy "Kulak-"1 0 group which accumulated land-use rights and employed hired 
labour, and a group of poorer peasants who often became debt-ridden and some-
times lost their usufruct. 
A group of expatriate financiers and miners imposed itself upon Ghana, 
but even this group cannot be considered to be a capitalist class within the 
framework of the Ghanaian economy, although it obviously represented the over-
seas European capitalist class which dominated Ghana's import-export trade 
economy. This group, like the African traders, did not actually obtain control 
of the means of production or even organize production, although an attempt at 
obtaining such control was made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries when legislation was introduced, but not passed, which would have 
given the Government the right to sell land to European buyers. 11 Had this 
legislation been passed, a new form of production, agricultural capitalism, 
might have arisen, in which multinational corporations, based especially in 
Britain, would have organized production of primary goods, in particular cocoa, 
and then sold them on the world market. However, as land remained in indigenous 
hands, what occurred instead was the retention of a "trade economy" in which 
these international companies bought produce but did not organize production. 
1 OAm· 't 6 ~n, op. ~ ., p. 11 • 
llsee Chapter II. 
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••• the concept of 'economie de traite' [trade economy] ••. 
describes analytically the exchange of agricultural commodities 
provided by a peripheral society • • • against the products of a 
central capitalist industry (imported or produced on the spot by 
European enterprises). 12 
International companies did, however, organize the production of gold, and 
later of manganese and bauxite, and in this regard one might argue for the 
presence of a foreign capitalist class in Ghana. It would be more precise, 
however, to regard this group as outposts of the British capitalist class in 
the colony, rather than as a capitalist class indigenous to the Ghanaian 
economy. 
In general, then, Ghana, while integrated into an international trading 
system dominated by capitalist economies, did not herself become capitalist. 
While the potential for capitalist development existed, the reality had not yet 
matured; Ghana, in fact, was underdeveloped. In analyzing Ghana's economy 
during the colonial period, the term "development" should be used to define 
capitalist growth in the Western imperialist nations, and "underdevelopment" to 
define the lack of capitalist growth in Ghana. Underdevelopment is not a 
stagnant concept; rather, it is a concept which implies a process which is a 
result of a certain relationship between core and peripheral countries. Walter 
Rodney defines this relationship in terms of capitalist exploitation. 
All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are ex-
ploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now 
pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist 
exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently 
until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist 
powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the expoPt of 
surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural 
resources and labour.l3 · 
12Ami •t n, op. ~ ., p. 115. 
1 3Rodney. How EUPOpe 4 . •.•• , op. cit., p. 22, italics in original. 
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It is not, therefore, simply the case that certain economies are under-
developed because their precapitalist modes of economic formation have not yet 
evolved into capitalist modes of economic formation. One must distinguish be-
tween undeveloped and underdeveloped economies. Undeveloped economies, in the 
capitalist sense, are simply economies which have not yet moved from pre-
capitalist to capitalist modes of production. Underdeveloped economies are 
economies which have been thwarted in their capacity to achieve capitalist 
development by their relationships with alreaqy capitalist and imperialist 
nations, which have made incursions upon their indigenous development with for-
eign economic and political control. That is to sa;y, that had Ghana been able 
to somehow deal on equal terms with Europeans without being subject to their 
political control or to monopolistic and oligopolistic control of trade, ship-
ping and banking, then Ghanaian potential capitalism might have evolved much 
further than it evidently had by 1939. 
Table 40 below summarizes the major structural characteristics of the 
Ghanaian economy between 1886 and 1939 and the effects of this structure vn 
indigenous development. Until the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a 
relatively large group of entrepreneurs in Ghana who were eager and able to 
compete on relatively equal terms with Europeans. These entrepreneurs were 
progressively pushed out of the international trading system as Europeans took 
over complete control. At the same time, Ghana's capacity to develop her pro-
ductive processes was restrained by an oligopolistic system which insisted that 
she should produce only cheap agricultural goods which were necessary for the 
international market. The resulting dependence on the international commodity 
market ensured that Ghanaians would be unable to resume their former trading 
position; while the European firms could make large speculative profits on the 
international cocoa exchanges, the African traders were unable to use the market 
0 
Table 40. Effects of Foreign Control 
on the Ghanaian Econo~ 
Structural Characteristics Results 
dependence on world commodity markets 
Import-export econo~ dependence on imported goods 
middleman trading class develops 
Retention of land in African hands 
Extractive agriculture 
Oligopolistic control of: 
Trade 
Banking 
Shipping 
Mining 
Government-business co-operation 
underdevelopment of private property in 
land 
nondevelopment of a bourgeois propertied 
class 
cash-crop production 
differentiation of the peasantry 
small agricultural labouring class 
agreements on prices 
undercutting of.African sellers 
undeveloped trading class 
lack of credit to Africans 
monopoly price-setting and route-setting 
small migrant mining labouring class 
north-south export-oriented transport 
routes 
currency preference to Europeans 
transferability of profits 
lack of--quality control 
--crop diversification 
--industrial investment 
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for their own advantage at all. The underdevelopment of Ghana was a result, 
therefore, of a dynamic process in which developed capitalist nations, through 
the relations of international trade, undermined any possibilities for the 
development of an indigenous capitalist class. 
What is being contended, therefore, is that Ghana, although she was in-
tegrated completely into the capitalist-dominated world market, and although 
she traded extensively with capitalist countries, was not herself capitalist. 
The mode of production was not yet capitalist; although many Ghanaians had been 
at least partially integrated into a money economy, others were largely outside 
it; in any case, although they traded with capitalists, the products which they 
traded were produced in precapitalist agricultural units which had not yet been 
centralized into private hands. Ownership of land was still communal, although 
the profits from individual usufructs were not returned to the community. 
Finally, the relations of production were not yet capitalist insofar as neither 
a small, centralized owning class nor a free, landless labouring class had yet 
developed. 
The basis for. the development of capital ism in Ghana could have been 
laid had it not been for foreign economic and political control. As it was, 
Ghana remained only a marginal participant in the international trade economy; 
her status as a colony ensured her inability to compete on equal terms in this 
trading system. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonial 
profits resembled profits made in Europe during the era of mercantilism. Prof-
its were not yet internal to the system of production; that is, they were not 
yet a function of the surplus value which resulted from the opposition of a 
small, centralized capitalist class to a large, free wage-labour class; rather 
they were based on exploitative trading contacts. 
For many centuries Europe had engaged in international trade. But until 
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the beginnings of the process which finally resUlted in the development of 
capitalism, much of this trade was only in preciosities, that is in very ex-
pensive, low-weight goods which could be transported over long distances and 
still be sold at a profit, such as spices, jewels, and silks. "At this epoch, 
the relationship of Europe and Asia might be summed up as the exchange of pre-
ciosities. The bullion flowed east to decorate the temples, palaces and 
clothing of Asian aristocratic classes and the jewels and spices flowed 
west. " 14 A change occurred in Europe when low-value, mass-produced goods such 
as salt, glass, metal-wares, textiles, and various foods and fuels began to be 
traded. 15 Such trade had many more linkage effects, demanding new investments 
in transportation, new productive techniques, and most important, new organ-
izers of producers into large manufactories. To facilitate the expansion of 
such production the state began to organize to help the capitalist class elim-
inate feudal barriers to free trade such as internal tolls, and to encourage 
the development of a landless, propertyless proletariat instead of a landed 
peasantry bound to the soil by feudal obligations. Mercantilism was a stage in 
European history in which the capacity for full-fledged capitalist control and 
organization of production was being established. By about 1750, mercantilist 
Europe gave way to capitalist Europe, and an economy based on profits through 
trade gave way to an economy based on profits through the exploitation of the 
labour power of free wage-labourers. 
In Ghana, the trade economy was still in existence in 1939. That is, no 
landless, propertyless class, selling its labour for wages, with the potential 
1 ~allerstein, op. ait., p. 41. 
15For a description of the production of these new goods, see John U. 
Nef, The Conquest of the Material Wo:r>Zd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1964), Chapter 4. 
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to become a proletariat, had yet emerged (except for the few migrant labourers, 
who actually retained land in their own home areas but who worked part of the 
year in the mines, for the Government transport department, or on cocoa farms). 
Nor was the Government interested in facilitating the development of a capital-
ist class which would eventually own and control all the means of production. 
The Government's role, as the representative of a foreign power, was to prevent 
such a development as it would result in an African class which would compete 
with the European traders. As a trade economy, Ghana resembled European 
economies passing through the mercantilist stage on the way to capitalism, but 
with one essential difference; one of the most important means of primitive 
capital accumulation for European mercantilism was the acquisition of colon-
ies, 16 but Ghana, far from acquiring colonies, was a colony herself. 
The trade in cheap bulk commodities in the international marketplace did 
not in fact create capitalism in Ghana; it simply created the potentiaZ for 
capitalist development, a potential which was not realized. The cheap bulk 
commodities were exchanged for more expensive manufactured consumer goods; the 
more Ghana adopted a monocultural pattern of production, and the more she 
bought from Europe, the more dependent she became. 
In theoretical terms, the basis of the profit extracted from the trade 
relationship between Ghana and Europe was u."lequal exchange .1 7 The idea of un-
equal exchange is that it is fundamentally a noncapitalistic way to make 
profits. Profits within pure capitalism are made by the creation of a surplus; 
that is, by the creation of a system in which the labourer sells his use value 
16For the theory that colonies were necessary to capitalism, see Marx, 
Capital, Vol. I, op. ait., Chapter 33, and V. I. Lenin, ImperiaUsm, the Highest 
Stage of CapitaZism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969). 
1 7The following argument on unequal exchange is based on Arghiri Emmanuel, 
Unequa'l &ahange (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), especially Chapter 3. 
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to a capitalist in return for payment of exchange value. The amount of ex-
change value which a capitalist pays a labourer for his use value is much less 
than the amount of exchange value which the labourer produces. The difference 
between the two exchange values constitutes surplus value, which is appropri-
ated by the capitalist as profit. Goods using the same amount of labour power 
are then exchanged at equal rates; each of the two exchanging capitalists 
making his profit from the difference between the price of the exchange and 
the price of the labour power. 
However, while this type of profit is made within capitalist nations 
such as Britain or America, much profit is also made between nations (not nec-
essarily capitalist) through unequal exchange. When unequal exchange takes 
place, goods which are of equal value in terms of the labour power which enters 
into them are not exchanged for equal prices. Rather, one costs far less on 
the market than the other; the labour power, which is of equal use value in 
both situations, is remunerated unequally. Where both sides of the trade are 
controlled by the same capitalist class, as in Ghana's export-import trade, 
extra profits are made through this unequal remuneration of the producing 
class. The cost in terms of labour power might be far moPe for one of the 
goods exchanged than for the other, yet the price offerred could be Zess. 
In general, when "Third World" countries produce commodities for export, 
the cost of producing the commodity is much higher than the cost to the buying 
country of producing the manufactured goods with which it pays. In other 
words, a Ghanaian might sell lOO loads of cocoa in return for twelve bolts of 
cloth. The amount of labour power which goes into the production of the hun-
dred loads of cocoa might be far more than the amount of labour power, 
including the labour power necessary for the manufacture of the machinery in-
volved, which went into the production of the twelve bolts of cloth. However, 
because of monopoly control of trade, pricing agreements, and the foreign 
domination of Ghana, the price offerred for the hundred loads of cocoa equals 
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the price which the Ghanaian must pay for the twelve bolts of cloth. 
The disparity described above, then, is known as unequaJ. exchange and 
is the primary means of profit-making between capitalist and noncapitalist 
nations, and was indeed the most important basis of profit-making in colonial 
Ghana. The quotation in which one official of the colonial Government main-
tained that Ghanaians should not be paid too much for their cocoa because they 
did not have to bear the cost of machinery, overhead and organization which a 
European plantation would have to bear,18 is indicative of the kind of profit-
making based on unequal exchange which occurred in Ghana. The official 
completely ignored the costs of labour in production when discussing the final 
price which should be paid to Ghanaian farmers even though the cost of labour 
is of the essence in determining what should be the real exchange value of a 
product; that is, there should be some correlation between exchange value and 
use value in pricing. "The prices of all comm.odi ties tend • • • to coincide 
with their values.nl9 
Those countries which profit from unequal exchange are often referred to 
as "core" countries; those which provide such profits are often referred to as 
"peripheral" countries. The terminology of core and periphery has often been 
used in this thesis, especially in Chapter rrr,· which discusses the "peripher-
alization" of the Ghanaian economy. This terminology provides a means of 
analyzing the kind of situation which occurs between developed capitalist na-
tions and underdeveloped, noncapitalist nations within an international 
18see Chapter VI. The exact quotation is 11 • • • natives • • • have not 
such items as shareholders' dividends or the cost of European supervision to 
bear, and, outside the actual cost of headload transport from the farms to the 
railway, the money they receive from their crop is a clear profit." GCLegCo, 
26 September 1916. 
19Emmanuel, op. ait., p. 106. 
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trading community. A peripheral nation is a country which produces for the 
benefit of capitalist nations without at the same time necessarily being capi-
talist itself. It may be capitalist, or it may be in a transitional stage 
between precapi talism and capitalism, as was colonial Ghana. In this respect a 
peripheral nation can be differentiated from a nation which would be entirely 
outside of the capitalist-dominated trading network. In precolonial times, for 
example, there were economies in existence which had not yet entered into trade 
with Europe, or which were not producing in any organized way for the capital-
ist market. 
Wallerstein introduces the concept of plunder, which he regards as a re-
lationship between two economies in which one plunders the other for its goods 
without regard to the effects on its internal production or social organization. 
A country which is simply plundered by the capitalist nations can be considered 
to be an "external arena." " • profit [ s] by trade in an external arena 
~ •• when all is said and done, are those of plunder. "20 The external arena, 
postulates Wallerstein, is not yet integrated into the world capitalist economy 
(or as this author contends, the capi talist-dcminated world economy). Never-
theless, once a country starts to organize production for sale in the capital-
ist-dominated world trading system, and once it also becomes a customer for the 
foreign capitalist nations, then it becomes a peripheral nation. For example, 
Wallerstein reasons that once the Spanish and Portuguese began to organize 
plantation production in North and South America, their relationship to Europe 
changed. " ••• the Americas became the periphery of the European world-
economy in the sixteenth century while Asia remained an external arena. "21 The 
20Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 334-35. 
21Jbid., p. 336, italics in original. 
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function of the periphery is to produce cheap bulk commodity goods for the in-
ternational trading system. 
Wallerstein argues that the defining mode of production in a peripheral 
economy is cash-crop production for the capitalist marketplace. He contends 
further that such cash-crop production indicates that the peripheral economy is 
itself capitalist. 22 The debate on whether cash-crop trading economies are 
capitalist or not has been of consuming interest in analyzing the so-called 
"second serfdom" in Eastern Europe and the forms of labour control in the 
hacienda of Latin America. 23 It is relevant in the context of Ghana because if 
one postulates that the mode of production in Ghana was cash-crop production 
for the marketplace, then one must make it quite clear that one does not neces-
sarily therefore wish to imply that Ghana was capitalist. This author argues 
that an economy is not capitalist until the internal mode of production and 
relations of production are capitalist, that is until two social classes, a 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, develop. Thus a peripheral nation can well be a 
cash-crop-producing nation, that is a nation which produces agricultural crops 
which are sold for cash in the international marketplace, without being capi-
talist. 
The international marketplace itself, moreover, is not always necessar-
ily capitalist; at certain times it is dominated by a capitalist economic 
system, but at other times it may be dominated by a noncapitalist system. 
Different types of economic systems may co-operate with one another in 
22Ib'd 91 92 1- • , pp. - • 
23For Eastern Europe, see Paul M. Sweezy, et at., The Transition fPom 
Feudalism to Capitalism: A Symposium (New York: Science and Society, 1967). 
For Latin America see the debate between Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capital-
ism in Latin America," New Left Review, no. 67 (May-June 1971), and Frank, op. 
cit. 
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international trade. The trading network itself does not have to be of one 
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system or another; all known economic systems with the exception of primitive 
communal societies producing only for use value have been observed to engage in 
international trade. Therefore a peripheral nation which trades with a core 
nation in the international capitalist-dominated marketplace is not necessarily 
itself capitalist. During the period under discussion in this thesis, Ghana 
was· a peripheral country producing cash crops for the international marketplace, 
but she did not herself have a capitalist economy. 
The question may be asked; what is the point of discussing the kind of 
economic formation which occurred in Ghana? It must be seen that this question 
is of the essence to understand the internal developments of Ghana during the 
colonial period. Ghana's underdevelopment reflected an international imperial-
ist system in which developed capitalist nations acquired colonies primarily in 
order to further facilitate their ability to produce and to make capitalist 
profits. One of the first theories of the interrelationship between capitalism 
and imperialism was that written by V. I. Lenin, Imperialism~ the Highest Stage 
of CapitaZism. 24 In this, Lenin posited several reasons for the acquisition of 
colonies by capitalist nations, some of which apply to Ghana. 
One of the most important of these, of course, was that colonies should 
provide raw materials which could be used for production in the imperialist 
economy. Ghana provided such raw materials in the form of cocoa, palm oil, 
palm kernels, timber, and other crops , and also in the form of minerals. A 
characteristic of this use of colonies for raw materials, Lenin r,easoned, 
was the cartelization of raw materials buyers in the late nineteenth century. 
These buyers tried to capture raw materials sources so that they could obtain a 
24ap. oit. 
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dominant position over the manufacturers of capitalist Europe. 
• • • the industries which process raw materials • • • not only secure 
advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high profits, to 
the detriment of the finished goods industry, but secured also a 
dominating position over the latter~ which did not exist under free 
competition. 2 5 
This is certainly a more than adequate description of the development of 
Ghana's cocoa export trade during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. Extreme cartelization of the buying of cocoa and attempts by these 
cartelized buyers to obtain control over production by controlling the commod-
ity markets in cities such as London and New York, were combined with attempts 
to take over or bring into their cartelized system companies which had previ-
ously been solely concerned with manufacture~ such as Cadbury. Ghana's major 
function was to be a source of raw materials for this type of international 
cartelized trading group. 
A second function of colonies~ Lenin postulated, was to provide new 
markets for the capitalist powers. He argued that the export of manufactured 
goods was typical of capitalism. "England became a capitalist country before 
any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free 
trade, claimed to be the 'workshop of the world', the purveyor of manufactured 
goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her supplied with raw 
materials."26 There was an ever-growing need for a constantly-expanding market 
because of the fact that there were not enough buyers within the capitalist 
nations themselves to support capitalist production. Overproduction of manu-
factured goods had as its counterpart the underconsumption of those same goods 
as fewer workers were employed in the machine-dominated factories. 
25Ib£d., p. 27, italics in original. 
26Ibid., P• 72. 
0 
c 
399 
Underconsumptionism was a serious problem in late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century capitalist nations because the more that the organic composition of 
capital (that is, the ratio of fixed to variable capital) increased, the fewer 
workers were needed, the more unemployment grew in Europe, and therefore the 
more need there was to find other people, in colonies, for example, to buy. 
11 [T]he growing extent of the means of production • • • is an expression of the 
growing productiveness of labour. The increase of the latter appears, there-
fore, in the diminution of the mass of labour in proportion to the mass of 
means of production moved by it •• 1127 
By encouraging Ghanaians to produce crops such as cocoa, the Europeans 
ensured that Ghana would enter the monetary economy and that Ghanaians would 
have the cash and the desire to buy new goods. Also, because they no longer 
produced all of the goods which. they used, they would have to buy from the 
capitalist producers (for example, Ghanaiar.s started to buy cloth, pots and 
containers, salt and sugar, all of which they had previously produced on their 
own). Africans were encouraged to bring their produce into European stores and 
then to immediately spend the money which they were paid on imported consumer 
goods from those same shops. Both Africans and Europeans were discouraged from 
producing anything within the colony which might compete with the imported con-
sumer goods. Hence, for example, it was important that Ghanaians bought 
imported cloth instead of making their own cloth: it was also important that 
the Government would not encourage diversification into any enterprise not 
solely concerned with the production of raw materials. Thus even such small 
projects as the internal production of beer met with opposition.28 
A third function which Lenin maintained the colonies fulfilled was that 
27Marx, Capital., Vol. I, op. ait., p. 622. 
28see Chapter VI. 
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of providing 11 super-profits11 for the capitalist world. " ••• superprofits 
• • • are obtained over and above the profits which the capitalists squeeze out 
of the workers of their 'own' country. • • . "2 9 These supeP-profits could be 
defined in two ways: first, as profits from unequal exchange {which has al-
ready been considered); second, as the antidote to the constantly decreasing 
rate of profit within the capitalist world.30 That is, while the absolute 
amount of profit might be rising, the rate was decreasing, as a function of the 
fact that less and less labour power was being exploited. Since profit came 
solely from surplus value, or from the difference between a labourer's cost of 
use value and his capacity to produce exchange value, as fewer and fewer 
labourers, proportionate to the expansion of capital, were employed in Europe 
the rate of profit declined. 
In the colonial countries, however, the rate of exploitation of labour 
power was higher because the overall organic composition of capital was much 
more weighted in favour of variable capital. Therefore, Lenin argued, the rate 
of profit was higher.in countries such as Ghana than in Europe. However, this 
particular function of providing colonial super-profits in Ghana was not very 
essential because in fact production per se, organized by Europeans, was non-
existent except in the mines. Therefore, Ghana's role with regard to super-
profits was to produce them as a function of unequal exchange between primary 
commodity goods and imported manufactured goods, rather than as a function of 
her participation in capitalist production. 
29Lenin, op. cit., p. 9, italics in original. 
30Michael Barratt Brown, in The Economics of Imperialism (Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1974), presents data which indicate that the average rate of 
profit on industrial capital in the United Kingdom from 1865 to 1913 declined 
from about sixteen per cent to twelve per cent, p. 176. 
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Finally, Lenin posits two more uses for colonies during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries which are of lesser importance when 
analyzing Ghana. The first of these was the provision of employment opportuni-
ties for the rapidly increasing mass of unemployed in the capitalist West, both 
through emigration to colonies and through manufacture connected with process-
ing of raw materials imported from the empire. 31 Few Europeans chose to 
emigrate to Ghana, although she did perhaps take some of the unemployed over-
flow in the British military, and later the civil service, establishment. She 
did, nevertheless, provide employment for those working in the chocolate- and 
palm-oil-processing factories of Europe. 
Secondly, Lenin maintains that colonies were used as outlets for finance 
capital: that as the absolute amount of profit in the capitalist world rose, 
it became more and more necessary for the capitalist investors to find new 
outlets for their idle wealth. An essentially parasitic class arose in Britain 
which was only concerned with living off profits from passive portfolio in-
vestments. "The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of 
imperialism, • • • isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of 
parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several 
" overseas countries and colonies.n 32 This argument is often made about North 
America, specifically in the sense that the railways were built with the in-
vestment funds of this parasitic class which wanted an outlet for its profits. 
It does not, however, seem the case that one of Ghana's functions in the imper-
ial system was to act as an outlet for capital. As shown in Chapter VI, the 
amount of investment in trading establishments in Ghana was minimal. 
31Lenin, op. oit., pp. 127 and 123. 
32Ibid., p. 120. 
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Furthermore, the amount of construction of railroads was minimal; this con-
struction was usually done not by private entrepreneurs but by Government 
contracts, and the financing of the Government indicates that very little 
capital came from loans raised on the London market. Most of its financing 
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came from import and export duties and other taxes paid within Ghana, although 
it could be reasoned that the financing of the actual railways was done primar-
ily through loans. Nevertheless, as compared to other countries which might 
have provided an outlet for surplus finance capital in Europe, Ghana's role was 
minimal. Michael Barratt Brown indicates in fact, in his consideration of 
Lenin's thesis, that perhaps this aspect of finance capital has been over-
stressed as regards Britain's colonies. His statistics indicate that most 
surplus finance capital was invested not in colonies but in other capitalist 
countries, or in highly-developed former colonies such as Canada and South 
Africa. 33 
Ghana's situation as a colony meant that on the whole her underdevelop-
ment was even more pronounced than it would have been had she remained in a 
neocolonial situation or in a situation in 'tvhich, although she was economically 
dominated by Britain, she was not under her political control. Andre Gunder 
Frank, in his Capitatiem and Dnderdevetopment in Latin Ameriaa,34 provides an 
interesting and comprehensive model of the type of underdevelopment which 
occurs in peripheral economies which are not under the direct political control 
of a foreign power. Such independent peripheral economies have a greater 
chance of developing on the road to capitalism, and of developing bourgeois and 
proletarian classes, than do colonial economies. Indeed, a refinement of the 
33B •t rown , op. en. • , p • 190. 
340p. ait. 
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term periphery to distinguish these differing internal developments might be 
apposite; one might distinguish between precapitalist and capitalist peripher-
ies, for example. 
In his study, Frank considers the problems of "backward" agriculture, 
poor production techniques, and the general situation of export-oriented pro-
duction and foreign investment in and domination of industry. However, his 
model indicates that, unlike in Ghana, a fairly strong compradOr bourgeois 
class was able to develop in Latin America. That is, that to a certain extent 
an indigenous class arose in Latin America which concentrated the means of 
production in its own hands; which developed large plantations; which dispos-
sessed large numbers of indigenous producers from the soil, forcing them to 
evolve into a proletarian class, working without land for wages on large 
plantations or else in the cities; and which eventually began itself to invest 
in capitalist mass production in the urban centres. The rise of this class was 
facilitated because Latin American states obtained their political independence 
in the early nineteenth century, and because Latin America was a settled terri-
tory in which a white or mestizo group emerged which had extensive trading and 
personal connections with Europe. In other words, political independence meant 
that primitive capital accumulation was more possible in Latin America than in 
Africa. Moreover, more credit was available to Latin American traders than was 
ever available to Africans, whose skin colour and lack of established property 
acted to their disadvantage in their relationships with British bankers. The 
Latin American trading class had the resources to organize production on its 
own, although it was always dominated by core country industrialists and trad-
ers, first from Britain (as the inheritor of Spain and Portugal) and later from 
the United States. Such domination permeated the African traders much more 
completely than the Latin Americans. 
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A colonial economy such as Ghana could not develop an indigenous 
oomprador bourgeoisie to the same extent that it could be developed in Latin 
America. First, Ghana moved very rapidly from a precapitalist economy into a 
cash-crop economy in which she was·still not capitalist but in which, on the 
other hand, she had lost some of her precapitalist roots. She was more un-
developed than Latin America. Secondly, Ghana was under direct foreign 
political control. This direct political control implied a much closer co-
operation between the governing elite and the foreign economic elite. In Latin 
America, governments swayed between co-operation with the outside economic 
elite and encouraging of indigenous growth~ but in all cases there was a dis-
tinction between the Government of the Latin American country and the 
Government of the country of origin of the external economic elite. 
In Ghana, there were two external elites, one political and one econom-
ic, which co-operated very closely. The colonial Government of Ghana was not 
always in complete accord with the wishes of the external British-dominated 
economic elite. Several instances have been recorded of discord between the 
two groups, especially when the civil servants who directed the Government 
considered it their duty to assume the "White Man's Burden" and, to some extent 
at least, to protect the "native" from exploitation by the cartelized European 
fir.ms. However~ in any case of severe conflict the desires of the economic 
elite took precedence, and the external political elite was obliged to give in. 
Projects for capitalist development initiated by the external political 
elite were usually thwarted by opposition from the external economic elite, 
which had extensive ties with the home Government, especially with the Colonial 
Office, the final arbiter in any case of conflict. The Colonial Office, while 
it also was not completely dominated by economic interests, nevertheless per-
ceived its function as that of preservation of the Empire as an economic unit 
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which would maintain England at the top of the competitive international capi-
talist system. It therefore encouraged the external economic elite and 
discouraged any competitive outgrowths in colonies such as Ghana, whose 
primary function was to provide raw materials for the capitalist Government and 
not to compete in any way with existing industry in Britain. 
It was for this reason that the colonial Government did not, on the 
whole, discourage the growth of oligopolistic control of Ghana's trade. The 
Government's objection to the cocoa Agreement of 1937-38 was not that it ex-
ploited Africans but that it held up the system of production and the system of 
importing essential goods into England. Up until the boycott, the Government, 
although well aware of the growth of oligopolistic trading practices and 
oligopolistic control of shipping and banking, investigated these practices 
only when complaints were instituted by other Europeans, especially by other 
British traders, against the British firms who controlled these cartelized 
organizations. The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, 35 for instance, was 
primarily interested in investigating complaints which had been made against 
the two large shipping companies by small British trading firms. It was not 
investigating the effects of this kind of cartelization on African shippers. 
Similarly, in 1930, when there was a boycott of the cocoa buyers, the Govern-
ment did not hesitate to impose legal constraints on African organization while 
encouraging European organization in restraint of trade. The boycott of 
1930-31 was not successful enough to warrant Government concern with the issue 
of oligopolistic buying. 
Monopoly per se was not considered, within Britain, to be an illegiti-
mate means of organizing trade in the best interests of the Empire. Occasional 
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conflicts between manufacturers in Manchester, shippers in Liverpool, and fin-
anciers in London might result in Government investigations, but only in order 
to keep capitalist competition on a fairly peaceful footing within Britain it-
self. Monopoly control of the economies of Britain's colonies was considered 
natural, inevitable and valuable within the context of the overall goals of the 
Empire. 
Because of this monopoly control, however, circumstances arose in Ghana 
under which it was almost impossible for the kind of comprador bourgeoisie 
which developed in Latin America to evolve. The monopolists who controlled 
trade made sure that the African role was confined to that of middleman. 
African entrepreneurs bought cocoa from indigenous producers and sold it to 
European firms, or they bought it on a commission basis on behalf of those 
firms. They also bought goods which were imported by Europeans and then sold 
them to other Africans. Thus an extensive parasitic trading group arose in 
Ghana, a group with many gradations, each of which took its tiny share of 
trading profits. This group mediated between the Ghanaian producer and consumer 
and the European exporter and importer. It was not, however, given the chance 
to realize its own economic potential. The middleman role did not include, as 
it did in Latin America, the actual organization of production. Nor did it 
include direct contacts with the ultimate European buyers who would process 
exported commodity goods. There were no linkages which might result in the 
development of an internal market to offset reliance on the export-import 
economy. The traders were strictly confined to their middleman role, and their 
earnings from this role were most uneven because of the subjection of Ghana's 
trade to the fluctuations of the international commodity markets. 
But it must not therefore be assumed that this group of Ghanaians was 
not possessed of the potential to develop, had the situation been more 
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favourable. It was not a question of Ghanaians' lacking entrepreneurial 
skills. The most prominent organizers of the two cocoa boycotts of 1930-31 and 
1937-38 were Ghanaians who wished to break out of their middleman role and be-
come exporters and importers in their own right, with their own connections 
with the European and American markets, to avoid the European middleman role 
between the ultimate European consumer and the original African producer. 
Africans demonstrated considerable entrepreneurial ability, in the face of all 
odds, throughout the colonial period. However, because they could not obtain 
access to banking and shipping facilities, and because they were not privy to 
agreements in restraint of trade which set prices on both produced goods and 
imported goods, they could not compete on equal terms. The development of 
their entrepreneurial skills took place within the constraint of the parasitic 
economic role which they played as middlemen. Thus their capacity to develop 
from traders into capitalist organizers of production, a development which took 
place over the space of 300 years in early capitalist Europe, was thwarted. 
Without this kind of capitalist class, underdevelopment as a whole continued in 
Ghana. 
It is in this context that the argument made in Chapter II, that the 
necessity to defend traditional rights to·property against the incursions of 
the Europeans in the long run inhibited the growth of capitalism, is crucial. 
There are some indications that property in land among Africans was growing in 
the late nineteenth century, and that Africans were acquiring private plots for 
productive use in the emerging cash-crop economy. Where urban areas were es-
tablished, Ghanaians who controlled land developed an interest in acquiring 
outright property rights so that they could rent it or sell it at its new in-
flated value. Had the British Government not tried to take over land, the 
African elite might not have adopted the position that above all it wished to 
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preserve communal ownership. 
Had communal ownership not been preserved, had instead Africans been 
able to acquire land in their own right, then the result might have been the 
development of a proletariat class similar to that in England. In England the 
development of the proletariat was primarily facilitated by the enclosures of 
farmland for wool, which resulted in the throwing off of peasants from land 
which they had formerly cultivated in perpetuity, and in the consequent crea-
tion of a landless wage-earning class. Such a landless wage-earning class in 
Ghana would have constituted the basis of a proletariat which could have been 
used for capitalist agriculture. When the African capitalist agricultural 
class had developed enough to have large profits, it could then have invested 
in capitalist manufacturing production using the landless agricultural class as 
its basis for industrial labour. Development of indigenous capitalist produc-
tion might therefore have occurred in Ghana, very similar to the process which 
occurred two centuries previously in Europe. But without either a bourgeois 
or a proletariat class, Ghana did not enter capitalist production and could not 
be considered a capitalist nation. The chance for primitive capital accumula-
tion which could have resulted in advanced capitalism based on production of a 
surplus by a proletariat, a surplus which could then be appropriated by the 
bourgeoisie, was denied this potential Ghanaian entrepreneurial class. 
One must conclude, therefore, that Ghana's colonial status was directly 
responsible for her inability to compete on equal terms in the world capitalist 
marketplace. Implicit in this conclusion there is the assumption that the 
kinds of monopolistic mechanisms of control imposed on Ghana from the outside 
resulted in her underdevelopment. In a processual, dynamic manner, Ghana's 
potential for development was checked. Ghana was denied the opportunity to be-
come a capitalist nation in her own right, and her economy therefore could not 
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progress as it might otherwise have done. The consistent denial to African 
entrepreneurs and traders of opportunities to compete with Europeans on an 
equal basis meant the denial of opportunities to make profits which might even-
tually have resulted in their formation as a bourgeois class. Because they 
could not form as a bourgeois class, similarly no proletariat class could 
develop. 
The imposition of expatriate control on Ghana and the types of resist-
ance which this imposition incurred, resulted in underdevelopment. African 
resistance did achieve the preservation of African land rights. This, al-
though partly also a result of British Government policy, meant that foreign 
capitalists could not establish an expatriate agricultural capitalist class 
within Ghana's own boundaries. At the same time, however, an indigenous 
capitalist class, based on private ownership of the means of production, es-
pecially land, did not develop. African resistance to trade, while often 
well-organize(l, was in the end fUtile, because Ghana could not break out of the 
international capitalist-dominated trading system. Therefore, on the whole, 
resistance, while evident within the period of capitalist incursion, failed. 
Similarly, the attempts of Ghanaians to compete in the international trading 
system and therefore to develop, within their country, the capacity for capital-
ist growth, failed. 
Ultimately, both the economy and the indigenous farmers and traders were 
subject to the: control of an external elite and an expatriate capitalist class 
which preferred to maintain Ghana in a peripheral role within the world 
capitalist-dominated economic system. 
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APPENDIX A 
West African Firms Incorporated into the United 
Africa Co:n.Pany .(to 1938) 1 
1. Companies Acguired or Formed by the 
African and ~a?tern Trade Corporation 
Limited (1919-1928) 
Angola Land Company Limited ( 1922) 
African Mahogany Association Limited (1919} 
African Traders Company Limited ( 1919) 
Ambas Bay Trading Company Limited (1920) 
African and Eastern (Spain) Limited (1923) 
Bai Rubber and Cocoa Estates Limited (1920) 
British Nigeria Company Limited (1919) 
Crombie Steedman and Company Limited ( 1920) 
Egwanga Limited ( 1920) 
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company Limited (1920) 
Gold Coast Petroleum Limited (1926) 
Hatton and Cookson Limited {1919) 
Kingsway Chemists Limited (1928) 
Lagos Stores Limited (1919) 
Ma.'la Company Limited (1920) 
Millers Nigerian Estates Limited (1920) 
McNeill Scott and Company Limited (1920) 
McLaren Brothers (Manchester) Limited (1926) 
Nigerian Products Limited (1920) 
Nigerian Motors Limited (1920) 
Pesquerias de San Cristobal S.A. (1926) 
Standard Mahogany Company Limited ( 1919) 
Takoradi Coaling and Lighterage Company Limited (1926) 
Tarquah Trading Company Limited (1920} 
West African Publicity Limited (1928) 
W. D. Woodin and Company Limited (1919) 
2. Companies Acguired or Formed by the Ni~er 
C.ompan;y Limited (1899-1919) 
African Products Development Company Limited (1918) 
Company of African Merchants Limited (1917) 
Compagnie du Niger Fran~ais S.A. (1913) 
G. W. Christian and Company Limited (1919) 
R. Hassan and Company Limited ( 1916) 
1Source: UAC Rankin file. Dates are dates of acquisition of companies, 
or dates of formation in the case of new companies. 
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c. 
3. Companies Acquired by Lever Brothers 
Limited (1900-1921) 
4. 
5. 
Bathu.rst Trading Company Limited (1918) 
Cavalla River Company Limited (1912) 
Compagnie Proprietaire du Kouilou Niari, S.A. (1911) 
R. and W. King Limited (1918) 
W. B. Mciver and Company Limited (1921) 
Palm Oil Estates Managers Limited (1919) 
P. Ratcliffe and Company Limited (1912) 
Sedec, S.A. (1912) 
John Walkden and Company Limited (1917) 
African Oil Nuts Company Limited (1920) 
African Timber Company Limited { 192 5) 
Compagnie Fran~aise de la C5te d'Ivoire, S.A. (1926) 
Gambia Trading Company Limited (1922) 
Lever Stores (later Opobo Stores) Limited (1922) 
Niger l.fineral Development Company Limited (1922) 
Pickering and Berthoud Limited (1926) 
Societe Mini~re du Niger Fran~ais, S.A. (1926) 
Thomas Brothers (Liverpool) Limited (1922) 
Trading Association of Nigeria Limited (1922) 
T. Welsh and Company Limited {1929) 
Weeks Transport and Engineering Company Limited (1927) 
West African Motors Limited (1926) 
Voltaland Limited (1923) 
Companies Acguired or Formed by the United 
Africa Company (1222-1938) 
The Aleppo Company Limited (1932) 
Anglo-Guinea Produce Company Limited (1930} 
Anglo-African Aerated Waters Limited (1929) 
The Beyrout Trading Company Limited {1931) 
The Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company Limited (1931) 
Jurgens Colonial Products Limited (1932) 
Kingsway Chemists Limited (1931) 
The Lebanon Trading Company Limited (1932) 
Millers Swanzy Limited ( 1929) 
N. R. Caterers Limited (1929) 
Nigerian Motors Limited (1931) 
Nouvelle Societe Commerciale Africaine, S.A. (1932) 
The Ologbo Timber Company Limited (1935) 
Palmine Limited (1932} 
Schweizerisch Afrikanische Handelsgesellschaft (1935) 
Societe de l'Exploitation des Acajous Bassam, S.A. (1935) 
Societe Forestiere de Niari, S.A. (1936) 
Societe Forestiere de Tabou et du Cavally, S.A. (1935) 
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Takoradi Coaling and Lighterage Company Limited (1931) 
United Agencies, S.A. (1937) 
West African Motors Limited (1931) 
Anchor Limited (1937) 
Commercial Development Company Limited (1937) 
Elmina Limited (1937) 
Gold Coast Properties Company Limited (1934) 
Nigerian Properties Company Limited (1933) 
Pamol Limited (1936) 
Sherbro Limited {1937) 
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APPENDIX B 
Interlocking Directorships in the West Africa Trade: 
Selected Examples 1885-19351 
Director 
Elder, Alexander 
Godfrey, Joseph S. 
Mirrlees, J. B. 
Watson, William R. 
2. 1895 
Director 
Cookson, Edward H. 
Mi~ls, Hon. Charles W. 
Rogerson, Thomas Stanley 
Directorships 
British and African Steam Navigation Company 
Limited* 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company 
African Steam Ship Company* 
East Indian Railway Company 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company 
British and African Steam Navigation Company 
Limited* 
Clydesdale Bank Limited 
British and African Steam Navigation Company 
Limited* 
Glasgow and South Western Railway Company 
Directorships 
African Association Limited* 
Maritime Insurance Company Limited 
Royal Niger Company Limited* 
Anglo-Austrian Bank 
Imperial Ottoman Bank 
North British and Mercantile Insurance Company 
Railway Passenger's Assurance Company 
African Association Limited* 
Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company 
Limited 
1This list i3 selected from 380 directors of major British firms in 
Ghana, from 1885 to 1935. It is designed to demonstrate the ty~es of inter-
locks which existed between West African companies and outside companies, 
including mines, resource development firms, insurance companies, banks, trans-
port firms, and others. The list is by no means complete. Source: Direatory 
of Direators (1885,1895,1905,1915,1925,1935). 
*Indicates firms involved in the West Africa trade. 
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3. 1905 
Director 
Byas, Edward Hegley 
Coke, Henry 
Duncannon, Viscount 
Hillingdon, Lord 
Ingram, Sir Herbert 
4. 1915 
Director 
Beazley, Eidwin A. 
Bessborough, the Earl of 
Catling, Charles E. 
Cotterell, Harry 
Hughes, Thomas Rowland 
Milner, Viscount 
Directorships 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited* 
A. and F. Pears Limited 
Bank of British West Africa* 
Imperial Bank of Persia 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited* 
Bovril Limited 
London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway 
Company 
Niger Company Limited* 
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Egyptian Government Irrigation Trust Certifi-
cates 
West African Mahogany, Petroleum, and Gold 
Company Limited* 
Angle-French Quicksilver and Mining Concession 
of China Limited 
Directorships 
African Association Limited* 
Great Central Railway Company 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation* 
Bank of Roumania Limited 
West African Mahogany, Petroleum, and Gold 
Company Limited* 
Societe Fran~aise de Petrole Limited 
Afric~~ Association Limited* 
Bai Rubber and Cocoa Estates Limited 
Forum River (Nigeria) Tin Company Limited 
African Association Limited* 
Canadian Dominion Development Limited 
Canadian Resources Development Limited 
Bank of British West Africa* 
London Joint Stock Bank Limited 
Rio Tinto Company Limited 
Nicholl, Lt.-Col. William African Association Limited* 
Congo Exploration Company Limited 
0 
0 
Pirrie, Lord 
Director 
Bell, E. Hyslop 
Bicker-Caarten, E. 
Cadbury, Edward 
Campbell, Colin Algernon 
Carisbrooke, Marquess of 
Cassels, George Cyril 
Dickinson, Robert Edmund 
Du Buis son, Thomas 
Fox, Sir Gilbert Wheaton 
Eastern Telegraph Company Limited 
Elder, Dempster and Company Limited* 
London and South-West Railway Company 
London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron 
Shipbuilding Company Limited 
London City and Midland Bank Limited 
Scottish Widow's Fund Life Assurance Society 
Directorships 
Niger Company* 
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Deptford Dry Docks Company Limited 
Tyne Dock Engineering Company Limited 
Compagnie Belge Maritime du Congo 
Elder, Dempster and Company Limited* 
British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited* 
Daily News Limited 
Colonial Bank* 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporatic,n 
London Assurance 
Westminster Bank Limited 
Lever Brothers Limited* 
Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam 
Navigation Company Limited 
Bank of Montreal (France) 
Colonial Bank* 
Bank of British West Africa* 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited 
Colonial Bank* 
Antigua Sugar Factory Limited 
St. Kitt's (Basse Terre) Sugar Factory Limited 
Colonial Bank* 
Guardian Assurance Company Limited 
Greenhalgh, Harold Robert Lever Brothers Limited* 
Planters Foods Limited 
Rambling, Sir Herbert Colonial Bank* 
Imperial AirH"ays Limited 
Harris, Sir Austin Edward Bank of British West Africa* 
Itabira Iron Ore Company Limited 
Lloyds Bank Limited 
c 
c 
Henriques, David Q. 
Nicholl, Lt.-Col. William 
Pollard, George Arthur 
Sanders, Sir Edgar 
Christian 
Selbourne, Earl of 
Sharp, La-urence Mort on 
Tatlow, Charles Ed.mund 
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Bank of British West Africa* 
London and Foreign Banking Corporation Limited 
Rubber Estates of Ceylon Limited 
African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited* 
African Mahogany Association Limited* 
Angola Land Company Limited 
J. Iqons and Company Limited* 
Jersey Tomato and Fruit Preserves Limited 
Lafon River Tin Areas (Nigeria) Limited 
MacFisheries Limited 
Niger Company Limited* 
Bank of British West Africa* 
Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company 
Limited 
Elder, Dempster and Company Limited* 
Yselhaven Wharf(Rotterdam) Limited 
Lever Brothers Limited* 
New Transvaal Chemical Company Limited 
Wargrave, the Rt.-Hon. Lord Colonial Bank* 
Rolls-Royce Limited 
6. 1935 
Director 
Beatty, Alfred Chester 
Cadbury, F.~gbert 
Cripps, Hon. H. L. 
Eley, Sir Frederick 
Foa, Raoul Hector 
Directorships 
American Metal Company Limited 
Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited* 
Consolidated Diamond l~nes of South West 
Africa Limited 
Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited 
Sierre Leone Selection Trust Limited 
Bristol Gas Company 
British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited* 
J. S. Fry and Sons Limited* 
China Mutual Steam Navigation Company Limited 
Elder, Dempster Lines Limited* 
Bank of British West Africa Limited* 
Cross and Blac~well Limited 
Waldorf Hotel Company Limited 
Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas* 
British Bank of South America Limited 
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Greenha.lgh, Harold Robert United Africa Company Limited* 
Southern WhaJ..ing and Sealing Company Limited 
Hoare, 0. V. G. Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas* 
Gold Coast Selection Trust Limited* 
Suchi Timber Company Limited 
Hol t, Sir Richard Durning Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
Elder, Dempster Lines Limited* 
Martins Bank Limited 
Jones, David Port of London Authority 
Atlantic Coaling Company 
Elder Line Limited* 
Oppenheimer, Sir Ernest Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas* 
Companhia de Diamantes d'Angola 
de Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 
Gold Coast Exploration Limited* 
Rhodesian Anglo-American Limited 
Oppenheimer, Louis Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited* 
Northern Rhodesia Power Company Limited 
Rand Selection Corporation Limited 
Pearson, John Westall British Extracting Company Limited 
British Oil a~d Cake Mills Limited 
Lever Brothers Limited* 
Pusch, Emile Lazard Brothers and Company 
Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas* 
Tennant, Robert Hugh Bank of British West Africa* 
Brampton Brewer~ Company Limited 
Westminster Bank Limited 
Wilson, Sir Roderick Roy Bank of British West Africa* 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited 
Waldorf Hotel Company Limited 
West African Currency Board (member) 
